Spratly Islands

The Spratly Islands (Vietnamese: Quần đảo Trường Sa, Tagalog: Kapuluan ng Kalayaan,[1] Malay: Kepulauan Spratly, Chinese: 南沙群岛 (Nánshā Qúndǎo), Dusun: Kopulohon Dibut) are a disputed archipelago in the South China Sea. Composed of islands, islets and cays[2] and more than 100 reefs, sometimes grouped in submerged old atolls,[3] the archipelago lies off the coasts of the Philippines, Malaysia, and southern Vietnam. Named after the 19th-century British whaling captain Richard Spratly who sighted Spratly Island in 1843, the islands contain less than 2 km2 (490 acres) of naturally occurring land area, which is spread over an area of more than 425,000 km2 (164,000 sq mi).

Not to be confused with Spratly Island.
"Spratly" redirects here. For the surname, see Spratly (surname).

Part of a series on the
Spratly Islands
Spratly Islands military occupations map
Related articles
Confrontations

Southwest Cay incident (1975)
Johnson South Reef skirmish (1988)
Military occupations

The Spratly Islands are one of the major archipelagos in the South China Sea which complicate governance and economics in this part of Southeast Asia due to their location in strategic shipping lanes. The islands have no indigenous inhabitants, but offer rich fishing grounds and may contain significant oil and natural gas reserves,[4][5] and as such are important to the claimants in their attempts to establish international boundaries. Some of the islands have civilian settlements, but of the approximately 45 islands, cays, reefs and shoals that are occupied, all contain structures that are occupied by military forces from Malaysia, Taiwan (ROC), China (PRC), the Philippines or Vietnam. Additionally, Brunei has claimed an exclusive economic zone in the southeastern part of the Spratly Islands, which includes the uninhabited Louisa Reef.

Geographic and economic overview
Further information: List of maritime features in the Spratly Islands
Spratly Islands
Spratly Islands

In 1939, the Spratly Islands were coral islets mostly inhabited by seabirds.[2] Despite the Spratly Islands naturally consisting of 19 islands (see below), according to a Chinese 1986 source, the Spratly Islands consist of 14 islands or islets, 6 banks, 113 submerged reefs, 35 underwater banks and 21 underwater shoals.[6]

The northeast part of the Spratly Islands is known as Dangerous Ground and is characterised by many low islands, sunken reefs, and degraded, sunken atolls with coral often rising abruptly from ocean depths greater than 1,000 metres (3,300 ft) – all of which makes the area dangerous for navigation.

The islands are all of similar nature; they are cays (or keys): sand islands formed on old degraded and submerged coral reefs.

The Spratly Islands contain almost no significant arable land, have no indigenous inhabitants, and very few of the islands have a permanent drinkable water supply.[7]

Natural resources include fish, guano, oil and natural gas.[8] Economic activity has included commercial fishing, shipping, guano mining, oil and gas exploitation, and more recently, tourism. The Spratly Islands are located near several primary shipping lanes.

In 1987, China installed a small military structure on Fiery Cross Reef under the pretext of building an oceanic observation station and installing a tide gauge for the Global Sea Level Observing System.[9] After a deadly skirmish with the Vietnamese Navy, China installed some military structures on more reefs in the vicinity of the Philippines and Vietnamese occupied islands and this led to escalating tensions between these countries and China over the status and "ownership" of reefs.

The islands and cays, listed in descending order of naturally occurring area, are:

#Island namein AtollArea
(ha.)		LocationCurrently occupied byReclaimed
area
1Itu Aba IslandTizard Bank46.0010°23′N 114°21′ETaiwan (Taiping Island)~6ha
2Thitu IslandThitu Reefs37.2011°03′N 114°17′EPhilippines (Pagasa Island)
3West York IslandWest York Island18.6011°05′N 115°01′EPhilippines (Likas Island)
4Spratly IslandSpratly Island13.0008°38′N 111°55′EVietnam (Trường Sa Island)
5Northeast CayNorth Danger Reef12.7011°28′N 114°21′EPhilippines (Parola Island)
6Southwest CayNorth Danger Reef12.0011°26′N 114°20′EVietnam (Song Tử Tây Island)~8ha
7Sin Cowe IslandUnion Banks08.0009°52′N 114°19′EVietnam (Sinh Tồn Island)~1ha
8Nanshan IslandNanshan Group07.9310°45′N 115°49′EPhilippines (Lawak Island)
9Sand CayTizard Bank07.0010°23′N 114°28′EVietnam (Sơn Ca Island)~2.1ha[10]
10Loaita IslandLoaita Bank06.4510°40′N 114°25′EPhilippines (Kota Island)
11Swallow ReefSwallow Reef06.2007°22′N 113°50′EMalaysia (Layang-Layang Reef)
12Namyit IslandTizard Bank05.3010°11′N 114°22′EVietnam (Nam Yết Island)
13Amboyna CayAmboyna Cay01.6007°51′N 112°55′EVietnam (An Bang Island)
14Grierson ReefUnion Banks01.6009°51′N 114°29′EVietnam (Sinh Tồn Đông Island)
15West London ReefLondon Reefs01.1008°52′N 112°15′EVietnam (Đá Tây A Island)
16Central London ReefLondon Reefs00.8808°56′N 112°21′EVietnam (Trường Sa Đông Island)
17Flat Island Nanshan Group00.5710°49′N 115°49′EPhilippines (Patag Island)
18Lankiam CayLoaita Bank00.4410°43′N 114°32′EPhilippines (Panata Island)

