Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir

The insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir (also Kashmiri Insurgency, or Kashmir Intifada[16][17][18]) is an uprising or revolt[19][20][21] against the Indian administration of Jammu and Kashmir,[22][23] a region constituting the southern portion of the larger Kashmir region, which has been the subject of a dispute between India and Pakistan since 1947.[24][25]

This article is about the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir. For the wider conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, see Kashmir conflict.

Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir
Part of the Kashmir conflict

Kashmir: A map of the disputed Kashmir region showing the Indian-administered region in citrine yellow. Jammu and Kashmir is roughly the left half of this region. Pakistani-administered Kashmir is shown in tea green, and Chinese-administered Kashmir in fallow brown
Date13 July 1989[1] – present (31 years, 2 months and 1 day)
Location
Jammu and Kashmir
Status Ongoing (high level insurgency)
Belligerents

 India

Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami
Lashkar-e-Taiba
Jaish-e-Mohammed
Hizbul Mujahideen
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen
Al-Badr
Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front
ISIL-JK[2]

Supported by:

Commanders and leaders
Ram Nath Kovind
(President)
Narendra Modi
(Prime Minister)
Rajnath Singh
(Minister of Defence)
Manoj Mukund Naravane
(COAS General)
Rakesh Kumar Singh Bhadauria
(COS General)
Rajiv Rai Bhatnagar
(Director General)
V K Johri
(Director General)		 Hafiz Saeed
Maulana Azhar
Ilyas Kashmiri †
] Sayeed Salahudeen
Fazlur Rehman Khalil
Farooq Kashmiri
Arfeen Bhai
Amanullah Khan
Bakht Zameen
Dawood Ahmed Sofi †
Strength
3,500 to 5,000 (2006 est.)[9]
150 (2014 est.)[10]
200 (2017 est.)[11]
Casualties and losses
5,462 security forces personnel killed[12] 25,000 militants killed[13]
3,000 captured[9]
4,500 surrendered[9]
20,867[14]–100,000 killed overall[15]

Jammu and Kashmir, long a breeding ground of separatist ambitions,[26] has been wracked by the insurgency since 1989.[27][23] Although the failure of Indian governance and democracy lay at the root of the initial disaffection, Pakistan played an important role in converting the latter into a fully developed insurgency.[22][28] Some insurgent groups in Kashmir support the complete independence, whereas others seek accession to Pakistan.[29][28]

More explicitly, the roots of the insurgency are tied to a dispute over local autonomy.[30] Democratic development was limited in Kashmir until the late 1970s and by 1988 many of the democratic reforms provided by the Indian government had been reversed and non-violent channels for expressing discontent were limited and caused a dramatic increase in support for insurgents advocating violent secession from India.[30] In 1987, a disputed State election[31] created a catalyst for the insurgency when it resulted in some of the state's legislative assembly members forming armed insurgent groups.[32][33][34] In July 1988, a series of demonstrations, strikes and attacks on the Indian government began the Kashmir insurgency, which during the 1990s escalated into the most important internal security issue in India.

Pakistan claims to be giving its "moral and diplomatic" support to the separatist movement.[35] The Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan has been accused by India and the international community of supporting, supplying arms and training mujahideen,[36][37] to fight in Jammu and Kashmir.[4][37][38] In 2015, former President of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf admitted that Pakistan had supported and trained insurgent groups in the 1990s.[39] India has repeatedly called Pakistan to end its "cross-border terrorism" in Kashmir.[35] Several new militant groups with radical Islamic views emerged and changed the ideological emphasis of the movement to Islamic. This had happened partly due to a large number of Islamic "Jihadi" fighters (mujahadeen) who had entered the Kashmir valley following the end of the Soviet–Afghan War in the 1980s.[35]

The conflict between the militants and the Indian forces have led to large number of casualties.[40] Many civilians have also died as a result of being targeted by the various armed groups.[41] According to official figures released in Jammu and Kashmir assembly, there were 3,400 disappearance cases and the conflict has left more than 47,000 people dead which also includes 7,000 police personnel as of July 2009.[42] Some rights groups claim a higher figure of 100,000 deaths since 1989.[15] Since the revocation of the special status of Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019, the indian military has intensified its counter-insurgency operations. Clashes in the first half of 2020 left 229 dead, including 32 civilians. The 283 people killed in all of 2019 was the highest toll for a decade. [43]

History of the movement
See also: Timeline of the Kashmir conflict, History of Jammu and Kashmir, Kashmir conflict, and Exodus of Kashmiri Hindus

1947–1987
See also: Partition of India

After independence from colonial rule India and Pakistan fought a war over the princely state of Kashmir. At the end of the war India controlled the most valuable parts of Kashmir.[44] While there were sporadic periods of violence there was no organised insurgency movement.[45]

During this period legislative elections in Jammu and Kashmir were first held in 1951 and Sheikh Abdullah's secular party stood unopposed. He was an instrumental member in the accession of the state to India.[46][47]

However, Sheikh Abdullah would fall in and out of favour with the central government and would often be dismissed only to be re-appointed later on.[48] This was a time of political instability and power struggle in Jammu and Kashmir, and it went through several periods of president's rule by the Federal Government.[34]

1987–2004
The trend in total yearly civilian and security forces fatalities from insurgency-related violence over 25 years from 1988 to 2013.[49]

After Sheikh Abdullah's death, his son Farooq Abdullah took over as Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. Farooq Abdullah eventually fell out of favour with the Central Government and the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had his government toppled with the help of his brother-in-law G. M. Shah. A year later, Abdullah reached an accord with the new Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and announced an alliance with the Congress party for the elections of 1987. The elections were allegedly rigged in favour of Abdullah.[32][34]

Most commentators state that this led to the rise of an armed insurgency movement composed, in part, of those who unfairly lost the elections. Pakistan supplied these groups with logistical support, arms, recruits and training.[50][32][34][51][52]

In the second half of 1989 the alleged assassinations of the Indian spies and political collaborators by JKLF (Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front) was intensified. Over six months more than a hundred officials were killed to paralyse government's administrative and intelligence apparatus. The daughter of then interior affairs minister, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed was kidnapped in December and four terrorists had to be released for her release. This event led to mass celebrations all over the valley. Farooq Abdullah resigned in January after the appointment of Jagmohan Malhotra as the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir. Subsequently, J&K was placed under Governor's Rule under Article 92 of state constitution.[53]

Under JKLF's leadership on 21–23 January large scale protests were organised in valley. As a response to this largely explosive situation paramilitary units of BSF and CRPF were called. These units were used by the government to combat Maoist insurgency and the North-Eastern insurgency. The challenge to them in this situation was not posed by armed insurgents but by the stone pelters. Their inexperience caused at least 50 casualties in Gawkadal massacre. In this incident the underground militant movement was transformed into a mass struggle. To curb the situation AFSPA (Armed Forces Special Powers Act) was imposed on Kashmir in September 1990 to suppress the insurgency by giving armed forces the powers to kill and arrest without warrant to maintain public order. During this time the dominant tactic involved killing of a prominent figure in a public gathering to push forces into action and the public prevented them from capturing these insurgents. This sprouting of sympathisers in Kashmir led to the hard-line approach of Indian army.[54]

