Colombian conflict

The Colombian conflict (Spanish: Conflicto armado interno de Colombia) began on May 27, 1964 and is a low-intensity asymmetric war between the government of Colombia, far-right paramilitary groups, crime syndicates and far-left guerrilla groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), fighting each other to increase their influence in Colombian territory.[39] Some of the most important international contributors to the Colombian conflict include multinational corporations, the United States,[40][41][42] Cuba[43] and the drug trafficking industry.[44]

Colombian conflict (1964–present)
Part of the Cold War (1964–1992) and the War on Drugs (1993–present)
Top: A Colombian marine on a field training exercise Bottom: FARC guerrillas at the Caguan peace talks
Date 27 May 1964[1][2] – present (56 years, 2 months, 3 weeks and 1 day) Location Colombia Status Ongoing Colombia–FARC peace deal in 2016 Territorial changes El Caguán DMZ (currently non-existent)
Belligerents
Colombia Supported by:  United States  Spain[3]  United Kingdom 14 Intelligence Company[4]  Peru	Paramilitaries (Far-right) AUC (1997–08) AAA (1978–99) CONVIVIR (1994–07) ACCU (1964–09) Los Paisas (2008–14) [5] Black Eagles (2006–present) Los Rastrojos[6] (2004–16) Libertadores del Vichada (2010–17)[7] Bloque Meta (2010–17)[8] ERPAC (1964–2010) Clan del Golfo Oficina de Envigado	Guerrillas (Far-left) ELN FARC dissidents[9] EPL[10][11][12](residual) FARIP(?) FARC (1964–2017) ERP (1985–2007) CGSB (1987–90) M-19 (1964–90) MOEC (1964–95) MAQL (1984–91) ERC (1964–92) ERG (1964–2008) PRT (1964–91) Supported by:  Venezuela (alleged)[13][14][15][16]  Cuba[17][18]  Soviet Union (until 1989) [18] ETA (1964–2018) PIRA (1969–98)
Commanders and leaders
Colombian government: Iván Duque Márquez (2018–) Juan Manuel Santos (2010–18) Alvaro Uribe Velez (2002–10) Andrés Pastrana Arango (1998–02) Ernesto Samper Pizano (1994–98) César Gaviria Trujillo (1990–94)	AUC: Fidel Castaño † Carlos Castaño † Vicente Castaño[19] Rodrigo Tovar Pupo Salvatore Mancuso Diego Murillo	FARC: Timoleón Jiménez Iván Márquez Joaquín Gómez Mauricio Jaramillo ELN: Antonio García Francisco Galán
Strength
National Police: 175,250[20] Army: 237,567[20] Navy: 33,913[20] Air Force: 14,033[20]	Paramilitary successor groups, including the Black Eagles: 3,749 – 13,000[21][22][23]	FARC: 13,980 (2016[24])[25][26][27][28][29][30] ELN: 1,380 – 3,000 (2013)[28][29][31] EPL: 400 (2017)[12] FARC dissidents: 1200 (2018)[32]
Casualties and losses
Army and Police: 4,908 killed since 2004[20] 20,001 injured since 2004[20]	AUC: 2,200 killed 35,000 demobilized. BACRIM: 222 killed[20] 18,506 captured[20]	FARC, ELN and other irregular military groups: 11,484 killed since 2004[20] 26,648 demobilized since 2002[33] 34,065 captured since 2004[20]
Total casualties: 218,094[34][35] Total civilians killed: 177,307[34] People abducted: 27,023[34] Victims of enforced disappearances: 25,007[34] Victims of anti-personnel mines: 10,189[34] Total people displaced: 4,744,046–5,712,506[34][36] Total number of children displaced: 2.3 million children.[37] Number of refugees: 340,000[38] The number of children killed: 45,000[37] Missing children: 8,000 minors[37]
(De): Demobilized (Dis): Dismantled

It is historically rooted in the conflict known as La Violencia, which was triggered by the 1948 assassination of populist political leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán,[45] and in the aftermath of the anti-communist repression (backed by the United States and others)[46] in rural Colombia in the 1960s that led Liberal and Communist militants to re-organize into FARC.[47]

The reasons for fighting vary from group to group. The FARC and other guerrilla movements claim to be fighting for the rights of the poor in Colombia to protect them from government violence and to provide social justice through communism.[48] The Colombian government claims to be fighting for order and stability, and to protect the rights and interests of its citizens. The paramilitary groups claim to be reacting to perceived threats by guerrilla movements.[49] All sides have engaged in drug trafficking and terrorism and have been criticized for numerous human rights violations.

According to a study by Colombia's National Centre for Historical Memory, 220,000 people have died in the conflict between 1958 and 2013, most of them civilians (177,307 civilians and 40,787 fighters) and more than five million civilians were forced from their homes between 1985 – 2012, generating the world's second largest population of internally displaced persons (IDPs).[34][50][51] 16.9% of the population in Colombia has been a direct victim of the war.[52] 2.3 million children have been displaced from their homes, and 45,000 children killed, according to national figures cited by Unicef. In total, one in three of the 7.6 million registered victims of the conflict are children, and since 1985, 8,000 minors have disappeared.[37] A Special Unit was created to search for persons deemed as missing within the context of and due to the armed conflict.[53]

On 23 June 2016, the Colombian government and the FARC rebels signed a historic ceasefire deal, bringing them closer to ending more than five decades of conflict.[54] Although the deal was rejected in the subsequent October plebiscite,[55] the same month, President of Colombia Juan Manuel Santos was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to bring the country's more than 50-year-long civil war to an end.[56] A revised peace deal was signed the following month and submitted to Congress for approval.[57] The House of Representatives unanimously approved the plan on November 30, a day after the Senate also gave its backing.[58] As of 2020, fighting had resumed.

Armed conflict

The armed conflict in Colombia emerged due to a combination of economic, political and social factors in the country.[59] Various organizations and scholars that have studied the conflict trace it back to a long history of political violence, a high social and economic inequality, the lack of strong state capable of providing for its citizens (especially in the rural and remote areas of the country), conflict of political ideologies (mainly capitalist-right wing groups represented by the government against communist left wings groups represented by the armed groups), and an unequal distribution of land, power, and wealth in the country.[60] The precise date of the conflict's beginning is still disputed, with some scholars claiming it started in 1958 with the start of the Frente Nacional ("National Front") and the end of La Violencia ("The Violence")[61] meanwhile others believe it was in 1964 with the creation of the FARC and the end of the National Front. Some scholars even trace it back to the 1920s, with the unequal distribution of land in the country which has been one of the main causes and disputes of the conflict throughout the years.[62]

In the early period (1970s), guerrilla groups like the FARC, the ELN and others adopted a slogan of greater equality through communism,[63] which came to be supported by many people, mostly in low-income and rural areas of the country.{{citation needed}} During these years the violence was low in intensity and occurred mainly in remote parts of the country. However, the balance of power and influence shifted in the mid-1980s when Colombia granted greater political and fiscal autonomy to local governments, strengthening the position of the Colombian Government in more remote regions of the country.[59] In 1985, during peace talks between President Belisario Betancur and the FARC, the armed group co-created the left-wing Patriotic Union (UP) political party as a path to leave violence behind and eventually move into politics. However, between 1985 and 2002 right-wing paramilitaries, with the help and support from parts of the government, murdered and disappeared 4,153 members and supporters of the party, including two presidential candidates, six of 16 congressmen, 17 regional representatives and 163 councilmen.[64] This systematic killing decimated the organization and aggravated the broader conflict.[65]

In the 1980s the level of violence increased in many parts of the country as a result of the beginning of the drug trafficking. Trafficking had begun in the 1960s and 70s, when a group of Americans began to smuggle marijuana. Later, the American Mafia began to establish drug trafficking in Colombia in cooperation with local marijuana producers.[66] Cocaine (and other drugs) manufactured in Colombia were historically mostly consumed in the US as well as Europe. Organized crime in Colombia grew increasingly powerful in the 1970s and 80s with the introduction of massive drug trafficking to the United States from Colombia.[67][68] After the Colombian Government dismantled many of the drug cartels that appeared in the country during the 1980s, left-wing guerrilla groups and rightwing paramilitary organizations resumed some of their drug-trafficking activities and resorted to extortion and kidnapping for financing, activities which led to a loss of support from the local population.[59] These funds helped finance paramilitaries and guerrillas, allowing these organizations to buy weapons which were then sometimes used to attack military and civilian targets.[69][70]

During the presidency of Álvaro Uribe, the government applied more military pressure on the FARC and other outlawed far-left groups. After the offensive, many security indicators improved.[71] As part of a controversial peace process, the AUC (right-wing paramilitaries) as a formal organization had ceased to function.[50][72] Colombia achieved a great decrease in cocaine production, leading White House drug czar R. Gil Kerlikowske to announce that Colombia was no longer the world's biggest producer of cocaine.[73][74] The United States is still the world's largest consumer of cocaine[75] and other illegal drugs.[76][77][78]

In February 2008, millions of Colombians demonstrated against the FARC and other outlawed groups.[79][80][81] 26,648 FARC and ELN combatants have decided to demobilize since 2002.[33] During these years the military forces of the Republic of Colombia were strengthened.[82]

The Peace process in Colombia, 2012 refers to the dialogue in Havana, Cuba between the Colombian government and guerrilla of FARC-EP with the aim to find a political solution to the armed conflict. After almost four years of peace negotiations, the Colombian state and the FARC announced consensus on a 6-point plan towards peace and reconciliation.[83] The government also began a process of assistance and reparation for victims of conflict.[84][85] Recently, U.P. supporters reconstituted the political party, within the process of reconciliation.[86] Colombia's congress approved the revised peace accord.[58]

In February 2015, the Historical Commission on the Conflict and its Victims (Comisión Histórica del Conflicto Armado y sus Víctimas – CHCV) published its report entitled "Contribution to an Understanding of the Armed Conflict in Colombia". The document addresses the "multiple reasons for the conflict, the principle factors and circumstances that made it possible and the most notable impacts on the population", and explains Colombia's armed conflict in terms of international law.[87]

Background

The origin of the armed conflict in Colombia goes back to 1920 with agrarian disputes over the Sumapaz and Tequendama regions.[88] Peasants at the time fought over ownership of coffee lands which caused the liberals and conservative parties to take sides in the conflict, worsening it.

In 1948 the assassination of populist Jorge Eliécer Gaitán radically stirred up the armed conflict. It led to the Bogotazo, an urban riot killing more than 4,000 people, and subsequently to ten years of sustained rural warfare between members of Colombian Liberal Party and the Colombian Conservative Party, a period known as La Violencia ("The Violence"), which took the lives of more than 200,000 people throughout the countryside.[45]

As La Violencia wound down, most self-defense and guerrilla units made up of Liberal Party supporters demobilized, but at the same time some former Liberals and active Communist groups continued operating in several rural enclaves. One of the Liberal bands was a group known as the "Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia" (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), or FARC, formed by Pedro Antonio Marin in 1964. The goal of the FARC, among other things, was redistribution of land that would benefit poor peasant farmers like Marin, along with the desire to establish a communist state.[89]

Also in 1958, an exclusively bipartisan political alternation system, known as the National Front, resulted from an agreement between the Liberal and Conservative parties. The agreement had come as a result of the two parties attempting to find a final political solution to the decade of mutual violence and unrest, remaining in effect until 1974.[45]

Timeline

1960s

In the early 1960s Colombian Army units loyal to the National Front began to attack peasant communities. This happened throughout Colombia with the Colombian army considering that these peasant communities were enclaves for bandits and Communists. It was the 1964 attack on the community of Marquetalia that motivated the later creation of FARC.[90] Despite the infantry and police encirclement of the villages inside Marquetalia (3500 men swept through the area), Manuel Marulanda managed to escape the army cordon.

Unlike the rural FARC, which had roots in the previous Liberal peasant struggles, the ELN was mostly an outgrowth of university unrest and would subsequently tend to follow a small group of charismatic leaders, including Camilo Torres Restrepo.[91]

Both guerrilla groups remained mostly operational in remote areas of the country during the rest of the 1960s.

The Colombian government organized several short-lived counter-guerrilla campaigns in the late 1950s and early 1960s. These efforts were aided by the U.S. government and the CIA, which employed hunter-killer teams and involved U.S. personnel from the previous Philippine campaign against the Huks, and which would later participate in the subsequent Phoenix Program in the Vietnam War.[49][92]

1970s

By 1974, another challenge to the state's authority and legitimacy had come from the 19th of April Movement (M-19), leading to a new phase in the conflict. The M-19 was a mostly urban guerrilla group, founded in response to an alleged electoral fraud during the final National Front election of Misael Pastrana Borrero (1970–1974) and the forced removal of former president Gustavo Rojas Pinilla.[93]

1980s

By 1982, the perceived passivity of the FARC, together with the relative success of the government's efforts against the M-19 and the ELN, enabled the administration of the Liberal Party's Julio César Turbay Ayala (1978–82) to lift a state-of-siege decree that had been in effect, on and off, for most of the previous 30 years. Under the latest such decree, president Turbay had implemented security policies that, though of some military value against the M-19 in particular, were considered highly questionable both inside and outside Colombian circles due to numerous accusations of military human rights abuses against suspects and captured guerrillas.

