Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict[lower-alpha 4] is an ethnic[38][39] and territorial[34] conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding districts, which are de facto controlled by the self-declared Republic of Artsakh, but are internationally recognized as de jure part of Azerbaijan. The conflict has its origins in the early 20th century. Under the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin decided to make the Nagorno-Karabakh region an autonomous oblast of Soviet Azerbaijan.[40] The present conflict began in 1988, when the Karabakh Armenians demanded that Karabakh be transferred from Soviet Azerbaijan to Soviet Armenia. The conflict escalated into a full-scale war in the early 1990s.

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

Current military situation in Nagorno-Karabakh
DateFebruary 1988–present[1]
full-scale war: 1992–94[2][3]
Location
Nagorno-Karabakh line of contact
Armenia–Azerbaijan border
Result

Decisive Armenian military victory in 1994[4]

Territorial
changes		 De facto independence of Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) and annexation by Armenia.[10]
Belligerents
 Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh)
 Armenia

 Azerbaijan
Supported by:

Foreign groups (1992–94):

Units involved
Artsakh Defence Army
Armed Forces of Armenia		 Azerbaijani Armed Forces
Strength

65,000 active servicemen (2018 estimate)[23]

  • Armenia: 44,800 active servicemen (2019, IISS)[24]
  • Artsakh: 18,000–20,000 (2008, ARAG)[25]
 66,950 active servicemen (2019, IISS)[26]
Casualties and losses
214 soldiers, 16 civilians killed (2008–2016) 1,008 soldiers and 90+ civilians killed, 1,205 soldiers and 140 civilians wounded, 30+ soldiers and 12 civilians captured (1994–2016)[27]
28,000–38,000 killed (1988–1994)[32]
3,000 killed (May 1994–August 2009)[33]
545–551+ killed (2010–2020)

A ceasefire signed in 1994 provided for two decades of relative stability, which significantly deteriorated along with Azerbaijan's increasing frustration with the status quo, at odds with Armenia's efforts to cement it.[41] A four-day escalation in April 2016 became the deadliest ceasefire violation to date. Since then, the possibility of resumed major hostilities has greatly increased.[42]

Background
Main articles: History of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenian–Azerbaijani War, and Armenia–Azerbaijan relations

The modern phase of the conflict began in February 1988, during the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1989, ethnic tensions between Armenians and Azerbaijanis increased in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. As of 2017, public opinion on both sides has been noted as "increasingly entrenched, bellicose and uncompromising".[41] In this context, mutual concessions that might lower tensions in the longer term could in the shorter run threaten internal stability and the survival of ruling elites, hence leaving little incentive for compromise.[41]

Timeline

Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988–94)
Main article: Nagorno-Karabakh War

The Nagorno-Karabakh War, also known as the Artsakh Liberation War in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, was an armed conflict that took place in the late 1980s to May 1994, in the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in southwestern Azerbaijan, between the majority ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh backed by the Republic of Armenia, and the Republic of Azerbaijan. As the war progressed, Armenia and Azerbaijan, both former Soviet Republics, entangled themselves in a protracted, undeclared war in the mountainous heights of Karabakh as Azerbaijan attempted to curb the secessionist movement in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The enclave's parliament had voted in favor of uniting with Armenia. A a referendum, boycotted by the Azerbaijani population of Nagorno-Karabakh, was held, whereby most of the voters voted in favor of independence. The demand to unify with Armenia, which began anew in 1988, began in a relatively peaceful manner. As the Soviet Union's dissolution neared, the tensions gradually grew into an increasingly violent conflict between ethnic Armenians and ethnic Azerbaijanis. Both sides made claims of ethnic cleansing and pogroms conducted by the other.[43][44]

Inter-ethnic clashes between the two broke out shortly after the parliament of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) in Azerbaijan voted to unify the region with Armenia on 20 February 1988. The circumstances of the dissolution of the Soviet Union facilitated an Armenian separatist movement in Soviet Azerbaijan. The declaration of secession from Azerbaijan was the final result of a territorial conflict regarding the land.[45] As Azerbaijan declared its independence from the Soviet Union and removed the powers held by the enclave's government, the Armenian majority voted to secede from Azerbaijan. In the process they proclaimed the unrecognized Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh.[46]

Full-scale fighting erupted in the late winter of 1992. International mediation by several groups, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), failed to bring resolution. In the spring of 1993, Armenian forces captured territory outside the enclave itself, threatening to catalyze the involvement of other countries in the region.[47] By the end of the war in 1994, the Armenians were in full control of most of the enclave and also held and currently control approximately 9% of Azerbaijan's territory outside the enclave.[48] As many as 230,000 Armenians from Azerbaijan and 800,000 Azerbaijanis from Armenia and Karabakh have been displaced as a result of the conflict.[49] A Russian-brokered ceasefire was signed in May 1994 and peace talks, mediated by the OSCE Minsk Group, have been held ever since by Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Some clashes occurred in the years following the 1994 ceasefire.[50]

Border clashes (1994–2016)
Main article: 2008 Mardakert clashes
The situation in the area after the 1994 ceasefire

The 2008 Mardakert clashes began on 4 March after the 2008 Armenian election protests. It involved the heaviest fighting between ethnic Armenian[51] and Azerbaijani forces[52] over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh[52][53] since the 1994 ceasefire after the Nagorno-Karabakh War.

Armenian sources accused Azerbaijan of trying to take advantage of ongoing unrest in Armenia. Azerbaijani sources blamed Armenia, claiming that the Armenian government was trying to divert attention from internal tensions in Armenia.