With JKLF at forefront large number of militant groups like Allah Tigers, People's League and Hizb-i-Islamia sprung up. Weapons were smuggled on a large scale from Pakistan. In Kashmir JKLF operated under the leadership of Ashfaq Majid Wani, Yasin Bhat, Hamid Shiekh and Javed Mir. To counter this growing pro-Pakistani sentiment in Kashmir, Indian media associated it exclusively with Pakistan.[55]

JKLF used distinctly Islamic themes to mobilise crowds and justify their use of violence. They sought to establish an Islamic democratic state where the rights of minorities would be protected according to Quran and Sunna and economy would be organised on the principles of Islamic socialism.[56]

The Indian army has conducted various operations to control and eliminate insurgency in the region such as Operation Sarp Vinash,[57][58] in which a multi-battalion offensive was launched against terrorists from groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami, al-Badr and Jaish-e-Mohammad who had been constructing shelters in the Pir Panjal region of Jammu and Kashmir over several years.[59] The subsequent operations led to the death of over 60 terrorists[60] and uncovered the largest network of militant hideouts in the history of insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir covering 100 square kilometers.

Islamisation of Kashmir in early 1989

During the early period of militancy in 1989, multiple militants groups strive to Islamise Kashmiri culture and political setup to create a conducive environment for the merger of Kashmir with Pakistan. Numerous Islamist groups were formed in early 1990 who emerged advocating Nizam-e-Mustafa (Rule of Muhammad) as the objective for their struggle. Militant groups like Hizbul mujahideen and Jamaat-e-Islami asserted that struggle of Kashmir will continue till Islamic Caliphate is achieved in Kashmir.[61] Murder of Kashmiri Hindus, Intellectuals, Liberals and activists were described necessary to get rid of un-Islamic elements. Concurrently all cinema houses, beauty parlours, wine shops, bars, video centres, use of cosmetics and similar things were banned by militant groups. Many militant organisations like Al baqr, People's league, Wahdat-e-Islam and Allah Tigers imposed restrictions like banning cigarettes, restrictions on Kashmiri girls.[62] Apart from militants, Kashmir was witnessing Islamization during 1980's when Abdullah Government changed the names of about 2,500 villages from their native names to new Islamic names. The Sheikh also started delivering communal speeches in mosques similar to his speeches in the 1930s. Additionally, he referred Kashmiri Pandits as "mukhbir" or informers of the Indian government.[63][64]

2004–11
Main article: 2010 Kashmir unrest

Beginning in 2004 Pakistan began to end its support for insurgents in Kashmir.[65] This happened because terrorist groups linked to Kashmir twice tried to assassinate Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf.[52] His successor, Asif Ali Zardari has continued the policy, calling insurgents in Kashmir "terrorists".[66] Although it is unclear if Pakistan's intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence, thought to be the agency aiding and controlling the insurgency[66][67][68] is following Pakistan's commitment to end support for the insurgency in Kashmir.[66]

Despite the change in the nature of the insurgency from a phenomenon supported by external forces to a primarily domestic-driven movement[44][66][69][70][71] the Indian government has continued to send large numbers of troops to the Indian border.[69][71][72]

There have been widespread protests against the Indian army presence in Kashmir.[69]

Once the most formidable face of Kashmir militancy, Hizbul Mujahideen is slowly fading away as its remaining commanders and cadres are being taken out on a regular interval by security forces.[73] Some minor incidents of grenade throwing and sniper firing at security forces notwithstanding, the situation is under control and more or less peaceful. A record number of tourists including Amarnath pilgrims visited Kashmir during 2012. On 3 August 2012, a top Lashkar-e-Taiba militant commander, Abu Hanzulah involved in various attacks on civilians and security forces was killed in an encounter with security forces in a village in Kupwara district of north Kashmir.[74]

2012–present
Main articles: 2013 India–Pakistan border skirmishes, 2014–15 India–Pakistan border skirmishes, and 2016–17 Kashmir unrest

According to Indian Army data quoted by Reuters, at least 70 young Kashmiris joined the insurgency in the 2014, army records showed, with most joining the banned group Lashkar-e-Taiba, which was accused of carrying out attacks on the Indian city of Mumbai in 2008. Two of the new recruits have doctorates and eight were post graduates, the army data showed.[75] According to BBC, that despite a Pakistani ban on militant activity in Kashmir in 2006, its fighters continue to attempt infiltration into Indian-administered Kashmir. These attempts were curtailed however when people living along the Line of Control which divides Indian and Pakistani Kashmir started to hold public protests against the activities of the insurgent groups.[76]

In June 2020, Doda was declared militancy free while Tral was declared free from Hizbul Mujaheddin militants.[77][78] In July, a Kashmir police tweet from an official twitter handle said that "no resident of #Srinagar district in terrorist ranks now".[79][80][81]

Reasons for the insurgency

Rigging of 1987 Assembly elections
Further information: 1987 Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly election

Following the rise of Islamisation in the Kashmir valley, during the 1987 state elections, various Islamic anti-establishment groups including Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir were organised under a single banner named Muslim United Front (MUF), that is largely current Hurriyat. MUF's election manifesto stressed the need for a solution to all outstanding issues according to Simla Agreement, work for Islamic unity and against political interference from the centre. Their slogan was wanting the law of the Quran in the Assembly.[82] But the MUF won only four seats, even though it had polled 31% votes in the election. However, the elections were widely believed to be rigged, changing the course of politics in the state. The insurgency was sparked by the apparent rigging of state elections in 1987.[32][34][83]

ISI's role

The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence has encouraged and aided the Kashmir independence movement through an insurgency[66][67][68][84] due to its dispute on the legitimacy of Indian rule in Kashmir, with the insurgency as an easy way to keep Indian troops distracted and cause international condemnation of India.[44]
Former Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf in Oct 2014 said during TV interview, "We have source (in Kashmir) besides the (Pakistan) army…People in Kashmir are fighting against (India). We just need to incite them."[85]

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in their first ever open acknowledgement in 2011 in US Court, said that the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) sponsors terrorism in Kashmir and it oversees terrorist separatist groups in Kashmir.[86][87][88][89]

In 2019, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan publicly discouraged Pakistani people from going to Kashmir to do Jihad. People who went to Kashmir will do an "injustice to the Kashmiri people".[90][91] Most of the Pakistani militants who had crossed the border over the years and were caught by the Indian security forces were found to belong to the Punjab province of Pakistan.[91]

Mujahideen influence

After the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, Mujahideen fighters, with the aid of Pakistan, slowly infiltrated Kashmir with the goal of spreading a radical Islamist ideology.[32]

Religion

Jammu and Kashmir is the only Muslim majority state in Hindu-majority India. Indian-American journalist Asra Nomani states that while India itself is a secular state, Muslims are politically, culturally and economically marginalised when compared to Hindus in India as a whole.[92] The government's decision to transfer 99 acres of forest land in near Amarnath in the Kashmir valley to a Hindu organisation (for setting up temporary shelters and facilities for Hindu pilgrims) solidified this feeling and led to one of the largest protest rallies in Jammu and Kashmir.[93]