The total area of the archipelago's naturally occurring islands is 177 ha (440 acres) and 200 ha (490 acres) with reclaimed land.

Spratly Islands
Disputed islands
The Spratly Islands
Geography
LocationSouth China Sea
Coordinates10°N 114°E
Total islands18 islands and cays
Major islands
Area~200 hectares (490 acres)
Coastline926 km (575 mi)
Highest point
Claimed by
Brunei
EEZBrunei zone
People's Republic of China
Prefecture-level citySansha, Hainan[12]
Malaysia
StateSabah
Philippines
MunicipalityKalayaan
Taiwan
MunicipalityKaohsiung
Vietnam
DistrictTrường Sa, Khánh Hòa
Spratly Islands
Chinese name
Traditional Chinese南沙群島
Simplified Chinese南沙群岛
Vietnamese name
VietnameseQuần đảo Trường Sa
Hán-Nôm群島長沙
Malay name
Malay
Filipino name
TagalogKapuluan ng Kalayaan
A geographic map of Spratly Islands[lower-alpha 1]

Geology

The Spratly Islands consist of islands, reefs, banks and shoals that consist of biogenic carbonate. These accumulations of biogenic carbonate lie upon the higher crests of major submarine ridges that are uplifted fault blocks known by geologists as horsts. These horsts are part of a series of parallel and en echelon, half-grabens and rotated fault-blocks. The long axes of the horsts, rotated fault blocks and half-grabens form well-defined linear trends that lie parallel to magnetic anomalies exhibited by the oceanic crust of the adjacent South China Sea. The horsts, rotated fault blocks, and the rock forming the bottoms of associated grabens consist of stretched and subsided continental crust that is composed of Triassic, Jurassic, and Cretaceous strata that include calc-alkalic extrusive igneous rocks, intermediate to acid intrusive igneous rocks, sandstones, siltstones, dark-green claystones, and metamorphic rocks that include biotite–muscovite–feldspar–quartz migmatites and garnet–mica schists.[17][18][19]

The dismemberment and subsidence of continental crust into horsts, rotated fault blocks and half-grabens that underlie the Spratly Islands and surrounding sea bottom occurred in two distinct periods. They occurred as the result of the tectonic stretching of continental crust along underlying deeply rooted detachment faults. During the Late Cretaceous and Early Oligocene, the earliest period of tectonic stretching of continental crust and formation of horsts, half-grabens, and rotated fault-blocks occurred in association the rifting and later sea-floor spreading that created the South China Sea. During the Late Oligocene-Early Miocene additional stretching and block faulting of continental crust occurred within the Spratly Islands and adjacent Dangerous Ground. During and after this period of tectonic activity, corals and other marine life colonised the crests of the horsts and other ridges that lay in shallow water. The remains of these organisms accumulated over time as biogenic carbonates that comprise the current day reefs, shoals and cays of the Spratly Islands. Starting with their formation in Late Cretaceous, fine-grained organic-rich marine sediments accumulated within the numerous submarine half-grabens that underlie sea bottom within the Dangerous Ground region.[17][18][19]

The geological surveys show localised areas within the Spratly Islands region are favourable for the accumulation of economic oil and gas reserves. They include thick sequences of Cenozoic sediments east of the Spratly Islands. Southeast and west of them, there also exist thick accumulations of sediments that possibly might contain economic oil and gas reserves lie closer to the Spratly Islands.[4][20]

Ecology

In some cays in the Spratly Islands, the sand and pebble sediments form the beaches and spits around the island. Under the influence of the dominant wind direction, which changes seasonally, these sediments move around the island to change the shape and size of the island. For example, Spratly Island is larger during the northeast monsoon (about 700 × 300 meters), and smaller during the southwest monsoon (approximately 650 × 320 meters).[21]

Some islands may contain fresh groundwater fed by rain. Groundwater levels fluctuate during the day with the rhythm of the tides.[22]

Phosphates from bird faeces (guano) are mainly concentrated in the beach rocks by the way of exchange-endosmosis. The principal minerals bearing phosphate are podolite, lewistonite and dehonite.[23]

Coral reefs

Coral reefs are the predominant structures of these islands; the Spratly group contains over 600 coral reefs in total.[3] In April 2015 the New York Times reported that China were using "scores of dredgers" to convert Fiery Cross Reef and several other reefs into military facilities.[24][25]

