Arab Spring

The Arab Spring (Arabic: الربيع العربي‎) was a series of anti-government protests, uprisings, and armed rebellions that spread across much of the Arab world in the early 2010s. It began in response to oppressive regimes and a low standard of living, starting with protests in Tunisia.[1][2] From Tunisia, the protests then spread to five other countries: Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain, where either the ruler was deposed (Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Muammar Gaddafi, Hosni Mubarak, and Ali Abdullah Saleh) or major uprisings and social violence occurred including riots, civil wars or insurgencies. Sustained street demonstrations took place in Morocco, Iraq, Algeria, Iranian Khuzestan, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman,and Sudan. Minor protests in Djibouti, Mauritania, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, and the Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara.[3] A major slogan of the demonstrators in the Arab world is ash-shaʻb yurīd isqāṭ an-niẓām ("the people want to bring down the regime").[4]

This article is about the demonstrations and revolts in the Arab world in the early 2010s. For other Arab revolts, see Arab Revolt (disambiguation).

Arab Spring
Clockwise from the upper left corner: Protesters gathered at Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt 9 February 2011; Habib Bourguiba Boulevard, protesters in Tunis, Tunisia 14 January 2011; dissidents in Sana'a, Yemen calling for president Ali Abdullah Saleh to resign on 3 February 2011; crowds of hundreds of thousands in Baniyas, Syria 29 April 2011
Date	17 December 2010 – December 2012
Location	North Africa, Middle East (i.e. MENA or "Arab world")
Caused by	Authoritarianism Monarchy Demographic structural factors 2000s energy crisis Political corruption Human rights violations Unemployment Inflation Kleptocracy Poverty Sectarianism Self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi
Goals	Democracy Free elections Economic freedom Human rights Employment Regime change Secularism Islamism
Methods	Civil disobedience Civil resistance Demonstrations Defection Insurgency Internet activism Mutiny Protests Protest camps Revolution Riots Self-immolation Silent protests Sit-ins Social media activism Strike actions Urban warfare Uprising
Resulted in	Arab Spring concurrent incidents, Arab Winter, Impact of the Arab Spring, and New Arab Spring (2018–19) Full result by country Tunisia: President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali ousted, charged, exiled and government overthrown. Egypt: President Hosni Mubarak ousted, arrested, charged, and government overthrown. Libya: Leader Muammar Gaddafi killed following an eight-month civil war that saw a foreign military intervention and the government overthrown. Yemen: President Ali Abdullah Saleh ousted, and power handed to a national unity government. Syria: President Bashar al-Assad faced civil uprising against his rule that deteriorated into armed rebellion and eventual full-scale civil war. Bahrain: Civil uprising against the government crushed by authorities and Saudi-led intervention. Kuwait, Lebanon and Oman: Government changes implemented in response to protests. Morocco, Jordan and Palestine: Constitutional reforms implemented in response to protests. Saudi Arabia, Mauritania, Sudan and other Arab countries: Protests.
Casualties
Death(s)	61,080–140,000 deaths in total (International estimate; see table below)

The importance of external factors versus internal factors to the protests' spread and success is contested.[5] Social media is one way governments try to inhibit protests. In many countries, governments shut down certain sites or blocked Internet service entirely, especially in the times preceding a major rally.[6] Governments also accused content creators of unrelated crimes or shutting down communication on specific sites or groups, such as Facebook.[7] In the news, social media has been heralded as the driving force behind the swift spread of revolution throughout the world, as new protests appear in response to success stories shared from those taking place in other countries.

The wave of initial revolutions and protests faded by mid-2012, as many Arab Spring demonstrations met with violent responses from authorities,[8][9][10] as well as from pro-government militias, counter-demonstrators and militaries. These attacks were answered with violence from protesters in some cases.[11][12][13] Large-scale conflicts resulted: the Syrian Civil War;[14][15] the rise of ISIL, insurgency in Iraq and the following civil war;[16] the Egyptian Crisis, coup, and subsequent unrest and insurgency;[17] the Libyan Civil War; and the Yemeni Crisis and following civil war.[18] Regimes that lacked major oil wealth and hereditary succession arrangements were more likely to undergo regime change.[19]