Human rights abuses
Main article: Human rights abuses in Jammu and Kashmir

After insurgency started in Kashmir valley because of above reasons in the late 1980s, Indian troops entered in Kashmir valley to control the insurgency.[94] Some analysts have suggested that the number of Indian troops in Jammu and Kashmir is close to 600,000 although estimates vary and the Indian government refuses to release official figures.[95] The troops have been accused and held accountable for several humanitarian abuses[71] and have engaged in mass extrajudicial killings, torture, rape and sexual abuse.[72]

Indian security forces have been implicated in many reports for enforced disappearances of thousands of Kashmiris whereas the security forces deny having their information and/or custody. This is often in association with torture or extrajudicial killing. Human right activists estimate the number of disappeared to be over eight thousand, last seen in government detention.[96][97] The disappeared are believed to be dumped in thousands of mass graves across Kashmir.[98][99][100][101][102] A State Human Rights Commission inquiry in 2011, has confirmed there are thousands of bullet-ridden bodies buried in unmarked graves in Jammu and Kashmir. Of the 2730 bodies uncovered in 4 of the 14 districts, 574 bodies were identified as missing locals in contrast to the Indian governments insistence that all the graves belong to foreign militants.[103][104]

Military forces in Jammu and Kashmir operate under impunity and emergency powers granted to them by the central government. These powers allow the military to curtail civil liberties, creating further support for the insurgency.[105][106]

The insurgents have also abused human rights, driving Kashmiri Pandits away from the valley of Kashmir, an action regarded as ethnic cleansing [107] The government's inability to protect the people from both its own troops and the insurgency has further eroded support for the government.[108]

Amnesty International accused security forces of exploiting the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) that enables them to "hold prisoners without trial". The group argues that the law, which allows security to detain individuals for as many as two years "without presenting charges, violating prisoners' human rights".[109] The Army sources maintain that "any move to revoke AFSPA in Jammu and Kashmir would be detrimental to the security of the Valley and would provide a boost to the terrorists."[110]

Former Indian Army Chief General V. K. Singh rejected the accusations that the action was not taken in the cases of human rights violations by Army personnel. On 24 October 2010, he has said that 104 Army personnel had been punished in Jammu and Kashmir in this regard, including 39 officers. He also said that 95% of the allegations of human rights abuses against Indian Army were proved to be false, of which he remarked, had apparently been made with the "ulterior motive of maligning the armed forces".[111] However, according to Human Rights Watch, the military courts in India, in general, were proved to be incompetent to deal with cases of serious human rights abuses and were responsible in covering up evidence and protecting the involved officers.[112] Amnesty International in its report in 2015, titled "Denied"-Failures in Accountability in Jammu and Kashmir, says, "...with respect to investigations, an inquiry that is conducted by the same authority accused of the crime raises serious questions about the independence and impartiality of those proceedings", adding that according to the international law, an independent authority that is not involved in the alleged violations has to investigate such crimes.[113]

These human rights violations are said to have contributed to the rise of resistance in Kashmir.[114][115][116]

Other reasons

Psychological

Psychologist Waheeda Khan, explaining the rebellious nature of the Kashmiris, says that because of the tense situations in the valley from the 1990s, the generation gap between parents and young generations has increased. Young generations tend to blame their parents for failing to do anything about the political situation. So they start experimenting with their own aggressive ways to show their curbed feelings and would go against any authority. A prominent psychiatrist of the valley, Margoob, described that children/teenagers are much more vulnerable to passionate actions and reactions, since the young minds are yet to completely develop psychological mechanisms. When they assume that they are "pushed against the wall", they get controlled by the emotions without bothering about the consequences. Also young people easily identify themselves with the "group" rather than with their individual identities. It leads to psychological distress which causes antisocial behaviour and aggressive attitude. Often, this situation gets worsened by the availability of weapons and people becoming familiar to violence after having exposed to conflict for so long. Waheeda Khan remarks, the major concern is that generations of children who are experiencing long-term violence in their lives, may reach adulthood perceiving that violence is a fair means of solving ethinic, religious, or political differences.[117]

Economic

High unemployment and lack of economic opportunities in Kashmir are also said to have intensified the struggle.[118][119][120]

Stone pelting

Since the 2008 protests and 2010 unrest, the turmoil has taken a new dimension when people, particularly youngsters of the Kashmir valley have started pelting stones on security forces to express their aggression and protest for the loss of freedom. In turn they get attacked by the armed personnel with pellets, rubber bullets, sling shots and tear gas shells. This leads to eye-injuries and several other kind of injuries to many people. Security forces also face injuries, and sometimes get beaten up during these events. According to Waheeda Khan, most of the 'stone-pelters' are school and college going students. Large number of these people get arrested during these events for allegedly resorting to stone pelting, after which some of them are also tortured. According to political activist Mannan Bukhari, Kashmiris made stone, an easily accessible and defenseless weapon, their weapon of choice for protest.[121][122]

Kashmiri senior journalist Parvaiz Bukhari remarked:[122][123]

The summer of 2010 witnessed a convulsion in the world’s most militarized zone, the Indian-controlled part of Kashmir, an unprecedented and deadly civil unrest that is beginning to change a few things on the ground. [...] Little known and relatively anonymous resistance activists emerged, organizing an unarmed agitation more fierce than the armed rebellion against Indian rule two decades earlier. And apparently aware of the post 9/11 world, young Kashmiris, children of the conflict, made stones and rocks a weapon of choice against government armed forces, side-stepping the tag of a terrorist movement linked with Pakistan. The unrest represents a conscious transition to an unarmed mass movement, one that poses a moral challenge to New Delhi’s military domination over the region.

Human rights violations by militants and army

Further information: Human rights abuses by insurgents, Human rights abuses in Jammu and Kashmir and Rape by militants

Islamic separatist militants are accused of violence against the Kashmir populace.[124][125][126] . On the other hand , Indian army has also committed serious crimes like using pellet guns, torture , killing and rape etc . The militants have kidnapped and killed many civil servants and suspected informers. Tens of thousands of Kashmiri Pandits have emigrated as a result of the violence. Estimates of the displaced varies from 170,000 to 700,000. Thousands of Kasmiri Pandits had to move to Jammu because of militancy.[127]