Vegetation

Little vegetation grows on these islands, which are subject to intense monsoons. Larger islands are capable of supporting tropical forest, scrub forest, coastal scrub and grasses. It is difficult to determine which species have been introduced or cultivated by humans. Taiping Island (Itu Aba) was reportedly covered with shrubs, coconut, and mangroves in 1938; pineapple was also cultivated there when it was profitable. Other accounts mention papaya, banana, palm, and even white peach trees growing on one island. A few islands that have been developed as small tourist resorts had soil and trees brought in and planted where there was none.[3]

Wildlife

A total of 2,927 marine species have been recorded in the Spratly Sea, including 776 benthic species, 382 species of hard coral, 524 species of marine fish, 262 species of algae and sea grass, 35 species of seabirds, and 20 species of marine mammals and sea turtles.[26] Terrestrial vegetation in the islands includes 103 species of vascular plants of magnolia branches (Magnoliophyta) of 39 families and 79 genera.[26] The islands that do have vegetation provide important habitats for many seabirds and sea turtles.[3] Both the green turtle (Chelonia mydas, endangered) and the hawksbill turtle (Eretmochelys imbricata, critically endangered) formerly occurred in numbers sufficient to support commercial exploitation. These species reportedly continue to nest even on islands inhabited by military personnel (such as Pratas) to some extent, though it is believed that their numbers have declined.[3]

Seabirds use the islands as resting, breeding, and wintering sites. Species found here include streaked shearwater (Calonectris leucomelas), brown booby (Sula leucogaster), red-footed booby (S. sula), great crested tern (Sterna bergii), and white tern (Gygis alba). Little information is available regarding the current status of the islands' seabird populations, though it is likely that birds may divert nesting sites to smaller, less disturbed islands. Bird eggs cover the majority of Southwest Cay, a small island in the eastern Danger Zone.[3] A variety of cetaceans such as dolphins,[27] orcas, pilot whales, and sperm whales are also present around the islands.[28][29][30]

This ecoregion is still largely a mystery. Scientists have focused their research on the marine environment, while the ecology of the terrestrial environment remains relatively unknown.[3]

Ecological hazards

Political instability, tourism and the increasing industrialisation of neighbouring countries has led to serious disruption of native flora and fauna, over-exploitation of natural resources, and environmental pollution. Disruption of nesting areas by human activity and/or by introduced animals, such as dogs, has reduced the number of turtles nesting on the islands. Sea turtles are also slaughtered for food on a significant scale. The sea turtle is a symbol of longevity in Chinese culture and at times the military personnel are given orders to protect the turtles.[3]

Heavy commercial fishing in the region incurs other problems. Although it has been outlawed, fishing methods continue to include the use of bottom trawlers fitted with chain rollers. In 1994 a routine patrol by Taiwan's marine navy confiscated more than 200 kg of potassium cyanide solution from fishermen who had been using it for cyanide fishing. These activities have a devastating impact on local marine organisms and coral reefs.[31]

Some interest has been taken in regard to conservation of these island ecosystems. J.W. McManus, professor of marine biology and ecology at the University of Miami's Rosenstiel School of Marine and Atmospheric Science, has explored the possibilities of designating portions of the Spratly Islands as a marine park. One region of the Spratly Archipelago, named Truong Sa, was proposed by Vietnam's Ministry of Science, Technology, and the Environment (MOSTE) as a future protected area. The site, with an area of 160 km2 (62 sq mi), is currently managed by the Khánh Hòa Provincial People's Committee of Vietnam.[3]

Military groups in the Spratly Islands have engaged in environmentally damaging activities such as shooting turtles and seabirds, raiding nests and fishing with explosives. The collection of rare medicinal plants, collecting of wood, and hunting for the wildlife trade are common threats to the biodiversity of the entire region, including these islands. Coral habitats are threatened by pollution, over-exploitation of fish and invertebrates, and the use of explosives and poisons as fishing techniques.[3]

A 2014 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) report said: "Sand is rarer than one thinks".[32]

The average price of sand imported by Singapore was US$3 per tonne from 1995 to 2001, but the price increased to US$190 per tonne from 2003 to 2005.[32] Although the Philippines and China had both ratified the UNCLOS III, in the case of and Johnson South Reef, Hughes Reef, Mischief Reef, the PRC dredged sand for free in the EEZ the Philippines[33] had claimed from 1978[34] arguing this is the "waters of China's Nansha Islands".