Citizen exhaustion due to the conflict's newfound intensity led to the election with 47% of the popular vote of president Belisario Betancur (1982–1986), a Conservative. Betancur directed peace feelers at all the insurgents, and negotiated a 1984 cease-fire with the FARC at La Uribe, Meta, after a 1982 release of many guerrillas imprisoned during the previous effort to overpower them. A truce was also arranged with the M-19. The ELN, however, rejected any negotiations and continued to rebuild through the use of extortion and threats, in particular against oil companies of European and U.S. origin.

At the same time as these developments, the growing illegal drug trade was becoming increasingly important to all participants in the Colombian conflict. Guerrillas and newly wealthy drug lords had mutually uneven relations and numerous incidents occurred between them. Eventually the kidnapping of drug cartel family members by guerrillas led to the creation in 1981 of the Muerte a Secuestradores ("Death to Kidnappers") death squad (MAS). The Medellín Cartel and other cartels came under pressure from the U.S. government and from critical sectors of Colombian society who supported the extradition of suspected Colombian cartel members to the U.S.. The cartels responded by bribing or murdering numerous public officials, politicians and others. Their victims included Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, whose assassination in 1984 led the Betancur administration to confront the drug lords directly.

The first negotiated cease-fire with the M-19 ended when the guerrillas resumed fighting in 1985. The M-19 claimed that the cease-fire had not been fully respected by official security forces, alleged that several of its members had suffered threats and assaults, and questioned the government's real willingness to implement any accords. The Betancur administration in turn criticized the M-19's actions and questioned its commitment to the peace process, while at the same time continuing to advance high-profile negotiations with the FARC. These negotiations led to the creation of the Patriotic Union (Unión Patriótica) -UP-, a legal and non-clandestine political organization.

On November 6, 1985, the M-19 stormed the Colombian Palace of Justice and held the Supreme Court magistrates hostage, intending to put president Betancur on trial. The military responded with force and in the ensuing crossfire some 120 people lost their lives, including most of the guerrillas (several high-ranking operatives among them) and 12 Supreme Court Judges. Both sides blamed each other for the bloodbath, which marked the end of Betancur's peace process.

Meanwhile, individual FARC members initially joined the UP leadership in representation of the guerrilla command, though most of the guerrilla's chiefs and militiamen did not demobilize nor disarm, as that was not a requirement of the process at that point in time. Tension soon significantly increased, as both sides began to accuse each other of not respecting the cease-fire.

According to historian Daniel Pecáut, the creation of the Patriotic Union took the guerrillas' political message to a wider public outside of the traditional communist spheres of influence and led to local electoral victories in regions such as Urabá and Antioquia, with their mayoral candidates winning 23 municipalities and their congressional ones gaining 14 seats (five in the Senate, nine in the lower Chamber) in 1988.[94] According to journalist Steven Dudley, who interviewed ex-FARC as well as former members of the UP and the Communist Party,[95] FARC leader Jacobo Arenas insisted to his subordinates that the UP's creation did not mean that the group would lay down its arms; neither did it imply a rejection of the Seventh Conference's military strategy.[96] Pecáut states that new recruits entered the guerrilla army and its urban militia units during this period, and that the FARC continued to carry out kidnappings and to target regional politicians for assassination.[97]

In October 1987 Jaime Pardo Leal, who had been the UP's presidential candidate the previous year, was assassinated amid a wave of violence in which thousands of the party's members perished at the hands of death squads.[98][99] According to Pecáut, the killers included members of the military and the political class who had opposed Betancur's peace process and considered the UP to be little more than a "facade" for the FARC, as well as drug traffickers and landowners who were also involved in the establishment of paramilitary groups.[100]

1990s

Early 1990s

The Virgilio Barco Vargas (1986–1990) administration, in addition to continuing to handle the difficulties of the complex negotiations with the guerrillas, also inherited a particularly chaotic confrontation against the drug lords, who were engaged in a campaign of terrorism and murder in response to government moves in favor of their extradition overseas.

In June 1987, the ceasefire between FARC and the Colombian government formally collapsed after the guerrillas attacked a military unit in the jungles of Caquetá.[101][102] According to journalist Steven Dudley, FARC founder Jacobo Arenas considered the incident to be a "natural" part of the truce and reiterated the group's intention to continue the dialogue, but President Barco sent an ultimatum to the guerrillas and demanded that they immediately disarm or face military retaliation.[102] Regional guerrilla and Army skirmishes created a situation where each violation of the ceasefire rendered it null in each location, until it was rendered practically nonexistent.

By 1990, at least 2,500 members of the FARC-founded Patriotic Union had been murdered, according to historian Daniel Pecáut, leading up to that year's assassination of presidential candidate Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa. The Colombian government initially blamed drug lord Pablo Escobar for the murder but journalist Steven Dudley argues that many in the UP pointed at then-Interior Minister Carlos Lemos Simmonds for publicly calling out the UP as the "political wing of FARC" shortly before the murder, while others claimed it was the result of an alliance between Fidel Castaño, members of the Colombian military and the DAS.[103] Pecáut and Dudley argue that significant tensions had emerged between Jaramillo, FARC and the Communist Party due to the candidate's recent criticism of the armed struggle and their debates over the rebels' use of kidnapping, almost leading to a formal break.[104][105] Jaramillo's death led to a large exodus of UP militants; in addition, by then many FARC cadres who joined the party had already returned to clandestinity, using the UP experience as an argument in favor of revolutionary war.[99][101][106]

The M-19 and several smaller guerrilla groups were successfully incorporated into a peace process as the 1980s ended and the '90s began, which culminated in the elections for a Constituent Assembly of Colombia that would write a new constitution, which took effect in 1991.

Contacts with the FARC, which had irregularly continued despite the end of the ceasefire and the official 1987 break from negotiations, were temporarily cut off in 1990 under the presidency of César Gaviria Trujillo (1990–1994). The Colombian Army's assault on the FARC's Casa Verde sanctuary at La Uribe, Meta, followed by a FARC offensive that sought to undermine the deliberations of the Constitutional Assembly, began to highlight a significant break in the uneven negotiations carried over from the previous decade.

Both parties nevertheless never completely broke off some amount of political contacts for long, as some peace feelers continued to exist, leading to short rounds of conversations in both Caracas, Venezuela (1991) and Tlaxcala, Mexico (1992). Despite the signing of several documents, no concrete results were achieved when the talks ended.

Mid-1990s

FARC military activity increased throughout the bulk of the 1990s as the group continued to grow in wealth from both kidnapping and drug-related activities, while drug crops rapidly spread throughout the countryside. The guerrillas protected many of the coca growers from eradication campaigns and allowed them to grow and commercialize coca in exchange for a "tax" either in money or in crops.

In this context, FARC had managed to recruit and train more fighters, beginning to use them in concentrated attacks in a novel and mostly unexpected way. This led to a series of high-profile raids and attacks against Colombian state bases and patrols, mostly in the southeast of Colombia but also affecting other areas.

In mid-1996, a civic protest movement made up of an estimated 200,000 coca growers from Putumayo and part of Cauca began marching against the Colombian government to reject its drug war policies, including fumigations and the declaration of special security zones in some departments. Different analysts have stressed that the movement itself fundamentally originated on its own, but at the same time, FARC heavily encouraged the marchers and actively promoted their demands both peacefully and through the threat of force.[107][108]

Additionally, in 1997 and 1998, town councilmen in dozens of municipalities of the south of the country were threatened, killed, kidnapped, forced to resign or to exile themselves to department capitals by the FARC and the ELN.[109][110][111]

In Las Delicias, Caquetá, five FARC fronts (about 400 guerrillas) recognized intelligence pitfalls in a Colombian Army base and exploited them to overrun it on August 30, 1996, killing 34 soldiers, wounding 17 and taking some 60 as prisoners. Another significant attack took place in El Billar, Caquetá on March 2, 1998, where a Colombian Army counterinsurgency battalion was patrolling, resulting in the death of 62 soldiers and the capture of some 43. Other FARC attacks against Police bases in Miraflores, Guaviare and La Uribe, Meta in August 1998 killed more than a hundred soldiers, policemen and civilians, and resulted in the capture or kidnapping of a hundred more.

These attacks, and the dozens of members of the Colombian security forces taken prisoner by the FARC, contributed to increasingly shaming the government of president Ernesto Samper Pizano (1994–1998) in the eyes of sectors of public and political opinion. He was already the target of numerous critics due to revelations of a drug-money scandal surrounding his presidential campaign. Perceptions of corruption due to similar scandals led to Colombia's decertification as a country cooperating with the United States in the war on drugs in 1995 (when the effects of the measure were temporarily waived), 1996 and 1997.[112][113]

The Samper administration reacted against FARC's attacks by gradually abandoning numerous vulnerable and isolated outposts in more than 100,000 km² of the rural countryside, instead concentrating Army and Police forces in the more heavily defended strongholds available, which allowed the guerrillas to more directly mobilize through and influence events in large areas of rural territory which were left with little or no remaining local garrisons.

Samper also contacted the guerrillas in order to negotiate the release of some or all of the hostages in FARC hands, which led to the temporary demilitarization of the municipality of Cartagena del Chairá, Caquetá in July 1997 and the unilateral liberation of 70 soldiers, a move which was opposed by the command of the Colombian military. Other contacts between the guerrillas and government, as well as with representatives of religious and economic sectors, continued throughout 1997 and 1998.

Altogether, these events were interpreted by some Colombian and foreign analysts as a turning point in the armed confrontation, giving the FARC the upper hand in the military and political balance, making the Colombian government a target of critics from some observers who concluded that its weakness was being evidenced, perhaps even overshadowing a future guerrilla victory in the middle term. A leaked 1998 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report went so far as to speculate that this could be possible within 5 years if the guerrilla's rate of operations was kept up without effective opposition. Some viewed this report as inaccurate and alarmist, claiming that it did not properly take into account many factors, such as possible actions that the Colombian state and the U.S. might take in response to the situation, nor the effects of the existence of paramilitary groups.[114]

Also during this period, paramilitary activities increased, both legally and illegally. The creation of legal CONVIVIR self-defense and intelligence gathering groups was authorized by Congress and the Samper administration in 1994. Members of CONVIVIR groups were accused of committing numerous abuses against the civilian population by several human rights organizations. The groups were left without legal support after a 1997 decision by the Colombian Constitutional Court which restricted many of their prerogatives and demanded stricter oversight. However, in April 1997, preexisting paramilitary forces and several former CONVIVIR members were joined to create the AUC, a large paramilitary militia closely tied to drug trafficking which carried out attacks on the FARC and ELN rebel groups as well as civilians starting with the 1997 Mapiripán Massacre.[115]

The AUC, originally present around the central/northwest part of the country, executed a series of raids into areas of guerrilla influence, targeting those that they considered as either guerrillas or their supporters.[116] This resulted in a continuing series of massacres. After some of these operations, government prosecutors and/or human rights organizations blamed officers and members of Colombian Army and police units for either passively permitting these acts, or directly collaborating in their execution.[117][118][119]

1998–1999

On August 7, 1998, Andrés Pastrana Arango was sworn in as the President of Colombia. A member of the Conservative Party, Pastrana defeated Liberal Party candidate Horacio Serpa in a run-off election marked by high voter turn-out and little political unrest. The new president's program was based on a commitment to bring about a peaceful resolution of Colombia's longstanding civil conflict and to cooperate fully with the United States to combat the trafficking of illegal drugs.

In July 1999, Colombian military forces attacked the town of Puerto Lleras, Colombia where FARC rebels were stationed. Using U.S. supplied aircraft and equipment, and backed with U.S. logistical support, Colombian government forces strafed and bombed the town for over 72 hours. In the attack, three civilians were killed, and several others were wounded as the military attacked hospitals, churches, ambulances, and residential areas. FARC rebels were forced to flee the area, and many were killed or wounded. The Colombian government claimed that this was a significant victory, while human rights groups claimed this as proof that "anti-narcotics" aid, was actually just military aid which was being used to fight a leftist insurgency.[120]

2000–2006

The years from 2000–2006 were bloody ones in Colombia with thousands of deaths every year resulting from the ongoing war between the Colombian Armed Forces, Paramilitary groups such as the AUC and the rebel groups (mainly the FARC, ELN and also the EPL).[115] The fighting resulted in massive internal displacement of Colombia's civilian population and thousands of civilian deaths.[121]

During President Uribe's first term in office (2002–2006), the security situation inside Colombia showed some measure of improvement and the economy, while still fragile, also showed some positive signs of recovery according to observers. But relatively little has been accomplished in structurally solving most of the country's other grave problems, such as poverty and inequality, possibly in part due to legislative and political conflicts between the administration and the Colombian Congress (including those over a controversial project to eventually give Uribe the possibility of re-election), and a relative lack of freely allocated funds and credits.

Some critical observers considered that Uribe's policies, while reducing crime and guerrilla activity, were too slanted in favor of a military solution to Colombia's internal war while neglecting grave social and human rights concerns. Critics have asked for Uribe's government to change this position and make serious efforts towards improving the human rights situation inside the country, protecting civilians and reducing any abuses committed by the armed forces. Political dissenters and labor union members, among others, have suffered from threats and have been murdered.