Notable attacks in J&K
  • July and August 1989 – 3 CRPF personnel and politician Mohd. Yusuf Halwai of NC/F were killed.[128]
  • 1989 kidnapping of Rubaiya Sayeed daughter of the then Home Minister of India Mufti Sayeed.
  • Gawkadal massacre-Central Reserve Police Force opened fire on a group of Kashmiri protestors, killing 160.
  • Sopore massacre- Killing of 55 Kashmiri civilians by Border security force(BSF)
  • Bijbehara massacre-Massacre of 51 protestors by BSF.
  • 1995 kidnapping of western tourists in Jammu and Kashmir – Six foreign trekkers from Anantnag district were kidnapped by Al Faran. One was beheaded later, one escaped, and the other four remain missing, presumably killed.
  • 1997 Sangrampora massacre – On 22 March 1997, seven Kashmiri Pandits were killed in Sangrampora village in the Budgam district.[129]
  • Wandhama massacre – In January 1998, 24 Kashmiri Pandits living in the village of Wandhama were massacred by Pakistani militants. According to the testimony of one of the survivors, the militants dressed themselves as officers of the Indian Army, entered their houses and then started firing blindly. The incident was significant because it coincided with former US president Bill Clinton's visit to India and New Delhi highlighted the massacre to prove Pakistan-supported terrorism in Kashmir .[130]
  • 1998 Prankote massacre – 26 Hindu villagers of Udhampur district were killed by militants.
  • 1998 Champanari massacre – 25 Hindu villagers killed on 19 June 1998 by Islamic militants.
  • 2000 Amarnath pilgrimage massacre – 30 Hindu pilgrims massacred by militants.
  • Chittisinghpura massacre – 36 Sikhs massacred by LET militants.
  • 2001 terrorist attack on Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly – On 1 October 2001, a bombing at the Legislative Assembly in Srinagar killed 38.[131]
  • 2002 Raghunath temple attacks – First attack occurred on 30 March 2002 when two suicide bombers attacked the temple. Eleven persons including three security forces personnel were killed and 20 were injured. In second attack, the fidayeen suicide squad attacked the temple second time on 24 November 2002 when two suicide bombers stormed the temple and killed fourteen devotees and injured 45 others.
  • 2002 Qasim Nagar massacre – On 13 July 2002, armed militants believed to be a part of the Lashkar-e-Toiba threw hand grenades at the Qasim Nagar market in Srinagar and then fired on civilians standing nearby killing 27 and injuring many more.[132]
  • 2003 Nadimarg Massacre – 24 Hindus killed in Nadimarg, Kashmir on 23 March 2003 by Lashkar-e-Taiba militants.
  • 20 July 2005 Srinagar bombing – A car bomb exploded near an armoured Indian Army vehicle in the famous Church Lane area in Srinagar killing 4 Indian Army personnel, one civilian and the suicide bomber. Militant group Hizbul Mujahideen, claimed responsibility for the attack.[133]
  • Budshah Chowk attack – A militant attack on 29 July 2005 at Srinigar's city centre, Budshah Chowk, killed 2 and left more than 17 people injured. Most of those injured were media journalists.[134]
  • Assassination of Ghulam Nabi Lone – On 18 October 2005, suspected Kashmiri militants killed Jammu and Kashmir's then education minister Ghulam Nabi Lone. Militant group called Al Mansurin claimed responsibility for the attack.[135] Abdul Ghani Lone, a prominent All Party Hurriyat Conference leader, was assassinated by unidentified gunmen during a memorial rally in Srinagar. The assassination resulted in wide-scale demonstrations against the Indian forces for failing to provide enough security cover for Lone.[132]
  • 2006 Doda massacre – On 3 May 2006, militants massacred 35 Hindus in Doda and Udhampur districts in Jammu and Kashmir.[136]
  • On 12 June 2006, one person was killed and 31 were wounded when terrorists hurled three grenades on Vaishnodevi shrine-bound buses at the general bus stand.[137]
  • 2014 Kashmir Valley attacks – There were four attacks on 5 December 2014 on army, police and civilians resulted in 21 deaths and several injured. Their motive was to disrupt the ongoing assembly elections.[138]
  • 2016 Uri attack – Four armed terrorists sneaked into an army camp and lobbed grenades onto tents causing massive fire culminating in the death of 19 military personnel.
  • 2018 Sunjuwan attack - On 10 February 2018, Jaish-e-Mohammad terrorists attacked Sunjuwan Army Camp in Jammu and Kashmir. 6 Indian army soldiers, 4 terrorists, 1 civilian died and 11 were injured.
  • 2019 Pulwama attack - On 14 February 2019, Jaish-e-Mohammad terrorists attacked a convoy of CRPF men killing 46 soldiers and injuring 20.

Tactics

India

Over time the Indian government has increasingly relied on military presence to control the insurgency.[71] The military has allegedly committed human rights violations.[139] The government would often dissolve assemblies, arrest elected politicians and impose president's rule. The government also rigged elections in 1987.[34] In recent times there have been signs that the government is taking local elections more seriously.[140] The government has also funneled development aid to Kashmir and Kashmir has now become the biggest per capita receiver of Federal aid.[141]

Pakistan

The Pakistani central government originally supported, trained and armed the insurgency in Kashmir,[86][87][87][88][89][142] sometimes known as "ultras" (extremists),[143][144] however after groups linked to the Kashmiri insurgency twice attempted to assassinate president Pervez Musharraf, Musharraf decided to end support for such groups.[52] His successor, Asif Ali Zardari has continued the policy, calling insurgents in Kashmir "terrorists".[66]

But the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence hasn't followed the lead of the government and has continued its support for insurgent groups in Kashmir[66][67][68] In 2008, 541 people died due to insurgency, The Economist called it the lowest in two decades. The report cited a reduction in the support for militants by Pakistan and war fatigue among the Kashmiris as the reasons for the reduction in casualty figures.[71]

Insurgents

Since around 2000 the 'insurgency' has become far less violent and has instead taken on the form of protests and marches.[93] Certain groups have also chosen to lay down their arms and look for a peaceful resolution to the conflict.[145]

Groups

The different insurgent groups have different aims in Kashmir. Some want complete independence from both India and Pakistan, others want unification with Pakistan and still others just want greater autonomy from the Indian government.[146]

A 2010 survey found that 43% of the people in J&K and 44% of the people in AJK would favour complete independence from both India and Pakistan, with support for the independence movement unevenly distributed across the region.[147][148]

Identity

Over the last two years, the militant group, Lashkar-e-Toiba has split into two factions: Al Mansurin and Al Nasirin. Another new group reported to have emerged is the "Save Kashmir Movement". Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (formerly known as Harkat-ul-Ansar) and Lashkar-e-Toiba are believed to be operating from Muzaffarabad, Azad Kashmir and Muridke, Pakistan respectively.

Other less well known groups are the Freedom Force and Farzandan-e-Milat. A smaller group, Al-Badr, has been active in Kashmir for many years and is still believed to be functioning. All Parties Hurriyat Conference, an organisation that uses moderate means to press for the rights of the Kashmiris, is often considered as the mediator between New Delhi and insurgent groups.

Al-Qaeda

It is unclear if Al Qaeda has a presence in Jammu and Kashmir. Donald Rumsfeld suggested that they were active[149] and in 2002 the SAS hunted for Osama bin Laden in Jammu and Kashmir.[150] Al Qaeda claims that it has established a base in Jammu and Kashmir.[151] However, there has been no evidence for any of these assertions.[149][150][151] The Indian army also claims that there is no evidence of Al Qaeda presence in Jammu and Kashmir.[152] Al Qaeda has established bases in Pakistani administered Kashmir and some, including Robert Gates have suggested that they have helped to plan attacks in India.[152][153][154]

Casualties

According to Sumantra Bose in his book, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace, around 40000 (Indian estimates) to 80000 (Hurriyat estimates) civilians, separatist guerilla fighters and Indian security personnel died from the time period of 1989 to 2002 in both Kashmir Valley and Jammu . More than 4600 security personnel, 13500 civilians and 15937 militants including 3000 from outside Jammu and Kashmir (mostly Pakistanis and some Afghans) were killed in this fourteen-year period. Also in this period, 55,538 incidents of violence were recorded. Indian forces engaged in counter insurgency operations captured around 40,000 firearms, 150,000 explosive devices, and over 6 million rounds of assorted ammunition.[155] Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society posits a figure of 70,000 deaths, most of them civilians.[156]

gollark: What will take over a year?
gollark: GDPR is the law, "privacy" is a general principle I happen to like.
gollark: "Privacy" isn't a law.
gollark: And your response wasn't to report it to the police or something, but just to wreck random public-facing things tako is involved in.
gollark: Also, law is often pretty stupid.