Following the incident, on March 14 the United Nations General Assembly by a recorded vote of 39 in favour to 7 against adopted Resolution 62/243, demanding the immediate withdrawal of all Armenian forces from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.[54]

2010 violence
Main articles: 2010 Nagorno-Karabakh clashes and 2010 Mardakert clashes

The 2010 Nagorno-Karabakh clash was a scattered exchange of gunfire that took place on February 18 on the line of contact dividing Azerbaijani and the Karabakh Armenian military forces. Azerbaijan accused the Armenian forces of firing on the Azerbaijani positions near Tap Qaraqoyunlu, Qızıloba, Qapanlı, Yusifcanlı and Cavahirli villages, as well as in uplands of Agdam Rayon with small arms fire including snipers.[55][56] As a result, three Azerbaijani soldiers were killed and one wounded.[57]

The 2010 Mardakert clashes were a series of violations of the Nagorno-Karabakh War ceasefire. They took place across the line of contact dividing Azerbaijan and the ethnic Armenian military forces of the unrecognized but de facto independent Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Both sides accused the other of violating the ceasefire regime. These were the worst violations of the cease fire (which has been in place since 1994) in two years and left Armenian forces with the heaviest casualties since the Mardakert clashes of March 2008.[58]

Between 2008 and 2010, 74 soldiers were killed on both sides.[59]

2011–2013 continued fighting
See also: 2012 Armenian–Azerbaijani border clashes

In late April 2011, border clashes left three Nagorno-Karabakh soldiers dead,[60] while on 5 October, two Azerbaijani and one Armenian soldier were killed.[61] In all during the year, 10 Armenian soldiers were killed.[62]

The following year, border clashes between the armed forces of Armenia and Azerbaijan took place from late April through early June. The clashes resulted in the deaths of five Azerbaijani and four Armenian soldiers. In all during 2012, 19 Azerbaijani and 14 Armenian soldiers were killed.[63] Another report put the number of Azerbaijani dead at 20.[50]

Throughout 2013, 12 Azerbaijani and 7 Armenian soldiers were killed in border clashes.[63]

2014 clashes and helicopter shootdown
See also: 2014 Armenian–Azerbaijani clashes and 2014 Armenian Mil Mi-24 shootdown

In 2014, several border clashes erupted that had resulted in 16 fatalities on both sides by 20 June.[64]

On 2 August, Azerbaijani authorities announced that eight of their soldiers had been killed in three days of clashes with NKO forces, the biggest single death toll for the country's military since the 1994 war.[65] NKO denied any casualties on their side, while saying the Azerbaijanis had suffered 14 dead and many more injured.[65] Local officials in Nagorno-Karabakh reported at least two Armenian military deaths in what was the largest incident in the area since 2008.[66] Five more Azerbaijani troops were killed the following night, bringing the death toll from the August clashes to at least 15. The violence prompted Russia to issue a strong statement, warning both sides not to escalate the situation further.[67]

By August 5, 2014 the fighting that started on 27 July had left 14 Azerbaijani and 5 Armenian soldiers dead. Overall, 27 Azerbaijani soldiers had died since the start of the year in border clashes.[68]

In a separate incident in July 2014, the NKR Defense Army announced that troops had killed one and arrested two members of an Azerbaijani subversive group that had penetrated the contact line.[69] In addition to spying on Armenian troop movements and military installations and civilian settlements in Karvachar (Kelbajar), the team was charged with the murder of Smbat Tsakanyan, a seventeen-year-old Armenian boy and resident of the village of Jumen. Both surviving members of the group were sentenced to life in prison by an Armenian court. In July 2015, video footage recorded by the team was released to the public and aired on Armenian state television.[70]

On November 12, 2014, the Azerbaijani armed forces shot down a Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army Mil Mi-24 helicopter over Karabakh's Agdam district. Three servicemen were killed in the incident. Armenia's Defense Ministry stated the aircraft was unarmed and called its downing an "unprecedented provocation". Azerbaijani authorities claimed the helicopter was "trying to attack" Azerbaijani army positions.[71] Armenian authorities stated that Azerbaijan will face "grave consequences".[72] With the crash, 2014 became the deadliest year for Armenian forces since the 1994 ceasefire agreement, with 27 soldiers killed in addition to 34 fatalities on the Azerbaijani side.[73] Six Armenian civilians also died in 2014, while by the end of the year the number of Azerbaijanis killed rose to 39 (37 soldiers and 2 civilians).[50]

2015 sporadic fighting

In 2015, 42 Armenian soldiers and 5 civilians were killed as border clashes continued.[74] In addition, at least 64 Azerbaijani soldiers also died.[75][76]

Sporadic fighting primarily took place in: January,[77] June,[78] August,[79] September,[80][81] November[82] and throughout December.[76][83]

Four-Day War (2016)
Main article: 2016 Nagorno-Karabakh clashes

Over the years, Azerbaijan had been growing impatient with the status quo. In this regard, propelled by oil and gas windfall, the country embarked in a military build-up. In 2015 alone, Baku spent $3bn on its military, more than Armenia's entire national budget.[41]

Throughout January and February 2016, four Armenian and four Azerbaijani soldiers were killed in fighting at the Nagorno-Karabakh border.[84] The first casualty of 2016 was a Nagorno-Karabakh soldier Aramayis Voskanian, who was killed by Azerbaijani sniper fire while serving in the eastern direction of the Line of Contact.[85][86] In mid-February, Hakob Hambartsumyan, an Armenian herdsman from Vazgenashen, was killed by an Azerbaijani sniper.[87] In March, two Azerbaijani and one Armenian soldier were killed in clashes along the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia.[88][89]

Between 1 and 5 April 2016, heavy fighting along the Nagorno-Karabakh frontline left 88 Armenian and 31–92 Azerbaijani soldiers dead. One Armenian and three Azerbaijani soldiers were also missing. In addition, 10 civilians (six Azerbaijani and four Armenian) were also killed.[90][91] During the clashes, an Azerbaijani military helicopter, 13 unmanned drones were shot down[92] and an Azerbaijani tank was destroyed.[93]