A power struggle continued after the immediate response to the Arab Spring. While leadership changed and regimes were held accountable, power vacuums opened across the Arab world. Ultimately, it resulted in a contentious battle between a consolidation of power by religious elites and the growing support for democracy in many Muslim-majority states.[20] The early hopes that these popular movements would end corruption, increase political participation, and bring about greater economic equity quickly collapsed in the wake of the counter-revolutionary moves by foreign state actors in Yemen,[21] the regional and international military interventions in Bahrain and Yemen, and the destructive civil wars in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen.[22]

Some have referred to the succeeding and still ongoing conflicts as the Arab Winter.[14][15][16][17][18] As of May 2018, only the uprising in Tunisia has resulted in a transition to constitutional democratic governance.[3] Recent uprisings in Sudan and Algeria show that the conditions that started the Arab Spring are not going away and political movements against authoritarianism and exploitation are still occurring.[23] In 2019, multiple uprisings and protest movements in Algeria, Sudan, Iraq, Lebanon and Egypt have been seen as a continuation of the Arab Spring.[24][25] In 2020, multiple conflicts are still continuing that might be seen as a result of the Arab Spring. The Syrian Civil War has caused massive political instability and economic hardship in Syria, with the Syrian currency plunging to new lows.[26] In Libya, a major civil war is ongoing, with Western powers and Russia sending in proxy fighters.[27][28] In Yemen, a civil war continues to affect the country.[29] In Lebanon, a major banking crisis is threatening the economy of neighboring Syria.

Etymology

The term "Arab Spring" is an allusion to the Revolutions of 1848, which are sometimes referred to as the "Springtime of Nations", and the Prague Spring in 1968. In the aftermath of the Iraq War, it was used by various commentators and bloggers who anticipated a major Arab movement towards democratization.[30] The first specific use of the term Arab Spring as used to denote these events may have started with the American political journal Foreign Policy.[31] Political scientist Marc Lynch described "Arab Spring" as "a term I may have unintentionally coined in a 6 January 2011 article" for Foreign Policy magazine.[32][33] Joseph Massad on Al Jazeera said the term was "part of a US strategy of controlling the movement's aims and goals" and directing it towards western-style liberal democracy.[31] When Arab Spring protests in some countries were followed by electoral success for Islamist parties, some American pundits coined the terms "Islamist Spring"[34] and "Islamist Winter".[35]

Some observers have also drawn comparisons between the Arab Spring movements and the Revolutions of 1989 (also known as the "Autumn of Nations") that swept through Eastern Europe and the Second World, in terms of their scale and significance.[36][37][38] Others, however, have pointed out that there are several key differences between the movements, such as the desired outcomes, the effectiveness of civil resistance, and the organizational role of Internet-based technologies in the Arab revolutions.[39][40][41][42]

Causes

Pressures from within

The world watched the events of the Arab Spring unfold, "gripped by the narrative of a young generation peacefully rising up against oppressive authoritarianism to secure a more democratic political system and a brighter economic future".[22] The Arab Spring is widely believed to have been instigated by dissatisfaction, particularly of youth and unions, with the rule of local governments, though some have speculated that wide gaps in income levels and pressures caused by the Great Recession may have had a hand as well.[43] Some activists had taken part in programs sponsored by the U.S.-funded National Endowment for Democracy, but the U.S. government claimed that they did not initiate the uprisings.[44]

Numerous factors led to the protests, including issues such as monarchy,[45] human rights violations, political corruption (demonstrated by Wikileaks diplomatic cables),[46] economic decline, unemployment, extreme poverty, and a number of demographic structural factors,[47] such as a large percentage of educated but dissatisfied youth within the entire population.[48][49] Catalysts for the revolts in all Northern African and Persian Gulf countries included the concentration of wealth in the hands of monarchs in power for decades, insufficient transparency of its redistribution, corruption, and especially the refusal of the youth to accept the status quo.[50]

Some protesters looked to the Turkish model as an ideal (contested but peaceful elections, fast-growing but liberal economy, secular constitution but Islamist government).[51][52][53][54] Other analysts blamed the rise in food prices on commodity traders and the conversion of crops to ethanol.[55] Yet others have claimed that the context of high rates of unemployment and corrupt political regimes led to dissent movements within the region.[56][57]