See also

References
  1. Specified, Not. "Chronicle of Important events/date in J&K's political history". www.jammu-kashmir.com. Archived from the original on 12 October 2017. Retrieved 29 April 2018.
  2. "Islamic State J-K chief among 4 terrorists killed in Kashmir". Rediff.com. 22 June 2018.
  3. "Pakistan's Long Support for Militants Puts the Country in a Bind".
  4. Gall, Carlotta (21 January 2007). "At Border, Signs of Pakistani Role in Taliban Surge". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 31 December 2016. Retrieved 21 February 2017.
  5. Sharma, Vikram (18 August 2019). "Forces deploy 1 million to guard Kashmir Valley". The Asian Age. Retrieved 30 May 2020. Close to 9.5 lakh personnel from the Army, various paramilitary units and special forces, besides the Indian Air Force, are...
  6. , "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 30 June 2006. Retrieved 8 February 2006.CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link) Multiple sources for the number of Indian counter-insurgency troops in the region "The Times & the Sunday Times". Archived from the original on 23 May 2011. Retrieved 8 February 2006.CS1 maint: BOT: original-url status unknown (link)
  7. Chopra, Anuj (2 April 2007). "India weighs troop reduction in quieter Kashmir". The Christian Science Monitor. Archived from the original on 22 July 2016. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
  8. Das, Saraswati (2 August 2019). "Additional BSF and CPRF forces to Jammu and Kashmir". Livemint. Retrieved 3 August 2019.
  9. "Everyone Lives in Fear": Patterns of Impunity in Jammu and Kashmir, Volume 18. Human Rights Watch. 2006.
  10. Excelsior Correspondent (1 November 2014). "Over 150 militants, mostly foreigners, active in Kashmir: DGP". The Daily Excelsior. Archived from the original on 12 October 2017. Retrieved 24 February 2017.
  11. "Army releases names of top 11 militants active in Kashmir". Hindustan Times. 31 May 2017. Archived from the original on 4 August 2017.
  12. "Ultras kill 16725 civilians in 24 yrs in J&K". Kashmir Times. 2 March 2014. Archived from the original on 12 October 2017. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
  13. "Fatalities in Jammu and Kashmir: 1990-2017". South Asia Terrorism Portal. Retrieved 31 December 2017.
  14. "Kashmir insurgents". Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Archived from the original on 1 October 2017.
  15. "40,000 people killed in Kashmir: India". The Express Tribune. Archived from the original on 27 February 2017.
  16. Until My Freedom Has Come: The New Intifada in Kashmir. Penguin Books India. 2011. ISBN 9780143416470.
  17. Margolis, Eric (2004). War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir and Tibet. Routledge. p. 81. ISBN 9781135955595.
  18. Bose, Sumantra (2009). Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Harvard University Press. p. 107. ISBN 9780674028555.
  19. "insurgency" (noun), Merriam-Webster Unabridged, retrieved 27 November 2019 Quote: "The quality or state of being insurgent; specifically : a condition of revolt against a recognized government that does not reach the proportions of an organized revolutionary government and is not recognized as belligerency" (subscription required)
  20. insurgency, n, Oxford English Dictionary, retrieved 27 November 2019 Quote: "The quality or state of being insurgent; the tendency to rise in revolt; = insurgence n. = The action of rising against authority; a rising, revolt." (subscription required)
  21. Insurgency, Encyclopedia Britannica, retrieved 27 November 2019 Quote: "Insurgency, term historically restricted to rebellious acts that did not reach the proportions of an organized revolution. It has subsequently been applied to any such armed uprising, typically guerrilla in character, against the recognized government of a state or country." (subscription required)"
  22. Kazi, Seema (2017), "Law, Gender and Governance in Kashmir", in Chitralekha Zutshi (ed.), Kashmir: History, Politics, Representation, Cambridge University Press, pp. 150–171, 153, ISBN 978-1-108-22612-7 Quote: "By 1989-90, the slogan of aazadi (freedom) came to symbolize popular resentment and protest against the denial of democracy, and the demand for freedom from Indian rule over Kashmiri land. In response to a militant-led mass movement for independence by Kashmiri Muslims, the Indian state embarked on an extraordinary military occupation, combined with high levels of violence and repression in order to contain the rebellion. Among the notable characteristics of Kashmir’s revolt was the active participation of Kashmiri women during the most spontaneous phase of the struggle."
  23. Slater, Joanna (28 March 2019), "From scholars into militants: Educated Kashmiri youths are joining an anti-India insurgency", Washington Post, retrieved 27 November 2019 Quote: "Some of the recruits, like Bhat, are highly educated and have promising careers ahead of them; others are high school dropouts from rural villages. But each embraced violence, drawn to a three-decade insurgency against India’s rule in its portion of Kashmir, the Himalayan region claimed by India and Pakistan."
  24. (a) Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannia, Kashmir, region Indian subcontinent, Encyclopaedia Britannica, retrieved 15 August 2019CS1 maint: extra text: authors list (link) (subscription required) Quote: "Kashmir, region of the northwestern Indian subcontinent ... has been the subject of dispute between India and Pakistan since the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. The northern and western portions are administered by Pakistan and comprise three areas: Azad Kashmir, Gilgit, and Baltistan, the last two being part of a territory called the Northern Areas. Administered by India are the southern and southeastern portions, which constitute the state of Jammu and Kashmir but are slated to be split into two union territories. China became active in the eastern area of Kashmir in the 1950s and has controlled the northeastern part of Ladakh (the easternmost portion of the region) since 1962.";
    (b) "Kashmir", Encyclopedia Americana, Scholastic Library Publishing, 2006, p. 328, ISBN 978-0-7172-0139-6 C. E Bosworth, University of Manchester Quote: "KASHMIR, kash'mer, the northernmost region of the Indian subcontinent, administered partlv by India, partly by Pakistan, and partly by China. The region has been the subject of a bitter dispute between India and Pakistan since they became independent in 1947";
  25. Jan·Osma鈔czyk, Edmund; Osmańczyk, Edmund Jan (2003), Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements: G to M, Taylor & Francis, pp. 1191–, ISBN 978-0-415-93922-5 Quote: "Jammu and Kashmir: Territory in northwestern India, subject to a dispute between India and Pakistan. It has borders with Pakistan and China."
  26. The Editorial Board (6 August 2019), "India Tempts Fate in Kashmir, 'The Most Dangerous Place in the World'", New York Times Quote: "The Himalayan territory of Kashmir has long been the central source of friction between India and Pakistan and a hotbed of separatist aspirations."
  27. Ratcliffe, Rebecca (4 August 2019), "Heightened security and anxiety in Kashmir amid fears of unrest", Guardian Quote: "Kashmir is claimed by India and Pakistan in full and ruled in part by both. An insurgency on the Indian-administered side has been ongoing for three decades, and tens of thousands of people have been killed."
