Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) (Persian: سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی‎, romanized: Sepâh-e Pâsdârân-e Enghelâb-e Eslâmi, lit. 'Army of Guardians of the Islamic Revolution' or Sepâh for short) is a branch of the Iranian Armed Forces, founded after the Iranian Revolution on 22 April 1979[14] by order of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.[15] Whereas the Iranian Army defends Iranian borders and maintains internal order, according to the Iranian constitution, the Revolutionary Guard (pasdaran) is intended to protect the country's Islamic republic political system.[16] The Revolutionary Guards base their role in protecting the Islamic system as well as preventing foreign interference and coups by the military or "deviant movements".[17]

"IRGC" redirects here. For other uses, see IRGC (disambiguation).
"Sepah" redirects here. For the village in Iran, see Sepah, Iran.
Not to be confused with the Libyan Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی (in Persian)
Founded1979
Country Iran
AllegianceSupreme Leader of Iran
Branch
Size~250,000[1]
Motto(s)"Prepare against them whatever you are able of power."
(وَأَعِدُّوا لَهُمْ مَا اسْتَطَعْتُمْ مِنْ قُوَّةٍ)[2]
[Quran 8:60] (Heraldry slogan)
Engagements
Commanders
Chief CommanderMaj. Gen. Hossein Salami
Quds ForceBrig. Gen. Esmail Ghaani
Chief of the Joint StaffBrig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Naqdi
Ground ForcesBrig. Gen. Mohammad Pakpour
Aerospace ForceBrig. Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh
NavyCommodore Alireza Tangsiri
Mobilization forcesBrig. Gen. Gholamreza Soleimani
Insignia
Flag
Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution
Participant in the Syrian Civil War, War on Terror, Iran–Israel proxy conflict, and others
Active1979–present
IdeologyKhomeinism
Anti-Imperialism
Shia Islamism
Anti-Zionism
Pan-Islamism
Vilayat-e Faqih
AlliesState allies

Non-state allies:

     Hezbollah

    Opponent(s)State opponents

    Non-state opponents:

    Designated as a terrorist organisation by
     Bahrain
     Saudi Arabia
     United States

    The Revolutionary Guards have at least 250,000 military personnel including ground, aerospace and naval forces. Its naval forces are now the primary forces tasked with operational control of the Persian Gulf.[18] It also controls the paramilitary Basij militia which has about 90,000 active personnel.[19][20] Its media arm is Sepah News.[21]

    Since its origin as an ideologically driven militia, the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution has taken a greater role in nearly every aspect of Iranian society. Its expanded social, political, military and economic role under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's administration—especially during the 2009 presidential election and post-election suppression of protest—has led many Western analysts to argue that its political power has surpassed even that of the country's Shia clerical system.[22][23][24][25]

    The Chief Commander of the Guardians since 2019 is Hossein Salami[26] who was preceded by Mohammad Ali Jafari and Yahya Rahim Safavi respectively from 2007 and 1997.[27]

    The IRGC is designated as a terrorist organization by the governments of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United States.[28][29]

    Terminology
    Islamic Revolutionary
    Guard Corps
    Command
    Supreme Leader of Iran
    Commanders
    Military branches
    Ground Forces
    Aerospace Force
    Navy
    Quds Force
    Basij
    Intelligence agencies
    Intelligence Organization
    Intelligence Protection Organization
    Personnel
    Ranks insignia
    Facilities
    Imam Hossein University
    Baqiyatallah University
    University of Command and Staff

    Government organizations in Iran are commonly known by one-word names (that generally denote their function) rather than acronyms or shortened versions, and the general populace universally refers to the IRGC as Sepâh (سپاه). Sepâh has a historical connotation of soldiers, while in modern Persian it is also used to describe a corps-sized unit – in modern Persian Artesh (ارتش) is the more standard term for an army.

    Pâsdârân (پاسداران) is the plural form of Pâsdâr (پاسدار), meaning "Guardian", and members of Sepah are known as Pāsdār, which is also their title and comes after their rank.

    Apart from the name Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,[30][31][32] the Iranian Government, media, and those who identify with the organization generally use Sepāh-e Pâsdârân (Army of the Guardians), although it is not uncommon to hear Pâsdârân-e Enghelâb (پاسداران انقلاب) (Guardians of the Revolution), or simply Pâsdârân (پاسداران) (Guardians) as well. Among the Iranian population, and especially among diaspora Iranians, using the word Pasdaran indicates hatred or admiration for the organization.