In 2001 the largest government supported paramilitary group, the AUC, which had been linked to drug trafficking and attacks on civilians, was added to the US State Department's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations and the European Union and Canada soon followed suit.[122]

On January 17, 2002, right-wing paramilitaries entered the village of Chengue, and divided up the villagers into two groups. They then went from person to person in one of the groups, smashing each person's head with sledgehammers and rocks, killing 24 people, as the Colombian military sat by and watched. Two other bodies were later discovered dumped in a shallow grave. As the paramilitaries left, they set fire to the village.[123]

In 2004, it was revealed by the National Security Archive that a 1991 document from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency had described then-Senator Uribe as a "close personal friend" and collaborator of Pablo Escobar. The Uribe administration denied several of the allegations in the 1991 report.[124]

Starting in 2004 a disarmament process was begun of Colombia's paramilitary groups (especially the AUC) and was completed on April 12, 2006, when 1,700 fighters turned in their weapons in the town of Casibare.[116]

In May 2006, the Colombian presidential election resulted in Uribe winning re-election with a historic first round vote tally of 62%, followed by leftist Carlos Gaviria with 22% and Horacio Serpa.

2007–2009

See also: Colombian parapolitics scandal

On June 28, 2007 the FARC suddenly reported the death of 11 of the 12 kidnapped provincial deputies from Valle del Cauca Department. The Colombian government accused the FARC of executing the hostages and stated that government forces had not made any rescue attempts. FARC claimed that the deaths occurred during a crossfire, after an attack to one of its camps by an "unidentified military group". FARC did not report any other casualties on either side.[125]

In 2007, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and Colombian Senator Piedad Córdoba were acting as authorised mediators in the ongoing Humanitarian Exchange between the FARC and the government of Colombia. Colombian President Álvaro Uribe had given Chávez permission to mediate, under the conditions that all meetings with the FARC would take place in Venezuela and that Chávez would not contact members of the Colombian military directly, but instead go through proper diplomatic channels.[126][127] However, President Uribe abruptly terminated Chávez's mediation efforts on November 22, 2007, after Chávez personally contacted General Mario Montoya Uribe, the Commander of the Colombian National Army.[128] In response, Chávez said that he was still willing to mediate, but had withdrawn Venezuela's ambassador to Colombia and placed Colombian-Venezuelan relations "in a freezer"[129] President Uribe responded by accusing Chávez of legitimizing terrorism and pursuing an expansionist project on the continent.[130]

Several scandals have affected Uribe's administration. The Colombian parapolitics scandal expanded during his second term, involving numerous members of the administration's ruling coalition. Many pro-government lawmakers, such as the President's cousin Mario Uribe, have been investigated for their possible ties to paramilitary organizations.[131]

At the end of 2007, FARC agreed to release former senator Consuelo González, politician Clara Rojas and her son Emmanuel, born in captivity after a relationship with one of her captors. Operation Emmanuel was proposed and set up by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, with the permission of the Colombian government. The mission was approved on December 26. Although, on December 31, FARC claimed that the hostage release had been delayed because of Colombian military operations. On the same time, Colombian President Álvaro Uribe indicated that FARC had not freed the three hostages because Emmanuel may not be in their hands anymore.[132] Two FARC gunmen were taken prisoner.

Colombian authorities added that a boy matching Emmanuel's description had been taken to a hospital in San José del Guaviare in June 2005. The child was in poor condition; one of his arms was hurt, he had severe malnutrition, and he had diseases that are commonly suffered in the jungle. Having been evidently mistreated, the boy was later sent to a foster home in Bogotá and DNA tests were announced in order to confirm his identity.[132]

On January 4, 2008, the results of a mitochondrial DNA test, comparing the child's DNA with that of his potential grandmother Clara de Rojas, were revealed by the Colombian government. It was reported that there was a very high probability that the boy was indeed part of the Rojas family.[133] The same day, FARC released a communique in which they admitted that Emmanuel had been taken to Bogotá and "left in the care of honest persons" for safety reasons until a humanitarian exchange took place. The group accused President Uribe of "kidnapping" the child in order to sabotage his liberation.[134] However, on January 10, 2008, FARC released Rojas and Gonzalez through a humanitarian commission headed by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

On January 13, 2008, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez stated his disapproval with the FARC strategy of armed struggle and kidnapping saying "I don't agree with kidnapping and I don't agree with armed struggle".[135] He repeated his call for a political solution and an end to the war on March and June 2008, "The guerrilla war is history...At this moment in Latin America, an armed guerrilla movement is out of place".[136]

In February 2008, FARC released four others political hostages "as a gesture of goodwill" toward Chávez, who had brokered the deal and sent Venezuelan helicopters with Red Cross logos into the Colombian jungle to pick up the freed hostages.[137]

On March 1, 2008, the Colombian armed forces launched a military operation 1.8 kilometres into Ecuador on a FARC position, killing 24, including Raúl Reyes, member of the FARC Central High Command. This led to the 2008 Andean diplomatic crisis between Colombia and Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa, supported by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez. On March 3, Iván Ríos, also a member of the FARC Central High Command was killed by his security chief "Rojas". In March 2008 alone, FARC lost 3 members of their Secretariat, including their founder.

On May 24, 2008, Colombian magazine, Revista Semana, published an interview with Colombian defense minister Juan Manuel Santos in which Santos mentions the death of Manuel Marulanda Vélez. The news was confirmed by FARC-commander 'Timochenko' on Venezuelan based television station Telesur on May 25, 2008. 'Timochenko' announced the new commander in chief is 'Alfonso Cano'.[138]

In May 2008, a dozen jailed paramilitary leaders were extradited to the United States on drug-related charges. In 2009, extradited paramilitary leader Salvatore Mancuso would claim that the AUC had supported Uribe's 2002 election, but said that this was a result of their similar "ideological discourse" and not the result of any direct prior arrangement.[139]

On July 2, 2008, the Colombian armed forces launched Operation Jaque that resulted in the freedom of 15 political hostages, including former Colombian presidential candidate Íngrid Betancourt, Marc Gonsalves, Thomas Howes, and Keith Stansell, three American military contractors employed by Northrop Grumman[140] and 11 Colombian military and police.[141] Two FARC members were arrested. This trick to the FARC was presented by the Colombian government as a proof that the guerrilla organisation and influence is declining.

On October 26, 2008, after 8 years of captivity, the ex-congressman Óscar Tulio Lizcano escaped with the assistance of a FARC rebel he convinced to travel with him. Soon after the liberation of this prominent political hostage, the Vice President of Colombia Francisco Santos Calderón called Latin America's biggest guerrilla group a "paper tiger" with little control of the nation's territory, adding that "they have really been diminished to the point where we can say they are a minimal threat to Colombian security," and that "After six years of going after them, reducing their income and promoting reinsertion of most of their members, they look like a paper tiger." However, he warned against any kind of premature triumphalism, because "crushing the rebels will take time." The 500,000 square kilometers (190,000 sq mi) of jungle in Colombia makes it hard to track them down to fight.[142]

According to the Colombian government, in early 2009 FARC launched plan Rebirth to avoid being defeated. They planned to intensify guerrilla warfare by the use of landmines, snipers, and bomb attacks in urban areas. They also plan to buy missiles to fight the Colombian airforce which highly contribute to their weakness since few years.[143]

In February 2009, the guerrilla released 6 hostages as a humanitarian gesture. In March, they released Swedish hostage Erik Roland Larsson.

In April 2009, the Colombian armed forces launched Strategic Leap,[144] an offensive in borders areas where the FARC's forces still has a strong military presence, especially in Arauca, near the Venezuelan border.[145]

In November 2009, Nine Colombian soldiers were killed when their post was attacked by FARC guerrillas in a southwestern part of the country.[146]

On December 22, 2009, FARC rebels raided the home of Provincial governor Luis Francisco Cuéllar, killing one police officer and wounding two. Cuellar was found dead the following day.[147]

2010–2016

See also: List of attacks attributed to FARC

See also: Colombian peace process

On January 1, 2010, Eighteen FARC rebels were killed when the Colombian Air Force bombed a jungle camp in Southern Colombia. Colombian troops of the elite Task Force Omega then stormed the camp, capturing fifteen FARC rebels, as well as 25 rifles, war materials, explosives, and information which was given to military intelligence. In Southwestern Colombia, FARC rebels ambushed an army patrol, killing a soldier. The troops then exchanged fire with the rebels. During the fighting, a teenager was killed in the crossfire.[148]

When Juan Manuel Santos was elected president in August 2010, he promised to "continue the armed offensive" against rebel movements. In the month after his inauguration, FARC and ELN killed roughly 50 soldiers and policemen in attacks all over Colombia.[149] September also saw the killing of FARC's second-in-command Mono Jojoy. By the end of 2010, it became increasingly clear that "neo-paramilitary groups", referred to as "criminal groups" (BACRIM) by the government, had become an increasing threat to national security, with violent groups such as Los Rastrojos and Aguilas Negras taking control of large parts of the Colombian countryside.[150]

In 2010, the FARC killed at least 460 members of the security forces, while wounding more than 2,000.[151]

By early 2011, Colombian authorities and news media reported that the FARC and the clandestine sister groups have partly shifted strategy from guerrilla warfare to "a war of militias", meaning that they are increasingly operating in civilian clothes while hiding amongst sympathizers in the civilian population.[152] In early January 2011, the Colombian army said that the FARC has some 18,000 members, with 9,000 of those forming part of the militias.[153] The army says it has "identified" at least 1,400 such militia members in the FARC-strongholds of Valle del Cauca and Cauca in 2011.[154] In June 2011, Colombian chief of staff Edgar Cely claimed that the FARC wants to "urbanize their actions",[155] which could partly explain the increased guerrilla activity in Medellín and particularly Cali.[156][157][158][159][160] Jeremy McDermott, co-director of Insight Crime, estimates that FARC may have some 30,000 "part-time fighters" in 2011, consisting of supporters making up the rebel militia network instead of armed uniformed combatants.[161]

In 2011, the Colombian Congress issued a statement claiming that the FARC has a "strong presence" in roughly one third of Colombia, while their attacks against security forces "have continued to rise" throughout 2010 and 2011.[162]

In 2012, the Colombia Military launched The Espada de Honor War Plan, an aggressive counterinsurgency strategies that aims to dismantle FARC's structure, crippling them both militarily and financially. The plan targets FARC leadership and it is focused on eliminating 15 of the most powerful economic and military fronts.[163]

On July 20, 2013, as peace talks were making progress, two rebel attacks on government positions killed 19 soldiers and an unspecified number of combatants. It was the deadliest day since peace talks began in November 2012.[164]

On 15 December 2014, 9 FARC guerrillas were killed in the aftermath airstrikes conducted by the Colombian air force in the Meta province.[165]

On 22 May 2015, the FARC suspended a truce after 26 of its fighters were killed in a government air and ground offensive.[166]

On 22 June 2015, a Colombian Army Black Hawk helicopter was destroyed while landing on a mine field laid by FARC: four soldiers were killed and six were wounded.

On 23 June 2016, the Colombian government and FARC agreed to a ceasefire.[167] A "final, full and definitive accord" was agreed to on August 24, 2016.[168] This accord does not include ELN.[169]

On 2 October 2016, the results of the referendum to decide whether or not to support the peace accord showed that 50.2% opposed the accord while 49.8% favoured it.[170]

In October 2016, President Juan Manuel Santos was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his resolute efforts to bring the country's more than 50-year-long war to an end.[56]

The Colombian government and the FARC on November 24 signed a revised peace deal and the revised agreement will be submitted to Congress for approval.[57] The House of Representatives unanimously approved the plan on November 30, a day after the Senate also gave its backing.[58]

2017–2019

In September 2019, Colombia's President Iván Duque Márquez launched a new military crackdown against FARC, which declared resuming the armed struggle due to the government's failure to abide by the 2016 peace deal.[171]

2020–present

On April 25, senior Gulf's Cartel (Clan de Golfo) leader Gustavo Adolfo Álvarez Téllez, who was one of Colombia's most wanted drug lords and had bounty of up to 580 million pesos for his capture, was arrested at his lavish estate in Cereté while holding a party under quarantine during the COVID-19 pandemic.[172][173] Álvarez was described as the "brain" of the cartel,[173] and by this point was reported to have taken charge of the cartel's Caribbean operations.[174]

On June 26, Clan del Golfo and FARC dissidents were confirmed be in a direct armed conflict in northern Antioquia known as Operation Mil.[175] The Gulf's Clan, which dispatched 1,000 of its paramilitaries from Urabá, southern Córdoba and Chocó, hopes to remove FARC dissent from northern Antioquia and take control of the entire municipality of Ituango.[175]

FARC dissidents

FARC dissidents are a group formerly part of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, who have refused to lay down their arms after the FARC-government peace treaty came into effect in 2016. The dissidents number some 1200 armed combatants[32][176] with an unknown number of civilian militia supporting them. The FARC dissidents have become "an increasing headache" for the Colombian armed forces, as they have to fight them, the EPL, ELN and Clan del Golfo at the same time.[32] FARC dissidents are led by former mid-level commanders such as alias Gentil Duarte, alias Euclides Mora, alias John 40, alias Giovanny Chuspas and alias Julián Chollo. The FARC dissidents have been responsible for several attacks on the Colombian armed forces.[177][178][179] These fighters are believed to be heavily involved in the production and sale of cocaine.[180] Dissidents of FARC's 1st Front are located in the eastern plains of Colombia. Jhon 40 and their dissident 43rd Front moved into the Amazonas state of western Venezuela. Venezuela has served as the primary location for many FARC dissidents.[181] On 15 July 2018, the Colombian and Peruvian governments launched a joint military effort known as Operation Armageddon to combat FARC dissidents. Peru issued a 60-day state of emergency in the Putumayo Province, an area bordering both Colombia and Ecuador. On the first day alone, more than 50 individuals were arrested in the operation, while four cocaine labs were dismantled. The group has attempted to recruit locals in the Putumayo Province in Peru to take up their cause.[182]