Renewed border clashes (2016–present)

Between 8 and 17 May 2016, sporadic fighting left 14 Armenian and three Azerbaijani soldiers dead, as well as one Azerbaijani civilian.[94][95] On 5 October 2016, Armenian artillery shelled Azerbaijani positions on the line of contact with one Azerbaijani soldier being killed.[96] One Armenian soldier was killed on 11 October 2016 in a skirmish on the line of contact.[97] On 15 November, an Azerbaijani soldier was killed on the line of contact.[98] On 27 November, Azerbaijani forces reported shooting down an Armenian drone which had crossed the line of contact.[99]

A Nagorno-Karabakh soldier was killed in action with Azerbaijiani forces on 6 February 2017.[100] On 8 February 2017, one Nagorno-Karabakh soldier was killed and another wounded in a firefight with Azerbajiani troops along the line of contact.[100] On 24 February 2017, Azerbaijani forces shelled the Armenian positions near the village of Talish with artillery.[101] The next day a large firefight broke out with Azerbajiani forces approaching Armenian lines in the same area, 5 Azerbaijani soldiers were killed in the ensuing engagement.[101][102]

On 15 May 2017, a Karabakh Osa air defense system was damaged or destroyed by a guided missile launched by Azerbaijani forces.[103] On 20 May 2017, an Armenian soldier was killed in a firefight with Azeri troops, the Azerbaijani military utilized anti-tank grenades and 60mm mortar fire in the action.[104] On 26 May 2017, a Nagorno-Karabakh soldier was killed in a skirmish with Azerbajiani forces involving mortars and grenade launches.[105][106] On 16 June 2017 three Nagorno-Karabakh soldiers were killed by Azeri forces.[107] On 22 June 2017 four Azeri soldiers were killed by Nagorno-Karakakh soldiers.[108] On July 4 an Azeri woman and her two-year-old grandchild were killed as a result of shelling by Armenian forces.[109] On 10 July 2017 a Nagorno-Karabakh soldier was killed in shelling by the Azerbaijani forces.[110] On 25 July 2017, Azerbaijan claimed that one of its soldiers was wounded by a munition dropped from an Armenian UCAV.[111] On 31 August 2017, Azerbaijani military positions were fired at and shelled at from Armenian military positions. The Armenian military were using large-caliber machine guns.[112]

2018
Main article: 2018 Armenian–Azerbaijani clashes

A Nagorno-Karabakh soldier was killed by an Azerbaijani sniper near the line of contact on 7 January 2018.[113] A Nagorno-Karabakh soldier was killed by Azerbaijani fire on 7 February 2018.[114] Three civilian volunteers were killed in a demining operation in Nagorno-Karabakh on 29 March 2018.[115] A Nagorno-Karabakh soldier was killed by Azerbaijani fire on 9 April 2018.[116] A Nagorno-Karabakh soldier was killed in a firefight with Azeri forces on 10 June 2018.[117] In September 2018 a soldier of the Armenian Army was killed by Azeri gunfire whilst serving at a border post.[118] In the same month, two Nagorno-Karabakh soldiers were killed by the Azeri army.[119][120]

2020
Main article: 2020 Armenian–Azerbaijani clashes

Further clashes near Tavush took place in July 2020.[121] 13 Azeris, including a civilian, and four Armenians were killed.[122]

Fatalities

1994–present

Although no exact casualty figures exist, between 1994 and 2009, as many as 3,000 people, mostly soldiers, had been killed, according to most observers.[33] In 2008, the fighting became more intense and frequent.[123] With 72 deaths recorded throughout the year, 2014 became the bloodiest since the war ended.[50] According to the Union of Relatives of the Artsakh War Missing in Action Soldiers, as of 2014, 239 Karabakhi soldiers remain officially listed as unaccounted for.[124] Between 1 and 5 April 2016, heavy fighting along the Nagorno-Karabakh frontline left 102 Armenian (11 non-combat)[125][90] and 94 Azerbaijani soldiers dead. Two Azerbaijani soldiers were also missing.[91] In addition, 15 civilians (nine Armenian and six Azerbaijani) were killed.[126][127]

YearArmeniaAzerbaijanTotal
2008N/AN/A30 soldiers[59]
2009N/AN/A19 soldiers[59]
20107 soldiers[128]18 soldiers25 soldiers[59]
201110 soldiers[62]4+ soldiers,[59][61] 1 civilian[129]14+ soldiers, 1 civilian
201214 soldiers20 soldiers34 soldiers[50]
20137 soldiers12 soldiers19 soldiers[63]
201427 soldiers, 6 civilians37 soldiers, 2 civilians64 soldiers, 8 civilians[50]
201542 soldiers, 5 civilians[74]64 soldiers[75][76]77 soldiers, 5 civilians
2016108–112 soldiers,[125][130] 9 civilians[126]109 soldiers,[130] 6 civilians[127]217–221 soldiers, 15 civilians
201722 soldiers[131]19 soldiers[132]41 soldiers
20185–7 soldiers[133][134]6 soldiers[134]11–13 soldiers
20194 soldiers[135]6+ soldiers[136][137]10+ soldiers
20208 soldiers[138]15 soldiers, 1 civilian[139]23 soldiers, 1 civilian

Foreign involvement

Some commentators see the conflict as a part of the wider Russia–Turkey[140][141][142] and Iran–Israel proxy conflicts.[143]