    Most foreign governments and the English-speaking mass media tend to use the term Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRG) or simply the Revolutionary Guards.[33] In the US media, the force is frequently referred to interchangeably as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).[34][35][36][37] The US government standard is Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,[38] while the United Nations uses Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.[39]

    Organization

    The force's main role is in national security. It is responsible for internal and border security, law enforcement, and also Iran's missile forces. IRGC operations are geared towards asymmetric warfare and less traditional duties. These include the control of smuggling, control of the Strait of Hormuz, and resistance operations.[40] The IRGC is intended to complement the more traditional role of the regular Iranian military, with the two forces operating separately and focusing on different operational roles.[40]

    The IRGC is a combined arms force with its own ground forces, navy,[18] air force, intelligence,[41] and special forces. It also controls the Basij militia. The Basij is a volunteer-based force, with 90,000 regular soldiers and 300,000 reservists. The IRGC is officially recognized as a component of the Iranian military under Article 150 of the Iranian Constitution.[42] It is separate from, and parallel to, the other arm of Iran's military, which is called Artesh (another Persian word for army). Especially in the waters of the Persian Gulf, the IRGC is expected to assume control of any Iranian response to attacks on its nuclear facilities.[18]

    History and structure

    The IRGC was formed on 5 May 1979[3][43] following the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in an effort to consolidate several paramilitary forces into a single force loyal to the new government and to function as a counter to the influence and power of the regular military, initially seen as a potential source of opposition because of its traditional loyalty to the Shah. From the beginning of the new Islamic government, the Pasdaran (Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami) functioned as a corps of the faithful. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic entrusted the defense of Iran's territorial integrity and political independence to the regular military (artesh), while it gave the Pasdaran the responsibility of preserving the Revolution itself.

    Days after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's return to Tehran on 1 February 1979, Mehdi Bazargan's interim administration established the Pasdaran under a decree issued by Khomeini on 5 May. The Pasdaran was intended to protect the Revolution and to assist the ruling clerics in the day-to-day enforcement of the new government's Islamic codes and morality. There were other, perhaps more important, reasons for establishing the Pasdaran. The Revolution needed to rely on a force of its own rather than borrowing the previous regime's tainted units. As one of the first revolutionary institutions, the Pasdaran helped legitimize the Revolution and gave the new government an armed basis of support. Moreover, the establishment of the Pasdaran served notice to both the population and the regular armed forces that the Khomeini government was quickly developing its own enforcement body. Thus, the Pasdaran, along with its political counterpart, Crusade for Reconstruction, brought a new order to Iran. In time, the Pasdaran would rival the police and the judiciary in terms of its functions. It would even challenge the performance of the regular armed forces on the battlefield.

    IRGC's Naval special forces, S.N.S.F.

    Although the IRGC operated independently of the regular armed forces, it was often considered to be a military force in its own right due to its important role in Iranian defense. The IRGC consists of ground, naval, and aviation troops, which parallel the structure of the regular military. Unique to the Pasdaran, however, has been control of Iran's strategic missile and rocket forces.

    Also contained under the umbrella of the more conventional Pasdaran, were the Basij Forces (Mobilization Resistance Force), a network of potentially up to a million active individuals who could be called upon in times of need. The Basij could be committed to assist in the defense of the country against internal or external threats, but by 2008 had also been deployed in mobilizing voters in elections and alleged tampering during such activities. Another element was the Quds Force, a special forces element tasked with unconventional warfare roles and known to be involved providing assistance and training to various militant organizations around the world.

