Polish–Ukrainian War

The Polish–Ukrainian War of November 1918 and 1919 was a conflict between the Second Polish Republic and Ukrainian forces (both the West Ukrainian People's Republic and Ukrainian People's Republic). The conflict had its roots in ethnic, cultural and political differences between the Polish and Ukrainian populations living in the region. The war started in Eastern Galicia after the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and spilled over into Chełm Land and Volhynia (Wołyń) regions formerly belonging to the Russian Empire, which were both claimed by the Ukrainian State (a client state of the German Empire) and the Ukrainian People's Republic.

Polish–Ukrainian War
Part of the Ukrainian War of Independence

The map showing breaking the siege of Lviv (Lwów) by Poles (November 1918) and the Polish border at the Zbruch (Zbrucz) River by the war's end, with Eastern Galicia (shown in blue) under the Polish control.
Date1 November 1918 – 18 July 1919
(8 months, 2 weeks and 3 days)
Location
 Ukraine:  Poland
 Romania
Result

Polish victory

Belligerents

 Poland

Regional support:
 Romania
(in Bukovina and Pokuttia)
 Hungary

Strategic support:
 France

Ukraine

Hutsul Republic
(in Maramureș)

Komancza Republic
(in Lemkivshchyna until January 1919)
Ukrainian Bukovina
(in Bukovina, 6–11 November 1919)
Commanders and leaders
Józef Piłsudski
Józef Haller
Waclaw Iwaszkiewicz
Edward Rydz-Śmigły		 Yevhen Petrushevych
Oleksander Hrekov
Mykhailo Omelianovych-Pavlenko
Symon Petliura
Onelian Popovych
Strength
Polish forces:
190,000
Romanian forces:
4,000
Hungarian forces:
620+		 Ukrainian forces:
70,000–75,000[1] or over 100,000[2]
WUPR forces:
35,000
Hutsul forces:
1,100
Komancza forces:
800
Casualties and losses
10,000 15,000

Background
Polish–Ukrainian and Polish–Soviet Wars early 1919.

The origins of the conflict lie in the complex nationality situation in Galicia at the turn of the 20th century. As a result of the House of Habsburg's relative leniency toward national minorities, Austria-Hungary was the perfect ground for the development of both Polish and Ukrainian national movements. During the 1848 revolution, the Austrians, concerned by Polish demands for greater autonomy within the province, gave support to a small group of Ruthenians (the name of the East Slavic people who would later adopt the self-identification of "Ukrainians" or "Rusyns") whose goal was to be recognized as a distinct nationality.[3][4] Subsequently, Ruthenian language schools were established, Ruthenian political parties formed, and the Ruthenians began attempts to develop their national culture.[3][5] This came as a surprise to some Poles, who until the revolution believed, along with most of the politically aware Ruthenians, that Ruthenians were part of the Polish nation (which, at that time, was defined in political rather than ethnographic terms).[4] In the late 1890s and the first decades of the next century, the populist Ruthenian intelligentsia adopted the term Ukrainians to describe their nationality.[6] Beginning with the 20th century, national consciousness reached a large number of Ruthenian peasants.[7]

Multiple incidents between the two nations occurred throughout the latter 19th century and early 20th century. For example, in 1897 the Polish administration opposed the Ukrainians in parliamentary elections. Another conflict developed in the years 1901–1908 around Lviv University, where Ukrainian students demanded a separate Ukrainian university, while Polish students and faculty attempted to suppress the movement. In 1903 both Poles and Ukrainians held separate conferences in Lviv (the Poles in May and Ukrainians in August). Afterwards, the two national movements developed with contradictory goals, leading towards the later clash.

The ethnic composition of Galicia underlay the conflict between the Poles and Ukrainians there. The Austrian province of Galicia consisted of territory seized from Poland in 1772, during the first partition. This land, which included territory of historical importance to Poland, including the ancient capital of Kraków, had a majority Polish population, although the eastern part of Galicia included the heartland of the historic territory of Galicia-Volhynia and had a Ukrainian majority.[8] In eastern Galicia, Ukrainians made up approximately 65% of the population while Poles made up only 22% of the population.[9] Of the 44 administrative divisions of Austrian eastern Galicia, Lviv (Polish: Lwów, German: Lemberg), the biggest and capital city of the province, was the only one in which Poles made up a majority of the population.[10] In Lviv, the population in 1910 was approximately 60% Polish[11] and 17% Ukrainian. This city with its Polish inhabitants was considered by many Poles to have been one of Poland's cultural capitals. For many Poles, including Lviv's Polish population, it was unthinkable that their city should not be under Polish control.

The religious and ethnic divisions corresponded to social stratification. Galicia's leading social class were Polish nobles or descendants of Rus' gentry who had become polonized in the past, whereas, in the eastern part of the province Ruthenians (Ukrainians) constituted the majority of the peasant population.[12][13] Poles and Jews were responsible for most of the commercial and industrial development in Galicia in the late 19th century.[14]

Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, the local Ukrainians attempted to persuade the Austrians to divide Galicia into Western (Polish) and Eastern (Ukrainian) provinces. These efforts were resisted and thwarted by those local Poles who feared losing control of Lviv and East Galicia. The Austrians eventually agreed in principle to divide the province of Galicia; in October 1916 the Austrian Emperor Karl I promised to do so once the war had ended.[8]

Prelude

Due to the intervention of Archduke Wilhelm of Austria, who adopted a Ukrainian identity and considered himself a Ukrainian patriot, in October 1918 two regiments of mostly Ukrainian troops were garrisoned in Lemberg (modern Lviv).[15] As the Austro-Hungarian government collapsed, on October 18, 1918, the Ukrainian National Council (Rada), consisting of Ukrainian members of the Austrian parliament and regional Galician and Bukovynan diets as well as leaders of Ukrainian political parties, was formed. The council announced the intention to unite the West Ukrainian lands into a single state. As the Poles were taking their own steps to take over Lviv and Eastern Galicia, Captain Dmytro Vitovsky of the Sich Riflemen led the group of young Ukrainian officers in a decisive action and during the night of October 31 – November 1, the Ukrainian military units, consisting of 1,400 soldiers and 60 officers, took control over Lviv.[16] The West Ukrainian People's Republic was proclaimed on November 13, 1918, with Lviv as its capital.