Social media

Main article: Social media and the Arab Spring

In the wake of the Arab Spring protests, a considerable amount of attention has been focused on the role of social media and digital technologies in allowing citizens within areas affected by 'the Arab Uprisings' as a means for collective activism to circumvent state-operated media channels.[58] The influence of social media on political activism during the Arab Spring has, however, been much debated.[59][60][61] Protests took place both in states with a very high level of Internet usage (such as Bahrain with 88% of its population online in 2011) and in states with some of the lowest Internet penetration (Yemen and Libya).[62]

The use of social media platforms more than doubled in Arab countries during the protests, with the exception of Libya.[63] Some researchers have shown how collective intelligence, dynamics of the crowd in participatory systems such as social media, have immense power to support a collective action – such as foment a political change.[64][65] As of 5 April 2011, the number of Facebook users in the Arab world surpassed 27.7 million people.[63] Some critics have argued that digital technologies and other forms of communication – videos, cellular phones, blogs, photos, emails, and text messages – have brought about the concept of a 'digital democracy' in parts of North Africa affected by the uprisings.[66][67]

Facebook, Twitter and other major social media played a key role in the movement of Egyptian and Tunisian activists in particular.[62][68] Nine out of ten Egyptians and Tunisians responded to a poll that they used Facebook to organize protests and spread awareness.[63] This large population of young Egyptian men referred to themselves as "the Facebook generation", exemplifying their escape from their non-modernized past.[69] Furthermore, 28% of Egyptians and 29% of Tunisians from the same poll said that blocking Facebook greatly hindered and/or disrupted communication. Social media sites were a platform for different movements formed by many frustrated citizens, including the 2008 "April 6 Youth Movement" organized by Ahmed Mahed, which set out to organize and promote a nationwide labor strike, and which inspired the later creation of the "Progressive Youth of Tunisia".[70]

During the Arab Spring, people created pages on Facebook to raise awareness about alleged crimes against humanity, such as police brutality in the Egyptian Revolution (see Wael Ghonim and Death of Khaled Mohamed Saeed).[71] Whether the project of raising awareness was primarily pursued by Arabs themselves or simply advertised by western social media users is a matter of debate; Jared Keller, a journalist for The Atlantic, claims that most activists and protesters used Facebook (among other social media) to organize; However, what influenced Iran was "good old-fashioned word of mouth". Jared Keller argued that the sudden and anomalous social media output was caused from westerners witnessing the situation (s), and then broadcasting them. The Middle East and North Africa used texting, emailing, and blogging only to organize and communicate information about internal local protests.[72]

A study by Zeynep Tufekci of the University of North Carolina and Christopher Wilson of the United Nations Development Program concluded that "social media in general, and Facebook in particular, provided new sources of information the regime could not easily control and were crucial in shaping how citizens made individual decisions about participating in protests, the logistics of protest, and the likelihood of success."[73] Marc Lynch of George Washington University said, "while social media boosters envisioned the creation of a new public sphere based on dialogue and mutual respect, the reality is that Islamists and their adversaries retreat to their respective camps, reinforcing each other's prejudices while throwing the occasional rhetorical bomb across the no-man's land that the center has become."[73] Lynch also stated in a Foreign Policy article, "There is something very different about scrolling through pictures and videos of unified, chanting Yemeni or Egyptian crowds demanding democratic change and waking up to a gory image of a headless 6-year-old girl on your Facebook news feed."[74]

In the months leading up to events in Tunisia, Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection, Communications Program Manager Jonathan Stevens predicted the use of "Collaborative Internet Utilities" to effect governmental change. In his thesis, Webeaucracy: The Collaborative Revolution, Stevens put forth that unlike writing, printing, and telecommunications, "collaborative internet utilities" denote a sea-change in the ability of crowds to effect social change. People and collaborative internet utilities can be described as actor-networks; the subitizing limit (and history) suggests people left to their own devices cannot fully harness the mental power of crowds; Metcalfe's law suggests that as the number of nodes increases, the value of collaborative actor-networks increases exponentially; collaborative internet utilities effectively increase the subitizing limit; and at some macro scale, these interactive collaborative actor-networks can be described by the same rules that govern Parallel Distributed Processing resulting in crowd sourcing that acts as a type of distributed collective consciousness. The Internet assumes the role of totemic religious figurehead uniting the members of society through mechanical solidarity forming a collective consciousness. Through many-to-many collaborative internet utilities, the Webeaucracy is empowered as never before.[75]