Russia

Thomas de Waal has argued that there is an Azerbaijani narrative that Russia has "consistently supported the Armenian side." According to de Waal, Russia "has more supported the Armenian side," but there have been various "different Russian actors at different times supporting both sides in this conflict." He argues that President Boris Yeltsin did not "want to see the Armenian side be defeated, but he also didn't want to supply them with too many weapons." De Waal concluded in 2012 was that "Russia [is] playing both sides", but "ultimately more in the Armenian side."[144] Other commentators have argued that Russia plays both sides in the conflict.[145][146] Svante Cornell argued in 2018 that Russia "had been playing both sides of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict to gain maximum control over both, a policy that continues to this day."[147]

During the war, "Russia was widely viewed as supporting the Armenian position. Much of this perception stemmed from the fact that Russia transferred military support to Armenia."[148] According to de Waal, "greater Russian support for the Armenians" was one of the main factors behind the Armenian victory.[149] Russian support to Armenia during the war was in the form of both arms and fuel. De Waal notes that "Yet it is not entirely clear how this support for the Armenians was translated on to the battlefield; to complicate things further, the Russians also gave some assistance to Azerbaijan."[150]

In the post-war period, Russia is Armenia's main arms supplier and the two countries are military allies.[151][152] Russia is sometimes described as Armenia's supporter in the conflict,[153][154] however, this view is widely challenged as Russia extensively sells arms to Azerbaijan.[35][155][156][157] At the same time, Armenia buys Russian weaponry at a discount, while Azerbaijan pays the full price.[158]

Turkey

Turkey is widely considered Azerbaijan's main supporter in the conflict.[159][160][161] Svante Cornell wrote in 1998 that Turkey is the "only country that constantly expressed its support for Azerbaijan."[162] It provided Azerbaijan military support during the war.[163] Turkey also supports Azerbaijan diplomatically.[164][165] Turkish and Azerbaijani armed forces cooperate extensively[166] and regularly hold military exercises.[167][168] Azerbaijan has also bought weapons from Turkey.[169]

Turkey closed its border with Armenia in April 1993 after Armenian forces captured Kalbajar.[170] Prior to that, the border was only open "on demand and only for transferring the humanitarian aid (mainly wheat delivery) to Armenia and for the operation of the weekly Kars-Gyumri train, which had been crossing the Turkish-Armenian border since the days of the Soviet Union."[171]

Iran

Iran is officially neutral and has sought to play the role of a mediator,[172] most notably in 1992. In its official statements, Iran calls for a peaceful settlement[173] and restraint during skirmishes.[174] At the same time, Iranian officials have repeatedly reaffirmed their support for Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.[lower-alpha 5] Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated in 2020 that "While respecting the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan Republic, Iran is fundamentally opposed to any move that would fuel conflict between the two neighbouring countries of the Azerbaijan Republic and Armenia."[180]

During the war, "Iran was domestically torn in devising a policy", but de facto "pursued a policy that combined official neutrality with growing support for Armenia," according to Svante Cornell.[181] Cornell argues that Iran has "pursued policies in the conflict inclined towards Armenia."[162] However, Iran's tacit support for the Armenian side was limited to economic cooperation,[182] which was considered vital.[183][184][185][186] During the war, "Iran was serving as Armenia's main purveyor of electricity and goods, and once the Armenian conquest of Karabakh had been completed, Iranian trucks began to supply most of the secessionist enclave's needs."[181] According to Bahruz Balayev, "Iran supported the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and gave some humanitarian aid to the [Azerbaijani] refugees, but in the meantime widely cooperates with Armenia and even Karabakh Armenian authorities."[187] Brenda Shaffer wrote that "Iran's cooperation with Armenia and its tacit support in the conflict with Azerbaijan over Karabagh strengthened Yerevan's actual and perceived power and consequently may have lessened its sense of urgency to resolve the conflict."[188]

Some Iranian officials have made claims about Iran's alleged military support for Azerbaijan. In 2013 Mohsen Rezaee, who was commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) during the Karabakh war, stated that he "personally issued an order [...] for the Republic of Azerbaijan army to be equipped appropriately and for it to receive the necessary training." Rezaee added that "Many Iranians died in the Karabakh War. In addition to the wounded, who were transported to [Iran], many of the Iranian martyrs of the Karabakh War are buried in Baku."[189] In 2011, Hassan Ameli, a leading Iranian cleric, claimed that Iran provided Azerbaijan arms and helped Afghan mujaheddin move to Azerbaijan.[190][191] The Iranian embassy in Armenia stated that they would not like unreliable information affect the friendly Armenian-Iranian relations: "We do not exclude the possibility that there are forces, which aim to create hindrances for our friendly relations."[192]

United States

In 1998 Svante Cornell argued that the United States has "pursued policies in the conflict inclined towards Armenia."[162] Thomas Ambrosio suggested that the US "supported Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, but enacted policies that effectively supported Armenia's irrendentist policies."[193] Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, passed by the United States Congress in 1992, which banned any military aid to Azerbaijan. It was effectively amended by the Senate in 2001 and waived by President George W. Bush starting from 2002.[194] The US provides military aid to both countries. Between 2005 and 2016 Azerbaijan received $8.5 million for counternarcotics assistance and $11.5 million for counterterrorism aid. In the same period, Armenia received only $41,000 for counternarcotics assistance and none for counterterrorism aid. According to EurasiaNet, "Much of the money for Azerbaijan has been targeted toward naval forces, to reduce the risk that it could be used against Armenia."[195] The Trump administration greatly increased the US military aid to Azerbaijan to around $100 million in fiscal years 2018-19, compared to less than $3 million in a year in FY 2016-17. The US aid is primarily "offered in the context of U.S. policy to increase pressure on Iran and focuses on Azerbaijan’s Iranian border, but it also has implications for Armenia," according to Emil Sanamyan. In FY 2018 Armenia received $4.2 million in U.S. security assistance.[196]