The timing of proclamation of the Republic caught the Polish ethnic population and administration by surprise. The new Ukrainian Republic claimed sovereignty over Eastern Galicia, including the Carpathians up to the city of Nowy Sącz in the West, as well as Volhynia, Carpathian Ruthenia and Bukovina (the last two territories were claimed also by Hungary and Romania respectively.[17][18][19] Although, the majority of the population of the Western-Ukrainian People's Republic were Ukrainians, many urban settlements had Polish majorities. In Lviv, the Ukrainian residents enthusiastically supported the proclamation. The city's significant Jewish minority accepted or remained neutral towards the Ukrainian proclamation, while the city's Polish majority was shocked to find themselves in a proclaimed Ukrainian state.[19] Since, the West Ukrainian People's Republic was not internationally recognized and Poland's boundaries had not yet been defined, the issue of ownership of the disputed territory was reduced to a question of military control.[20]

The war
"Lwów Eaglets – the defence of the cemetery" by Wojciech Kossak (1926). Oil on canvas, Polish Army Museum, Warsaw.
A painting depicting Polish youths in the Battle of Lemberg (1918) (in Polish historiography called the Defense of Lwów) against the West Ukrainian People's Republic proclaimed in Lviv.
Final stage of the Polish–Ukrainian War.

Initial stages

Fighting between Ukrainian and Polish forces was concentrated around the declared Ukrainian capital of Lviv and the approaches to that city. In Lviv, the Ukrainian forces were opposed by local self-defence units formed mostly of World War I veterans, students and children. However, skillful command, good tactics and high morale allowed Poles to resist the badly planned Ukrainian attacks.[21] In addition, the Poles were able to skillfully buy time and wait for reinforcements through the arrangement of cease-fires with the Ukrainians.[22] While Poles could count on widespread support from the civilian population, the Ukrainian side was largely dependent on help from outside the city.[23] Other uprisings against Ukrainian rule erupted in Drohobych, Przemyśl, Sambir and Jarosław.[20] In Przemyśl, local Ukrainian soldiers quickly dispersed to their homes and Poles seized the bridges over the River San and the railroad to Lviv, enabling the Polish forces in that city to obtain significant reinforcements.[24]

After two weeks of heavy fighting within Lviv, an armed unit under the command of Lt. Colonel Michał Karaszewicz-Tokarzewski of the renascent Polish Army broke through the Ukrainian siege on November 21 and arrived in the city. The Ukrainians were repelled. Immediately after capturing the city, some in the local Jewish militia attacked Polish troops,[25] while at the same time elements of the Polish forces as well as common criminals looted the Jewish and Ukrainian quarters of the city, killing approximately 340 civilians.[26][27][28] The Poles also interned a number of Ukrainian activists in detention camps.[29] The Ukrainian government provided financial assistance to the Jewish victims of the violence[30] and were able to recruit a Jewish battalion into their army.[31] Some factions blame these atrocities on the Blue Army of General Haller. This is unlikely as this French-trained and supported fighting force did not leave France and the Western Front until April 1919, well after the rioting.[32][33][34][35][36]

On November 9 Polish forces attempted to seize the Drohobych oil fields by surprise but outnumbered by the Ukrainians, they were driven back. The Ukrainians would retain control over the oil fields until May 1919.[37]

On 6 November, a new Ukrainian polity was proclaimed in the Northern half of the region of Bukovina: Ukrainian Bukovina under President Omelian Popovych. The new state had its capital at Chernivtsi.[38] It was dissolved on 11 November, when the Romanian Army occupied Chernivtsi.[39][40][38] The Ukrainian administration and its military support retreated from the city the day before.[38]

Dmytro Vitovsky, first commander of the Ukrainian Galician Army, flanked by two officers, 1918.

By the end of November 1918, Polish forces controlled Lviv and the railroad linking Lviv to central Poland through Przemyśl, while Ukrainians controlled the rest of Eastern Galicia east of the river San, including the areas south and north of the railroad into Lviv. Thus, the Polish-controlled city of Lviv (Lwów) faced Ukrainian forces on three sides.[41]

Battles over Volhynia

Immediately after the collapse of Austria-Hungary, Polish forces had captured Kholm (Chełm) area; shortly thereafter the Austrian commandants in southwestern Volhynia (Volodymyr-Volynskyi and Kovel) handed over the government to the local Polish national committees. In November–December 1918, the Poles also advanced into Podlachia and Western Polesia, but were stopped in western Volhynia by the troops of gen. M. Osetsky.[42]

As Polish units tried to seize control of the region, the forces of the Ukrainian People's Republic under Symon Petlura tried to recover the territory of Kholm Governorate already controlled by the Polish troops.

According to Richard Pipes, the first major pogrom in this region took place in January 1919 in the town of Ovruch, where Jews were robbed and killed by regiments of Kozyr-Zyrka affiliated with Symon Petlura's[43] Nicolas Werth claims that armed units of the Ukrainian People's Republic were also responsible for rapes, looting, and massacres in Zhytomir, in which 500–700 Jews lost their lives.[44]

After two months of heavy fighting the conflict was resolved in March 1919 by fresh and well-equipped Polish units under General Edward Rydz-Śmigły.

Stalemate in Eastern Galicia
Polish and Ukrainian soldiers in Lviv (Lwów) during a ceasefire, 1918
Photograph of an improvised armored vehicle, constructed by the Polish defenders of Lwów, decked with the White Eagle and an American Flag, 1918

Thanks to fast and effective mobilization in December 1918, the Ukrainians possessed a large numerical advantage until February 1919 and pushed the Poles into defensive positions.[21] According to an American report from the period of January 13 – February 1, 1919, Ukrainians eventually managed to surround Lviv on three sides. The city's inhabitants were deprived of water supply and electricity. Ukrainian army also held villages on both sidelines of the railway leading to Przemyśl.[45]

Ukrainian forces continued to control most of eastern Galicia and were a threat to Lviv itself until May 1919. During this time, according to Italian and Polish reports, Ukrainian forces enjoyed high morale (an Italian observer behind Galician lines stated that the Ukrainians were fighting with the "courage of the doomed") while many of the Polish soldiers, particularly from what had been Congress Poland, wanted to return home because they saw no reason to fight against Ruthenians over Ruthenian lands; the Polish forces were outnumbered by two to one and lacked ammunition.[46] Despite being initially outnumbered, the Poles had certain advantages. Their forces had many more and better-trained officers resulting in a better disciplined and more mobile force; the Poles also enjoyed excellent intelligence and, due to their control of railroads behind their lines, were able to move their soldiers quite quickly. As a result, although the Poles had fewer total troops than did the Ukrainians, in particularly important battles they were able to bring in as many soldiers as did the Ukrainians.[41]

On December 9, 1918, Ukrainian forces broke through the outer defences of Przemyśl in the hope of capturing the city and thus cutting off Polish-controlled Lviv from central Poland. However, the Poles were able to quickly send relief troops and by December 17 the Ukrainians were forced back. On December 27, bolstered by peasant troops sent to Galicia from Eastern Ukraine in the hopes that the Western Ukrainians would be able to form a disciplined force out of them, a general Ukrainian offensive against Lviv began. Lviv's defences held, and the eastern Ukrainian troops mutinied.[47]