Economic impact

Direct economic effects

Physical Infrastructure

The destruction of physical infrastructure has represented high costs for several sectors of the economy, directly altering production and distribution networks. The costs generated by damage to the oil infrastructure have shown a substantial increase since 1990. This is mainly explained by the increase in attacks on oil pipelines by groups outside the law. According to data from Ecopetrol,[183] between 1999 and 2003, the costs assumed by the hydrocarbon exploitation sector grew by approximately 59%, amounting to $817,654.5 million. This equates to 23.6% of the total royalties that Ecopetrol turned to 20 departments and 110 municipalities, destined to improve the quality of life of the inhabitants.[184] For 2004, costs decreased substantially to $11,015.5 million. This is the first sector most affected by the terrorist actions of groups outside the law. The costs are mainly derived from the spilled oil, "[...] from the repair of the pipeline, from the environmental decontamination and from the oil stopped producing 60% of the total expenses incurred."[185] During the 1999–2003 period, costs against electrical and telecommunications towers increased substantially, representing $134,871.2 million. This is equivalent to 5.4% of 2003 GDP for the electricity, gas and water sector.[186] On the other hand, according to data from the National Institute of Roads (INVÍAS), between 1993–1995, groups outside the law demolished eleven tolls and a bridge, and its reconstruction cost $378,476,248. This amount increased significantly during the 1999–2003 period, when the costs generated by the reconstruction of bridges represented $18,455.7 million. These costs are equivalent to 1.71% of the total INVÍAS budget for 2003. For 2004, costs for damages to the road infrastructure dropped substantially to $680 million.[186] The partial interruption of the roads directly affects the transport sector, food and other private guilds, which in turn assume costs for these damages. However, generally these have not been quantified, because of the difficulty they have to be directly calculated. This tends to present itself as a generalized problem in quantifying the costs associated with conflict. This is explained, in part, by the tendency in the various economic sectors not to denounce this type of actions that, in one way or another, interrupt the normal functioning of economic activities.

The costs of kidnaps and extortions

Colombia is the country in which more people are and have been kidnapped.[186] Kidnapping, as one of the manifestations that underlie the armed conflict, carries both direct and indirect costs. The former comprise mainly the payment of ransoms and the expenses assumed by the State to control and prevent it. Indirect costs include, "[...] the loss of human capital for the duration of the detention and for the death of the kidnapped during his captivity".[187] There are two types of kidnapping: a) kidnapping for extortion and political purposes; and b) simple kidnapping. According to data from the Directorate of Justice and Security of the DNP, this phenomenon shows an increasing trend. With respect to the costs of sequestration, the sources suggest an increasing behavior between 1996 and 2003. In such a way that "the average annual growth rate is 9.3%, the highest rate is observed in 1998 (46.2%), and in 2000 (37.2%) year in which the number of kidnappings also it is significantly high [...] reaching its peak in the year 2000 with 1,938 cases."[188] From then on, the trend becomes decreasing (except for a peak in 2002 with 1,542 cases) until reaching the 350 kidnappings (the lowest figure since 1996) in 2005. Within these costs, 64.4% are direct, representing US$167.4 million. 35.6% of the remaining costs are indirect, and represent US$92.7 million. In 2004, the costs of sequestration were reduced to $109,519 million, representing 0.27% of GDP in 2003.[186]

Costs of Defense and National Security

While spending on defense and security becomes very important to examine when dealing with a country immersed in an armed conflict, the analysis on this issue are relatively recent.[189] This can be explained because until the beginning of the second half of the nineties, defense and security spending had a significant growth. Spending on defense and security includes, on the one hand, the means by which the State must have to defend sovereignty and territorial integrity, and on the other, the costs involved in maintaining internal security. Various studies of National Planning suggest that the Colombian State spends a much greater percentage in defense and security than other Latin American countries. Between 1991–1996, the estimated value of these resources was $3.7 billion. That is, 2.6% of GDP, while for Latin America the average of this expenditure was 1.7% of GDP.[190] A study carried out by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) for the year 2001 "[...] shows that Colombia ranked 24th in the countries with the largest participation in military spending, out of a total of 116 investigated."The figure for the participation of military expenditures in GDP was 3.8% for Colombia while in the countries of the American continent the closest figure is that of the United States with 3.1% followed by Chile with 2.9%, Ecuador with 2.1% and the rest of countries below 2.0% ".[186] Thus, for the period 1999–2003, defense and security spending was $8,463,611.0 million, equivalent to 10.5% of GDP in 2003. The excess of said expense, compared to the average cost of neighboring countries, It was close to 0.79% of GDP. A Fedesarrollo study states that the Spending on defense and security carried out during 2004 "[...] represented 4.5% of GDP [...] "[191] which does not have precedents in the history of Colombia. This is directly related to the Security Policy Democratic undertaken by the government of the current president Álvaro Uribe, who focuses on hitting militarily to groups outside the law, in order to regain security national. On the other hand, for the year 2004, the expenses of the Colombian Government in war and security were 6.59%, placing the country between the tenth that invest the most in war as proportion of GDP .[186]

Indirect economic effects

Productivity loss

The estimated loss of human capital and productivity due to labor absenteeism in 2003 amounted to $366.2 billion".[187] On the other hand, the loss of land productivity, which translates into a negative impact on administration, investment in physical and social capital, and the price of land in subsectors such as livestock and commercial agriculture is one of the consequences associated with the presence of an armed conflict.[188][192] This cost is mainly assumed by farmers who experience the pressure of armed actions in their areas of operation. Within this context, the most serious consequences are related to the devaluation of the properties, the loss of productivity of the land -represented in the products that could potentially have been cultivated in these lands- and the difficulty in managing the efficient production of the lands. According to a study of National Planning, the estimated costs for the loss of productivity of land represented, between 1999 and 2003, $140,443.5 million,[187] equivalent to 1.28% of the GDP of the agricultural sector of 2003.

Impact on income distribution

The duration and expansion of the national conflict has had a significant impact on the distribution of income and wealth in Colombia. According to an investigation by the CEDE of the Universidad de los Andes, "as a result of the displacement, the displaced households have left behind a little more than four million hectares, which correspond to 6.7 times of the total hectares granted by the program. of Agrarian Reform during the period between 1993 and 2000, and represent a total value of $ 2.6 billion." [193] In this context, the enormous concentration of rural property in the hands of a few individuals is not only the result of the purchase of land by drug traffickers and the illegal appropriation by groups outside the law, but also the consequence of acquisition of properties devalued due to the armed conflict [...]. It is estimated that 1.3% of the owners control 48% of the best lands.[192] On the other hand, a study carried out by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) states that the Colombian conflict has had a negative effect on the income of the population. According to this study, because of the conflict, Colombia has lost 17% of its per capita income in the last ten years. That is to say, "[...] the money wasted every year corresponds to about 4.6 times what the community welfare homes programs, children's homes and school restaurants of the social support network cos."[194]

Decrease in investments

Although the agents adjust their investment behavior, that is, they internalize the phenomenon of violence, assuming it as a change in the structures of the economy[195] in the long term the investment of both the State and the private sector is diminished in substantial ways. In the Colombian case, the loss in private investment has been estimated at 0.53 points of the annual GDP, due to the public order conditions that arise directly from the presence of an armed conflict. A 1% increase in the homicide rate reduces private investment by 0.66%.[196] Thus, we can observe that the high levels of violence directly affect the transaction costs and levels of uncertainty in society. Likewise, they reduce to a certain degree the profitability of investments. A study by Corporación Invertir en Colombia (Coinvertir) and the National Planning Department (DNP) shows that insecurity hinders the development of new foreign investments, especially in the financial, oil and gas, and electric power sectors.

One of the biggest problems to invest in Colombia is that it is necessary to devote a large part of the budget to security and protection controls, which is very difficult to justify before the house. In this sense, the economic environment affected by the violence translates into a tax on investment."[197] On the other hand, within the studies on the costs of the conflict, specific sectors such as the private sector have begun to be studied, taking into account the high costs they have had to assume due to the existence of this phenomenon. The large companies and those that operate at the national level assume the highest costs associated with the existence of the conflict. This is because they are more attractive for someone who wants to extort for example, and also those who lose most in adverse conditions. Appealing to the economic arguments that underlie the conflict, various state and international aid and cooperation institutions seek to establish the scope and potential benefits of a peaceful situation. This argument has mobilized and sensitized various sectors of society to understand that peace is also an economic necessity.[195] In Colombia, as shown in the studies that have estimated the costs of the conflict, since the nineties it has imposed increasingly higher costs to various productive sectors of the economy and society in general.[186]

Among the sectors most affected by the conflict are the exploitation of hydrocarbons, electricity and livestock. This is explained, in part, because the areas where the operations and activities of these sectors take place, in parallel, are the territories where groups outside the law exert a very strong presence. Likewise, for the Colombian private sector, indirect costs have more impact on their activities than direct costs. With respect to indirect costs, although there is a clear difficulty to be quantified, the various studies suggest that they have been significantly high and that they have had a representative impact on society as such.

Role of the United States

See also: Plan Colombia, Right-wing paramilitarism in Colombia, and Colombia–United_States_relations

US General William P. Yarborough was the head of a counterinsurgency team sent to Colombia in 1962 by the US Special Warfare Center. Yarborough was one of the earliest proponents of "paramilitary [...] and/or terrorist activities against known communist proponents"[198].

The United States has been heavily involved in the conflict since its beginnings, when in the early 1960s the U.S. government encouraged the Colombian military to attack leftist militias in rural Colombia. This was part of the U.S. fight against communism.[41]

In October 1959, the United States sent a "Special Survey Team", composed of counterinsurgency experts, to investigate Colombia's internal security situation.[199] In February 1962, a Fort Bragg top-level U.S. Special Warfare team headed by Special Warfare Center commander General William P. Yarborough, visited Colombia for a second survey.[200] In a secret supplement to his report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Yarborough encouraged the creation and deployment of a paramilitary force to commit sabotage and terrorist acts against communists:

A concerted country team effort should be made now to select civilian and military personnel for clandestine training in resistance operations in case they are needed later. This should be done with a view toward development of a civil and military structure for exploitation in the event the Colombian internal security system deteriorates further. This structure should be used to pressure toward reforms known to be needed, perform counter-agent and counter-propaganda functions and as necessary execute paramilitary, sabotage and/or terrorist activities against known communist proponents. It should be backed by the United States.[201][202][203]

Colin Powell, then the US Secretary of State, visiting Colombia as part of the United States' support of Plan Colombia

The first paramilitary groups were organized following recommendations made by U.S. military counterinsurgency advisers who were sent to Colombia during the Cold War to combat leftist political activists and armed guerrilla groups.[42]

One multinational corporation has also been directly tied to paramilitary death squads. Chiquita Brands International was fined $25 million as part of a settlement with the United States Justice Department for having ties to paramilitary groups.[42] In 2016, Judge Kenneth Marra of the Southern District of Florida ruled in favor of allowing Colombians to sue former Chiquita Brand International executives for the company's funding of the outlawed right-wing paramilitary organization that murdered their family members. He stated in his decision that "'profits took priority over basic human welfare' in the banana company executives' decision to finance the illegal death squads, despite knowing that this would advance the paramilitaries' murderous campaign."[204]

In December 2013, The Washington Post revealed a covert CIA program, started in the early 2000s, which provides the Colombian government with intelligence and GPS guidance systems for smart bombs.[205]

As of August, 2004, the US had spent $3 billion in Colombia, more than 75% of it on military aid. Before the Iraq war, Colombia was the third largest recipient of US aid only after Egypt and Israel, and the U.S. has 400 military personnel and 400 civilian contractors in Colombia. Currently, however, Colombia is not a top recipient of U.S. aid; while it was under the first five years of the Plan Colombia, Colombia today no longer ranks among the top ten.[206]

In March 2015, it was revealed DEA agents were participating in drug cartel-funded sex parties with prostitutes.[207] Agents were provided with expensive gifts, weapons and money from drug cartel members.[208] The head of the US Drug Enforcement Administration, Michele Leonhart announced her retirement. Leonhart's tenure as DEA Administrator was marked with controversy and scandals including a prostitution scandal.[209]

If the peace talks underway in Havana are successful in bringing peace to Colombia, this U.S. aid to the military will likely need to be reallocated to help support a lasting peace.[210]

Colombia rejects threats and blackmail of the United States of America after the threat of Donald Trump to decertify the country as a partner in counter-narcotics efforts.

For more than 30 years Colombia has demonstrated its commitment – paying a very high cost in human lives – with overcoming the drug problem. This commitment stems from the profound conviction that the consumption, production and trafficking of drugs constitute a serious threat to the well-being and security of citizens. Colombia is undoubtedly the country that has fought the most drugs and with more successes on this front. No one has to threaten us to meet this challenge.

— Colombia's National Government [211]

The problem of drugs is global. Overcoming it can only be achieved through cooperation and under the principle of joint responsibility. Consumer countries' authorities have a fundamental responsibility to their fellow citizens and the world to reduce consumption and to attack trafficking and distribution organizations in their own countries.