    Yahya Rahim Safavi, head of the IRGC since 1997, was dismissed as commander in chief of the Revolutionary Guards in August 2007. The dismissal of Safavi disrupted the balance of power in Iran to the advantage of conservatives. Analysis in the international press considered the removal of Safavi to be a sign of change in the defense strategies of Iran, but the general policies of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps are not personally determined by its commander.[44]

    Military structure
    IRGC tank in 2012 military parade in Tehran

    In late July 2008 reports originating that the IRGC was in the process of dramatically changing its structure. In a shake-up, in September 2008 Iran's Revolutionary Guards established 31 divisions and an autonomous missile command. The new structure changes the IRGC from a centralized to a decentralized force with 31 provincial corps, whose commanders wield extensive authority and power. According to the plan, each of Iran's thirty provinces will have a provincial corps, except Tehran Province, which will have two.[45]

    Basij
    Main article: Basij

    The Basij is a paramilitary volunteer militia founded by the order of the Ayatollah Khomeini in November 1979. The Basij are (at least in theory) subordinate to, and receive their orders from, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and current Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. However they have also been described as "a loosely allied group of organizations" including "many groups controlled by local clerics." Currently, the Basij serve as an auxiliary force engaged in activities such as internal security as well as law enforcement auxiliary, the providing of social service, organizing of public religious ceremonies, and as morality police and the suppression of dissident gatherings.

    Quds Force
    Main article: Quds Force

    The elite Quds Force (or Jerusalem Force), sometimes described as the successor to the Shah's Imperial Guards, is estimated to be 2,000–5,000 in number.[19] It is a special operations unit, handling activities abroad.[46] The force basically does not engage directly.

    Aerospace Force of the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution
    Main article: Aerospace Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
    Qiam (left) and Sejjil 2 (right) ballistic missiles in a 2012 exhibition
    Main article: Navy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
    One of the various types of fast attack craft used by the IRGC

    IRGC started naval operations using mainly swarm tactics and speedboats during "Tanker War" phase of the Iran–Iraq War.

    IRGC Navy and the regular Artesh Navy overlap functions and areas of responsibility, but they are distinct in terms of how they are trained and equipped—and more importantly also in how they fight. The Revolutionary Guards Navy has a large inventory of small fast attack craft, and specializes in asymmetric hit-and-run tactics. It is more akin to a guerrilla force at sea, and maintains large arsenals of coastal defense and anti-ship cruise missiles and mines.[47] It has also a Takavar (special force) unit, called Sepah Navy Special Force (S.N.S.F.).

    Ground forces
    Main article: Ground Forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
    Ansar-ul-Mahdi Corps

    The Ansar-ul-Mahdi (Followers of Imam Mahdi (12th Shia Imam) Corps is primarily responsible for the protection of top officials of government and parliament (excluding the Supreme Leader). As an elite, secretive force within the I.R.G.C Ground force, its officers are entrusted with many other special assignments, such as Counter Intelligence & Covert Operations beyond Iran's borders.

    The corps has four layers of protection for top officials and the agents go to each layer according to their experience and loyalty. The current commander of Ansar-Ul-Mehdi is Colonel Asad Zadeh.[48][49]

    Size
    Zelzal-3

    The IISS Military Balance 2007 says the IRGC has 125,000+ personnel and controls the Basij on mobilisation.[50] It estimates the IRGC Ground and Aerospace Forces are 100,000 strong and is 'very lightly manned' in peacetime. It estimates there are up to 20 infantry divisions, some independent brigades, and one airborne brigade.[51]

    The IISS estimates the IRGC Naval Forces are 20,000 strong including 5,000 Marines in one brigade of three or four Marine Battalions.,[52] and are equipped with some coastal defence weapons (some HY-2/CSS-C-3 Seersucker SSM batteries and some artillery batteries) and 50 patrol boats. The IRGC air arm, says the IISS, controls Iran's strategic missile force and has an estimated one brigade of Shahab-1/2 with 12–18 launchers, and a Shahab-3 unit. The IISS says of the Shahab-3 unit 'estimated 1 battalion with estimated 6 single launchers each with estimated 4 Shahab-3 strategic IRBM.'

    Senior commanders

    Combat history

    Iran–Iraq War
    Main article: Iran–Iraq War

    Lebanon Civil War
    Further information: 1982 Lebanon War

    During the Lebanese Civil War, the IRGC allegedly sent troops to train fighters in response to the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.[60] In Lebanon, political parties had staunch opinions regarding the IRGC's presence. Some, mainly the Christian militias such as the Lebanese Forces, Phalanges, and most of the Christian groups declared war on the IRGC, claiming they violated Lebanese sovereignty, while others, including Muslim militias, were neutral to their presence. Groups such as the PSP and Mourabiton did not approve of their presence, but to preserve political alliances they decided to remain silent on the matter.