Although the consequences of substrate mining are hidden, they are tremendous.[32] Aggregate particles that are too fine to be used are rejected by dredging boats, releasing vast dust plumes and changing water turbidity.[32]

John McManus, a professor of marine biology and ecology at the Rosenstiel School of Marine and Atmospheric Science, said: "The worst thing anyone can do to a coral reef is to bury it under tons of sand and gravel ... There are global security concerns associated with the damage. It is likely broad enough to reduce fish stocks in the world's most fish-dependent region." He explained that the reason "the world has heard little about the damage inflicted by the Peoples [sic] Republic of China to the reefs is that the experts can't get to them" and noted "I have colleagues from the Philippines, Taiwan, PRC, Vietnam and Malaysia who have worked in the Spratly area. Most would not be able to get near the artificial islands except possibly some from PRC, and those would not be able to release their findings."[35]

History
The Velarde map shows actual Philippine control over Scarborough Shoal, as well as islands off of Palawan, identified as the Spratly Islands. The map was one of the key evidences in the Philippines v. China international case that debunked China's so-called nine-dash line claims.[36]

Records show the islands as inhabited at various times in history by Chinese and Vietnamese fishermen. In 1888 the Central Borneo Company were granted a lease to work guano 'on Sprattly island and Amboyna Cay'[37] During the Second World War troops from French Indochina and Japan were in occupation.[38][39][40] However, there is no record of large settlements on the islands until 1956, when Filipino adventurer Tomás Cloma, Sr., decided to "claim" a part of Spratly islands as his own, naming it the "Free Territory of Freedomland".[41]

Evidence of human presence in the region extends back nearly 50,000 years at Tabon Caves on Palawan. Therefore, it is difficult to say when humans first came upon this island group. Within historical times, several groups may have passed through or occupied the islands. Between 600 BC to 3 BC there was an east to west migration by members of the seafaring Sa Huỳnh culture. This may have led them through the Spratly Islands on their way to Vietnam. These migrants were the forebears of the Cham people, an Austronesian-speaking people that founded the Old Champa empire that ruled what was known for centuries as the Champa Sea.[42] [43]

Early records and cartography
Mao Kun map, Spratly Islands is suggested to be the islands at the bottom right (石星石塘; shíxīng shítáng).[44] Others however believe the islands may refer to the Paracel Islands or Macclesfield Bank.[45][46]

In the Song Dynasty work Zhu fan zhi by Zhao Rugua, the name "Thousand Li Stretch of Sands" (Qianli Changsha, 千里長沙) and the "Ten-Thousand Li of Stone Pools/Beds" (Wanli Shitang 萬里石塘, or Wanli Shichuang 萬里石床) were given, interpreted by some to refer to Paracel and Spratly respectively.[47] Wanli Shitang is also recorded in the History of Yuan to have been explored by the Chinese during the Mongol-led Yuan dynasty and may have been considered by them to have been within their national boundaries.[48][49][50] However, the Yuan also ruled over Korea, Mongolia, and parts of modern Russia. They are also referenced, sometimes with different names, in the Ming dynasty.[51][52] For example, in the Mao Kun map dating from Zheng He's voyage of the early 15th century, Shixing Shitang (石星石塘) is taken by some to mean Spratly,[44] however different authors interpret the identities of these islands differently.[45] Another Ming text, Haiyu (海語, On the Sea), uses Wanli Changsha (萬里長沙) for Spratly and noted that it is located southeast of Wanli Shitang (Paracels).[44] When the Ming Dynasty collapsed, the Qing dynasty continued to include the territory in maps compiled in 1724,[53] 1755,[54] 1767,[55] 1810,[56] and 1817,[57] but did not officially claim jurisdiction over these islands.

An 1801 Cary Map of the East Indies and Southeast Asia, with isles similar to those in the Mao Kun map. The isles are not the Paracels or Spratly Islands, but are instead identified as "Pulo Taya" and "Amphitrite".
An 1838 Unified Dai Nam map marking Trường Sa and Hoàng Sa, which are considered as Spratly and Paracel Islands by some Vietnamese scholars; yet they share different latitude, location, shape and distance. The Paracel claim may have been correctly identified, however, the "Spratly" claim on the map may instead be islands nearer to Vietnamese shores, instead of the actual Spratly Islands.

A Vietnamese map from 1834 also combines the Spratly and Paracel Islands into one region known as "Vạn Lý Trường Sa", a feature commonly incorporated into maps of the era (萬里長沙) ‒ that is, the same as the aforementioned Chinese island name Wanli Changsha.[58] According to Hanoi, Vietnamese maps record Bãi Cát Vàng (Golden Sandbanks, referring to both the Spratly and Paracel Islands), which lay near the coast of the central Vietnam, as early as 1838.[59] In Phủ Biên Tạp Lục (The Frontier Chronicles) by scholar Lê Quý Đôn, both Hoàng Sa and Trường Sa were defined as belonging to the Quảng Ngãi District. He described it as where sea products and shipwrecked cargoes were available to be collected. Vietnamese text written in the 17th century referenced government-sponsored economic activities during the Lê dynasty, 200 years earlier. The Vietnamese government conducted several geographical surveys of the islands in the 18th century.[59]

A striking large black and white British chart of the sea in northern Borneo, first issued in 1881 and corrected to 1935.