From January 6-January 11, 1919 a Polish attack by 5,000 newly recruited forces from formerly Russian Poland commanded by Jan Romer was repulsed by Western Ukrainian forces near Rava-Ruska, north of Lviv. Only a small number of troops together with Romer were able to break through to Lviv after suffering heavy losses. Between January 11 and January 13, Polish forces attempted to dislodge Ukrainian troops besieging Lviv from the south while at the same time Ukrainian troops attempted another general assault on Lviv. Both efforts failed. In February 1919, Polish troops attempting to capture Sambir were defeated by the Ukrainian defenders with heavy losses, although the poor mobility of the Ukrainian troops prevented them from taking advantage of this victory.[47]

On February 14, Ukrainian forces began another assault on Lviv. By February 20, they were able to successfully cut off the rail links between Lviv and Przemysl, leaving Lviv surrounded and the Ukrainian forces in a good position to take the city. However, a French-led mission from the Entente arrived at the Ukrainian headquarters on February 22 and demanded that the Ukrainian cease hostilities under threat of breaking all diplomatic ties between the Entente and the Ukrainian government. On February 25 the Ukrainian military suspended its offensive.[47] The Barthélemy mission proposed a demarcation line (February 28) leaving almost 70% of the East Galician territory to Ukrainians, and Lviv with oil fields to Poland. The Ukrainians would be supplied with half of the oil production. The proposal was accepted by the Poles.[48][49] The Allied demands, which included the loss of significant amount of Ukrainian-held and inhabited territory, were however deemed to excessively favor the Poles by the Ukrainians, who resumed their offensive on March 4. On March 5 Ukrainian artillery blew up the Polish forces' ammunition dump in Lviv; the resultant explosion caused a panic among Polish forces. The Ukrainians, however, failed to take advantage of this. During the time of the cease-fire, the Poles had been able to organize a relief force of 8,000–10,000 troops which by March 12 reached Przemyśl and by March 18 had driven the Ukrainian forces from the Lviv-Przemyśl railroad, permanently securing Lviv.[47]

On January 6–11 of 1919 a small part of the Ukrainian Galician Army invaded Transcarpathia to spread pro-Ukrainian sentiments among residents (the region was occupied by Hungarians and Czechoslovaks). Ukrainian troops fought with Czechoslovak and Hungarian local police. They succeeded in capturing some Hungarian-controlled Ukrainian settlements. After some clashes with Czechoslovaks, the Ukrainians retreated because Czechoslovakia (instead of Ukrainian People's Republic) was the only country that traded with the Western Ukrainian People's Republic and that supported it politically. Further conflict with the Czechoslovak authorities would have led to the complete economical and political isolation of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic.

Ukrainian collapse
The Blue Army included the 1st Tank Regiment of 120 Renault FT tanks. With its arrival in Lwów, the Ukrainians had to face the fourth largest tank unit in the world.
Nieuport 17 of the Ukrainian Galician Army

On May 14, 1919, a Polish general offensive began throughout Volhynia and Eastern Galicia. It was carried out by units of the Polish Army aided by the newly arrived Blue Army of General Józef Haller de Hallenburg. This army, composed of Polish forces which had fought for the Entente on the Western front,[50] numbering 60,000 troops,[51] was well equipped by the Western allies and partially staffed with experienced French officers specifically in order to fight the Bolsheviks and not the forces of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic. Despite this, the Poles dispatched Haller's army against the Ukrainians in order to break the stalemate in eastern Galicia. The allies sent several telegrams ordering the Poles to halt their offensive as using of the French-equipped army against the Ukrainian specifically contradicted the conditions of the French help, but these were ignored,[52] with the Polish side arguing that Ukrainians were Bolshevik sympathizers.[53] At the same time, on May 23 Romania opened a second front against Ukrainian forces, demanding their withdrawal from the southern sections of eastern Galicia including from the temporary capital of Stanislaviv. This resulted in a loss of territory, ammunition and further isolation from the outside world.[54]

The Ukrainian lines were broken, mostly due to the withdrawal of the elite Sich Riflemen. On May 27 the Polish forces reached the Złota Lipa–Berezhany-Jezierna-Radziwiłłów line. The Polish advance was accompanied by a large wave of anti-Jewish violence and looting conducted not only by disorganized Polish mobs, as in Lviv in 1918, but by Polish military units operating against the orders of their officers, in particular, those of the Poznań regiments and Haller's army.[55] Following the demands of the Entente, the Polish offensive was halted and the troops of General Haller adopted defensive positions.

Chortkiv Offensive and ultimate Polish victory
Shell from Polish–Ukrainian war 1918–1919 in Lviv, dated 5 January 1919.

On June 8, 1919, the Ukrainian forces under the new command of Oleksander Hrekov, a former general in the Russian army, started a counter-offensive, and after three weeks advanced to Hnyla Lypa and the upper Stryi river, defeating five Polish divisions. Although the Polish forces had been forced to withdraw, they were able to prevent their forces from collapsing and avoided being encircled and captured. Thus, in spite of their victories, the Ukrainian forces were unable to obtain significant amounts of arms and ammunition. By June 27 the Ukrainian forces had advanced 120 km. along the Dnister river and on another they had advanced 150 km, past the town of Brody. They came to within two days' march of Lviv.[56]

The successful Chortkiv offensive halted primarily because of a lack of arms – there were only 5–10 bullets for each Ukrainian soldier.[57] The West Ukrainian government controlled the Drohobych oil fields with which it planned to purchase arms for the struggle, but for political and diplomatic reasons weapons and ammunition could only be sent to Ukraine through Czechoslovakia. Although the Ukrainian forces managed to push the Poles back approximately 120–150 km. they failed to secure a route to Czechoslovakia. This meant that they were unable to replenish their supply of arms and ammunition, and the resulting lack of supplies forced Hrekov to end his campaign.

Józef Piłsudski assumed the command of the Polish forces on June 27 and started yet another offensive, helped by two fresh Polish divisions. On June 28, the Polish offensive began. Short of ammunition and facing an enemy now twice its size, the Ukrainian Galician Army and ZUNR leadership were pushed back to the line of the Zbruch river on 16–18 July, after which ZUNR was occupied by Poland.[58] Although the Ukrainian infantry had run out of ammunition, its artillery had not. This provided the Ukrainian forces with cover for an orderly retreat. Approximately 100,000 civilian refugees and 60,000 troops, 20,000 of whom were combat ready, were able to escape across the Zbruch River into Central Ukraine.[56]

The diplomatic front
Allied diplomatic mission to Poland in Lwów, February 1919. First row from the left: Stanisław Wańkowicz, Robert Howard Lord, Gen. Joseph Barthélemy, Gen. Tadeusz Rozwadowski, Gen. Adrian Carton de Wiart and Maj. Giuseppe Stabile.