    2006 Lebanon War
    Further information: 2006 Lebanon War

    During the 2006 Lebanon War, several Iranian Revolutionary Guards were reportedly killed by Israeli forces in Baalbek, a town close to the Syrian border.[61] Israeli officials believe that Iranian Revolutionary Guards forces were responsible for training and equipping the Hezbollah fighters behind the missile attack on the INS Hanit which left four Israeli sailors dead and seriously damaged the vessel.[62]

    2006 plane crash

    In January 2006, an IRGC Falcon crashed near Oroumieh, about 560 miles northwest of Tehran, near the Turkish border, Iranian media reported. All fifteen passengers died, including twelve senior IRGC commanders.[54] Among the dead was General Ahmad Kazemi, the IRGC ground forces commander, and Iran–Iraq War veteran.[63]

    Gen. Masoud Jazayeri, spokesman for the IRGC, told state radio that both of the plane's engines had failed, its landing gear had jammed, and there was snow and poor visibility at the time.[64]

    Possible attacks on Quds Force

    On 7 July 2008, investigative journalist and author Seymour Hersh wrote an article in The New Yorker stating that the Bush Administration had signed a Presidential Finding authorizing the CIA's Special Activities Division to begin cross border paramilitary operations from Iraq and Afghanistan into Iran. These operations would be against the Quds Force, the commando arm of the IRGC that had been blamed for repeated acts of violence in Iraq, and "high-value targets" in the war on terror.[65]

    October 2009 Pishin bombing
    Main article: 2009 Pishin bombing

    In October 2009, several top commanders of the Revolutionary Guards were killed in a suicide bombing in the Pishin region of Sistan-Baluchistan, in the south-east of Iran. The Iranian state television said 31 people died in the attack, and more than 25 were injured. Shia and Sunni tribal leaders were also killed. The Sunni Baluchi insurgent group Jundullah claimed responsibility for the attack. The Iranian government initially blamed the United States for involvement in the attacks,[66] as well as Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and later Pakistan for their alleged support of the Jundallah group.[67][68] The United States denied involvement,[69] but some reports of US assistance to Jundallah during the Bush administration have come from Western sources.[70] The attacks appear to have originated in Pakistan and several suspects have been arrested.[71][72]

    Syria, 2011–present

    Prior to the Syrian war, Iran had between 2,000 and 3,000 IRGC officers stationed in Syria, helping to train local troops and managing supply routes of arms and money to neighboring Lebanon.[73]

    General Qa'ani, Senior officer of Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, said: "If the Islamic Republic was not present in Syria, the massacre of civilians would have been twice as bad. Had physically and non-physically stopped the rebels from killing many more among the Syrian people."[74]

    Iranian Revolutionary Guard soldiers, along with fellow Shi'ite forces from Hezbollah and members of Iran's Basij militia participated in the capture of Qusair from rebel forces on 9 June 2013.[75][76] In 2014, Iran increased its deployment of IRGC in Syria.[73]

    194 IRGC troops have been killed in Syria; almost all of these soldiers were officers, with several even reaching the rank of Brigadier.[77][78] Additionally, 354 Afghan combatants died[79][80] who were fighting under the command of the IRGC, as part of the IRGC-equipped and trained Fatemiyoun Brigade, which is part of Hezbollah Afghanistan.[81] Another 21 Pakistanis also died as part of the Zainabiyoun Brigade.[80][82] The Afghan and Pakistani immigrants volunteered to go to Syria in exchange for salaries and citizenship. The Afghans were recruited largely from refugees inside Iran, and usually had combat experience before joining the IRGC; their status as members of the Iranian military is only vaguely acknowledged and sometimes denied, despite the troops being uniformed fighters led by IRGC officers. They were trained and equipped in Iran, paid salaries by the Iranian military, and received state funerals involving uniformed IRGC personnel.[81] Mid to late October 2015 was particularly bloody for the IRGC, due to them stepping up their involvement in offensives around Aleppo. During this time, 30 IRGC officers, including "three generals, battalion commanders, captains and lieutenants" and "one pilot" were killed in fighting in Syria, as were several Afghan and Pakistani auxiliaries.[83][84]