  28. Kapur, S. Paul (2017), Jihad as Grand Strategy: Islamist Militancy, National Security, and the Pakistani State, Oxford University Press, pp. 84–, ISBN 978-0-19-976852-3 Quote: "Popular discontent in Kashmir resulted largely from chronic mismanagement and malfeasance on the part of the Indian central government, as well as the Kashmiri National Conference. It was not a Pakistani creation. The Pakistanis actively capitalized on Kashmiri discontent, however, and played a crucial role in transforming spontaneous, decentralized opposition to Indian rule into a full-fledged insurgency dedicated to promoting an Islamist sociopolitical agenda and violently joining Kashmir to Pakistan"
  29. Conflict Encyclopedia – India: Kashmir Archived 1 October 2017 at the Wayback Machine, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 29 May 1977, retrieved 2013-05-29,
  30. Uppsala Conflict Data Program Conflict Encyclopedia, Conflict Summary, Conflict name: India: Kashmir, "Roots of Conflict and the emergence of Kashmir Insurgents", viewed 2013-05-29, http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=74&regionSelect=6-Central_and_Southern_Asia# Archived 3 February 2013 at the Wayback Machine
  31. "Elections in Kashmir". Kashmirlibrary.org. Archived from the original on 1 February 2017. Retrieved 23 February 2017.
  32. "Kashmir insurgency". BBC News. Archived from the original on 22 February 2017. Retrieved 21 February 2017.
  33. Jeelani, Mushtaq A. (25 June 2001). "Kashmir: A History Littered With Rigged Elections". Media Monitors Network. Archived from the original on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 24 February 2017.
  34. Hussain, Altaf (14 September 2002). "Kashmir's flawed elections". BBC News. Archived from the original on 26 February 2017. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
  35. "India Pakistan – Timeline". BBC News. BBC News. Archived from the original on 22 February 2017. Retrieved 10 April 2015.
  36. Ali, Mahmud (9 October 2006). "Pakistan's shadowy secret service". BBC News. Archived from the original on 21 February 2017. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
  37. Rashid, Ahmed (6 October 2006). "Nato's top brass accuse Pakistan over Taliban aid". The Daily Telegraph. Archived from the original on 22 February 2017. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
  38. Jehl, Douglas; Dugger, Celia W.; Barringer, Felicity (25 February 2002). "Death of Reporter Puts Focus on Pakistan Intelligence Unit". The New York Times. Retrieved 21 February 2017.
  39. "Pakistan supported, trained terror groups: Pervez Musharraf". Business Standard. Press Trust of India. 28 October 2015. Archived from the original on 5 June 2017. Retrieved 21 February 2017.
  40. Uppsala Conflict Data Program Conflict Encyclopedia, Conflict Summary, India: Kashmir (entire conflict), Fatality estimates, viewed 2013-05-29, http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=74&regionSelect=6-Central_and_Southern_Asia# Archived 3 February 2013 at the Wayback Machine
  41. Uppsala Conflict Data Program Conflict Encyclopedia, India One-sided violence, Government of India – civilians, Kashmir insurgents – civilians, Lashkar-e-Taiba – civilians, viewed on 2012-05-29, http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=74&regionSelect=6-Central_and_Southern_Asia# Archived 3 February 2013 at the Wayback Machine
  42. Editorial, Reuters. "India revises Kashmir death toll to 47,000". Reuters India. Archived from the original on 8 May 2017. Retrieved 20 May 2017.
  43. "Kashmir: A year of lockdown and lost autonomy". DW. 4 August 2018. Retrieved 14 August 2020.
  44. Bose, Sumantra. Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Harvard, 2005.
  45. Swami, Praveen.India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad. 2006.
  46. "Omar Abdullah hails Sheikh Abdullah's decision to accede J-K to India".
  47. "Excerpts of Sheikh Abdullah's speech defending the accession". 9 August 2016. Archived from the original on 10 November 2016.
  48. Mohd, Abbas Wani (2014). "Beginning of Terrorism in Jammu&Kashmir". Indian Streams Research Journal. Laxmi Book Publication. ISSN 2230-7850.
  49. Fatalities in Terrorist Violence 1988–2014 in Jammu & Kashmir Archived 15 July 2011 at Wikiwix, South Asian Terrorism, SATP (2014)
  50. Hasan, Syed Shoaib (3 March 2010). "Why Pakistan is 'boosting Kashmir militants'". BBC News. Archived from the original on 28 February 2017. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
  51. Jamar, Arif. The untold story of Jihad in Kashmir. 2009.
  52. Khan, Aamer Ahmed (6 April 2005). "Pakistan: Where have the militants gone?". BBC News. Archived from the original on 22 February 2017. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
  53. Behera, Navnita Chadha (2006). Kashmir Demysitified. Washington: Brookings Institution Press.
  54. Behera, Navnita Chadha (2006). Kashmir Demystified. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
  55. Bose, Sumantra (2003). Kashmir Roots of Conflict Paths to Peace. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 146.
  56. Behra, Navnita Chadha (2006). Demystifying Kashmir. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. p. 150.
  57. "The Hindu : Fernandes reveals 'Sarp Vinash' toll". The Hindu. 31 July 2003. Archived from the original on 5 November 2005.
  58. "A Militia Against Terror | J&K: Operation Sarp Vinash - The Army Strikes Hard | South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR), Vol. No. 1.46". www.satp.org. Archived from the original on 25 September 2016. Retrieved 7 March 2018.
  59. Kumar, Devesh (24 May 2003). "Operation Sarp Vinash: Army clears Hill Kaka". The Economic Times. Archived from the original on 8 March 2018. Retrieved 7 March 2018.
  60. "Operation 'Sarp Vinash': Over 60 terrorists killed". www.rediff.com. Archived from the original on 13 June 2017. Retrieved 7 March 2018.
  61. Chitkara, M. G. (2003). Kashmir: LoC. APH Publishing. p. 123. ISBN 9788176484411.
  62. Benkin, Richard L. (12 April 2017). What Is Moderate Islam?. Lexington Books. p. 47. ISBN 9781498537421.
  63. "Kashmir violence- possible solution". The Shillong Times. Retrieved 24 February 2019.
  64. "Kashmir Conflict - A Study of What Led to the Insurgency in Kashmir Valley - Pobierz pdf z Docer.pl". Docer.pl (in Polish). Retrieved 24 February 2019.
  65. Tucker, Spencer C. (2013). Encyclopedia of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency A New Era of Modern Warfare. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, LLC. ISBN 978-1-61069-279-3.
  66. Stephens, Bret (4 October 2008). "The Most Difficult Job in the World". The Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 22 February 2017. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
  67. Cole, Juan (12 December 2008). "Does Obama understand his biggest foreign-policy challenge?". Salon. Archived from the original on 23 March 2017. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
  68. "Links between ISI, militant groups: Straw". Rediff.com. 11 June 2002. Archived from the original on 24 March 2017. Retrieved 24 February 2017.