— Colombia's National Government [211]

Statistics about victims of war

The of Peace and Memory: A "memorial" to the victims of the conflict.[212] In Colombia, the 9th of April is a symbolic day. It is a day of remembrance and solidarity with the conflict's victims.[213]

According to a study by Colombia's National Centre for Historical Memory, 220,000 people have died in the conflict between 1958 and 2013, most of them civilians (177,307 civilians and 40,787 fighters) and more than five million civilians were forced from their homes between 1985 – 2012, generating the world's second largest population of internally displaced persons (IDPs). The report shows that the humanitarian crisis in Colombia is extremely serious in terms of both lethal and nonlethal violence. The report examines the widespread use of sexual violence against women and girls as a weapon of war, as well as the invisibility of this phenomenon.[34][50][51] 16.9% of the population in Colombia has been a direct victim of the war.[52]

2.3 million children have been displaced from their homes, and 45,000 children killed, according to national figures cited by Unicef. In total, one in three of the 7.6 million registered victims of the conflict are children, and since 1985, 8,000 minors have disappeared. Since the peace talks with the FARC began four years ago, some 1,000 children have been forcibly recruited by some of the myriad armed groups in the country, 75 have been killed, and 65 schools have been damaged by fighting.[37]

According to the report "Basta ya", written in 2013 by Colombia's National Centre for Historical Memory, 80% of victims affected by conflict-related violence and landmines were civilians. The report documents 1,982 massacres between 1980 and 2012.[50]

The Government also began a process of assistance, attention and comprehensive reparation for victims of conflict.[213][214] During his visit to Colombia, Pope Francis brought with him a message of peace and paid tribute to the victims of the conflict.[215]

The Special Jurisdiction of Peace (Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz, JEP) would be the transitional justice component of the Comprehensive System, complying with Colombia's duty to investigate, clarify, prosecute and punish serious human rights violations and grave breaches of international humanitarian law which occurred during the armed conflict. Its objectives would be to satisfy victims' right to justice, offer truth to the public, contribute to the reparation of victims, contribute to the fight against impunity, adopt decisions which give full legal security to direct and indirect participants in the conflict and contribute to the achievement of a stable and lasting peace.[216]

The Special Unit for the Search of Missing Persons in the context and due to the armed conflict (Unidad especial para la búsqueda de personas dadas por desaparecidas en el contexto y en razón del conflicto armado) would be a special high-level unit created following the signature of the final agreement. It would direct and coordinate efforts to search for and locate missing persons, or find their remains so that they may be returned to their families. To carry out its work, the search unit would collect the necessary information about missing persons, analyze the information collected, strengthen and streamline processes for identifying mortal remains in coordination with the National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences, guarantee families' participation and present an official report to families informing them of the fate of missing relatives.[53] The search unit would be administrative and financially independent and autonomous, complementing the other components of the Comprehensive System.

Use of land mines

Since 1990, over 11,000 people have been killed or wounded by landmines in Colombia.[217][218] Between 1982 and the end of 2012, 2,038 people have been killed by landmines, according to the Presidential Program for Mine Action.[219] Since 2000, casualties from landmines in Colombia have ranged from 1,300 a year to just around 550.[219]

In the past, the Colombian government laid landmines around 34 military bases to protect key infrastructure, but it renounced their use in 1997. Landmines are primarily used by the rebel groups to protect their home bases and illegal drug crops, which fund the conflict.[220] FARC and ELN have deployed antipersonnel mines throughout an estimated area of up to 100 square kilometers.[221] In March 2015, FARC stated that it would begin humanitarian demining in selected parts of Colombia.[222]

See also

• Colombian peace process
• National Liberation Army (Colombia)
• Paramilitarism in Colombia
• 2003 El Nogal Club Terrorist attack
• Operation Traira
• Colombian diaspora
• Alliance for Progress
• Plan Colombia
• Gustavo Moncayo
• Mexican Drug War
• Paraguayan People's Army insurgency

References

Notes

1. ^ "Why did the Colombia Peace Process Fail?" (PDF). The Tabula Rasa Institute. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2012-07-21. Retrieved 2006-02-26. [PDF file]
2. ^ Livingstone, Grace (2004). Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democracy, and War. Rutgers University Press. p. 176. ISBN 0-8135-3443-7.
3. ^ Molano, Alfredo (February 18, 2004). James Graham (Translator) (ed.). Loyal Soldiers in the Cocaine Kingdom: Tales of Drugs, Mules, and Gunmen. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-12915-7.
4. ^ Peter, Canby (August 16, 2004). "Latin America's longest war; "More Terrible than Death: Massacres, Drugs, and America's War in Colombia," "Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia," "Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democracy and War," "Loyal Soldiers in the Cocaine Kingdom: Tales of Drugs, Mules and Gunmen," "Law in a Lawless Land: Diary of a Limpieza in Colombia"; Book Review". The Nation. 279 (5): 31. Archived from the original on October 20, 2006.
5. ^ Stokes, Doug (July 1, 2005). "America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia". Canadian Dimension. 39 (4): 26. Archived from the original on January 9, 2016.
6. ^ Stokes, p. 26, quoting Marc Grossman, U.S. undersecretary of state for political affairs.
7. ^ Dudley, Steven; January (2004). Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia. Routledge. ISBN 0-415-93303-X.
8. ^ Corbyn, Jeremy (July 2, 2003). "Supporting terror; Jeremy Corbyn MP explains the reasons why Britain should be staying well clear of Colombian President Uribe Velez's regime". Morning Star: 7. Archived from the original on May 31, 2006.
9. ^ Livingstone, (Foreword by Pearce, Jenny), p. xvii (f24)
10. ^ Livingstone, p. 5;
    Pearce, Jenny (May 1, 1990). 1st (ed.). Colombia:Inside the Labyrinth. London: Latin America Bureau. p. 287. ISBN 0-906156-44-0.
11. ^ Pearce's forward in Livingstone, p. xx
12. ^ LeGrand, Catherine C (June 2003). "The Colombian crisis in historical perspective (Record in progress)". Canadian Journal of Latin American & Caribbean Studies. 28 (55/5): 165–209. Archived from the original on May 31, 2006.
13. ^ "Economic Indicators Real Sector, 1999–2004". Latin Focus. Archived from the original on 2006-06-19. Retrieved 2006-05-31.
14. ^ Legrand, p. 165. See Note #15 for more on women in the conflict.
15. ^ Legrand, p. 165. See Note #18 for more on peasant support for the guerrillas. (see also Ortiz 2001; Reyes Posada and A. Bejarano 1988; Archila N. 1996)", Notes.
16. ^ Legrand, p. 165. Lengrand states: "Some observers noted that this percentage of supposed paramilitary supporters elected to congress in March 2002 corresponded to the number of representatives elected from Uraba and the Atlantic coast where the paramilitaries are strong. (El Tiempo March 13–14, 2002)", see Notes.
17. ^ "Colombia's Three Wars: U.S. Strategy at the Crossroads" (PDF). Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. Retrieved 2006-02-26. [PDF file]
18. ^ "Colombia's Three Wars: U.S. Strategy at the Crossroads" (PDF). Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. Retrieved 2006-02-26. [PDF file]
    James, Preston Everett (1969). Latin America (4th edition). The Odyssey Press. p. 426.
19. ^ "The United States and Colombia: The Journey from Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity" (PDF). Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. Retrieved 2006-02-26. [PDF file]
20. ^ Livingstone, p. 5; Author Unknown (February 2001). Bergquist, Charles (ed.). Violence in Colombia, 1990–2000: Waging War and Negotiating Peace. SR Books. p. 13. ISBN 0-8420-2869-2.
21. ^ Livingstone, p. 110.
22. ^ Livingstone, p. 7; Quoting: Colombia: Inseguridad, Violencia, y Desempeño Económico en las Areas Rurales, Consejería para la Paz de la Presidencia de la República, Colombia, 1999, Director de Investigación: Jesus Antonio Bejarano Avila.
23. ^ Livingstone, p. 5
24. ^ Livingstone, p. 5; Canby, p 31
    "Colombia". infoplease.com. Retrieved 2006-02-26.
25. ^ Livingstone, p. 6; "Amnistía Internacional Colombia Seguridad, ¿a qué precio? La falta de voluntad del gobierno para hacer frente a la crisis de derechos humanos". Amnesty Internacional (Amnesty International). December 2002. Archived from the original on November 7, 2007.
26. ^ Livingstone, p. 6; Source: Colombian Commission of Jurists; Arocha, Jaime (1998). Evolución reciente del conflicto armado en Colombia: La Guerrilla in Las violencias: inclusión creciente (1998 ed.). Bogata: CES. pp. 35–65. ISBN 958-96259-5-9.
27. ^ Livingstone, p. 6; Source: Colombian Commission of Jurists; Author Unknown (2000). "Country report on Human Rights in Colombia". US State Department: 1 (mimeograph).
28. ^ Livingstone, p. 7; Source: Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS); Richani, Nazih (April 1, 2002). Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia. State University of New York Press. ISBN 0-7914-5345-6.
29. ^ Livingstone, p. 7; Richani, p. 87
30. ^ Livingstone, p. 7