    The fallen include General Hossein Hamadani,[85] Farshad Hosounizadeh (IRGC colonel and former commander of the Saberin Special Forces Brigade), Mostafa Sadrzadeh (commander of the Omar Battalion of the Fatmiyoon Brigade), and Hamid Mojtaba Mokhtarband (IRGC commander).[84]

    Iraq, 2014–present
    Further information: Iranian intervention in Iraq (2014–present), International military intervention against ISIL, and 2019–20 Persian Gulf crisis

    Two battalions of Revolutionary Guards were reported to be operating in Iraq trying to combat the 2014 Northern Iraq offensive.[86] The IRGC is considered to be a principle backer of the Popular Mobilization Forces, a loose coalition of Shi'a militias allied with the Iraqi government in its fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In addition, Major General Qasem Soleimani has been an instrumental force in the Iranian ground mission in Iraq against ISIS, purportedly planning the Second Battle of Tikrit.[87] In December 2014, Brigadier General Hamid Taqavi, a veteran of the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq War, was killed by snipers in Samarra.[88] In May 2017, Shaaban Nassiri, a senior IRGC commander was killed in combat near Mosul, Iraq.[89] In December 2019, the U.S. Air Force conducted airstrikes on weapons caches and facilities of the IRGC-sponsored militant group Kata'ib Hezbollah. In retaliation, the group attacked the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad in the Green Zone.[90][91] On January 1, 2020, Major General Soleimani was killed in a U.S. drone strike at Baghdad International Airport along with the PMF commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.[92]

    2014 Israeli drone shoot down

    Iran revolutionary guards said that they had shot down an Israeli drone approaching the Natanz nuclear facility.[93][94][95] According to ISNA, "The downed aircraft was of the stealth, radar-evasive type ... and was targeted by a ground-to-air missile before it managed to enter the area."[93][95] The statement by revolutionary guards did not mention how they recognized it as an Israeli drone. Israel offered no comment.[94]

    Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752

    Iranian authorities initially denied responsibility for the Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 incident. After international pressure, the Revolutionary Guard later admitted that the plane had been shot down by mistake.[96]

    The Aerospace Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps took "full responsibility" for unintentionally shooting down Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 with a surface-to-air missile on January 8, 2020.[97] President Hassan Rouhani stated that the plane was approaching an IRCC base when it was shot down: according to a senior Revolutionary Guards commander, the plane was mistaken for a cruise missile.[98] On 17 January 2020, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) which mistakenly shot down a Ukrainian passenger plane, were protected by Ali Khamenei in the Friday sermon. He said that the downing was a "bitter" tragedy and additionally declared that "Iran's enemies" used the crash and the military's admission to "weaken" the IRGC.[99]

    Influence

    Political
    See also: Sanctions against Iran and Criticism of the Iran nuclear deal

    Ayatollah Khomeini urged that the country's military forces should remain unpoliticized. However, the Constitution, in Article 150, defines the IRGC as the "guardian of the Revolution and of its achievements" which is at least partly a political mission. His original views have therefore been the subject of debate. Supporters of the Basiji have argued for politicization, while reformists, moderates and Hassan Khomeini opposed it. President Rafsanjani forced military professionalization and ideological deradicalization on the IRGC to curb its political role, but the Pasdaran became natural allies of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei when reformists threatened him.[100] The IRGC grew stronger under President Ahmedinejad, and assumed formal command of the Basiji militia in early 2009.[101]

    Although never explicitly endorsing or affiliating themselves with any political parties, the Alliance of Builders of Islamic Iran (or Abadgaran), is widely viewed as a political front for the Revolutionary Guards. Many former members (including Ahmadinejad) have joined this party in recent years and the Revolutionary Guards have reportedly given them financial support.

    As an elite group, members of Pasdaran have influence in Iran's political world. President Ahmadinejad joined the IRGC in 1985, serving first in military operation in Iraqi Kurdistan before leaving the front line to take charge of logistics. A majority of his first cabinet consisted of IRGC veterans.[102] Nearly one third of the members elected to Iran's Majlis in 2004 are also "Pásdárán".[103] Others have been appointed as ambassadors, mayors, provincial governors and senior bureaucrats.[46] However, IRGC veteran status does not imply a single viewpoint.[100]