Despite the fact that China and Vietnam both made a claim to these territories simultaneously, at the time, neither side was aware that its neighbour had already charted and made claims to the same stretch of islands.[59]

An early European map, A correct chart of the China Seas of 1758 by William Herbert, left the Spratly Islands region (known then as the Dangerous Ground) as largely blank, indicating that region has yet to be properly surveyed, although some islands and shoals at its western edge were marked (one appears at the same place as Thitu Island).[60][61] A number of maps of the South China Sea were later produced, but the first map that gives a reasonably accurate delineation of the Spratly Islands region (titled [South] China Sea, Sheet 1) was only published in 1821 by the hydrographer of the East India Company James Horsburgh after a survey by Captain Daniel Ross. A later 1859 edition of the map named the Spratly Island as Storm Island.[60] The islands were sporadically visited throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries by mariners from different European powers (including Richard Spratly, after whom the island group derives its most recognisable English name, who visited the group in the 1840s in his whaler Cyrus).[62] However, these nations showed little interest in the islands. In 1883, German boats surveyed the Spratly and the Paracel Islands but eventually withdrew the survey, after receiving protests from the Guangdong government representing the Qing dynasty. China sent naval forces on inspection tours in 1902 and 1907 and placed flags and markers on the islands.[63]

In the 1950s, a group of individuals claimed sovereignty over the islands in the name of Morton F. Meads, supposedly an American descendant of a British naval captain who gave his name to Meads Island (Itu Aba) in the 1870s. In an affidavit made in 1971, the group claimed to represent the Kingdom of Humanity/Republic of Morac-Songhrati-Meads,[64] which they asserted was in turn the successor entity for a supposed Kingdom of Humanity established between the two world wars on Meads Island, allegedly by the son of the British captain. This claim to this would-be micronation fell dormant after 1972, when several members of the group drowned in a typhoon.[65][66][67][68]

Military conflict and diplomatic dialogues
Further information: Spratly Islands dispute

The following are political divisions for the Spratly Islands claimed by various area nations (in alphabetical order):

In the 19th century, Europeans found that Chinese fishermen from Hainan annually sojourned on the Spratly islands for part of the year, while in 1877 it was the British who launched the first modern legal claims to the Spratly Islands.[71][72]

When the Spratly Islands and Paracels were surveyed by Germany in 1883, China issued protests against them. The 1887 Chinese-Vietnamese Boundary convention signed between France and China after the Sino-French War said that China was the owner of the Spratly and Paracel islands.[73][63] China sent naval forces on inspection tours in 1902 and 1907 and placed flags and markers on the islands. The Qing dynasty's successor state, the Republic of China, claimed the Spratly and Paracel islands under the jurisdiction of Hainan.[63]

In 1933, France asserted its claims to the Spratly and Paracel Islands on behalf of its then-colony Vietnam.[74] It occupied a number of the Spratly Islands, including Taiping Island, built weather stations on two of the islands, and administered them as part of French Indochina. This occupation was protested by the Republic of China (ROC) government because France admitted finding Chinese fishermen there when French warships visited nine of the islands.[75] In 1935, the ROC government also announced a sovereignty claim on the Spratly Islands. Japan occupied some of the islands in 1939 during World War II, and it used the islands as a submarine base for the occupation of Southeast Asia. During the Japanese occupation, these islands were called Shinnan Shoto (新南諸島), literally the New Southern Islands, and together with the Paracel Islands (西沙群岛), they were put under the governance of the Japanese colonial authority in Taiwan.

Japan occupied the Paracels and the Spratly Islands from February 1939 to August 1945.[76] Japan annexed the Spratly Islands via Taiwan's jurisdiction and the Paracels via Hainan's jurisdiction.[71] Parts of the Paracels and Spratly Islands were again controlled by Republic of China after the 1945 surrender of Japan,[77] since the Allied powers assigned the Republic of China to receive Japanese surrenders in that area,[63] however no successor was named to the islands.[77]

In November 1946, the ROC sent naval ships to take control of the islands after the surrender of Japan.[76] It had chosen the largest and perhaps the only inhabitable island, Taiping Island, as its base, and it renamed the island under the name of the naval vessel as Taiping. Also following the defeat of Japan at the end of World War II, the ROC re-claimed the entirety of the Spratly Islands (including Taiping Island) after accepting the Japanese surrender of the islands based on the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations. The Republic of China then garrisoned Itu Aba (Taiping) island in 1946 and posted Chinese flags.[71] The aim of the Republic of China was to block the French claims.[63][78] The Republic of China drew up the map showing the U-shaped claim on the entire South China Sea, showing the Spratly and Paracels in Chinese territory, in 1947.[63] Japan had renounced all claims to the islands in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty together with the Paracels, Pratas and other islands captured from the Chinese, and upon these declarations, the government of the Republic of China reasserted its claim to the islands. The Chinese Kuomintang force withdrew from most of the Spratly and Paracel Islands after they retreated to Taiwan from the opposing Communist Party of China due to their losses in the Chinese Civil War and the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.[74] Taiwan quietly withdrew troops from Taiping Island in 1950, but then reinstated them in 1956 in response to Tomás Cloma's sudden claim to the island as part of Freedomland.[79] As of 2013, Taiping Island is administered by Taiwan.[80]