Social networks were not the only instrument for rebels to coordinate their efforts and communicate. In the countries with the lowest Internet penetration and the limited role of social networks, such as Yemen and Libya, the role of mainstream electronic media devices – cell phones, emails, and video clips (e.g. YouTube) was very important to cast the light on the situation in the country and spread the word about the protests in the outside world.[62] In Egypt, in Cairo particularly, mosques were one of the main platforms to coordinate the protest actions and raise awareness to the masses.[76]

Conversely, scholarship literature on the Middle East, political scientist Gregory Gause has found, had failed to predict the events of the Arab uprisings. Commenting on an early article by Gause whose review of a decade of Middle Eastern studies led him to conclude that almost no scholar foresaw what was coming, Chair of Ottoman and Turkish Studies at Tel Aviv University Ehud R. Toledano writes that Gause's finding is "a strong and sincere mea culpa" and that his criticism of Middle East experts for 'underestimating the hidden forces driving change' "while they worked instead to explain the unshakable stability of repressive authoritarian regimes" is well-placed. Toledano then quotes Gause saying, 'As they wipe the egg off their faces,' those experts 'need to reconsider long-held assumptions about the Arab world.'[77]

Timeline

Main article: Timeline of the Arab Spring

Events leading up to the Arab Spring

Tunisia experienced a series of conflicts during the three years leading up to the Arab Spring, the most notable occurring in the mining area of Gafsa in 2008, where protests continued for many months. These protests included rallies, sit-ins, and strikes, during which there were two fatalities, an unspecified number of wounded, and dozens of arrests.[78][79]

In Egypt, the labor movement had been strong for years, with more than 3,000 labor actions since 2004, and provided an important venue for organizing protests and collective action.[80] One important demonstration was an attempted workers' strike on 6 April 2008 at the state-run textile factories of al-Mahalla al-Kubra, just outside Cairo. The idea for this type of demonstration spread throughout the country, promoted by computer-literate working-class youths and their supporters among middle-class college students.[80] A Facebook page, set up to promote the strike, attracted tens of thousands of followers and provided the platform for sustained political action in pursuit of the "long revolution".[49] The government mobilized to break the strike through infiltration and riot police, and while the regime was somewhat successful in forestalling a strike, dissidents formed the "6 April Committee" of youths and labor activists, which became one of the major forces calling for the anti-Mubarak demonstration on 25 January in Tahrir Square.[80]

In Algeria, discontent had been building for years over a number of issues. In February 2008, United States Ambassador Robert Ford wrote in a leaked diplomatic cable that Algeria is 'unhappy' with long-standing political alienation; that social discontent persisted throughout the country, with food strikes occurring almost every week; that there were demonstrations every day somewhere in the country; and that the Algerian government was corrupt and fragile.[81] Some claimed that during 2010 there were as many as '9,700 riots and unrests' throughout the country.[82] Many protests focused on issues such as education and health care, while others cited rampant corruption.[83]

In Western Sahara, the Gdeim Izik protest camp was erected 12 kilometres (7.5 mi) south-east of El Aaiún by a group of young Sahrawis on 9 October 2010. Their intention was to demonstrate against labor discrimination, unemployment, looting of resources, and human rights abuses.[84] The camp contained between 12,000 and 20,000 inhabitants, but on 8 November 2010 it was destroyed and its inhabitants evicted by Moroccan security forces. The security forces faced strong opposition from some young Sahrawi civilians, and rioting soon spread to El Aaiún and other towns within the territory, resulting in an unknown number of injuries and deaths. Violence against Sahrawis in the aftermath of the protests was cited as a reason for renewed protests months later, after the start of the Arab Spring.[85]

The catalyst for the escalation of protests was the self-immolation of Tunisian Mohamed Bouazizi. Unable to find work and selling fruit at a roadside stand, Bouazizi had his wares confiscated by a municipal inspector on 17 December 2010. An hour later he doused himself with gasoline and set himself afire. His death on 4 January 2011[86] brought together various groups dissatisfied with the existing system, including many unemployed, political and human rights activists, labor, trade unionists, students, professors, lawyers, and others to begin the Tunisian Revolution.[78]