The Polish and Ukrainian forces struggled on the diplomatic as well as military fronts both during and after the war. The Ukrainians hoped that the western allies of World War I would support their cause because the Treaty of Versailles that ended the first world war was based on the principle of national self-determination. Accordingly, the diplomats of the West Ukrainian People's Republic hoped that the West would compel Poland to withdraw from territories with a Ukrainian demographic majority.[54]

Opinion among the allies was divided. Britain, under the leadership of prime minister David Lloyd George, and to a lesser extent Italy were opposed to Polish expansion. Their representatives maintained that granting the territory of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic to Poland would violate the principle of national self-determination and that hostile national minorities would undermine the Polish state.[54] In reality, the British policy was dictated by unwillingness to harm Russian interests in the region and alienate the future Russian state through preventing possible union of Eastern Galicia with Russia.[59] In addition, Britain was interested in Western Ukraine's oil fields. Czechoslovakia, itself involved in a conflict with Poland, was friendly towards the Ukrainian government and sold it weapons in exchange for oil.[37][60] France, on the other hand, strongly supported Poland in the conflict. The French hoped that a large, powerful Polish state would serve as a counterbalance to Germany and would isolate Germany from Soviet Russia. French diplomats consistently supported Polish claims to territories also claimed by Germany, Lithuania and Ukraine.[54] France also provided large numbers of arms and ammunition, and French officers, most notably General Haller's forces, to Polish forces that were used against the western Ukrainian military, much to the horror of Lloyd George and President Wilson.[60][61]

During the winter of 1918–1919, a diplomatic offensive by the Polish government tried to tilt the opinions of the Allies in favor of fully backing the Polish cause and to counter German disinformation campaign, which aimed to weaken French, British and American support of the new Polish state. Government officials in Poland and abroad repeatedly raised the issue of a possible link between Germany and the West Ukrainian People's Republic, insisting that the Germans were financially supporting the West Ukrainian government and the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in order to sow a wave of political unrest and chaos in the region.[62] However, the Ukrainians objected to such claims, arguing that the Poles only sought to portray the West Ukrainian People's Republic as pro-German and sympathetic to the Bolsheviks because of a successful defense put up by the Ukrainian Galician Army, which stalled the Polish military offensive.[54]

In attempt to end the war, in January 1919 an Allied commission led by a French general was sent to negotiate a peace treaty between the two sides, prompting a ceasefire. In February it recommended that the West Ukrainian People's Republic surrender a third of its territory, including the city of Lviv and the Drohobych oil fields. The Ukrainians refused, the truce did not correspond to ethnology of the country or the military situation and broke diplomatic ties with Poland.[54][63] In mid-March 1919, the French marshal Ferdinand Foch, who wanted to use Poland as an operational base for an offensive against the Red Army, brought the issue of Polish–Ukrainian war before the Supreme Council and appealed for large-scale Polish-Romanian military operation which would be conducted with Allied support, as well as sending Haller's divisions to Poland immediately to relieve Lviv from Ukrainian siege.[59]

Another Allied commission, led by South African General Louis Botha, proposed an armistice in May that would involve the (West) Ukrainians keeping the Drohobych oil fields and the Poles keeping Lviv.[54][59] The Ukrainian side agreed to this proposal[54] but it was rejected by the Poles on the grounds that it didn't take into consideration the overall military situation of Poland and the circumstances on the eastern front. The Bolshevik army broke through the UNR forces and was advancing to Podolia and Volhynia. The Poles argued that they need military control over whole Eastern Galicia to secure the Russian front in its southern part and strengthen it by a junction with Romania.[59] The Poles launched an attack soon afterward using a large force equipped by France (Haller's Army), which captured most of the territory of the West Ukrainian People's Republic. Urgent telegrams by the Western allies to halt this offensive were ignored.[54] Czechoslovakia, which had inherited seven oil refineries from prewar Austrian times and which was dependent on its contracts for oil with the Ukrainian government, demanded that the Poles send the Czechoslovaks the oil that had been paid for to the Ukrainian government. The Poles refused, stating that the oil was paid for with ammunition that had been used against Polish soldiers. Although the Czechoslovaks did not retaliate, according to Polish reports the Czechoslovaks considered seizing the oil fields from the Poles and returning them to the Ukrainians who would honor their contracts.[37]

On June 25, 1919, the Allied Council legitimized Polish control over Eastern Galicia through the resolution that approved military occupation by Polish forces, including Haller's Army, up to the river Zbruch and authorized the Polish government to establish an interim civil administration, which would preserve as far as possible the territorial autonomy and liberties of the inhabitants.[64][65] On November 21, 1919, the Highest Council of the Paris Peace Conference granted Eastern Galicia to Poland for a period of 25 years, after which a plebiscite was to be held there, and obliged the Polish government to give territorial autonomy to the region.[66][67] This decision was suspended on 22 December 1919 and never implemented.[66][64] On April 21, 1920, Józef Piłsudski and Symon Petliura signed an alliance, in which Poland promised the Ukrainian People's Republic the military help in the Kiev Offensive against the Red Army in exchange for the acceptance of Polish–Ukrainian border on the river Zbruch.[68][69]

Following this agreement, the government of the West Ukrainian People's Republic went into exile in Vienna, where it enjoyed the support of various West Ukrainian political emigrees as well as soldiers of the Galician army interned in Bohemia.[70] Although not officially recognized by any state as the government of West Ukraine,[69] it engaged in diplomatic activity with the French and British governments in the hopes of obtaining a favourable settlement at Versailles. As a result of its efforts, the council of the League of Nations declared on February 23, 1921 that Galicia lay outside the territory of Poland and that Poland did not have the mandate to establish administrative control in that country and that Poland was merely the occupying military power of Galicia, the sovereign of which were the Allied Powers (pursuant to the Treaty of Saint-Germain signed with Austria in September 1919) and whose fate would be determined by the Council of Ambassadors at the League of Nations.[70] The Council of Ambassadors in Paris stated on July 8, 1921, that so-called "West Ukrainian Government" of Yevhen Petrushevych did not constitute a government either de facto or de jure and did not have the right to represent any of the territories formerly belonging to the Austrian empire.[69] After a long series of negotiations, on March 14, 1923, the Council of Ambassadors decided that Galicia would be incorporated into Poland "taking into consideration that Poland has recognized that in regard to the eastern part of Galicia ethnographic conditions fully deserve its autonomous status."[70] After 1923, Galicia was internationally recognized as part of the Polish state.[71] The government of the West Ukrainian People's Republic then disbanded, while Poland reneged on its promise of autonomy for Eastern Galicia.