After pulling out its garrison in 1950 when the Republic of China evacuated to Taiwan, when the Filipino Tomas Cloma uprooted an ROC flag on Itu Aba laid claim to the Spratly Islands and, Taiwan again regarrisoned Itu Aba in 1956.[81] In 1946, the Americans allegedly reminded the Philippines at its independence that the Spratly Islands were not Philippine territory, both to not anger Chiang Kai-shek in China and because the Spratly Islands were not part of the Philippines per the 1898 treaty Spain signed with the United States.[71] However, no document was found to that effect. The Philippines then claimed the Spratly Islands in 1971 under President Marcos, after Taiwanese troops attacked and shot at a Philippine fishing boat on Itu Aba.[82]

Taiwan's garrison from 1946 to 1950 and 1956-now on Itu Aba represents an "effective occupation" of the Spratly Islands.[82][83] China established a coastal defence system against Japanese pirates or smugglers.[84]

Territorial monument of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) on Southwest Cay, Spratly Islands, defining the cay as part of Vietnamese territory (Phước Tuy Province). Used from 22 August 1956 until 1975, when replaced by another one from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (successor state after the Fall of Saigon)

In 1958, China issued a declaration defining its territorial waters that encompassed the Spratly Islands. North Vietnam's prime minister, Phạm Văn Đồng, sent a formal note to Zhou Enlai, stating that the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) respected the Chinese decision regarding the 12 nmi (22 km; 14 mi) limit of territorial waters.[85] While accepting the 12-nmi principal with respect to territorial waters, the letter did not actually address the issue of defining actual territorial boundaries. North Vietnam recognised China's claims on the Paracels and Spratly Islands during the Vietnam War as it was being supported by China. Only after winning the war and conquering South Vietnam did North Vietnam retract its recognition and admitted it recognised them as part of China to receive aid from China in fighting the Americans.[86][87]

In 1988, the Vietnamese and Chinese navies engaged in a skirmish in the area of Johnson South Reef (also called Gạc Ma Reef in Vietnam and Yongshu Reef in China).[88]

Under President Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan stated that "legally, historically, geographically, or in reality", all of the South China Sea and Spratly islands were Taiwan's territory and under Taiwanese sovereignty, and denounced actions undertaken there by Malaysia and the Philippines, in a statement on 13 July 1999 released by the foreign ministry of Taiwan.[89] Taiwan and China's claims "mirror" each other; during international talks involving the Spratly islands, China and Taiwan have cooperated with each other since both have the same claims.[82][90]

It was unclear whether France continued its claim to the islands after World War II, since none of the islands, other than Taiping Island, was habitable. The South Vietnamese government took over the Trường Sa administration after the defeat of the French at the end of the First Indochina War. "The French bestowed its titles, rights, and claims over the two island chains to the Republic of Vietnam (RoV) in accordance with the Geneva Accords", said Nguyen Hong Thao, Associate Professor at Faculty of Law, Vietnam National University.[91]

In 1999, a Philippine navy ship (Number 57 – BRP Sierra Madre) was purposely run aground near Second Thomas Shoal to enable establishment of an outpost. As of 2014 it had not been removed, and Filipino marines have been stationed aboard since the grounding.[92][93]

Taiwan and mainland China are largely strategically aligned on the Spratly islands issue, since they both claim exactly the same area, so Taiwan's control of Itu Aba (Taiping) island is viewed as an extension of China's claim.[73] Taiwan and China both claim the entire island chain, while all the other claimants only claim portions of them. China has proposed co-operation with Taiwan against all the other countries claiming the islands. Taiwanese lawmakers have demanded that Taiwan fortify Itu Aba (Taiping) island with weapons to defend against the Vietnamese, and both China and Taiwanese NGOs have pressured Taiwan to expand Taiwan's military capabilities on the island, which played a role in Taiwan expanding the island's runway in 2012.[94] China has urged Taiwan to co-operate and offered Taiwan a share in oil and gas resources while shutting out all the other rival claimants. Taiwanese lawmakers have complained about repeated Vietnamese aggression and trespassing on Taiwan's Itu Aba (Taiping), and Taiwan has started viewing Vietnam as an enemy over the Spratly Islands, not China.[95] Taiwan's state run oil company CPC Corp's board director Chiu Yi has called Vietnam as the "greatest threat" to Taiwan.[94] Taiwan's airstrip on Taiping has irritated Vietnam.[96] China views Taiwan's expansion of its military and airstrip on Taiping as benefiting China's position against the other rival claimants from southeast Asian countries.[83] China's claims to the Spratly Islands benefit from legal weight because of Taiwan's presence on Itu Aba, while America on the other hand has regularly ignored Taiwan's claims in the South China Sea and does not include Taiwan in any talks on dispute resolution for the area.[97]