The Arab Spring

The series of protests and demonstrations across the Middle East and North Africa that commenced in 2010 became known as the "Arab Spring",[87][88][89] and sometimes as the "Arab Spring and Winter",[90] "Arab Awakening"[91][92][93] or "Arab Uprisings",[94][95] even though not all the participants in the protests were Arab. It was sparked by the first protests that occurred in Tunisia on 18 December 2010 in Sidi Bouzid, following Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation in protest of police corruption and ill treatment.[96][97] With the success of the protests in Tunisia, a wave of unrest sparked by the Tunisian "Burning Man" struck Algeria, Jordan, Egypt, and Yemen,[98] then spread to other countries. The largest, most organised demonstrations often occurred on a "day of rage", usually Friday afternoon prayers.[99][100][101] The protests also triggered similar unrest outside the region. Contrary to expectations the revolutions were not led by Islamists:

Even though the Islamists were certainly present during the uprisings, they never determined the directions of these movements—after all, there was hardly any central leadership in any of the uprisings. Some Islamist groups initially were even reluctant to join in the protests, and the major religious groups in Egypt—Salafis, al-Azhar, and the Coptic Church—initially opposed the revolution. The mufti of Egypt, Ali Gomaa, proclaimed that rising against a lawful ruler—President Mubarak—was haram, not permissible. And the Muslim Brotherhood's old guard joined in the protests reluctantly only after being pushed by the group's young people.[102]

The Arab Spring caused the "biggest transformation of the Middle East since decolonization".[103] By the end of February 2012, rulers had been forced from power in Tunisia,[104] Egypt,[105] Libya,[106] and Yemen;[107] civil uprisings had erupted in Bahrain[108] and Syria;[109] major protests had broken out in Algeria,[110] Iraq,[111] Jordan,[112] Kuwait,[113] Morocco,[114] Oman,[115] and Sudan;[116] and minor protests had occurred in Mauritania,[117] Saudi Arabia,[118] Djibouti,[119] Western Sahara,[120] and Palestine. Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia on 14 January 2011 following the Tunisian Revolution protests. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak resigned on 11 February 2011 after 18 days of massive protests, ending his 30-year presidency. The Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown on 23 August 2011, after the National Transitional Council (NTC) took control of Bab al-Azizia. He was killed on 20 October 2011 in his hometown of Sirte after the NTC took control of the city. Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh signed the GCC power-transfer deal in which a presidential election was held, resulting in his successor Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi formally replacing him as president on 27 February 2012 in exchange for immunity from prosecution. Weapons and Tuareg fighters returning from the Libyan Civil War stoked a simmering conflict in Mali that has been described as 'fallout' from the Arab Spring in North Africa.[121]

During this period, several leaders announced their intentions to step down at the end of their current terms. Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir announced that he would not seek reelection in 2015 (he ultimately retracted his announcement and ran anyway),[122] as did Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, whose term was to end in 2014,[123] although there were violent demonstrations demanding his immediate resignation in 2011.[124] Protests in Jordan also caused the sacking of four successive governments[125][126] by King Abdullah.[127] The popular unrest in Kuwait also resulted in the resignation of Prime Minister Nasser Al-Sabah's cabinet.[128]

The geopolitical implications of the protests drew global attention.[129] Some protesters were nominated for the 2011 Nobel Peace Prize.[130] Tawakkol Karman of Yemen was co-recipient of the 2011 Nobel Peace Prize due to her role organizing peaceful protests. In December 2011 Time magazine named "The Protester" its "Person of the Year".[131] Spanish photographer Samuel Aranda won the 2011 World Press Photo award for his image of a Yemeni woman holding an injured family member, taken during the civil uprising in Yemen on 15 October 2011.[132]

Summary of conflicts by country

  Government overthrown more than once   Government overthrown   Civil war   Protests and governmental changes   Major protests   Minor protests   Other protests and militant action outside the Arab world