Citations

1. "Timeline: Colombia's war with the FARC". November 13, 2012.
2. Bargent, James. "The FARC 1964–2002: From Ragged Rebellion to Military Machine". Archived from the original on 2016-09-27. Retrieved 2016-09-27.
3. "España apoyará la lucha de Colombia contra las Farc". caracol.com.co. Archived from the original on 12 October 2017. Retrieved 28 June 2017.
4. "British intelligence members sent to Colombia after IRA suspects arrested". The Irish News. The Irish News. 17 September 2016. Archived from the original on 20 March 2017. Retrieved 2 March 2017.
5. "Alianzas mantienen a "los Urabeños" en regiones". elcolombiano.com. Archived from the original on September 18, 2017. Retrieved February 10, 2018.
6. "Caen los últimos herederos de los rastrojos". semana.com. Archived from the original on 27 July 2017. Retrieved 16 February 2017.
7. "El ministro de Defensa aseguró que con este logro se desarticula toda la organización". infobae.com. Archived from the original on 10 February 2018. Retrieved 10 February 2018.
8. "El ministro de Defensa aseguró que con este logro se desarticula toda la organización". infobae.com. Archived from the original on 10 February 2018. Retrieved 10 February 2018.
9. "La disidencia de las FARC llega ya a los 700 combatientes". Archived from the original on 2 June 2018. Retrieved 6 June 2018.
10. "EPL / Los Pelusos – Profile". 26 March 2017. Archived from the original on 12 July 2018. Retrieved 6 June 2018.
11. "Colombia Arrest of EPL Middleman Shows Booming Venezuela Arms Market". 28 April 2017. Archived from the original on 13 February 2018. Retrieved 6 June 2018.
12. "Las 10 razones por las que el EPL es un problema que se le creció al Gobierno". lasillavacia.com. Archived from the original on August 17, 2017. Retrieved August 16, 2017.
13. "Venezuela's relations with terrorism and FARC exposed". Infovenezuela.org. Archived from the original on February 17, 2015. Retrieved October 14, 2014.
14. Martinez, Michael (May 10, 2011). "Study: Colombian rebels were willing to kill for Venezuela's Chavez". CNN. Archived from the original on May 8, 2014. Retrieved April 21, 2014.
15. "Colombia: Chavez funding FARC rebels". USA Today. March 4, 2008. Archived from the original on May 8, 2014. Retrieved April 21, 2014.
16. Padgett, Tim (September 3, 2008). "Chávez and the Cash-Filled Suitcase". TIME. Archived from the original on March 18, 2014. Retrieved March 28, 2014.
17. "Cuba's Renewed Support for Violence in Latin America" (PDF). United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs. 14 December 1981. Retrieved 1 April 2020.
18. Franks, Jeff; Murphy, Helen (September 6, 2020). "Colombia's FARC rebels to ask government for ceasefire". Reuters. Retrieved April 1, 2020.
19. "Vicente Castaño, muerto". Cambio. Archived from the original on February 27, 2012. Retrieved September 18, 2012.
20. "Military Personnel, 2013" (PDF) (in Spanish). mindefensa.gov.co. Archived from the original (PDF) on April 13, 2015. Retrieved March 22, 2014.
21. "New armed drug-trafficking groups menace Colombia". BBC News. 2010-09-12. Archived from the original on 2018-12-24. Retrieved 2018-06-21.
22. Human Rights Watch, "World Report 2011: Colombia Archived 2015-02-06 at the Wayback Machine", World Report 2011, January 2011
23. "10,000 demobilized fighters rearm – Colombia news". Colombia Reports. September 14, 2010. Archived from the original on September 17, 2010. Retrieved October 18, 2011.
24. "Las Farc tendrían 13.980 miembros". Archived from the original on 2016-08-13. Retrieved 2016-08-13.
25. "A las Farc la conforman unas 13.892 personas armadas y colaboradores". Archived from the original on 2016-04-21. Retrieved 2016-04-22.
26. "Colombian soldiers die in clashes". BBC News. July 21, 2013. Archived from the original on September 25, 2018. Retrieved June 21, 2018.
27. "To the edge and back again". The Economist. August 31, 2013. Archived from the original on August 31, 2017. Retrieved August 25, 2017.
28. "Desmovilización, principal arma contra las guerrillas" (in Spanish). eltiempo.com. Archived from the original on September 23, 2013. Retrieved September 27, 2013.
29. "Colombia army claims guerrillas have lost 5000 fighters in past 2 years". colombiareports.co. Archived from the original on October 14, 2013. Retrieved September 27, 2013.
30. "Comandantes de Fuerza presentaron resultados operacionales de los últimos 2 años" (in Spanish). mindefensa.gov.co. Archived from the original on October 5, 2013. Retrieved September 27, 2013.
31. "Colombia's ELN rebels release oil workers after brief capture -police". Reuters. October 18, 2013. Archived from the original on September 24, 2015. Retrieved June 30, 2017.
32. Cali, Casa Editorial El País. "Disidencias de las Farc, un 'blanco' cada vez más grande para las Fuerzas Armadas". Archived from the original on 14 June 2018. Retrieved 6 June 2018.
33. "Desmovilización, principal arma contra las guerrillas" (in Spanish). eltiempo.com. Archived from the original on September 23, 2013. Retrieved September 26, 2013.
34. "Informe ¡Basta Ya! Colombia: memorias de guerra y dignidad: Estadísticas del conflicto armado en Colombia". Archived from the original on 2014-04-26. Retrieved 2014-04-26.
35. "Georgetown Welcomes Colombia's Ex-Pres. Uribe". Georgetown University. Archived from the original on November 13, 2010. Retrieved October 2, 2010.
36. Silva, Gustavo. "The price of Colombia's drug war". Colombia Reports. Archived from the original on February 21, 2012. Retrieved October 9, 2011.
37. "The Psychological Trauma of a Multi-Generation War". theatlantic.com. Archived from the original on 2017-03-05. Retrieved 2017-03-06.
38. "COLOMBIA FACTSHEET February 2017" (PDF). UNHCR. Archived (PDF) from the original on 25 December 2017. Retrieved 21 November 2018.
39. • "War and Drugs in Colombia – International Crisis Group". Crisisgroup.org. Archived from the original on October 20, 2014. Retrieved October 14, 2014.
    • "'Loco,' Colombia's Last Drug Lord, Extradited to New York". Foreign Policy. July 10, 2013. Archived from the original on October 18, 2014. Retrieved October 14, 2014.
    • "Neo-Paramilitary Groups Consolidating in Colombia: Report". Insightcrime.org. Archived from the original on October 22, 2014. Retrieved October 14, 2014.
    • "Neo-paramilitaries do not deserve political status: Govt". Colombia News – Colombia Reports. Archived from the original on February 23, 2014. Retrieved October 14, 2014.
    • "armed conflict Archives – Colombia News – Colombia Reports". Colombia News – Colombia Reports. Archived from the original on September 1, 2014. Retrieved October 14, 2014.
    • "peace talks Archives – Colombia News – Colombia Reports". Colombia News – Colombia Reports. Archived from the original on October 16, 2014. Retrieved October 14, 2014.
    • "The Colombian "War on Drugs", A Family Affair – SHOAH". Shoah.org. Archived from the original on March 1, 2015. Retrieved October 14, 2014.
40. Historical Commission on the Conflict and Its Victims (CHCV) (February 2015). "Contribution to an Understanding of the Armed Conflict in Colombia" (PDF) (in Spanish). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2016-01-21. Retrieved 2017-03-26.
41. Mario A. Murillo; Jesús Rey Avirama (2004). Colombia and the United States: war, unrest, and destabilization. Seven Stories Press. p. 54. ISBN 978-1-58322-606-3. la violencia colombia united states.
42. "Understanding Colombia's armed conflict: International actors". colombiareports.com. Archived from the original on 10 February 2017. Retrieved 25 March 2017.
43. "Cuba's Renewed Support for Violence in Latin America" (PDF). United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs. 14 December 1981. Retrieved 1 April 2020.
45. Garry Leech (2009). Beyond Bogota: Diary of a Drug War Journalist. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. pp. 242–247. ISBN 978-0-8070-6148-0.
46. https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/176886/h-diplo-article-review-692-%E2%80%9Creading-cuban-revolution-bogot%C3%A1-1957
47. Mario A. Murillo; Jesús Rey Avirama (2004). Colombia and the United States: war, unrest, and destabilization. Seven Stories Press. p. 57. ISBN 978-1-58322-606-3. la violencia colombia united states.
48. "Farc-EP confirma muerte de Marulanda a través de un comunicado". Rebelion.org. 2008-05-26. Archived from the original on 2011-06-14. Retrieved 2010-07-26.
49. "War on Drugs and Human Rights in Colombia". Archived from the original on December 26, 2009. Retrieved 2010-11-09.
50. Historical Memory Group (2013). "Enough Already!" Colombia: Memories of War and Dignity (PDF) (in Spanish). The National Center for Historical Memory's (NCHM). ISBN 978-958-57608-4-4. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2015-12-11. Retrieved 2015-12-11.
51. "Report says 220,000 died in Colombia conflict". Al Jazeera. 25 July 2013. Archived from the original on 25 July 2013. Retrieved 25 July 2013.
52. "Registro Único de Víctimas – Unidad para las Víctimas". arcoiris.com.co. 14 May 2016. Archived from the original on 8 July 2016.
53. "Agreement Victims". FARC-EP International. Archived from the original on 15 September 2016. Retrieved 23 August 2016.
54. Gregor Maaß and Mario Pilz (23 July 2016). "Returning to everyday life". D+C/Development+Cooperation. Archived from the original on 24 July 2016. Retrieved 12 August 2016.
55. Idler, Annette. "Colombia just voted no on its plebiscite for peace. Here's why and what it means". Washington Post. Retrieved 2020-06-23.
56. "The Nobel Peace Prize 2016 – Juan Manuel Santos". nobelprize.org. Archived from the original on 7 October 2016. Retrieved 7 October 2016.
57. "Colombia signs new peace deal with Farc". BBC News. 24 November 2016. Archived from the original on 28 December 2016. Retrieved 21 June 2018.
58. "Colombia's congress approves historic peace deal with FARC rebels". Washington Post. 30 November 2016. Archived from the original on 1 December 2016. Retrieved 1 December 2016.
59. Yaffe, Lilian (2011-07-01). "Conflicto armado en Colombia: análisis de las causas económicas, sociales e institucionales de la oposición violenta" [Armed conflict in Colombia: analyzing the economic, social, and institutional causes of violent opposition] (PDF). Revista CS (in Spanish). Cali, Colombia: Universidad Icesi (8): 187–208. doi:10.18046/recs.i8.1133. eISSN 2665-4814. ISSN 2011-0324. Retrieved 2020-02-01.
60. Cosoy, Natalio (2016-08-24). "¿Por qué empezó y qué pasó en la guerra de más de 50 años que desangró a Colombia?". Archived from the original on 2019-03-29. Retrieved 2019-03-29.
61. "¡Basta ya! Colombia: memorias de guerra y dignidad". ¡Basta ya! Colombia: memorias de guerra y dignidad (in Spanish). Archived from the original on 2017-12-07. Retrieved 2019-03-29.
62. "Las teorías del origen del conflicto armado en Colombia". www.elheraldo.co (in Spanish). Archived from the original on 2019-03-29. Retrieved 2019-03-29.
63. Ángel, Gabriel. "A PROPÓSITO DE LOS 22 AÑOS DE SU MUERTE Memoria de una entrevista con Jacobo Arenas". FARC-EP. Archived from the original on 9 February 2014. Retrieved 14 April 2014.
64. "Todo pasó frente a nuestros ojos. Genocidio de la Unión Patriótica 1984–2002". www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co (in Spanish). Archived from the original on 2019-03-29. Retrieved 2019-03-29.
65. "Peace and brotherly love". economist.com. 27 July 2013. Archived from the original on 17 October 2013. Retrieved 22 October 2013.
66. "Memorias de violencia: bonanza marimbera en la ciudad de Santa Marta durante las década del setenta al ochenta" (PDF) (in Spanish). unimagdalena.edu.co. Archived from the original (PDF) on February 21, 2017. Retrieved February 21, 2017.
67. "El narcotráfico" (in Spanish). verdadabierta.com. Archived from the original on February 21, 2014. Retrieved February 11, 2013.
68. "LA BONANZA MARIMBERA". radionacional.co. Archived from the original on October 12, 2017. Retrieved February 21, 2017.
69. Bustelo, Mabel González. "Colombia, de la guerra antidrogas a la guerra contra el terrorismo". iecah.org. Archived from the original on October 12, 2017. Retrieved June 19, 2017.
70. Tiempo, Casa Editorial El. "La bonanza de marihuana en Colombia (1974–1980)". El Tiempo. Archived from the original on May 8, 2017. Retrieved June 19, 2017.
71. "Military Personnel – Logros de la Política Integral de Seguridad y Defensa para la Prosperidad" (PDF) (in Spanish). mindefensa.gov.co. Archived from the original (PDF) on April 13, 2015.
72. "Colombia". The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency. Archived from the original on May 13, 2009. Retrieved May 24, 2009.
73. "Colombia grew less coca in 2012, UN survey reports". un.org. Archived from the original on 26 August 2013. Retrieved 8 August 2013.
74. "Colombia no longer top cocaine producer". usatoday.com. July 30, 2012. Archived from the original on November 12, 2013. Retrieved April 24, 2013.
75. "The World Factbook". Archived from the original on 29 December 2010. Retrieved 16 December 2014.
76. "U.S. Leads the World in Illegal Drug Use". CBS News. 1 July 2008. Archived from the original on 27 September 2014. Retrieved 26 March 2017.
77. "U.S. drug habit keeps Mexican war boiling". NBC News. Archived from the original on 9 March 2014. Retrieved 16 December 2014.
78. Oriana Zill & Lowell Bergman (2000). "Special Reports – Do The Math – Why The Illegal Business Is Thriving – Drug Wars". Frontline. PBS. Archived from the original on 2014-12-31. Retrieved 2017-08-25.
79. "Oscar Morales and One Million Voices Against FARC". movements.org. 23 July 2010. Archived from the original on April 10, 2013. Retrieved 1 April 2013.
80. "One Million Voices Against the FARC: A Milestone for Freedom". George W. Bush Presidential Center. 4 February 2011. Archived from the original on 13 February 2019. Retrieved 12 February 2019.
81. "One Million Voices Against FARC" (in Spanish). millondevoces.org. Archived from the original on March 23, 2013. Retrieved 1 April 2013.
82. "Presidente Santos anunció fortalecimiento de las capacidades y equipos de la Fuerza Pública" (in Spanish). ejercito.mil.co. Archived from the original on 27 September 2013. Retrieved 25 September 2013.
83. "Colombia's peace deals". mesadeconversaciones.com.co. Archived from the original on 1 April 2016. Retrieved 24 August 2016.
84. "Ley de víctimas y restitución de tierras" (PDF) (in Spanish). derechoshumanos.gov.co. Archived from the original (PDF) on October 29, 2013. Retrieved 23 October 2013.
85. "Unidad de restitución de tierras". restituciondetierras.gov.co. Archived from the original on 5 March 2013. Retrieved 23 March 2013.
86. "La Unión Patriótica vuelve a la arena política" (in Spanish). semana.com. Archived from the original on 29 October 2013. Retrieved 23 October 2013.
87. Kai Ambos and John Zuluaga. "Understanding Colombia's war". D+C, development and cooperation. Archived from the original on 22 December 2015. Retrieved 21 December 2015.
88. "History of the Guerillas in Colombia" (PDF). Ecsbdefesa.com.br. Archived (PDF) from the original on 26 November 2014. Retrieved 14 October 2014.
89. Kraul, Chris. "The battles began in 1964: Here's a look at Colombia's war with the FARC rebels". Los Angeles Times. Archived from the original on 2016-10-17. Retrieved 2016-10-18.
90. "Marquetalia and the FARC". Archived from the original on October 28, 2010. Retrieved 2010-11-09.
91. "Camilo Torres and the ELN". Archived from the original on October 7, 2008. Retrieved 2010-11-09.
92. "Hunter Killer Teams". Archived from the original on June 6, 2009. Retrieved 2010-11-09.
93. "biografia Gustavo Rojas Pinilla". Archived from the original on April 8, 2016. Retrieved April 9, 2016.
94. Pecáut, Daniel (2008). Las FARC: ¿Una guerrilla sin fin o sin fines?. Grupo Editorial Norma. pp. 50–51. ISBN 978-958-45-1322-9.
95. Dudley, Steven (2004). Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia. Routledge. pp. 58–61, 94–95, 233–237. ISBN 0-415-93303-X.
96. Dudley, p. 56
97. Pecáut, p. 51-52
98. Dudley, pp. 91–104
99. Russ Kick, ed. (2009). You are still being lied to: the remixed disinformation guide to media distortion, historical whitewashes and cultural myths. Constellation. pp. 160–163. ISBN 978-1-934708-07-1.
100. Pécaut, p.51
101. Pecáut, p. 52
102. Dudley, p. 102
103. Dudley, pp. 162–165
104. Dudley, pp. 127–139, 165–166
105. Pecáut, pp. 51–52
106. Dudley, pp. 165–166
107. "Research". Ces.fe.uc.pt. Archived from the original on September 23, 2015. Retrieved October 18, 2011.
108. "Milson Betancourt". Uasb.edu.ec. Archived from the original on March 11, 2012. Retrieved October 14, 2014.
109. "CONTEXT ANALYSIS OF RIGHTS SITUATION IN COLOMBIA HUMAN". Cidh.oas.org. Archived from the original on 16 September 2015. Retrieved 14 October 2014.
110. "Informe sobre prácticas de derechos humanos" (in Spanish). January 30, 1998. Archived from the original on September 2, 2005. Retrieved August 31, 2005.
111. "Colombia and International Humanitarian Law". Archived from the original on February 13, 2008. Retrieved February 12, 2008.
112. "Online NewsHour: President Samper of Colombia". PBS NewsHour. March 20, 1996. Archived from the original on October 26, 2013. Retrieved October 14, 2014.
113. "Narcotics and Economics Drive U.S. Policy in Latin America". Archived from the original on October 27, 2005. Retrieved August 31, 2005.