Civilian casualties

Historian Christoph Mick states there was no systematic violence nor massacres of ethnic Poles during the course of this war[72] but that both sides blamed each other for bloodshed. When Ukrainian forces first captured Lviv they refused to take hostages,[73] tolerated Polish recruitment centers [74] and were even prepared to enter negotiations with the Polish side, but were met with armed resistance.[73] Polish historians, however, describe numerous examples during which Ukrainian troops used terror to subdue Poles into compliance.[75][76] Ukrainian authorities tried to intimidate Polish population in Lviv by sending soldiers and armed trucks into the streets and dispersed crowds that could turn to Polish demonstrations.[77] Ukrainian soldiers patrolled the streets with firearms and machine guns aimed at pedestrians; Polish sources claim that the Ukrainians shot bystanders who were looking at them from windows or building entrances.[78] while Ukrainians claimed Poles were shooting at their soldiers from windows and behind gateways.[79] Polish fighters also often dressed in civilian clothing when shooting at Ukrainian soldiers.[80] According to historian Christoph Mick, both Poles and Ukrainians engaged in a propaganda war with each side accusing the other of war crimes and brutality.[81] During fights over Lviv, Polish nurses who assisted wounded soldiers were said to have been captured by Ukrainian forces and tortured before being executed,[82] while Ukrainians sources claimed that Polish soldiers shot Ukrainian medical patrols and accused Poles of rape and bloodlust.[83]

When Poles captured Lviv, a mixed group of Polish criminals released form prisons, militiamen and some regular soldiers pillaged the Jewish and Ukrainian parts of the city, and abusing local civilians.[84] According to historian Norman Davis the Poles killed approximately 340 civilians, 2/3 of them Ukrainians and the rest Jews.[28] According to Christoph Mick, only Jews were killed during these events and Ukrainians, while subject to hostile acts, were not murdered.[85]

According to Polish historians, during the course of the war, Ukrainian forces conducted massacres against the Polish population in Sokoloniki where 500 buildings were burned down and circa 50 Poles killed.[86] In Zamarstynow, a Ukrainian commander accused the Polish civilian population of supporting the Polish side and allowed for brutal house searchers by his troops in which civilians were beaten, robbed, murdered and raped. Ukrainian forces also murdered prisoners of war during these events. A day later, Polish troops executed a group of Ukrainian prisoners in retaliation.[87][88] On 24 November 1919, the village of Bilka Szlachecka was attacked by Ukrainian forces, burned down and its civilian population massacred, with 45 civilians murdered and 22 wounded.[89] In Chodaczkow Wielki, 4 Polish girls were murdered by Ukrainian soldiers and their bodies mutilated.[90] A special Polish commission for investigation of these atrocities established that even more drastic events occurred, but refused to blame Ukrainian nation for them, putting the blame for them on small percentage of Ukrainian society, mainly soldiers, peasants and so called "half-intelligentsia", that is village teachers, officers and members of gendarmerie.[91] The commission, which included representatives from Italy and France, established that in just three districts 90 murders were committed on civilians besides robberies. Numerous churches desecrated by Ukrainian forces as well. Nuns from three cloisters were raped and later murdered by being blown up by explosive grenades. They were cases of people being buried alive. The commission also noted however that several Ukrainian villagers have hidden Poles.[91] The head of the commission, Zamorski recommended imprisonment of culprits of the atrocities, while establishing friendly relationship with Ukrainian population based on existing laws.[92]

Overall, although there is no evidence of government-controlled mass persecutions of civilians by either the Ukrainians or the Poles, given the paramilitary nature of the fighting atrocities were committed by soldiers or paramilitaries from both sides.[93]

Aftermath
Polish–Ukrainian War 1918–1919. Polish defenders of Chyrów (modern Khyriv) with the Jesuit college in the background, 1919.
Polish armoured train Sanok-Gromobój and a Polish soldier Wiktor Borczyk with his son, 1918.

Approximately 10,000 Poles and 15,000 Ukrainians, mostly soldiers, died during this war.[53] Ukrainian POWs were kept in ex-Austrian POW camps in Dąbie (Kraków), Łańcut, Pikulice, Strzałków, and Wadowice.

Both sides conducted mass arrests of civilians. By July 1919, as many as 25,000 Poles ended up in Ukrainian internment camps,[94] in Zhovkva, Zolochiv, Mykulyntsi, Strusiv, Yazlovets, Kolomyya and Kosiv. Interned Polish civilians, soldiers and Catholic priests were held during the winter months in unheated barracks or railway cars with little food, many subsequently died from exposure to the cold, starvation and typhoid.[95][96]

After the war, in 1920–1921, over one hundred thousand people [97] were placed in camps (often characterized as internment camps [98] or sometimes as concentration camps[99]) by the Polish government. In many cases prisoners were denied food and medical attention, and some starved, died of disease or committed suicide. The victims included not only Ukrainian soldiers and officers but also priests, lawyers and doctors who had supported the Ukrainian cause.[100] The death toll at these camps was estimated at 20,000 from diseases [101] or 30,000 people.[98]

Following the war, the French, who had supported Poland diplomatically and militarily, obtained control over the eastern Galician oil fields under conditions that were very unfavorable to Poland.[102]

In the beginning of the Second World War, the area was annexed by the Soviet Union and attached to Ukraine, which at that time was a republic of the Soviet Union. According to the Yalta Conference decisions, while the Polish population of Eastern Galicia was resettled to Poland, the borders of which were shifted westwards, the region itself remained within the Soviet Ukraine after the war and currently forms the westernmost part of now independent Ukraine.

Legacy

Although the 70 to 75 thousand men who fought in the Ukrainian Galician Army lost their war, and the Polish territory was brought back to Poland, the experience of proclaiming a Ukrainian state and fighting for it significantly intensified and deepened the nationalistic Ukrainian orientation within Galicia. Since the interwar era, Galicia has been the center of Ukrainian nationalism.[103]

According to a noted interwar Polish publicist, the Polish–Ukrainian war was the principal cause for the failure to establish a Ukrainian state in Kiev in late 1918 and early 1919. During that critical time the Galician forces, large, well-disciplined and immune to Communist subversion, could have tilted the balance of power in favor of a Ukrainian state. Instead, it focused all of its resources on defending its Galician homeland. By the time the western Ukrainian forces did transfer East in the summer of 1919 after having been overwhelmed by the Poles, the Russian forces had grown significantly and the impact of the Galicians was not decisive.[104]

After the war, the Ukrainian soldiers who fought in this war became the subject of folk songs and their graves a site of annual pilgrimages in western Ukraine which persisted into Soviet times despite persecution by the Soviet authorities of those honoring the Ukrainian troops.[105]

For Poles living in Eastern Galicia, the victory of the Polish forces over the Ukrainian Galician Army and the prospect of the region once again becoming part of the newly reconstructed Polish Republic, after 123 years of foreign domination caused a great wave of excitement. In the years following the war, battles such as the Defense of Lwów were remembered as outstanding examples of Polish heroism and resilience. Young defenders of the Łyczakowski Cemetery, who lost their lives defending the city, such as Jerzy Bitschan became household names in Poland during the interwar period.[106][107][108]

gollark: Also, affects.
gollark: Obviously. Common words are prioritised over uncommon words are prioritised over nonwords.
gollark: People say Hitler more than hter.
gollark: To be fair, hter isn't an actual word.
gollark: (roughly)