    Economic activity
    See also: Economy of Iran and Smuggling in Iran

    IRGC first expanded into commercial activity through informal social networking of veterans and former officials. IRGC officials confiscated assets of many refugees who had fled Iran after the fall of Abolhassan Banisadr's government. It is now a vast conglomerate, controlling Iran's missile batteries and nuclear program but also a multibillion-dollar business empire reaching almost all economic sectors.[22] Estimates of the fraction of Iran's economy that it controls through a series of subsidiaries and trusts[104] vary from ten percent[105] to over 50.[106]

    The Los Angeles Times estimates that IRGC has ties to over one hundred companies, with its annual revenue exceeding $12 billion in business and construction.[107] IRGC has been awarded billions of dollars in contracts in the oil, gas and petrochemical industries, as well as major infrastructure projects.[108]

    The following commercial entities have been named by the United States as owned or controlled by the IRGC and its leaders.[109]

    • Khatam al-Anbia Construction Headquarters, the IRGC's major engineering arm & one of Iran's largest contractors employing about 25,000 engineers and staff on military (70%) and non-military (30%) projects[100] worth over $7 billion in 2006.[109]
    • Oriental Oil Kish (oil and gas industry)[110]
    • Ghorb Nooh[110]
    • Sahel Consultant Engineering[110]
    • Ghorb Karbala[110]
    • Sepasad Engineering Co. (excavation and tunnel construction)[110]
    • Omran Sahel[110]
    • Hara Company (excavation and tunnel construction)[110]
    • Gharargahe Sazandegi Ghaem[110]
    • Imensazen Consultant Engineers Institute (subsidiary of Khatam al-Anbia)
    • Fater Engineering Institute (subsidiary of Khatam al-Anbia)

    In September 2009, the Government of Iran sold 51% of the shares of the Telecommunication Company of Iran to the Mobin Trust Consortium (Etemad-e-Mobin), a group affiliated with the Guards, for the sum of $7.8 billion. This was the largest transaction on the Tehran Stock Exchange in history.[111][112] IRGC also owns 45% participation in automotive Bahman Group and has a majority stake in Iran's naval giant SADRA through Khatam al-Anbia.[100][113]

    The IRGC also exerts influence over bonyads, wealthy, non-governmental ostensibly charitable foundations controlled by key clerics. The pattern of revolutionary foundations mimics the style of informal and extralegal economic networks from the time of the Shah. Their development started in the early 1990s, gathered pace over the next decade, and accelerated even more with many lucrative no-bid contracts from the Ahmadinejad presidency.[110] The IRGC exerts informal, but real, influence over many such organizations including:

    • Mostazafan Foundation (Foundation of the Oppressed or The Mostazafan Foundation)
    • Bonyad Shahid va Omur-e Janbazan (Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs)[100]

    As an elite force with great economic assets it has developed into what some observers call an "untouchable élite" and somewhat isolated in Iranian society. According to a "former senior Middle Eastern intelligence officer", “they have their own schools, their own markets, their own neighborhoods, their own resorts. The neighborhoods look like a carbon copy of Beverly Hills.”[106]

    Analysis

    Mehdi Khalaji of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy argues that the IRGC is "the spine of the current political structure and a major player in the Iranian economy."[114] The once theocratic state has evolved into a garrison state, like Burma, whereby the military dominates social, cultural, political, and economic life, protecting the government from internal rather than external opponents.[114]

    Greg Bruno and Jayshree Bajoria of the Council on Foreign Relations agree, stating that the IRGC has expanded well beyond its mandate and into a "socio-military-political-economic force" that deeply penetrates Iran's power structure.[115] "The Guards' involvement in politics has grown to unprecedented levels since 2004, when IRCG won at least 16 percent of the 290 seats" in the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran.[115] During the elections of March 2008, IRGC veterans won 182 out of 290 seats, helping Mahmoud Ahmadinejad consolidate power.[116]

    Half of Ahmadinejad's cabinet was composed of former IRGC officers while several others were appointed to provincial governorships.[116]

    Ali Alfoneh of the American Enterprise Institute contends that "While the presence of former IRGC officers in the cabinet is not a new phenomenon, their numbers under Ahmadinejad—they occupy nine of the twenty-one ministry portfolios—are unprecedented."[117] Additionally, Ahmadinejad successfully purged provincial governorships of Rafsanjani and Khatami supporters and replaced them not only with IRGC members, but also members of the Basij and the Islamic Republic prison administration.[118]