Country	Date started	Status of protests	Outcome	Death toll	Situation
Tunisia	18 December 2010	Government overthrown on 14 January 2011	Overthrow of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali; Ben Ali flees into exile in Saudi Arabia Resignation of Prime Minister Ghannouchi[133] Dissolution of the political police[134] Dissolution of the RCD, the former ruling party of Tunisia and liquidation of its assets[135] Release of political prisoners[136] Elections to a Constituent Assembly on 23 October 2011[137]	338[138]	E Government overthrown
Algeria	29 December 2010	Ended on 10 january 2012	Lifting of the 19-year-old state of emergency[139][140]	8[141]	E Major protests
Jordan	14 January 2011	Ended on 4 October 2012	In February 2011, King Abdullah II dismisses Prime Minister Rifai and his cabinet[142] In April 2011, King Abdullah creates the Royal Committee to Review the Constitution with directions to review the Constitution in accordance with calls for reform. On 30 September 2011, Abdullah approves changes to all 42 articles of the Constitution[143] In October 2011, Abdullah dismisses Prime Minister Marouf al-Bakhit and his cabinet after complaints of slow progress on promised reforms[144] In April 2012, as the protests continue, Awn Al-Khasawneh resigned, and the King appoints Fayez Tarawneh as the new Prime Minister of Jordan[145] In October 2012, Abdullah dissolves the parliament for new early elections, and appoints Abdullah Ensour as the new Prime Minister[146]	3[147]	C Protests and governmental changes
Oman	17 January 2011	Ended on 8 April 2011	Economic concessions by Sultan Qaboos bin Said al Said[148][149] Dismissal of ministers[150][151] Granting of lawmaking powers to Oman's elected legislature[152]	2–6[153][154][155]	C Protests and governmental changes
Egypt	25 January 2011	Two governments overthrown (On 11 February 2011 and 3 July 2013), Egyptian Crisis follows until 2014	Overthrow of Hosni Mubarak, who is later convicted of corruption and ordered to stand trial for ordering the killing of protesters. Resignation of Prime Minister(s) Ahmed Nazif and Ahmed Shafik[156] Assumption of power by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces[157] Suspension of the Constitution, dissolution of the Parliament[158] Disbanding of State Security Investigations Service[159] Dissolution of the NDP, Egypt's former ruling party, and transfer of its assets to the state[160] Arrest and prosecution of Mubarak, his family and his former ministers[161][162][163] Lifting of the 31-year-old state of emergency[164] Democratic election held to replace Mubarak as president; Mohamed Morsi elected and inaugurated;[165] Sinai insurgency begins	846[166]	ETwo governments overthrown (EMubarak government • EMorsi government)
Syria	26 January 2011 (Major protests began on 15 March 2011).	Civil uprising, which transformed into Syrian Civil War by July–August 2011	Release of some political prisoners[167][168] Dismissal of Provincial Governors[169][170] Resignation of the Government[171] End of Emergency Law Resignations from Parliament[172] Large defections from the Syrian army and clashes between soldiers and defectors[173] Formation of the Free Syrian Army and deterioration into full-scale civil war	2,206–2,654	Civil War
Yemen	27 January 2011	Two governments overthrown (On 27 February 2012 and 22 January 2015). Yemeni Crisis follows.	Overthrow of Ali Abdullah Saleh; Saleh granted immunity from prosecution. Resignation of Prime Minister Ali Muhammad Mujawar Resignation of MPs from the ruling party[174] Occupation of several areas of Yemeni territory by al-Qaeda and Houthi rebels Restructure of the military forces by sacking several of its leaders[175] Approval of Saleh's immunity from prosecution by Yemeni legislators[176] Presidential election held to replace Saleh; Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi elected and inaugurated Yemeni Crisis Begins	2,000[177]	ETwo governments overthrown (ESaleh government • EHadi government)
Djibouti	28 January 2011	Ended on 11 March 2011		2[178]	A Minor protests
Sudan	30 January 2011	Ended on 26 October 2013	President Omar al-Bashir announces he will not seek another term in 2015[179] Bashir nevertheless chosen as Ruling Party candidate for 2015 election[180]	200+[181]	A Major protests
Palestinian National Authority	10 February 2011	Ended on 5 October 2012	Then Palestinian prime minister Salam Fayyad states that he is "'willing to resign"[182] Fayyad resigns on 13 April 2013 because of political differences between him and the Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas over the finance portfolio[183]	None	C Minor protests
Iraq	12 February 2011	Ended 23 December 2011, instability and eventually civil war follows	Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki announces he will not run for a 3rd term;[184] Resignation of provincial governors and local authorities[185] Two-third wage increase for Sahwa militia members Elections held and Haider al-Abadi elected ISIL insurgents take broad swathes of Iraq Start of Iraqi Civil War	35 35	B Protests and a beginning of a civil war
Bahrain	14 February 2011	Ended on 18 March 2011	Economic concessions by King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa[186] Release of political prisoners[187] Negotiations with Shia representatives[188] GCC intervention at the request of the Government of Bahrain Head of the National Security Apparatus removed from post[189] Formation of a committee to implement BICI report recommendations[190]	120[191]	D Sustained civil disorder and government changes
Libya	15 February 2011 (Major protests began on 17 February 2011).	Government overthrown on 23 August 2011, crisis follows	Overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi; Gaddafi killed by rebel forces Government defeated by armed revolt with UN-mandated military intervention[192] Assumption of interim control by the National Transitional Council Beginning of sporadic low-level fighting and clashes[193]	9,400–20,000[194]	EGovernment overthrown and Ecivil war
Kuwait	19 February 2011	Ended in December 2012	Resignation of Prime Minister Nasser Al-Sabah[195] Dissolution of the Parliament[196]	None[197]	C Protests and governmental changes
Morocco	20 February 2011	Ended in March–April 2012	Political concessions by King Mohammed VI;[198] Referendum on constitutional reforms; Respect to civil rights and an end to corruption[199]	6[200]	C <span style="color:white;"|>Protests and governmental changes
Mauritania	25 February 2011	Ended in 2013		3[201]	A Minor protests
Lebanon	27 February 2011	Ended on 15 December 2011		None	D Protests and governmental changes
Saudi Arabia	11 March 2011	Ended on 24 December 2012	Economic concessions by King Abdullah[202][203] Male-only municipal elections held 29 September 2011[204][205] Abdullah announces women's approval to vote and be elected in the 2015 municipal elections and to be nominated to the Shura Council[206] Commitment to the expansion of women's rights in Saudi Arabia, especially after the ascension of Mohammad bin Salman to position of Crown Prince.[207][208]	24[209]	A Minor protests
Borders of Israel	15 May 2011	Ended on 5 June 2011		35[210][211]	B Major protests
Total death toll and other consequences:	61,080+ (combined estimate of events)	4 governments overthrown as part of the events Six protests leading to governmental changes Five major protests Four minor protests 3 governments overthrown in the aftermath Four civil wars in the aftermath (Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen)