See also

Notes
  1. Lev Shankovsky. Ukrainian Galician Army Archived August 14, 2015, at the Wayback Machine. Encyclopedia of Ukraine. Vol. 5. 1993.
  2. William Jay Risch. The Ukrainian West: Culture and the Fate of Empire in Soviet Lviv. Harvard University Press. 2011. p. 30.
  3. C. M. Hann, P. R. Magocsi, Galicia: A Multicultured Land, 2005, University of Toronto Press, p. 14
  4. Roman Szporluk. "The Making of Modern Ukraine: The Western Dimension" Archived 2011-03-25 at the Wayback Machine. Harvard Ukrainian Studies XXV (1/2) 2001. pp. 64–65
  5. H. V. Kas'ianov, A Laboratory of Transnational History: Ukraine and Recent Ukrainian Historiography, Central European University Press, 2009 , p. 199
  6. P. R. Magocsi. A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its People. University of Toronto Press. 2010. p. 471.
  7. S. Conrad. Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany. Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 200
  8. Magosci, R. (1996). A History of Ukraine. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
  9. Timothy Snyder. (2003). The Reconstruction of Nations. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 123
  10. Timothy Snyder, 2003, p. 134
  11. November Uprising in Lviv, 1918 Archived August 14, 2015, at the Wayback Machine
  12. P. R. Magocsi. A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its People. University of Toronto Press. 2010. p. 419.
  13. R. Bideleux, I. Jeffries. A History of Eastern Europe: Crisis and Change. Taylor & Francis. 2007. p. 182.
  14. P. R. Magocsi, 1996, p. 429.
  15. Timothy Snyder (2008). Red Prince: The Secret Lives of a Habsburg Archduke. New York: Basic Books, p. 117
  16. THE UKRAINIAN-POLISH WAR 1918-1919 by Nicholas Litvin. Dissertation for Doctor of History, National Library of Ukraine
  17. Magocsi, 1996, p. 518
  18. I. Livezeanu. Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building, and Ethnic Struggle, 1918–1930. Cornell University Press. 2000. p. 56
  19. Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, pp. 367–368, University of Toronto Press, 2000, ISBN 0-8020-8390-0
  20. A. Chojnowski. "Ukrainian-Polish War in Galicia Archived 2012-10-12 at the Wayback Machine, 1918–19." Encyclopedia of Ukraine. Vol. 5 1993.
  21. Subtelny, 2000, p. 370.
  22. Vasyl Kuchabsky, Gus Fagan. (2009). Western Ukraine in Conflict with Poland and Bolshevism, 1918–1923. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press at the University of Toronto, pp. 44–48
  23. Chris Hann, Paul R. Magocsi, 2005, p. 144.
  24. P. J. Wróbel. "The revival of Poland and Paramilitary Violence. 1918–1920." In: Rüdiger Bergien. Spießer, Patrioten, Revolutionäre: Militärische Mobilisierung und gesellschaftliche Ordnung in der Neuzeit. V&R unipress. 2010. p. 296.
  25. Czeslaw Madajczyk "Poles were upset that a Jewish militia was shooting at Polish troops" Archived 2017-09-06 at the Wayback Machine
  26. Joanna B. Michlic. Poland's Threatening Other: The Image of the Jew from 1880 to the Present. University of Nebraska Press, 2006. "One of the first and worst instances of anti-Jewish violence was Lviv pogrom, which occurred in the last week of November 1918. In three days 72 Jews were murdered and 443 others injured. The chief perpetrators of these murders were soldiers and officers of the so-called Blue Army, set up in France in 1917 by General Jozef Haller (1893–1960) and lawless civilians".
  27. Herbert Arthur Strauss. Hostages of Modernization: Studies on Modern Antisemitism, 1870-1933/39. Walter de Gruyter, 1993. "In Lwów, a city whose fate was disputed, the Jews tried to maintain their neutrality between Poles and Ukrainians, and in reaction a pogrom was held in the city under auspices of the Polish army"
  28. Norman Davies. "Ethnic Diversity in Twentieth Century Poland." In: Herbert Arthur Strauss. Hostages of Modernization: Studies on Modern Antisemitism, 1870–1933/39. Walter de Gruyter, 1993.
  29. Grünberg, Sprengel, p. 260
  30. Alexander Victor Prusin. (2005). Nationalizing a Borderland: War, Ethnicity, and Anti-Jewish Violence in East Galicia, 1914–1920. University of Alabama Press. p. 99
  31. Myroslav Shkandrij. (2009). Jews in Ukrainian Literature: Representation and Identity. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 94–95
  32. Nastal, Stanislaw I., The Blue Division, Polish Army Veteran's Association in America, Cleveland, Ohio 1922
  33. Wyczolkowski, Major Stefan, Outline of the Wartime History of the 43rd Regiment of the Eastern Frontier Riflemen, Warsaw 1928
  34. Bobrowski, Major Stanislaw, Outline of the Wartime History of the 44th Regiment of Eastern Frontier Riflemen, Warsaw 1929
  35. Dabrowski, Major Jerzy, Outline of the Wartime History of the 45th Regiment of Eastern Frontier Infantry Riflemen, Warsaw 1928
  36. Skarzynski, Lt. Wincenty, The Polish Army in France in Light of the Facts, Warsaw 1929
  37. Alison Fleig Frank. (2005). Oil Empire: Visions of Prosperity in Austrian Galicia. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. pp. 207–228
  38. Volodymyr Kubiĭovych, Ukrainian National Association, 1963, Ukraine, a Concise Encyclopedia, Volume 1, p. 787
  39. Robert A. Kann, Zdenek David, University of Washington Press, 2017, Peoples of the Eastern Habsburg Lands, 1526-1918, p. 446
  40. Ivan Katchanovski, Zenon E. Kohut, Bohdan Y. Nebesio, Myroslav Yurkevich, Scarecrow Press, 2013, Historical Dictionary of Ukraine, p. 749
  41. Vasyl Kuchabsky, Gus Fagan. (2009). Western Ukraine in Conflict with Poland and Bolshevism, 1918–1923. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press at the University of Toronto, pp. 179–184
  42. Kubijovyč, Volodymyr E., ed. (1963). Ukraine, a Concise Encyclopedia, Vol. 1. Ukrainian National Association, University of Toronto Press. p. 760.
  43. Richard Pipes. "The Ukrainian pogroms during the Russian Civil War." In: B. Frankel. A Restless Mind: Essays in Honor of Amos Perlmutter. Routledge. 1996. p. 268
  44. Nicolas Werth. Crimes and Mass Violence of the Russian Civil Wars (1918-1921) Archived 2015-09-26 at the Wayback Machine. March 2008
  45. J. Cisek. Kościuszko, We Are Here! American Pilots of the Kosciuszko Squadron in Defense of Poland, 1919–1921. McFarland. 2002. p. 49.