Taiwan performed live fire military exercises on Taiping island in September 2012; reports said that Vietnam was explicitly named by the Taiwanese military as the "imaginary enemy" in the drill. Vietnam protested against the exercises as violation of its territory and "voiced anger", demanding that Taiwan stop the drill. Among the inspectors of the live fire drill were Taiwanese national legislators, adding to the tensions.[98]

In May 2011, Chinese patrol boats attacked two Vietnamese oil exploration ships near the Spratly Islands.[99] Also in May 2011, Chinese naval vessels opened fire on Vietnamese fishing vessels operating off East London Reef (Da Dong). The three Chinese military vessels were numbered 989, 27 and 28, and they showed up with a small group of Chinese fishing vessels. Another Vietnamese fishing vessel was fired on near Fiery Cross Reef (Chu Thap). The Chief Commander of Border Guards in Phú Yên Province, Vietnam reported that a total of four Vietnamese vessels were fired upon by Chinese naval vessels.[100] These incidents involving Chinese forces sparked mass protests in Vietnam, especially in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City,[101] and in various Vietnamese communities in the West (namely in the US state of California and in Paris) over attacks on Vietnamese citizens and the intrusion into what Vietnam claimed was part of its territory.[102]

In June 2011, the Philippines began officially referring to the South China Sea as the "West Philippine Sea" and the Reed Bank as "Recto Bank".[103][104]

In July 2012, the National Assembly of Vietnam passed a law demarcating Vietnamese sea borders to include the Spratly and Paracel Islands.[105][106]

In 2010, it was reported that the former Malaysian Prime Minister (now the current Malaysian Prime Minister) Mahathir Mohamad believed Malaysia could profit from China's economic growth through co-operation with China,[107] and said that China "was not a threat to anyone and was not worried about aggression from China", as well accusing the United States of provoking China and trying to turn China's neighbours against China.[108] Malaysian authorities displayed no concern over China conducting a military exercise at James Shoal in March 2013,[33] with its Defence Minister Hishammuddin Hussein suggested they might work with China and saying that Malaysia had no problem with China patrolling the South China Sea, and telling ASEAN, America, and Japan that "Just because you have enemies, doesn't mean your enemies are my enemies".[109] However, until present Malaysia still maintained a balance relations with the countries involved in this dispute.[110] But since China has started encroaching its territorial waters,[111] Malaysia has become active in condemning China.[112][113]

The editorial of the Taiwanese news website Want China Times accused America of being behind the May 2014 flareup in the South China Sea, saying that Vietnam rammed a Chinese vessel on 2 May over an oil rig drilling platform and the Philippines detained 11 Chinese fishermens occurred because of Obama's visit to the region and that they were incited by America "behind the scenes". Want China Times claimed America ordered Vietnam on 7 May to complain about the drilling platform, and noted that a joint military exercise was happening at this time between the Philippines and America, and also noted that the American New York Times newspaper supported Vietnam.[114]

In a series of news stories on 16 April 2015, it was revealed, through photos taken by Airbus, that China had been building an airstrip on Fiery Cross Reef, one of the southern islands. The 10,000-foot-long (3,048 m) runway covers a significant portion of the island, and is viewed as a possible strategic threat to other countries with claims to the islands, such as Vietnam and the Philippines.

Champa historically had a large presence in the South China Sea. The Vietnamese broke Champa's power in an invasion of Champa in 1471, and then finally conquered the last remnants of the Cham people in an invasion in 1832. A Cham named Katip Suma who received Islamic education in Kelantan declared a Jihad against the Vietnamese, and fighting continued until the Vietnamese crushed the remnants of the resistance in 1835. The Cham organisation Front de Libération du Champa was part of the United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races, which waged war against the Vietnamese for independence in the Vietnam War along with the Montagnard and Khmer Krom minorities. The last remaining FULRO insurgents surrendered to the United Nations in 1992.

The Vietnamese government fears that evidence of Champa's influence over the disputed area in the South China Sea would bring attention to human rights violations and killings of ethnic minorities in Vietnam such as in the 2001 and 2004 uprisings, and lead to the issue of Cham autonomy being brought into the dispute, since the Vietnamese conquered the Hindu and Muslim Cham people in a war in 1832.[115]

Japanese scholar Taoka Shunji said in a journal article that when it came to China’s advance in the South China Sea and the Spratly Islands, the assumption amongst many Japanese people that the territory of the Philippines was being invaded was incorrect. According to him, "in the 1898 Treaty of Paris in which Spain ceded the Philippines to the US, the object of cession was east of 118 degrees longitude (116 in the South); and the Spratly Islands fall outside (West) of that line. The US therefore did not claim these islands to be the US territory when in 1938 Japan declared them to be Japanese territory and incorporated them as connected to Taiwan under the name of ‘Shinnan Gunto’. The Japanese government now considers the territorial status of these islands ‘undetermined.’"[116]