Major events

Bahrain (2011)

Main article: Bahraini uprising of 2011

Over 100,000 Bahrainis taking part in the "March of Loyalty to Martyrs" in Manama honoring political dissidents killed by security forces

The protests in Bahrain started on 14 February, and were initially aimed at achieving greater political freedom and respect for human rights; they were not intended to directly threaten the monarchy.[108][212]^(pp162–3) Lingering frustration among the Shiite majority with being ruled by the Sunni government was a major root cause, but the protests in Tunisia and Egypt are cited as the inspiration for the demonstrations.[108][212]^(p65) The protests were largely peaceful until a pre-dawn raid by police on 17 February to clear protestors from Pearl Roundabout in Manama, in which police killed four protesters.[212]^(pp73–4) Following the raid, some protesters began to expand their aims to a call for the end of the monarchy.[213] On 18 February, army forces opened fire on protesters when they tried to reenter the roundabout, fatally wounding one.[212]^(pp77–8) The following day protesters reoccupied Pearl Roundabout after the government ordered troops and police to withdraw.[212]^(p81)[214] Subsequent days saw large demonstrations; on 21 February a pro-government Gathering of National Unity drew tens of thousands,[212]^(p86)[215] whilst on 22 February the number of protestors at the Pearl Roundabout peaked at over 150,000 after more than 100,000 protesters marched there and were coming under fire from the Bahraini Military which killed around 20 and injured over 100 protestors.[212]^(p88) On 14 March, GCC forces (composed mainly of Saudi and UAE troops) were requested by the government and occupied the country.[212]^(p132)[216]

King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa declared a three-month state of emergency on 15 March and asked the military to reassert its control as clashes spread across the country.[212]^(p139)[217] On 16 March, armed soldiers and riot police cleared the protesters' camp in the Pearl Roundabout, in which 3 policemen and 3 protesters were reportedly killed.[212]^(pp133–4)[218] Later, on 18 March, the government tore down Pearl Roundabout monument.[212]^(pp150)[219] After the lifting of emergency law on 1 June,[220] several large rallies were staged by the opposition parties.[221] Smaller-scale protests and clashes outside of the capital have continued to occur almost daily.[222][223] On 9 March 2012, over 100,000 protested in what the opposition called "the biggest march in our history".[224][225]