  46. Michael Palij. (1995). The Ukrainian-Polish Defensive Alliance, 1919–1921: an aspect of the Ukrainian revolution. Edmonton, Alberta: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press at University of Alberta, pg.50 According to a confidential report written in January 1919 by Polish expert Roman Knoll within the Polish ministry of foreign affairs, based on a discussion with Col. Nienewski a deputy of Gen. Stanyslaw Szeptycki, "Soldiers from Congress Poland, in the units of the Bug group, are saying that 'they want to go back to Poland because they do not see any reason to fight Ruthenians concerning Ruthenian lands."
  47. Vasyl Kuchabsky, Gus Fagan. (2009). Western Ukraine in Conflict with Poland and Bolshevism, 1918–1923. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press at the University of Toronto, pp. 192–211
  48. "According to a member of the Ukrainian delegation in Lviv, Dr. Michael Lozynsky the French representative on the commission, warned the Ukrainians that their military advantage could disappear quickly once General Haller's Polish Army arrived from France." John Stephen Reshetar. The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1920: A Study of Nationalism. Princeton University Press. 1952. pp. 273, 176.
  49. The Rebirth of Poland. University of Kansas, lecture notes by professor Anna M. Cienciala, 2004.
  50. W. F. Reddaway. The Cambridge History of Poland, Vol. 1. Cambridge University Press. 1971. p. 477
  51. Orest subtelny. (200). Ukraine: a History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pg. 370
  52. Watt, R. (1979). Bitter Glory: Poland and Its Fate 1918–1939. New York: Simon and Schuster.
  53. Subtelny, op. cit., p. 370
  54. Michael Palij. (1995). The Ukrainian-Polish Defensive Alliance, 1919–1921: An Aspect of the Ukrainian Revolution. Edmonton, Alberta: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press at University of Alberta, pp. 48–58
  55. Prusin, Alexander Victor (2005). Nationalizing a Borderland: War, Ethnicity, and Anti-Jewish Violence in East Galicia, 1914-1920. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, pp. 102–103. The author describes mass thefts, forced labor by Jewish women and children, ritual humiliation of Jews (beards being cut off, etc.), and destruction of sacred scrolls and prayer books in synagogues. He write "two Polish units – Poznan regiments and General Jozef Haller's Army – especially earned the reputation as notorious Jew baiters and staged brutal pogroms in Sambor, the Lwow district, and Grodek Jagiellonski."
  56. Vasyl Kuchabsky, Gus Fagan. (2009). Western Ukraine in Conflict with Poland and Bolshevism, 1918–1923. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press at the University of Toronto, pp. 241–242
  57. Subtelny, op. cit., p. 368
  58. Ending of the Polish-Ukrainian war
  59. P. S. Wandycz. France and Her Eastern Allies, 1919–1925: French-Czechoslovak-Polish Relations from the Paris Peace Conference to Locarno. University of Minnesota Press. 1962. pp. 107–116
  60. Orest Subtelny. (1988). Ukraine: A History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pg. 370–371
  61. Mantoux, Paul, Arthur S Link, and Manfred F Boemeke. The Deliberations of the Council of Four (March 24-June 28, 1919). Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992.
  62. Bolshevism and Poland, Paris - June, 1919 "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2015-10-22. Retrieved 2017-11-02.CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  63. Temperley, Harold William Vazeille. "A history of the Peace Conference of Paris". London Oxford University Press, Hodder & Stoughton. Archived from the original on 3 April 2016. Retrieved 5 May 2018 – via Internet Archive.
  64. Piotr Wandycz. The United States and Poland. Harvard University Press. 1980. pp. 141-143.
  65. "The Paris Peace Conference, 1919". Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States. U.S. Government Printing Office. IV: 854–855. 1919.
  66. Piotr Eberhardt. "The Curzon line as the eastern boundary of Poland. The Origins and the political background". Geographica Polonica. Vol. 85. Issue 1. 2012. p. 10.
  67. Lawrence Martin, John Reed. The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923. The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2007. p. lviii.
  68. Kofman, Jan; Roszkowski, Wojciech, eds. (2008). Biographical dictionary of Central and Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century. M.E. Sharpe. p. 783.
  69. S. Talmon. Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular Reference to Governments in Exile. Oxford University Press. 1998. pp. 289, 320.
  70. Kubijovic, V. (1963). Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
  71. Magocsi. R. (1996), p. 526.
  72. Christoph Mick. (2015). Lemberg, Lwow, Lviv, 1914–1947: Violence and Ethnicity in a Contested City. West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, pg. 177-184
  73. Christoph Mick. (2015). Lemberg, Lwow, Lviv, 1914–1947: Violence and Ethnicity in a Contested City. West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, pg. 150
  74. Jochen Böhler. (2019). Civil War in Central Europe, 1918-1921: The Reconstruction of Poland. Oxford University Press, pg. 78
  75. Wojna polsko-ukraińska 1918-1919: działania bojowe, aspekty polityczne, kalendarium Grzegorz Łukomski, Czesław Partacz, Bogusław Polak Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Inżynierskiej w Koszalinie ; Warszawa, 1994 - 285 page 96 Terrorem usiłowano milionową społeczność polską zmusić do spokoju i respektowania zarządzeń władz ukraińskich
  76. Czesław Partacz – Wojna polsko-ukraińska o Lwów i Galicję Wschodnią 1918-1919 [w:] Przemyskie Zapiski Historyczne – Studia i materiały poświęcone historii Polski Południowo-Wschodniej. 2006-09 R. XVI-XVII (2010)
  77. Lwów 1918-1919 Michał Klimecki Dom Wydawniczy Bellona, 1998, page 99
  78. Czesław Partacz – Wojna polsko-ukraińska o Lwów i Galicję Wschodnią 1918-1919 Przemyskie Zapiski Historyczne – Studia i materiały poświęcone historii Polski Południowo-Wschodniej. 2006-09 R. XVI-XVII (2010) page 65
  79. Christoph Mick. (2015). Lemberg, Lwow, Lviv, 1914–1947: Violence and Ethnicity in a Contested City. West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, pg 146-150
  80. Christoph Mick. (2015). Lemberg, Lwow, Lviv, 1914–1947: Violence and Ethnicity in a Contested City. West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, pg 146 "Particularly in the early stages, Polish fighters often wore civilian clothes without any signs identifying them as combatants"