114. "Waging War US Policy Toward Colombia". Archived from the original on February 22, 2005.
115. "Database – Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)". Ucdp.uu.se. Archived from the original on June 6, 2013. Retrieved October 14, 2014.
116. "Terrorist Organization Profiles – START – National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism". Start.umd.edu. Archived from the original on July 27, 2013. Retrieved October 14, 2014.
117. "Uscátegui acusa" (in Spanish). Archived from the original on December 1, 2006.
118. "Human Rights and USA Military Aid to Colombia III". Archived from the original on February 2, 2004. Retrieved August 31, 2005.
119. "Guerra sin cuartel Colombia y el derecho internacional humanitario" (in Spanish). Archived from the original on August 30, 2005. Retrieved August 31, 2005.
120. Tod Robberson, "U.S. aid questioned in Colombian battle" Archived November 21, 2008, at the Wayback Machine, Dallas Morning News, 08/16/1999 (accessed: 02/27/2010)
121. "Database – Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)". Archived from the original on June 6, 2013. Retrieved October 14, 2014.
122. "Chapter 6 – Terrorist Organizations". Retrieved July 15, 2007.
123. Grace Livingstone (2004). Inside Colombia: drugs, democracy and war. Rutgers University Press. pp. xvi. ISBN 978-0-8135-3443-5.
124. "A Harsh Light On Associate 82". Archived from the original on October 15, 2007. Retrieved July 14, 2010.
125. "BBC NEWS – Americas – Colombia rebels 'killed hostages'". News.bbc.co.uk. Archived from the original on October 22, 2014. Retrieved October 14, 2014.
126. "Dossier de Información—Proceso en Busca del Acuerdo Humanitario Gobierno del Presidente Álvaro Uribe -FARC Noviembre 27 de 2007" (PDF) (in Spanish). Archived from the original (PDF) on July 24, 2011.
127. "Uribe terminó con mediación de Hugo Chávez" (in Spanish). Caracol TV. November 22, 2007. Archived from the original on March 9, 2008. Retrieved 2008-03-05.
128. Salazar, Hernando (2007-11-22). "Uribe termina mediación de Chávez" (in Spanish). BBC News. Archived from the original on 2007-12-14. Retrieved 2008-03-05.
129. "Chávez acusa a Uribe de mentiroso y congela las relaciones con Colombia" (in Spanish). El Clarín. 2007-11-26. Archived from the original on 2008-03-20. Retrieved 2008-03-05.
130. Simon Romero (November 26, 2017). "Tensions Rise for Colombia and Venezuela". New York Times. Archived from the original on February 13, 2019. Retrieved February 12, 2019.
131. "Uribe ally quits Colombia Senate". BBC News. 2007-10-05. Archived from the original on 2011-02-26. Retrieved 2010-07-14.
132. "Colombia tests 'hostage' boy DNA". BBC News. January 2, 2008. Archived from the original on November 13, 2012. Retrieved October 18, 2011.
133. "Colombia boy may be hostage's son". BBC News. January 5, 2008. Archived from the original on January 28, 2012. Retrieved October 18, 2011.
134. "Farc admit 'hostage boy' not held". BBC News. January 5, 2008. Archived from the original on January 28, 2012. Retrieved October 18, 2011.
135. "Hugo Chavez tells Colombian rebels to stop kidnapping". Reuters. January 13, 2008. Archived from the original on February 10, 2009. Retrieved October 18, 2011.
136. "Chavez Calls on Colombian Rebels to End Struggle, Free Hostages". Fox News. 2008-06-09. Archived from the original on 2009-02-11. Retrieved 2009-04-10.
137. "Colombian rebels free hostages in jungle to Hugo Chávez". Yahoo News. Reuters. February 27, 2008. Archived from the original on March 3, 2008. Retrieved 2008-03-04.
138. "FARC confirm death of 'Manuel Marulanda'". Colombia Reports. May 25, 2008.
139. "AUC supported Uribe's election: Mancuso – Colombia news". Colombia Reports. May 28, 2009. Archived from the original on March 10, 2012. Retrieved October 18, 2011.
140. "Betancourt, U.S. contractors rescued from FARC". CNN. 2008-07-02. Archived from the original on 2012-11-08. Retrieved 2008-07-02.
141. "Betancourt, 14 others freed by Colombian forces". Monsters and Critics. 2008-07-02. Archived from the original on July 10, 2008. Retrieved 2008-07-02.
142. Murphy, Helen (October 29, 2008). "FARC Is a 'Paper Tiger' After Offensive, Desertions (Update1)". Bloomberg. Archived from the original on June 26, 2009. Retrieved October 18, 2011.
143. "FARC launch 'Rebirth' plan: intelligence – Colombia news". Colombia Reports. February 17, 2009. Archived from the original on October 7, 2011. Retrieved October 18, 2011.
144. "Operation 'Strategic Leap' to marginalize FARC: VP – Colombia news". Colombia Reports. April 1, 2009. Archived from the original on February 22, 2012. Retrieved October 18, 2011.
145. "Colombia attacks rebels in border areas – Colombia news". Colombia Reports. April 10, 2009. Archived from the original on February 22, 2012. Retrieved October 18, 2011.
146. Bronstein, Hugh (2009-11-10). "Surprising rebel attack kills 9 Colombian soldiers". Reuters. Archived from the original on 2009-11-17. Retrieved 2017-06-30.
147. Kraul, Chris (December 23, 2009). "Abducted Colombia governor found dead". Los Angeles Times. Archived from the original on October 12, 2017. Retrieved September 17, 2017.
149. "Colombian rebel attacks intensify, dozens killed | Energy & Oil | Reuters". Reuters. September 10, 2010. Archived from the original on March 13, 2016. Retrieved October 18, 2011.
150. McDermott, Jeremy (April 25, 2011). "Colombia's criminal bands pose new security challenge". BBC News. Archived from the original on November 3, 2011. Retrieved October 18, 2011.
151. "En 2010, unos 460 militares y policias murieron en combates en Colombia". ABC Color. Archived from the original on December 27, 2010. Retrieved October 18, 2011.
152. "Milicias, el plan pistola en el Cauca". El Colombiano. Archived from the original on August 30, 2011. Retrieved October 18, 2011.
153. enLatino.com. "FARC tienen menos integrantes y están debilitadas, dice jefe militar colombiano". enLatino.com. Archived from the original on March 13, 2012. Retrieved October 18, 2011.
154. "Fuerzas Militares tienen identificados a 1410 milicianos de Las Farc | RCN La Radio". RCN Radio. Archived from the original on April 13, 2011. Retrieved October 18, 2011.
155. "Reconocer el conflicto no cambia estatus de las Farc – Noticias de Justicia en Colombia". Eltiempo.Com. Archived from the original on January 11, 2012. Retrieved October 18, 2011.
156. "Acción propagandística de las Farc en Medellín – 20110602". Caracol.com.co. Archived from the original on October 12, 2017. Retrieved October 18, 2011.
157. "Asesinan a dos candidatos a la alcaldía de Campamento en Antioquia – 20110530". Caracol.com.co. Archived from the original on October 12, 2017. Retrieved October 18, 2011.
158. "Las Farc amenazan a la senadora antioqueña Liliana Rendón – 20110527". Caracol.com.co. Archived from the original on October 12, 2017. Retrieved October 18, 2011.
159. "Hallan caleta con 213 minas de las Farc en Cali". Elespectador.Com. May 26, 2011. Archived from the original on January 11, 2012. Retrieved October 18, 2011.
160. "Atentados de las Farc en el Valle – Noticias de Justicia en Colombia". Eltiempo.Com. Archived from the original on January 11, 2012. Retrieved October 18, 2011.
161. Otis, John (July 16, 2011). "Colombia's Guerrillas: The Rebellion That Would Not Die". Time. Archived from the original on August 23, 2013. Retrieved May 7, 2014.
162. "Alertan que más de 330 municipios tienen fuerte presencia de las Farc". Elespectador.Com. Archived from the original on September 30, 2011. Retrieved October 18, 2011.
163. "Colombia’s New Counterinsurgency Plan". Archived June 16, 2012, at the Wayback Machine InterAmerican Security Watch, March 29, 2012. Retrieved: June 8, 2012.
164. "Colombian soldiers die in clashes". BBC News. July 21, 2013. Archived from the original on July 23, 2013. Retrieved July 22, 2013.
165. "Nine FARC members killed by army raid in Colombian jungle". Reuters. 16 December 2014. Archived from the original on 16 December 2014. Retrieved 16 December 2014.
166. "Farc suspends truce after Colombia army attack". BBC. 22 May 2015. Archived from the original on 27 September 2017. Retrieved 21 June 2018.
167. "Colombia and Farc rebels sign historic ceasefire". BBC News. Archived from the original on June 23, 2016. Retrieved June 23, 2016.
168. "Colombians celebrate as peace deal is reached with Farc rebels". BBC News. August 25, 2016. Archived from the original on August 25, 2016. Retrieved August 25, 2016.
169. "Denuncian presencia de disidentes de las Farc en parque natural. Serían guerrilleros del frente primero, que no se acogieron el acuerdo de paz". El Tiempo. 16 September 2016. Archived from the original on 17 September 2016. Retrieved 16 September 2016.
170. "A look at Colombia's half-century-long rebel conflict". October 3, 2016. Archived from the original on October 11, 2016. Retrieved October 11, 2016.
171. James, Julian. "Colombian government renews civil war amid growing social unrest". www.wsws.org. Retrieved 2019-09-12.
172. https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=https://www.elheraldo.co/region-caribe/por-una-fiesta-en-cerete-ubicaron-supuesto-capo-del-narcotrafico-721011&prev=search
173. https://today.rtl.lu/news/world/a/1507820.html
174. https://caracol.com.co/emisora/2020/04/26/monteria/1587852736_119612.html
175. https://caracol.com.co/emisora/2020/06/27/medellin/1593219073_729114.html
176. "Disidencias de las Farc contarían con 1.200 hombres - ELESPECTADOR.COM". 20 March 2018. Archived from the original on 14 June 2018. Retrieved 6 June 2018.
177. "Un ataque perpetrado por disidentes de las FARC dejó a 6 policías heridos en Colombia". Archived from the original on 14 June 2018. Retrieved 6 June 2018.
178. "Policía murió en ataque atribuido a disidencia de FARC en Meta – Noticias Caracol". 25 February 2018. Archived from the original on 17 June 2018. Retrieved 6 June 2018.
179. "Dos policías muertos en ataque donde opera disidencia de las FARC". Archived from the original on 14 June 2018. Retrieved 6 June 2018.
180. "La historia de "Gentil Duarte", el disidente de las Farc más buscado del país - ELESPECTADOR.COM". 2 April 2018. Archived from the original on 20 September 2018. Retrieved 11 August 2018.
181. Venezuela: A Mafia State?. Medellin, Colombia: InSight Crime. 2018. pp. 3–84.
182. "Peru arrests more than 50 in anti-drug bust at Colombian border". Reuters. 16 July 2018. Archived from the original on 17 July 2018. Retrieved 18 July 2018.
183. Borrego, M. E. P., Ballen, A. V., & Percipiano, Y. L. (2005). "Costos Generados por la violencia armada en Colombia". Departamento Nacional de Planeacion.CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
184. "Informe Anual 2003" (PDF). Ecopetrol.
185. Granada y Rojas (1995). "Los Costos Economicos del Conflicto armado en Colombia: 1990–1994". Archivos de Macroeconomia. Departamento Nacional de Planeacion.
186. Otero, D. (2007). "Las Cifras del Conflicto Colombiano". Instituto de Estudios Para el Desarrollo y la Paz.
187. Pinto, Vergara, Lahuerta (2004). "Costos generados por la violencia armada en Colombia: 1999–2003". Archivos de Macroeconomia: Departamento Nacional de Planeacion.CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
188. Pinto, M. I. Altamae, Y. Lahuerta y L. Cepeda (2004). "El secuestro en Colombia caracterizacion y costos economicos". Archivos de Economia: Documento 257, Departamento Nacional de Planeacion.CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
189. Urrutia, N. (2004). "El gasto en defensa y seguridad: caracterizacion del caso colombiano en el contexto internacional". Archivos de Economia, Documento 249, Departamento Nacional de Planeacion.
190. Trujillo, C y M. Badel (1998). "Los Costos Economicos de la criminalidad y la violencia en Colombia: 1991–1996". Archivos de Macroeconomia, Departamento Nacional de Planeacion.
191. Cardenas, M., X. Cadena y C. Caballero (2005). "El Incremento en el gasto en defensa y seguridad: resultados y sostenibilidad de la estrategia". Sostenibilidad de la Seguridad Democratica. Fundacion Seguridad y Democracia.CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
192. Echandia, C (1997). "Expansion territorial de la guerrilla colombiana: geografia, economia y violencia". Programa de Estudios Sobre Seguridad, Justicia y Violencia. Universidad de los Andes.
193. Ibanez, A., A. Moya y A. Velasquez (2006). "Hacia una politica proactiva de la poblacion desplazada". Universidad de los Andes, Secretariado Nacional de Pastoral Social Caritas Colombia.CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
194. Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (2003). "El conflicto, callejon con salida: informe nacional de desarrollo humano para Colombia". PNUD.
195. Echeverry, J., N. Salazar y V. Navas (2001). "Nos parecemos al resto del mundo? El conflicto Colombiano en el contexto internacional". Archivos de Macroeconomia, Documento 143, Departamento Nacional de Planeacion.CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
196. Parra, C. (1998). "Determinantes de la Inversion en Colombia: evidencia sobre el capital humano y la violencia". Planeacion y Desarrollo. 84: 1–31.
197. Echeverry, J., N. Salazar y V. Navas. (2001). "Nos parecemos al resto del mundo? El conflicto colombiano en el contexto internacional". Archivos de Macroeconomia, Documento 143, Departamento Nacional de Planeacion.CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
198. Rempe, Dennis M. (Winter 1995). "Guerrillas, Bandits, and Independent Republics: US Counter-insurgency Efforts in Colombia 1959–1965". Small Wars and Insurgencies. 6 (3): 304–327. doi:10.1080/09592319508423115. Archived from the original on March 30, 2010.
199. Rempe, 1995 Archived March 30, 2010, at the Wayback Machine
200. Livingstone, 2004: p. 155
201. Visit to Colombia, South America, by a Team from Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Headquarters, U.S. Army Special Warfare School, 26 Feb. 1962, Kennedy Library, Box 319, National Security Files, Special Group; Fort Bragg Team; Visit to Colombia; 3/62, "Secret Supplement, Colombian Survey Report."
202. Noam Chomsky (2000). Rogue states: the rule of force in world affairs. South End Press. p. 69. ISBN 978-0-89608-611-1. Retrieved 2017-03-26.
203. HRW, 1996: "II. History of the Military-Paramilitary Partnership" Archived 2017-10-12 at the Wayback Machine
204. Families Of Death Squad Victims Allowed To Sue Chiquita Executives Archived 2017-02-25 at the Wayback Machine. CommonDreams. 4 June 2016.
205. Priest, Dana (21 December 2013). "Covert action in Colombia: U.S. intelligence, GPS bomb kits help Latin American nation cripple rebel forces". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 8 February 2015. Retrieved 30 December 2013.
206. "Top 10 U.S. Foreign Aid Recipients". abcnews. Archived from the original on 10 November 2014. Retrieved 10 November 2014.
207. "Report Says Drug Agents Attended Sex Parties". New York Times. March 26, 2015. Archived from the original on August 29, 2017. Retrieved August 29, 2017.
208. "Report: DEA agents had 'sex parties' with prostitutes hired by drug cartels". washingtonpost.com. Archived from the original on 29 August 2017. Retrieved 28 August 2017.
209. "DEA chief resigns after 'sex parties' scandal". thehill.com. Archived from the original on 1 September 2017. Retrieved 28 August 2017.
210. Ending 50 Years of Conflict in Colombia: The Challenges Ahead and the U.S. Role Archived 2014-04-17 at the Wayback Machine, WOLA, 4/14/2014.
211. "Comunicado del Gobierno Nacional". presidencia.gov.co. 2017-09-14. Archived from the original on 2017-09-14. Retrieved 2017-09-14.
212. "The Axis of Peace and Memory". centromemoria.gov.co. Archived from the original on 2017-07-15. Retrieved 2017-04-23.
213. "The Victims and Land Restitution Law" (PDF) (in Spanish). unidadvictimas.gov.co. Archived from the original (PDF) on September 25, 2015. Retrieved December 21, 2014.
214. "the Land Restitution Unit". restituciondetierras.gov.co. Archived from the original on 5 March 2013. Retrieved 23 March 2013.
215. "Pope at Colombia prayer meeting for reconciliation weeps with victims". radiovaticana.va. 2017-09-08. Archived from the original on 2017-09-09. Retrieved 2017-09-09.
216. "ABC Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz". Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz. Archived from the original on 5 October 2016. Retrieved 24 August 2016.
217. "Natalio Cosoy, "Clearing Colombia of landmines," BBC Mundo, Bogota, 14 March 2015". Archived from the original on 22 June 2017. Retrieved 21 June 2018.
218. "Removing Colombia's landmines, one by one". The Christian Science Monitor. January 30, 2013. Archived from the original on October 18, 2014. Retrieved October 14, 2014.
219. "Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor". The-monitor.org. Archived from the original on May 19, 2014. Retrieved October 14, 2014.
220. "Leah Young, "Colombia," Journal of ERW and Mine Action, Issue 13.1, Summer 2009". Archived from the original on 2015-10-01. Retrieved 2015-06-08.
221. "Landmines Are Killing Colombians, "Lend Your Leg" to Support Victims – ABC News". ABC News. Archived from the original on October 22, 2014. Retrieved October 14, 2014.
222. ""FARC to Start 'Humanitarian' Removal of Landmines in Colombia." TeleSUR, 23 March 2015". Archived from the original on 3 July 2015. Retrieved 8 June 2015.