    The IRGC chief, General Mohammad Ali Ja’fari, announced that the Guards’ would go through internal restructuring in order to counter "internal threats to the Islamic Republic."[116] Bruce Riedel, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and former CIA analyst, argues the Guards was created to protect the government against a possible coup.[115]

    Since the disputed 2009 presidential elections, debate over how powerful the IRGC is has reemerged. Danielle Pletka and Ali Alfoneh see the irreversible militarization of Iran's government.[115] Abbas Milani, director of Iranian Studies at Stanford University, believes the Guards’ power actually exceeds that of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei.[115] Frederic Wehrey, adjunct Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation believes the Revolutionary Guards is not a cohesive unit of similar-minded conservatives but rather a factionalized institution that is hardly bent on overthrowing their masters.[115]

    U.S. Department of the Treasury terrorist aid claims

    The U.S. Department of the Treasury claims the Corp has supported several organizations the U.S. deems to be terrorist, including Hizballah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), and the Taliban.[119] In the U.S. Department of the Treasury's report, four IRGC senior officials, Hushang Alladad, Hossein Musavi, Hasan Mortezavi, and Mohammad Reza Zahedi, were specifically named for providing support to terrorist organizations. Hushang Alladad, a financial officer for the IRGC, was cited as personally administering financial support to terrorist groups including Hizballah, Hamas, and PIJ.[119] Both General Hossein Musavi and Colonel Hasan Mortevazi were claimed to have provided financial and material support to the Taliban. Mohammad Reza Zahedi, the IRGC commander in Lebanon, was claimed to have played a crucial role in Iran's aid to Hizballah. According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Zahedi served as a liaison to Hizballah and Syrian intelligence services as well as taking part in weapon deals involving Hizballah.[119] The U.S. Treasury report goes on to detail the IRGC's methods of support for terrorist groups: "The Government of Iran also uses the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and IRGC-QF to implement its foreign policy goals, including, but not limited to, seemingly legitimate activities that provide cover for intelligence operations and support to terrorist and insurgent groups. These activities include economic investment, reconstruction, and other types of aid to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon, implemented by companies and institutions that act for or on behalf of, or are owned or controlled by the IRGC and the Iranian government."[119]

    Controversy
    Main articles: Controversies surrounding the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Fuel smuggling in Iran

    From its origin as an ideologically driven militia, the IRGC has taken an ever more assertive role in virtually every aspect of Iranian society. Its part in suppressing dissent has led many analysts to describe the events surrounding the 12 June 2009 presidential election as a military coup, and the IRGC as an authoritarian military security government for which its Shiite clerical system is no more than a facade.[22]

    Since its establishment, IRGC has been involved in many economic and military activities among which some raised controversies. The organization has been accused of smuggling (including importing illegal alcoholic beverages, cigarettes and satellite dishes, into Iran via jetties not supervised by the Government[100][120][121][122]), training and supplying Hezbollah[123][124] and Hamas[125] fighters, and of being involved in the Iraq War.[126]

    In December 2009 evidence uncovered during an investigation by the Guardian newspaper and Guardian Films linked the IRGC to the kidnappings of 5 Britons from a government ministry building in Baghdad in 2007. Three of the hostages, Jason Creswell, Jason Swindlehurst and Alec Maclachlan, were killed. Alan Mcmenemy's body was never found but Peter Moore was released on 30 December 2009. The investigation uncovered evidence that Moore, 37, a computer expert from Lincoln was targeted because he was installing a system for the Iraqi Government that would show how a vast amount of international aid was diverted to Iran's militia groups in Iraq.[127]

    According to Geneive Abdo IRGC members were appointed "as ambassadors, mayors, cabinet ministers, and high-ranking officials at state-run economic institutions" during the administration of president Ahmadinejad.[25] Appointments in 2009 by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei have given "hard-liners" in the guard "unprecedented power" and included "some of the most feared and brutal men in Iran."[25]

    In May 2019, the United States accused the IRGC of being "directly responsible" for an attack on commercial ships in the Gulf of Oman. Michael M. Gilday, United States director of the Joint Staff, described US intelligence attributing that the IRGC used limpet mines to attack four oil tankers anchored in the Gulf of Oman for bunkering through the Port of Fujairah.[128]