The US has also provided humanitarian aid to Artsakh (some $36 million between 1998 and 2010),[197] including for demining.[198] The humanitarian aid has been criticized by Azerbaijan for legitimizing the "illegal regime in the occupied lands and damages the reputation of the US as a neutral mediator."[199]

Arms suppliers

In 1992 the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) "requested its participating states to impose an embargo on arms deliveries to forces engaged in combat in the Nagorno-Karabakh area." However, it is a "voluntary multilateral arms embargo and a number of OSCE participating states have supplied arms to Armenia and Azerbaijan since 1992."[200] The UN Security Council Resolution 853, passed in July 1993, called on states to "refrain from the supply of any weapons and munitions which might lead to an intensification of the conflict or the continued occupation of territory." According to SIPRI, "since 2002 the UN Security Council has no longer listed that it is 'actively seized of the matter'. As such, since 2002 it is assumed that the non-mandatory UN embargo is no longer active."[201]

Russia has long been Armenia's primary arms supplier. Smaller suppliers include China,[202][203] India,[204][205] Ukraine,[206] Greece,[207][182] Serbia,[208] Jordan (per Armenian MoD sources,[209][210] denied by Jordan).[211]

Russia supplied 85% of Azerbaijan's weaponry in 2010–14[212] and 31% in 2015–19.[213] Israel has become a major supplier.[214] In 2015–19 it accounted for 60% of Azerbaijan's arms imports.[213] Azerbaijan's other suppliers include Turkey,[169] Belarus,[215][6] Ukraine,[206][216] Serbia,[217] Czech Republic[218][219] (denied by the Czech authorities).[220]

Diplomatic support

Artsakh and Armenia

Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) has received diplomatic recognition[221] and support from three partially recognized states: Abkhazia,[lower-alpha 6][222] South Ossetia,[lower-alpha 7][223] and Transnistria.[lower-alpha 8][224]

During the war, Greece adopted a pro-Armenian position[225] and supported it in international forums.[226][182] During the April 2016 and July 2020 clashes, Cyprus blamed Azerbaijan for violating the ceasefire.[227][228]

Azerbaijan has repeatedly accused the Minsk Group (Russia, US, France) of being pro-Armenian.[229][230][231] Svante Cornell argued in 1997 that France, the US and Russia are "more or less biased towards Armenia in the conflict."[232] Azerbaijan accused the US and France in bias for allowing Bako Sahakyan, president of Artsakh, to visit those countries in 2018.[233][234] Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan reportedly told the Greek ambassador in 1993 that France and Russia were Armenia's only allies at the time.[235] According to a US State Department cable, released in 2020, the French ambassador to the UN, Jean-Bernard Mérimée, succeed in changing the wording of the UNSC Resolution 822 to state that it was the "local Armenian forces", not "Armenian forces" that occupied Kalbajar. He also suggested treating the Armenian capture of Kalbajar not under the chapter VII of the UN Charter (an act of aggression), but chapter VI (a dispute that should be settled peacefully).[236] In 1996, when France was chosen by the OSCE to co-chair the Minsk Group, Azerbaijan asked the OSCE to reconsider the decision because France was perceived by Azerbaijan as pro-Armenian.[237][238]

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan has received explicit diplomatic support in the conflict from several countries and international organizations. Azerbaijan strongest diplomatic supporters are Turkey and Pakistan,[239][240] which is the only UN member state not to have recognized Armenia's independence in support for Azerbaijan.[241] Turkish-backed unrecognized Northern Cyprus (Turkish Cyprus) also supports Azerbaijan.[242] The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)[243] and the Turkic Council[244] have repeatedly supported the Azerbaijani position. Some member states of these organizations, namely Uzbekistan,[245] Saudi Arabia,[246] and Palestine[247] have voiced support for Azerbaijan's position on their own repeatedly.

Azerbaijan has received diplomatic support, namely for its territorial integrity, from three post-Soviet states that have territorial disputes: Ukraine,[248] Georgia,[249] and Moldova.[250] These three countries and Azerbaijan form the GUAM organization and support the Azerbaijani position in the format as well.[251]

Two other post-Soviet states, Kazakhstan[252] and Belarus[253] tacitly support Azerbaijan's position, especially within the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), despite nominal alliance with Armenia.[254]

2008 UN vote

On March 14, 2008 the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution which "reaffirmed Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, expressing support for that country's internationally recognized borders and demanding the immediate withdrawal of all Armenian forces from all occupied territories there." It was adopted by a vote of 39 in favor to 7 against, while most countries either abstained or were absent. It was backed mostly by Muslim states[255][256] (31 were members of the OIC).[lower-alpha 9] Non-Muslim states that supported the resolution included three post-Soviet states: Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and five other nations: Cambodia, Colombia, Myanmar, Serbia, Tuvalu. Thus, it was supported by seven OSCE members;[lower-alpha 10] one NATO member (Turkey) and no EU member state.[257]

It was opposed by Angola, Armenia, France, India, Russia, United States, Vanuatu.[257] The OSCE Minsk Group co-chair countries (France, US, Russia) voted against the resolution. They argued that it "selectively propagates only certain of [the basic principles] principles to the exclusion of others, without considering the Co-Chairs' proposal in its balanced entirety." The co-chair countries called it a unilateral resolution, which "threatens to undermine the peace process," but reaffirmed their "support for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, and thus do not recognize the independence of NK."[258]

gollark: The timezone code is tzdata like Esobot.
gollark: <@166910808305958914> `++data set_global tz [timezone code]`.
gollark: As if this feature is *documented*.
gollark: You can set your timezone with the ABR settings.
gollark: I imagine this requires anomalous filesystem capabilities.