Further reading

Books

English

• Cuellar, Francisco Ramírez; Aviva Chomsky (2005). The Profits of Extermination. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press. ISBN 1-56751-322-0.
• Aviva Chomsky (2008). Linked labor histories: New England, Colombia, and the making of a global working class. Duke University Press. ISBN 978-0-8223-4190-1.
• Bushnell, David (1993). The Making of Modern Colombia, a Nation in spite of itself. University of California Press. ISBN 0-520-08289-3.
• Dudley, Steven (January 2004). Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia. Routledge. ISBN 0-415-93303-X.
• Kirk, Robin (January 2003). More Terrible than Death: Massacres, Drugs, and America's War in Colombia. PublicAffairs. ISBN 1-58648-104-5.
• Meernik, DeMerritt and Uribe-Lopez (eds.). 2019. As War Ends: What Colombia Can Tell Us About the Sustainability of Peace and Transitional Justice. Cambridge University Press.
• Ruiz, Bert (October 1, 2001). The Colombian Civil War. McFarland & Company. ISBN 0-7864-1084-1.
• Safford, Frank and Marco Palacios (July 1, 2001). Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-504617-X.
• Steele, Abbey. 2018. Democracy and Displacement in Colombia's Civil War. Cornell University Press.
• Stokes, Doug; Noam Chomsky (Foreword) (2005). America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia. Zed Books. ISBN 1-84277-547-2.
• Taussig, Michael (November 1, 2003). Law in a Lawless Land: Diary of a Limpieza. New Press. ISBN 1-56584-863-2.

Other languages

• Murillo, Mario and Jesus Rey Avirama (September 1, 2003). Colombia and the United States: War, Terrorism and Destabilization. Seven Stories Press. ISBN 1-58322-606-0.
• Palacios, Marco (1995). Entre la legitimidad y la violencia: Colombia 1875–1994 (in Spanish). Norma.
• Pardo Rueda, Rafael (2004). La historia de las guerras (in Spanish). Ediciones B-Vergara. ISBN 958-97405-5-3.
• Hennecke, Angelika (2006). Zwischen Faszination und Gewalt : Kolumbien—unser gemeinsamer Nenner : Reflexionen über das Verhältnis zwischen kultureller Identität, Kommunikation und Medien anhand der diskursanalytischen Untersuchung einer kolumbianischen Werbekampagne (in German). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. ISBN 3-631-54930-X.
• Pizarro Leongómez, Eduardo (1991). Las Farc: de la autodefensa a la combinación de todas las formas de lucha. Universidad Nacional.
• Tirado Mejía, Alvaro, ed. (1989). Nueva historia de Colombia. Planeta.

Journals and periodicals

• Sherman, John W. "Political Violence in Colombia: Dirty Wars Since 1977." History Compass (Sep 2015) 13#9 pp 454–465.
• Cirlig, Carmen-Cristina. "Colombia: new momentum for peace?" (PDF). Library Briefing. Library of the European Parliament. Retrieved 15 July 2013.
• Azcarate, Camilo A. (March 1999). "Psychosocial Dynamics of the Armed Conflict in Colombia". Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution. Archived from the original on 2003-01-06.
• James Petras (July 2, 1988). "Neglected Dimensions of Violence". Economic and Political Weekly. 23 (27): 1367. JSTOR 4378701.
• Elizabeth F. Schwartz (Winter 1995–1996). "Getting Away with Murder: Social Cleansing in Colombia and the Role of the United States". The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review. 27 (2): 381–420.
• John Lindsay-Poland (January–February 2010). "Retreat to Colombia: The Pentagon Adapts Its Latin America Strategy". NACLA Report on the Americas.

Government/NGO reports

• "Colombia". Human Rights Watch. Archived from the original on February 23, 2006. Retrieved 2006-02-24.
• "Information about the combatants". Center for International Policy. Retrieved 2006-02-24.
• "Solutions to Escape the Conflict's Impasse". National Human Development Report 2003. Archived from the original on August 3, 2004. Retrieved 2006-02-23. Extensive ideas on solutions to the Colombia conflict
• "Colombia 2005 Report". UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Retrieved 2006-02-24. (Spanish and English)
• "The Day after Tomorrow: Colombia's FARC and the End of the Conflict" (PDF). International Crisis Group. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2014-12-13. Retrieved 2014-12-11. (Spanish and English)
• "Squaring Colombia's Circle: The Objectives of Punishment and the Pursuit of Peace". International Center for Transitional Justice. Retrieved 2016-08-24.
• "From Principles to Practice: Challenges of Implementing Reparations for Massive Violations in Colombia". International Center for Transitional Justice. Retrieved 2016-08-24.
• "Political Crime, Amnesties and Pardons: Scope and Challenges". International Center for Transitional Justice. Retrieved 2016-08-24.

News

• Constanza Vieira (July 16, 2010). "'Let's talk about the disappeared'". Inter Press Service. Archived from the original on July 18, 2010.
• "Indigenous Community in Colombia Fears Start of "Dirty War". Democracy Now!. Archived from the original on February 23, 2006. Retrieved 2006-02-24. Guests: Ezequiel Vitonas, former mayor of Toribio, and Manuel Rozental, human rights activist. Interviewers: Juan Gonzalez and Amy Goodman. Segment available in and via streaming real audio, 128k streaming Real Video or MP3 download.
• The Colombian Miracle

External links

• Overview of Colombian–FARC Peace Process
• Who are the victims? – The aftermath of violence in Colombia – (Former combatants in Colombia's internal armed conflict spent two years painting their experiences. They face difficult decisions about what to remember, what to forget and how to forgive)
• "Colombia Page on InSight Crime". Archived from the original on July 26, 2011. Retrieved 2011-03-29. (Ongoing reporting on the Colombian conflict and active criminal groups)
• "Evolution of the Colombian Civil War". Paul Wolf. Archived from the original on February 3, 2006. Retrieved February 24, 2006. (collection of declassified U.S. documents online)
• Michael Evans, ed. (May 3, 2002). "War in Colombia: Guerrillas, Drugs and Human Rights in U.S.-Colombia Policy, 1988–2002". National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 69. National Security Archive.
• "America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia". Archived from the original on October 26, 2009. Retrieved February 25, 2006.
• Plan Colombia by Carmen Guhn-Knight
• "Rule of Law in Armed Conflict: Colombia". RULAC Project. Archived from the original on July 6, 2011. Retrieved March 23, 2009.
• "Q&A: Colombia's civil conflict". BBC. 2009-12-23. Retrieved 2006-02-24.
• "Colombia Program". Center for International Policy. Retrieved 2006-02-24.
• "Accord issue on Colombia's peace process". Alternatives to war. Archived from the original on 2006-11-17. Retrieved 2006-11-18. (In Spanish and English with chronology and key texts and agreements)
• "CERAC". Conflict Analysis Resources Center. Archived from the original on July 4, 2007. Colombian-based private research center that studies the conflict (In Spanish and English)
• "Colombian Army website". Archived from the original on 2007-09-27. Retrieved 2006-02-24. (In Spanish and English)
• "Colombian President's Office". Archived from the original on November 18, 2008. Retrieved February 24, 2006. (In Spanish and English)
• "Background Note: Colombia". U.S. Department of State. Retrieved 2006-02-11.
• "Different Views of Colombian Territory". Retrieved 2006-02-24. Maps of the conflict.
• "AUC Official Website". Retrieved 2006-02-24. (in Spanish)
• "FARC website". Archived from the original on July 5, 2008. Retrieved July 12, 2008. (in Spanish and English) – No longer available online (censored by U.S. government)
• "Colombia – Insurgency". Global Security. Retrieved 2006-02-24.
• "Civil War? The Language of Conflict in Colombia" (PDF). Ideas for Peace Foundation. Archived from the original (PDF) on September 10, 2009. Retrieved 2006-02-24. (PDF) Is the Colombia conflict a civil war?
• "The Peace Village San José Must Live". SOS San Jose. Archived from the original on 2006-01-12. Retrieved 2006-02-24. (in German and English)
• "Washington Office on Latin America". Retrieved 2006-02-24.
• "Who Shot My Brother?". National Film Board of Canada. Archived from the original on 2007-05-24. Retrieved 2018-05-27.
• "Why the End of the Cold War Doesn't Matter: the US War of Terror in Colombia". Bristol University Politics Department. Archived from the original on October 1, 2005. Retrieved 2006-02-27. by Doug Stokes
• Red Resistencia
• "Insight on Conflict". Colombia Peacebuilding database.
• Crisis briefing on displacement because of the war from Reuters AlertNet