  69. "Stony ground". The Economist. 8 July 2010. Archived from the original on 23 December 2016. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
  70. "Your place or mine?". The Economist. 12 February 2004. Archived from the original on 22 February 2017. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
  71. "Grim up north". The Economist. 25 June 2009. Archived from the original on 29 April 2017. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
  72. "Kashmir's extra-judicial killings". BBC News. 8 March 2007. Archived from the original on 14 June 2017. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
  73. "Hizbul Mujahideen almost wiped out in Kashmir". The Times of India. 19 October 2011. Archived from the original on 29 July 2012.
  74. "J&K: Top LeT commander killed in encounter". 3 August 2012. Archived from the original on 3 August 2012.
  75. "Kashmiris join insurgency against India at highest rate in two decades". The Express Tribune. 24 February 2015. Archived from the original on 26 June 2015. Retrieved 25 June 2015.
  76. "Who are the Kashmir militants?". BBC News. 1 August 2012. Archived from the original on 20 February 2017. Retrieved 21 February 2017.
  77. "Jammu's Doda is militancy free, say cops after Hizbul terrorist Masood killed in encounter". Hindustan Times. 29 June 2020. Retrieved 29 June 2020.
  78. "No Hizbul militant in south Kashmir's Tral now, first time since 1989: Police". The Times of India. PTI. 26 June 2020. Retrieved 29 June 2020.CS1 maint: others (link)
  79. "No resident of Srinagar in terrorist ranks after killing of top LeT commander: Kashmir IGP". The Indian Express. 26 July 2020. Retrieved 27 July 2020.
  80. Hussain, Ashiq (26 July 2020). "After killing of LeT man, no resident of Srinagar is in terrorist ranks: IGP". Hindustan Times. Retrieved 27 July 2020.
  81. Pandit, M. Saleem (26 July 2020). "Srinagar district is now terror-free: Police". The Times of India. Retrieved 27 July 2020.
  82. Schofield, Victoria (2000). Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War. I.B.Tauris. p. 137. ISBN 9781860648984.
  83. "How Mufti Mohammad Sayeed Shaped the 1987 Elections in Kashmir". The Caravan. 22 March 2016. Archived from the original on 28 April 2017. Retrieved 4 May 2017.
  84. "Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence [ISI]". GlobalSecurity.org. John Pike. Archived from the original on 27 December 2016. Retrieved 24 February 2017.
  85. "Pakistan needs to incite those fighting in Kashmir: Musharraf". India Today. 16 October 2014. Archived from the original on 12 October 2017. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
  86. "ISI sponsors terror activities in Kashmir, FBI tells US court". Firstpost. Archived from the original on 24 September 2015. Retrieved 1 April 2015.
  87. Rajghatta, Chidanand (20 July 2011). "US exposes ISI subversion of Kashmir issue; FBI arrests US-based lobbyist". The Times of India. Archived from the original on 12 August 2017. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
  88. Kumar, Himani (7 June 2011). "ISI gives arms to Kashmir terrorists: Rana to FBI". Rediff.com. Archived from the original on 5 August 2017. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
  89. Agencies (20 July 2011). "ISI funneled millions to influence US policy on Kashmir: FBI". The Indian Express. Archived from the original on 24 February 2017. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
  90. "'Historic day': PM Imran inaugurates 24/7 border crossing at Torkham". DAWN.COM. 18 September 2019. Retrieved 27 November 2019.
  91. Puri, Luv (27 November 2019). "The many faces of Pakistani Punjab's militancy". The Hindu. Retrieved 27 November 2019.
  92. Nomani, Asra Q. (1 December 2008). "Muslims -- India's new 'untouchables'". The Los Angeles Times. Archived from the original on 22 February 2017. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
  93. Thottam, Jyoti (4 September 2008). "Valley of Tears". Time. Archived from the original on 24 January 2017. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
  94. Hashim, Asad (27 May 2014). "Timeline: India-Pakistan relations". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 1 March 2017. Retrieved 23 February 2017.
  95. Nathan, Joanna."India's leader makes peace overtures in Kashmir" Archived 23 May 2011 at the Wayback Machine, The Times
  96. Brad Adams, Asia director at Human Rights Watch (16 February 2007). "India: Investigate All 'Disappearances' in Kashmir | Human Rights Watch". Hrw.org. Archived from the original on 5 August 2012. Retrieved 1 October 2012.
  97. Human Rights Watch (11 September 2006). "Everyone Lives in Fear". Hrw.org. Archived from the original on 15 April 2013. Retrieved 1 October 2012.
  98. "India | Human Rights Watch". Hrw.org. 14 January 2009. Archived from the original on 3 September 2012.
  99. Bukhari, Shujaat. "Mass graves found in North Kashmir containing 2,900 unmarked bodies". The Hindu. Archived from the original on 29 April 2018. Retrieved 22 April 2017.
  100. "Kashmir graves: Human Rights Watch calls for inquiry". BBC News. 25 August 2011. Archived from the original on 23 April 2017. Retrieved 22 April 2017.
  101. "India must investigate unidentified graves, News, Amnesty International Australia". 30 August 2008. Archived from the original on 30 August 2008. Retrieved 22 April 2017.
  102. Buried Evidence: Unknown, Unmarked, and Mass Graves in Indian-Administered Kashmir Archived 17 October 2011 at the Wayback Machine A preliminary report; International People's Tribunal on Human Rights and Justice in Kashmir
  103. "India: Investigate Unmarked Graves in Jammu and Kashmir | Human Rights Watch". Hrw.org. 24 August 2011. Archived from the original on 4 September 2012. Retrieved 1 October 2012.
  104. LYDIA POLGREEN (22 August 2011). "Mass Graves Hold Thousands, Kashmir Inquiry Finds". NYTimes. Archived from the original on 2 May 2016.
  105. Yardley, Jim (27 September 2010). "India Reopens Kashmir's Schools, but Many Stay Away". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 22 February 2017. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
  106. "India: Security forces cannot claim immunity under AFSPA, must face trial for violations". Amnesty International. Archived from the original on 23 April 2017. Retrieved 7 March 2012.
  107. Pallone, Frank."Resolution condemning Human Rights Violations against Kashmiri Pandits" Archived 10 August 2009 at the Wayback Machine
  108. "Rights Abuses Behind Kashmir Fighting – Human Rights Watch". hrw.org. Archived from the original on 19 October 2008. Retrieved 25 June 2015.
  109. Huey, Caitlin (28 March 2011). "Amnesty International Cites Human Rights Abuse in Kashmir". Usnews.com. Archived from the original on 30 April 2013. Retrieved 1 October 2012.
  110. "Army opposes Omar's plans to revoke AFSPA: Report - Times of India". The Times of India. Archived from the original on 12 October 2017. Retrieved 6 May 2017.
  111. "104 armymen punished for human rights violations in JK: Gen VK Singh | Latest News & Updates at Daily News & Analysis". dna. 24 October 2010. Archived from the original on 25 April 2017. Retrieved 24 April 2017.
  112. "Rape by Security Forces: The Pattern of Impunity". www.hrw.org. Archived from the original on 12 October 2017. Retrieved 1 May 2017.