See also

References
Notes
  1. The Soviet central government supported the status quo in Karabakh and the position of (Soviet) Azerbaijan.[11] It was directly involved in and supported Azerbaijani forces militarily in imposing a blockade on Karabakh in 1990[12] and directly intervened in other operations, most prominently during Operation Ring in April-May 1991.[13][14]
  2. [18][19] Namely the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.[17].
  3. In a 2010 interview, Mykola Karpyuk, a leader of the UNA-UNSO said that "many Ukrainians", including members of the organization fought on the Azerbaijani side.[20][21] Norat Ter-Grigoryants, Deputy Defense Ninister of Armenia in 1992–95, stated in 2016 that the following foreign groups fought on the Azerbaijani side in Karabakh: "Chechen militants, radical Islamists from Afghanistan, 'Gray Wolves', Ukrainian Nazis from UNA-UNSO."[22]
  4. Also called the Karabakh conflict,[34] Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict,[35] or Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict. Usually referred to as the Artsakh conflict in Armenia[36] and the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in Azerbaijan.[37]
  5. These include, among others, President Mohammad Khatami in 2004,[175] Chief of Staff of Iran's Armed Forces Mohammad Bagheri in 2019,[176] Chief of Staff of the President of Iran Mahmoud Vaezi in 2020,[177] and Iran's ambassadors in Azerbaijan.[178][179]
  6. Abkhazia is the subject of a territorial dispute between the Republic of Abkhazia and Georgia. The Republic of Abkhazia unilaterally declared independence on 23 July 1992, but Georgia continues to claim it as part of its own sovereign territory. Abkhazia has received formal recognition as an independent state from 7 out of 193 United Nations member states, 1 of which have subsequently withdrawn their recognition.
  7. South Ossetia's status is disputed. It considers itself to be an independent state, but this is recognised by only a few other countries. The Georgian government and most of the world's other states consider South Ossetia de jure a part of Georgia's territory.
  8. Transnistria's status is disputed. It considers itself to be an independent state, but this is not recognised by any country. The Moldovan government and all the world's other states consider Transnistria de jure a part of Moldova territory.
  9. Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Comoros, Djibouti, Gambia, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen.
  10. Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan
Citations
  1. Vaserman, Arie; Ginat, Rami (1994). "National, Territorial or Religious Conflict? The Case of Nagorno‐Karabakh". Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 17 (4): 345. The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, an autonomous region contested by both Azerbaijan and Armenia, began in February 1988...
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  183. Vatanka, Alex (January 15, 2013). "Tangle in the Caucasus: Iran and Israel Fight for Influence in Azerbaijan". Foreign Affairs. Fearing Baku's intentions to fuel secessionism inside its borders, Iran provided vital backing to Armenia in its war against Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, which dragged on from 1988 to 1994 and ended in an inconclusive cease-fire.
  184. Rudolph, Joseph Russell (2008). Hot Spot: North America and Europe. ABC-CLIO. pp. 185-186. ISBN 9780313336218. Iran supports Armenia on the geopolitical logic that as long as Baku is focused on regaining control over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, Azerbaijan has limited means with which to stir up trouble in the heavily Azeri-populated areas of Iran. To be sure, the assistance provided to Armenia and Azerbaijan respectively by these neighboring states has been limited to diplomatic support and occasional economic favors.
  185. Ehrmann, Maya; Kraus, Josef; Souleimanov, Emil (2013). "The Iran-Israel-Azerbaijan Triangle: Implications on Regional Security". Revista de Estudos Políticos. Fluminense Federal University. 4 (7): 215–228. ...Iran’s support of Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict...
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  203. Rolland, Nadège (December 2018). "China's Ambitions in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus" (PDF). Notes de l’Ifri. Institut français des relations internationales (112): 8. In 1999, China made its first arms sale in the Caucasus by supplying WM-80 rocket launchers to Armenia.
  204. "India pips Russia and Poland for $40m Armenia defence deal". The Times of India. March 2, 2020.
  205. Upadhyaya, Shishir (March 18, 2020). "India Wins Defense Deal With Armenia in Bid to Chasten Turkey". The Diplomat. Archived from the original on 28 June 2020.
  206. Kucera, Joshua (August 8, 2011). "Tajikistan Buying Guns; Ukraine Selling Weapons to Both Armenia and Azerbaijan". EurasiaNet. Archived from the original on 7 August 2020. Meanwhile, Ukraine reports that it has engaged in the time-honored tradition of selling weapons to both sides of a conflict.
  207. Harutyunyan, Garik (November 27, 2015). "Հայաստանը հակատանկային «Միլան» համակարգերը գնել է Հունաստանից. զեկույց [Report: Armenia Purchased Anti-tank MILAN Systems from Greece]". razm.info (in Armenian). Archived from the original on 17 August 2020.
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  209. "Հորդանան-Հայաստան զենքի տրանզիտ. ՕՍԱ-ԱԿՄ ՀՕՊ-երի գնման գործարքի մանրամասներ (մաս 2)". The Armenian Times (in Armenian). 21 June 2020. Archived from the original on 7 August 2020. ...ՊՆ աղբյուրների, ինչպես նաև այլ հետազոտությունների արդյունքում հայտնի է դարձել, որ համակարգերը Հայաստանը միջնորդ ընկերության միջոցով ձեռք է բերել Հորդանանից:
  210. Atanesian, Grigor (February 6, 2020). "Armenia's MOD spokesman replied to my FB post saying "the info is not necessarily 100% correct, but it is very close to the reality"". Twitter. Archived from the original on 7 August 2020.
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  214. Murinson, Alexander (October 2014). "The Ties Between Israel and Azerbaijan" (PDF). Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 110. Begin–Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. Archived from the original (PDF) on 3 November 2014. Israel supported the Azeri side in this conflict by supplying Stinger missiles to Azerbaijani troops during the war.
  215. Rahimov, Rahim. "Azerbaijan Shows off Polonez, LORA Missiles From Belarus, Israel". jamestown.org. Jamestown Foundation. Archived from the original on 24 July 2020. Retrieved June 14, 2018.