    Terrorist designation and sanctions
    See also: List of designated terrorist groups

    Since 15 April 2019, the United States, which opposes the activities of Sepah, considers the IRGC as a terrorist organization,[129] which some top CIA and Pentagon officials reportedly opposed.[130] On 8 April, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu tweeted in Hebrew that America's terrorist designation was the fulfillment of “another important request of mine.”[131] This designation was criticized by a number of governments including Turkey, Iraq and China as well as the Islamic Consultative Assembly, Iran's parliament, in which members wore IRGC uniforms in protest.[132][133]

    On April 29, 2019, United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael Mulroy said Iran posed five threats. The first was Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon. The second was to maritime security in the Straits of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab, because a substantial portion of energy trade and commercial goods go through those areas. The third was because of their support to proxies and terrorist organizations, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria, Houthis in Yemen, some Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq and safe-harboring senior al-Qaeda leaders in Iran. The fourth was Iranian made ballistic missiles sent to Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen for use against Saudi Arabia and to Syria with Hezbollah to use against Israel. Cyber is the fifth threat and a growing concern.[134][135][136] He also said that the terrorist designation did not grant any additional authorities to the Department of Defense and that they were not asking for any.[136]

    The IRGC has never been designated as a terrorist organization by the United Nations, although the UNSCR 1929 had its assets frozen (this was lifted in 2016). The European Union has already sanctions in place on the IRGC, though it is not designated as a terrorist group as such.[137][138]

    Although Saudi Arabia and Bahrain already designated the IRGC as a terrorist organisation,[139][140] several countries such as Canada and Australia are examining the possibility to designate the group as well (Canada already outlawed Quds Force in 2012).[141][142]

    According to Arab News, a 2020 report by the "Tony Blair Institute for Global Change" said that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is an “institutionalized militia” that "uses its vast resources to spread a 'mission of jihad' through an 'ideological army' of recruits and proxies".[143]

    Response to terrorist organization designation

    The move was met with unfavorable reactions from Iranian leaders and militants.[144] Shortly after the US announced the designation, the Iranian government declared the United States Central Command, whose area of responsibility includes the Middle East, as a terrorist organization.[145] According to Iran's Supreme National Security Council, the move "was in response to the illegal and unwise move from the U.S."[145] On the following day, Iranian Members of Parliament displayed their support of the IRGC by collectively wearing green military pants and chanted "death to America" as they opened session. Iranian president Hassan Rouhani also responded to the move, commenting that it was a mistake which would only increase the IRGC's popularity in Iran and elsewhere.[145]

    CountryDate
     Bahrain23 October 2018[139]
     Saudi Arabia
     United States15 April 2019[129]

    Since the designation, the United States Department of State’s Rewards for Justice Program has offered a reward of up to USD $15 million for financial background information about the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its branches,[146] including an IRGC financier, Abdul Reza Shahlai,[lower-alpha 1] who it says was responsible for a raid that killed five American soldiers in Karbala, Iraq on January 20, 2007.[149]

    gollark: Presumably these are weird unbranded DIMMs of some sort?
    gollark: I use a combination of GNU/Linux and not running random untrusted binaries.
    gollark: Really? That explains a lot.
    gollark: The games I like tend to be small because they rely more on interesting gameplay than increasingly shiny graphics.
    gollark: So far I've mostly avoided those, I don't have any bigger than 20GB or so.

    See also

    References and notes
    Notes
    1. The United States unsuccessfully targeted Abdul Reza Shahlai in Yemen on the same day of assassination of Qasem Soleimani,[147] which led to the death of Mohammad Mirza, a Quds Force operative, instead.[148]
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    Further reading
    • Hesam Forozan, The Military in Post-Revolutionary Iran: The Evolution and Roles of the Revolutionary Guards, c. 2017
    • Safshekan, Roozbeh; Sabet, Farzan, "The Ayatollah's Praetorians: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the 2009 Election Crisis", The Middle East Journal, Volume 64, Number 4, Autumn 2010, pp. 543–558(16).
    • Wise, Harold Lee (2007). Inside the Danger Zone: The U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf 1987–88. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-59114-970-5. (discusses U.S. military clashes with Iranian Revolutionary Guard during the Iran–Iraq War)
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