  81. Christoph Mick. (2015). Lemberg, Lwow, Lviv, 1914–1947: Violence and Ethnicity in a Contested City. West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, pg. 180
  82. Wojna polsko-ukraińska 1918-1919: działania bojowe, aspekty polityczne, kalendarium. Grzegorz Łukomski, Czesław Partacz, Bogusław Polak. Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Inżynierskiej w Koszalinie ; Warszawa, 1994 page 95
  83. Christoph Mick. (2015). Lemberg, Lwow, Lviv, 1914–1947: Violence and Ethnicity in a Contested City. West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, pg. 152
  84. Christoph Mick. (2015). Lemberg, Lwow, Lviv, 1914–1947: Violence and Ethnicity in a Contested City. West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, pg. 159
  85. Christoph Mick. (2015). Lemberg, Lwow, Lviv, 1914–1947: Violence and Ethnicity in a Contested City. West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, pg. 161
  86. Rafał Galuba, „Niech nas rozsądzi miecz i krew...”. Konflikt polsko-ukraiński o Galicję Wschodnią w latach 1918–1919, Poznań 2004, ISBN 83-7177-281-5, page 228; M. Klimecki, Polsko-ukraińska wojna o Lwów i Wschodnią Galicję. Aspekty polityczne i wojskowe, Warszawa 1997
  87. M. Klimecki, Polsko-ukraińska wojna o Lwów i Wschodnią Galicję. Aspekty polityczne i wojskowe, Warszawa 1997 page 102 Dołud oskarżył polską ludność cywilną o udzielanie pomocy wrogowi (szpiegowanie, ostrzeliwanie ukraińskich żołnierzy) i zezwolił na przeprowadzenie brutalnych rewizji domów. Doszło do gwałtów, pobić, mordów i rabunków bezbronnych. Podwładni Dołuda dopuścili się także mordu na grupie jeńców
  88. Wojna polsko-ukraińska 1918-1919: działania bojowe, aspekty polityczne, kalendarium Grzegorz Łukomski, Czesław Partacz, Bogusław Polak Wydawnicwo Wyższej Szkoły Inżynierskiej w Koszalinie ; Warszawa, 1994 page 92
  89. Folia Historica Cracoviensia 2004 Memoriał metropolity lwowskiego obrządku łacińskiego Józefa Bilczewskiego o relacjach ukraińsko-polskich w Galicji (Małopolsce) w latach 1914-1920 Uniwersytet Papieski Jana Pawła II w Krakowie page 456 "par. Biłka Szlachecka. Po napadzie ukraińskim na wieś 24 XI 1918 r. w niedzielę i podpaleniu wsi, zastrzelono 45 osób, a 22 odniosły rany"
  90. Wojna polsko-ukraińska 1918-1919: działania bojowe, aspekty Grzegorz Łukomski, Czesław Partacz, Bogusław Polak Wydawn. Wyższej Szkoły Inżynierskiej w Koszalinie ; Warszawa, 1994 page 103 "W Chodaczkowie Wielkim koło Tarnopola, żołnierze ukraińscy w maju 1919 r. zamordowali 4 polskie dziewczęta, obcięli im piersi i używali ich jako piłek"
  91. Wojna polsko-ukraińska 1918-1919: działania bojowe, aspekty polityczne, kalendarium Grzegorz Łukomski, Czesław Partacz, Bogusław Polak Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Inżynierskiej w Koszalinie ; Warszawa, 1994 page 103
  92. Czesław Partacz – Wojna polsko-ukraińska o Lwów i Galicję Wschodnią 1918-1919 Przemyskie Zapiski Historyczne – Studia i materiały poświęcone historii Polski Południowo-Wschodniej. 2006-09 R. XVI-XVII (2010) page 77
  93. Jochen Böhler. (2019). Civil War in Central Europe, 1918-1921: The Reconstruction of Poland. Oxford University Press, pg. 81
  94. Jochen Böhler. (2018) Civil War in Central Europe, 1918-1921: The Reconstruction of Poland. Oxford University Press pg. 81
  95. Żurawski vel Grajewsk, Przemysław (2017). MĘCZEŃSTWO KRESÓW 1918-1956, page 12. Biblioteka WEI.
  96. Kania, Leszek. (2007). ADMINISTRACJA POLSKICH OBOZÓW DLA JEŃCÓW I INTERNOWANYCH WOJENNYCH W POLSKO-UKRAIŃSKIEJ WOJNIE O GALICJĘ WSCHODNIĄ (1918-1919), page 194. Instytut Prawa i Administracji PWSZ w Sulechowie.
  97. Myroslav Shkandrij. (2015) Ukrainian Nationalism: Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1956. New Haven: Yale University Press pg. 19
  98. Christopher Mick. (2016). Lemberg, Lwow, and Lviv 1914-1947: Violence and Ethnicity in a Contested City Purdue University Press pg. 210
  99. Concentration camps Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine. Originally published in Encyclopedia of Ukraine, vol. 1 (1984). University of Toronto Press.
  100. Myroslav Shkandrij. (2015) Ukrainian Nationalism: Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1956. New Haven: Yale University Press pg. 19 Cited passage states "After the war, in 1920-1921, Polish concentration camps held over one hundred thousand people. In many cases prisoners were denied food and medical attention. Some starved; others died of disease or committed suicide. Among the interned were Jews and others of other nationalities who supported Ukrainian independence, and Jews figured among the witnesses who described the murder and abuse."
  101. Jochen Böhler. (2019). Civil War in Central Europe, 1918-1921: The Reconstruction of Poland. Oxford University Press, pg. 81 "100,000 Ukrainians were subsequently interred in the camps of the ultimately victorious Polish Army. One fifth of them fell to infectious diseases."
  102. Alison Fleig Frank. (2005). Oil Empire: Visions of Prosperity in Austrian Galicia. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. pp. 234–235
  103. Ronald Grigor Suny, Michael D. Kennedy. (2001). Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. pg. 131
  104. Peter J. Potichnyj (1980). Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present. Hamilton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, McMaster University. pp. 21–22
  105. William Jay Risch. (2011). The Ukrainian West: Culture and the Fate of Empire in Soviet Lviv. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. pp. 169–170
  106. Ciebie Polsko Orlęta Lwowskie. Dziecko – bohater. „Panteon Polski” Archived 2018-05-05 at the Wayback Machine, s. 16, Nr 16 z 1 listopada 1925.
  107. Władysław Nekrasz: Harcerze w bojach. Przyczynek do udziału harcerzy polskich w walkach o niepodległość Ojczyzny w latach 1914-1921. Warszawa: 1930, s. 57.
  108. Czesław Mazurczak: Harcerstwo Sanockie 1910–1949. Kraków: Harcerska Oficyna Wydawnicza, 1990.
  • In photo, "Polish–Ukrainian War 1918–1919. Polish defenders of Chyrów (modern Khyriv) with the Jesuit college in the background, 1919." my grandfather Charles (Karol) Cwiakala is in the third row with tilted hat. He was (16) years old. Tanya C. Cwiakala 2_27_2019

Bibliography
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