  216. Azadian, Edmond Y. (1999). History on the Move: Views, Interviews and Essays on Armenian Issues. Wayne State University Press. p. 173. ISBN 9780814329160. But as subsequent events evolved it became all too apparent that Ukraine has steadfastly stood behind Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict all along. ...it was reported from Stepanakert that Ukraine had shipped 40 tanks to Azerbaijan. Later that number was raised to 59. Ukraine had also supplied Azerbaijan with Mig-21 attack planes....
  217. "We sell weapons to Armenia and Azerbaijan to save military industry, Serbian president says". Vestnik Kavkaza. 1 August 2020. Archived from the original on 4 August 2020.
  218. Ljubas, Zdravko (18 September 2019). "Czech Weapons end up in Azerbaijan Despite Embargo". occrp.org. Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project. Archived from the original on 7 August 2020.
  219. Dawkins, David (October 18, 2019). "Meet 27-Year-Old Arms Dealer Michal Strnad, The Czech Industrialist With 'More Tanks' Than The Army". Forbes. Archived from the original on 7 August 2020. Weapons that Jaroslav Strnad and Excalibur sold to Israeli firm Elbit had immediately arrived in Azerbaijan...
  220. "Milan Štěch: Czech Republic did not sell weapons to Azerbaijan (video)". a1plus.am. A1plus. 4 October 2017. Archived from the original on 7 August 2020.
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  222. "Conversation of Viacheslav Chirikba with Karen Mirzoyan". old.mfaapsny.org. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia. 7 April 2016. Archived from the original on 9 August 2020.
  223. "Press release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Ossetia". mfa-rso.su. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of South Ossetia. April 6, 2016. Archived from the original on 24 July 2020. The Minister assured his colleague that South Ossetia people follow the development of situation and offered words of support to people of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.
  224. "Telephone conversation with NKR Foreign Minister Karen Mirzoyan". mid.gospmr.org. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PMR. 4 April 2016. Archived from the original on 9 April 2016. The head of the Pridnestrovian diplomacy expressed compassion and support to the people of Artsakh in connection with the escalation of tension on the part of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
  225. Yiallourides, Christodoulos K.; Tsakonas, Panayotis J., eds. (2001). Greece and Turkey after the End of the Cold War. New York and Athens: Aristide D. Caratzas. p. 412. ISBN 0-89241-564-9. Greece, on the other hand, had no particular reasons to shun Azerbaijan, but its historical friendship with the Armenian people, and shared concerns over Turkish aggression, naturally induced a pro-Armenian Greek policy.
  226. Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos, Ambassador of Greece to Armenia in 1993–94: Chrysanthopoulos, Leonidas (2002). Caucasus Chronicles: Nation-building and Diplomacy in Armenia, 1993-1994. Gomidas Institute. ISBN 9781884630057.
    • p. 66: "I told him that they should be very careful on the Fizuli issue, because if it were to fall into Armenian hands, the international condemnation would be so strong that Greece would no longer be able to support Armenia in international forums and particularly in the European Union.
    • p. 68: "Greece was doing everything possible in all the other international forums to help Armenia and to bring peace to the troubled area.
  227. "Cyprus Denounces Civilian Casualties in Artsakh; Urges Turkey Not to Destabilize Situation". Hetq. 4 April 2016. Retrieved 23 July 2020. The Government of the Republic of Cyprus monitors closely the worrying developments in Nagorno-Karabakh/Artsakh, following the violations of the armistice line from Azerbaijani military forces.
  228. "The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Nikos Christodoulides, had a telephone conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, Mr Zohrab Mnatsakanyan". pio.gov.cy. Press and Information Office, Ministry of Interior, Republic of Cyprus. 15 July 2020. Archived from the original on 15 July 2020. Minister Christodoulides expressed to Minister Mnatsakanyan his concern about this development, condemned the ceasefire violation by Azerbaijan...
  229. Rahimov, Rahim (July 22, 2020). "Armenian-Azerbaijani Border Clashes: The Russian Dimension and Beyond". jamestown.org. Jamestown Foundation. Archived from the original on 11 August 2020. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev had lambasted the Minsk Group co-chairs (Russia, France and the United States) in an unusually explicit manner for what he described as their ineffectiveness and alleged pro-Armenian bias (President.az, July 6).
  230. "Aliyev Again Lambastes 'Pro-Armenian' Mediators". azatutyun.am. RFE/RL. March 21, 2016. Archived from the original on 11 August 2020.
  231. Greene, Richard (March 25, 2002). "Armenia/Azerbaijan: As Minsk Group Marks 10 Years, Karabakh Peace Appears More Elusive Than Ever". rferl.org. RFE/RL. Archived from the original on 11 August 2020. ....Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Vilayat Guliev publicly accused the body of pro-Armenian bias.
  232. Cornell, Svante E. (Summer 1997). "Undeclared War: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Reconsidered" (PDF). Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. XX (4): 23. As a result, three of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council are more or less biased towards Armenia in the conflict (including France, where a substantial Armenian minority exists, which has always been politically active.)
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  235. Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos, Ambassador of Greece to Armenia in 1993–94, wrote: "Ter-Petrossian [...] told me that at the moment Russia and France were the only allies of Armenia. Both countries had reacted in an effective way to Turkey within the United Nations Security Council and the CSCE, and they forced the United States to adopt a more objective position on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue." Chrysanthopoulos, Leonidas (2002). Caucasus Chronicles: Nation-building and Diplomacy in Armenia, 1993-1994. Gomidas Institute. pp. 67–68. ISBN 9781884630057.
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  245. Kangarli, Gulu (20 October 2017). "President Mirziyoyev: Uzbekistan supports Azerbaijan's fair stance on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict". azertag.az. Azerbaijan State News Agency. Archived from the original on 9 August 2020.