The "Moro" as "people", is used to describe both the Filipino Muslims and their homeland. Ancestors of moro people were the owners of Spratly Islands prior to the arrival of the Spanish colonials in the 16th century, according to the Sultan of Sulu in the southern Philippines reported in a local paper. "China has no right over the Spratly Islands in what it calls the South China Sea because that is part of our ancestral domain," Majaraj Julmuner Jannaral, Sultanate information officer, told the Philippine Star. "The Spratly Archipelago is part of the Sulu Sea (the inner area around the islands in the southern Philippines, which is part of the West Philippine Sea (the new name of the South China Sea)," Jannaral concluded. "Exploration of the marine territory and the waters around the Spratly Archipelago, Palawan in southwestern Philippines and the southern Philippines, belong to the residents in those areas," he added. The Sultanate of Sulu claims historic proprietary rights over the Spratly Islands since before the Spanish colonial era.

Majority of hostile acts in the territory have come from China, as reported by multiple verified international news and independent media.[117][118] Chinese aggression have increased rapidly in the last few decades, forcing multiple countries to pushback, both diplomatically and militarily. Various fishing boats have been harassed by Chinese warships, of which those boats were from nationals of Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, Taiwan, Brunei, Vietnam, and the Philippines, all of which have made push-backs against China's aggressive territorial acts.[118][119][120] Many of the vessels were either rammed or sank by Chinese warships, wherein the Chinese let the fishermen drift at sea, leaving them behind without aid. Many of the drowning fishermen have been rescued by other nations such as Vietnam and the Philippines.[121][122]

2016 PCA Tribunal ruling
Main article: Philippines v. China

In January 2013, the Philippines formally initiated arbitration proceedings against China's claim on the territories within the "nine-dash line" that includes Spratly Islands, which it said is "unlawful" under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).[123][124] An arbitration tribunal was constituted under Annex VII of UNCLOS and it was decided in July 2013 that the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) would function as registry and provide administrative duties in the proceedings.[125]

On 12 July 2016, the arbitrators of the tribunal of PCA agreed unanimously with the Philippines. They concluded in the award that there was no evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive control over the waters or resources, hence there was "no legal basis for China to claim historic rights" over the nine-dash line.[126] Accordingly, the PCA tribunal decision is ruled as final and non-appealable by either countries.[127][128] The tribunal also criticized China's land reclamation projects and its construction of artificial islands in the Spratly Islands, saying that it had caused "severe harm to the coral reef environment".[129] It also characterized Taiping Island and other features of the Spratly Islands as "rocks" under UNCLOS, and therefore are not entitled to a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone.[130] China however rejected the ruling, calling it "ill-founded".[131] Taiwan, which currently administers Taiping Island, the largest of the Spratly Islands, also rejected the ruling.[132] Numerous countries called on the international community to support the ruling & positively acknowledge it. Among them were Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, India, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, & United States, as well as claimants to the area such as Malaysia, Vietnam.[133][134]

Transportation and communication

Airports
See also: List of airports in the Spratly Islands
LocationOccupied byNameCodeBuiltLengthNotes
Taiping IslandTaiwanTaiping Island AirportRCSP20071,200 m (est.) Military use only. No refueling facilities. [135]
Swallow ReefMalaysiaLayang-Layang AirportLAC19951,367 m Dual-use concrete airport.
Fiery Cross ReefChinaYongshu AirportAG 455320163,300 m (est.) Dual-use concrete airport.
Subi ReefChinaZhubi Airport20163,300 m (est.) Dual-use concrete airport.
Mischief ReefChinaMeiji Airport20162,700 m (est.) Dual-use concrete airport.
Thitu Island (Pag-asa)PhilippinesRancudo AirfieldRPPN19751,300 m (est.) Concrete.[136]
Spratly Island (Trường Sa)VietnamTrường Sa Airport1976-771,200 m (est.)[137] Military use only. Extended from 600m to 1,200m in 2016.[137]

Telecommunications

In 2005, a cellular phone base station was erected by the Philippines' Smart Communications on Pag-asa Island.[138]

On 18 May 2011, China Mobile announced that its mobile phone coverage has expanded to the Spratly Islands. The extended coverage would allow soldiers stationed on the islands, fishermen, and merchant vessels within the area to use mobile services, and can also provide assistance during storms and sea rescues. The service network deployment over the islands took nearly one year.[139]

gollark: Seriously.
gollark: *Text* uses UTF-32.
gollark: But if you want to deal with an individual *character*, that is *not* a u8.
gollark: * vectors
gollark: Strings are byte vecotrs with UTF-8 encoding.

See also

References

Informational notes

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