  113. Correspondent, Reader (3 September 2016). "96% complaints against army rejected by GoI under 'colonial' AFSPA: Amnesty". Kashmir Reader. Archived from the original on 4 August 2017. Retrieved 1 May 2017.
  114. "Kashmir's disturbing new reality | the young militants of Kashmir". Hindustantimes.com. Archived from the original on 30 May 2017. Retrieved 24 May 2017. Then, youngsters used to take to the streets and pelt stones to protest human right violations...
  115. Parthasarathy, Malini. "Understanding Kashmir's stone pelters". The Hindu. Archived from the original on 29 April 2018. Retrieved 24 May 2017. Today's protesters might shout anti-India slogans such as azadi, but their anger is specifically directed at the security forces in the context of the brutal killings of innocent boys...
  116. Gowhar Geelani. "Five reasons behind radicalisation in Kashmir". www.dailyo.in. Archived from the original on 9 March 2017. Retrieved 24 May 2017.
  117. Waheeda Khan, Conflict in Kashmir 2015, p. 90, 91.
  118. "Indian award for Kashmir 'human shield' officer". BBC News. 23 May 2017. Archived from the original on 23 May 2017. Retrieved 23 May 2017. High unemployment and complaints of heavy-handed tactics by security forces battling street protesters and fighting insurgents have aggravated the problem.
  119. "Unemployment a reason for surge in J&K violence? - Times of India". The Times of India. Retrieved 24 May 2017.
  120. Parthasarathy, Malini. "Understanding Kashmir's stone pelters". The Hindu. Archived from the original on 29 April 2018. Retrieved 24 May 2017. The protesters on the streets...(are) frustrated at the lack of employment and economic opportunities. It is not hard to see where the frustration of the educated Kashmiri youth comes from. On the one hand, they are told that they are Indian citizens but they are shut out of the narrative of India as an emerging economic power. With mobile phones and internet communication being restricted, their sense of participation in the larger Indian discourse is sharply reduced.
  121. Waheeda Khan, Conflict in Kashmir 2015, p. 88
  122. Bukhari, Mannan (28 July 2015). Kashmir - Scars of Pellet Gun: The Brutal Face of Suppression. Partridge Publishing. p. 44. ISBN 9781482850062.
  123. "Summers of Unrest Challenging India". www.kashmirlife.net. 20 December 2010. Archived from the original on 12 October 2017.
  124. "Four killed in Kashmir bomb blast". BBC News. 20 July 2005. Archived from the original on 25 August 2016. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
  125. Mushtaq, Sheikh. "Ten Killed in Kashmir Car Bomb Blast". ABC News. Retrieved 24 February 2017.
  126. "K P S Gill: The Kashmiri Pandits: An Ethnic Cleansing the World Forgot – Islamist Extremism & Terrorism in South Asia". satp.org. Archived from the original on 9 March 2009. Retrieved 25 June 2015.
  127. Alexander Evans, A departure from history: Kashmiri Pandits, 1990–2001, Contemporary South Asia (Volume 11, Number 1, 1 March 2002, pp. 19–37)
  128. "Chronicle of Important events/date in J&K's political history". jammu-kashmir.com. Archived from the original on 14 June 2015. Retrieved 25 June 2015.
  129. "Sangrampora killings". Archived from the original on 15 April 2005.
  130. "Wandhama Massacre report". Archived from the original on 9 October 1999.
  131. Dugger, Celia W. (9 October 2001). "Pakistan Asks India to Revive Talks Aimed at Bringing Peace to Kashmir". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 23 February 2017. Retrieved 23 February 2017.
  132. "Human Rights Watch World Report 2003: India". Archived from the original on 6 October 2010.
  133. "20 July 2005 Srinagar attack". Archived from the original on 18 November 2005.
  134. "July 29 attack in Srinagar". Archived from the original on 3 March 2007.
  135. "Kashmir minister killed in attack". BBC News. 18 October 2005. Archived from the original on 22 February 2017. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
  136. Tribune News Service (4 May 2006). "Phagwara observes bandh over J&K massacre". The Tribune. Archived from the original on 12 October 2017. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
  137. Sharma, S.P. (13 June 2006). "Terror in Jammu, Anantnag". The Tribune. Archived from the original on 1 October 2017. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
  138. "Multiple attacks rock Kashmir Valley". The Hindu: Mobile Edition. 5 December 2014. Archived from the original on 24 December 2014. Retrieved 24 December 2014.
  139. Human Rights Watch, Patricia Gossman. "India's secret army in Kashmir : new patterns of abuse emerge in the conflict ", 1996
  140. Ramaseshan, Radhika (30 December 2008). "Cong dilemma: young Omar or PDP". The Telegraph. Archived from the original on 23 February 2017. Retrieved 23 February 2017.
  141. Sanghvi, Vir "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 8 February 2011. Retrieved 23 December 2010.CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link) "Think the unthinkable" Hindustan Times, August 2008
  142. "Afzal Guru's confession: I helped them, took training in Pak". DAILY BHASKAR. 10 February 2013. Archived from the original on 2 April 2015. Retrieved 19 April 2015.
  143. Agencies (6 April 2012). "Attempts will be made to push ultras across LoC: Army". Indian Express. Archived from the original on 7 January 2014.
  144. Press Trust of India (7 January 2014). "Militants, Army troopers exchange fire in Pulwama, none hurt". The Times of India. Archived from the original on 7 January 2014.
  145. Gupta, Amit; Leather, Kaia. "Kashmir: Recent Developments and US Concerns", June 2002
  146. "The Future of Kashmir?". BBC News. Archived from the original on 19 March 2017. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
  147. Bradnock, Robert "Kashmir: Paths to Peace" Chatham House, London, 2008
  148. "Just 2% of people in J&K want to join Pak: Survey". The Times of India. Archived from the original on 14 January 2014. Retrieved 25 June 2015.
  149. Abbas, Zaffar (13 June 2002). "Analysis: Is al-Qaeda in Kashmir?". BBC News. Archived from the original on 29 December 2016. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
  150. Smith, Michael (23 February 2002). "SAS joins Kashmir hunt for bin Laden". The Daily Telegraph. Archived from the original on 15 March 2017. Retrieved 21 February 2017.
  151. International Herald Tribune. "Al Qaeda Claim of Kashmiri Link Worries India"
  152. The Hindu."No al Qaeda presence in Kashmir: Army". The Hindu. 18 June 2007. Archived from the original on 11 April 2010. "No Al Qaeda presence in Kashmir: Army"
  153. Dawn. "Al Qaeda could provoke new India-Pakistan war: Gates", January 2010
  154. Smucker, Phillip (2 July 2002). "Al Qaeda thriving in Pakistani Kashmir". The Christian Science Monitor. Archived from the original on 11 January 2017. Retrieved 21 February 2017.
  155. Bose, Sumantra (2003). Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Harvard University Press. p. 3. Archived from the original on 12 October 2017.
  156. "Like Karadzic, Prosecute All Accused of HR Violations in Kashmir: JKCCS". Kashmir Observer. Archived from the original on 16 October 2017. Retrieved 19 October 2017.

Bibliography
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.