    • "Узбекистан и Азербайджан наращивают сотрудничество [Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan are increasing cooperation]". old.president.uz (in Russian). Press Service of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan. 25 September 2010. Archived from the original on 9 August 2020. В этой связи позиция Республики Узбекистан по решению проблемы Нагорного Карабаха остается твердой и неизменной. Узбекистан открыто ее подтверждал при голосовании инициированных Азербайджаном соответствующих резолюций Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН в 2008 году. Узбекистан последовательно выступал и продолжает выступать за мирное, политическое решение нагорно-карабахского конфликта и при этом главным условием урегулирования считает обеспечение территориальной целостности и суверенитета Азербайджана.
    • "Joint press statements of Presidents of Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan". en.president.az. President of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 27 September 2010. Archived from the original on 23 November 2017. While describing Uzbekistan’s position on the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, Islam Karimov said: [...] Uzbekistan considers the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan as one of the key preconditions for its settlement. I believe that this position is absolutely consistent with international standards, meets historical parallels. Uzbekistan's position on this issue remains unchanged: the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan is a sacred concept, and it must be followed in all solution options of this problem.
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  246. Alrmizan, Mohammed (September 2019). "Azerbaijan and Saudi Arabia: Bilateral Opportunities in a Changing Middle East" (PDF). kfcris.com. King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies. p. 5. Archived from the original (PDF) on 9 August 2020. In this matter, the Saudis have backed the right of Azerbaijan in the United Nations General Assembly meetings and in the OIC, asserting its internationally recognized authority over Nagorno-Karabakh. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia does not have yet any level of official or even unofficial ties with Armenia. This is because the Saudis have tended to side with Azerbaijan, especially on this particular issue.
  247. "Ambassador of State of Palestine: Nagorno-Karabakh conflict must be solved for benefit of entire region". report.az. Report News Agency. June 4, 2015. Archived from the original on 12 August 2020. Retrieved 12 August 2020. "Palestine supports Azerbaijan for 100% in this issue. We believe the conflict should be resolved in peaceful way through negotiations", N.A. Kareem added.
  248. "Armenia Summons Ukraine Envoy Over Pro-Azeri Statement". azatutyun.am. RFE/RL. 14 July 2020. Ukraine’s current and former governments have repeatedly voiced support for Azerbaijan in the Karabakh conflict.
  249. Kupatadze, Giorgi (19 April 2016). "Georgia Weighs Karabakh Role". iwpr.net. Institute for War and Peace Reporting. Georgia firmly upholds the principle of territorial integrity, which is contrary to the position of Nagorny Karabakh and Armenia.
  250. "Republic of Moldova confirms its support for sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan". mfa.gov.md. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Moldova. 17 April 2020. Archived from the original on 24 July 2020. Republic of Moldova supports the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Azerbaijan and confirms its openness to further support the efforts made in the reglementation by peaceful means of the conflict from Nagorno-Karabakh region, based on norms and principles of international law.
    • "MFAEI statement on recent events on the Azerbaijani-Armenian border". mfa.gov.md. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova. 14 July 2020. Archived from the original on 24 July 2020. The Republic of Moldova advocates for the peaceful settlement of the conflict situation based on respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan within its internationally recognised borders.
  251. Secretariat of the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development – GUAM (July 15, 2020). "Secretariat expresses deep condolences to the families of the perished Azerbaijani militaries, as well as solidarity with the people of the Republic of Azerbaijan". Twitter. Archived from the original on 5 August 2020.
  252. Michel, Casey (April 28, 2016). "Frustrations Between Kazakhstan and Armenia Persist". The Diplomat. Archived from the original on 10 August 2020. As it is, the troubles between Yerevan and Astana – at least as it pertains to the EEU – stretch back to 2014, when Kazakhstan publicly pushed back against the accession of Nagorno-Karabakh...
  253. Bohdan, Siarhei (29 September 2011). "Why Belarus Sides With Azerbaijan, Not Armenia". Belarus Digest. Archived from the original on 11 August 2020. Belarus has explicitly supported Azerbaijan's territorial integrity in joint statements
  254. Shiriyev, Zaur (March 14, 2017). "The "Four-Day War": Changing Paradigms in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict". Turkish Policy Quarterly. Archived from the original on 11 August 2020. In addition, the military escalation destroyed any expectations Armenia might have harbored for support from the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) members. The response was fragmented, with Belarus, for example, openly supporting Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. Kazakhstan requested that the Prime Ministers’ meeting of EEU members, scheduled to take place in Yerevan on 8 April 2016, be moved to Moscow. Since Armenia’s accelerated progress towards membership of the Moscow-led EEU, Baku has strengthened its relations with member states, especially Belarus and Kazakhstan. In this way, Baku secured allies within what is formally Yerevan’s own alliance, showing the practicality of diplomatic investment after the four-day war.
  255. "Azerbaijan Withdraws Draft Karabakh Resolution From UN". rferl.org. RFE/RL. September 10, 2010. Archived from the original on 12 August 2020. The U.S., Russia, and France had opposed a similar resolution which Baku managed to push through the UN assembly in March 2008. It was backed by 39 countries, most of them Islamic.
  256. Mir - Ismail, Alman (January 21, 2009). "Azerbaijan, Trapped Between Palestinians and Israel, Takes a Pragmatic Position". jamestown.org. Jamestown Foundation. Archived from the original on 12 August 2020. As a result, on March 14, 2008, it was mainly the Muslim nations that supported Azerbaijan’s resolution on the Karabakh conflict at the UN General Assembly.
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  258. "Statement of the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group". osce.org. 17 March 2008. Archived from the original on 12 August 2020.

Bibliography


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