The police response has been described as a "brutal" crackdown on peaceful and unarmed protestors, including doctors and bloggers.[226][227][228] The police carried out midnight house raids in Shia neighbourhoods, beatings at checkpoints, and denial of medical care in a "campaign of intimidation".[229][230][231][232] More than 2,929 people have been arrested,[233][234] and at least five people died due to torture while in police custody.[212]^(p287,288) On 23 November 2011, the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry released its report on its investigation of the events, finding that the government had systematically tortured prisoners and committed other human rights violations.[212]^{(pp415–422)} It also rejected the government's claims that the protests were instigated by Iran.[235] Although the report found that systematic torture had stopped,[212]^(pp417) the Bahraini government has refused entry to several international human rights groups and news organizations, and delayed a visit by a UN inspector.[236][237] More than 80 people had died since the start of the uprising.[238]

Egypt (2011)

Main articles: Egyptian revolution of 2011 and Egyptian crisis (2011–14)

Celebrations in Tahrir Square after Omar Suleiman's statement concerning Hosni Mubarak's resignation

Inspired by the uprising in Tunisia and prior to his entry as a central figure in Egyptian politics, potential presidential candidate Mohamed ElBaradei warned of a "Tunisia-style explosion" in Egypt.[239]

Protests in Egypt began on 25 January 2011 and ran for 18 days. Beginning around midnight on 28 January, the Egyptian government attempted, somewhat successfully, to eliminate the nation's Internet access,[240] in order to inhibit the protesters' ability to use media activism to organize through social media.[241] Later that day, as tens of thousands protested on the streets of Egypt's major cities, President Hosni Mubarak dismissed his government, later appointing a new cabinet. Mubarak also appointed the first Vice President in almost 30 years.

The U.S. embassy and international students began a voluntary evacuation near the end of January, as violence and rumors of violence escalated.[242][243]

On 10 February, Mubarak ceded all presidential power to Vice President Omar Suleiman, but soon thereafter announced that he would remain as President until the end of his term.[244] However, protests continued the next day, and Suleiman quickly announced that Mubarak had resigned from the presidency and transferred power to the Armed Forces of Egypt.[245] The military immediately dissolved the Egyptian Parliament, suspended the Constitution of Egypt, and promised to lift the nation's thirty-year "emergency laws". A civilian, Essam Sharaf, was appointed as Prime Minister of Egypt on 4 March to widespread approval among Egyptians in Tahrir Square.[246] Violent protests, however, continued through the end of 2011 as many Egyptians expressed concern about the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces' perceived sluggishness in instituting reforms and their grip on power.[247]

Hosni Mubarak and his former interior minister Habib el-Adly were sentenced to life in prison on the basis of their failure to stop the killings during the first six days of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution.[248] His successor, Mohamed Morsi, was sworn in as Egypt's first democratically elected president before judges at the Supreme Constitutional Court.[249] Fresh protests erupted in Egypt on 22 November 2012. On 3 July 2013, the military overthrew the replacement government and President Morsi was removed from power.[250]

Libya (2011)

Main articles: Libyan Civil War (2011) and Libyan Crisis (2011–present)

Thousands of demonstrators gather in Bayda.

Anti-government protests began in Libya on 15 February 2011. By 18 February, the opposition controlled most of Benghazi, the country's second-largest city. The government dispatched elite troops and militia in an attempt to recapture it, but they were repelled. By 20 February, protests had spread to the capital Tripoli, leading to a television address by Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, who warned the protestors that their country could descend into civil war. The rising death toll, numbering in the thousands, drew international condemnation and resulted in the resignation of several Libyan diplomats, along with calls for the government's dismantlement.[251]

Amidst ongoing efforts by demonstrators and rebel forces to wrest control of Tripoli from the Jamahiriya, the opposition set up an interim government in Benghazi to oppose Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's rule.[252] However, despite initial opposition success, government forces subsequently took back much of the Mediterranean coast.

On 17 March, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 was adopted, authorising a no-fly zone over Libya, and "all necessary measures" to protect civilians. Two days later, France, the United States and the United Kingdom intervened in Libya with a bombing campaign against pro-Gaddafi forces. A coalition of 27 states from Europe and the Middle East soon joined the intervention. The forces were driven back from the outskirts of Benghazi, and the rebels mounted an offensive, capturing scores of towns across the coast of Libya. The offensive stalled however, and a counter-offensive by the government retook most of the towns, until a stalemate was formed between Brega and Ajdabiya, the former being held by the government and the latter in the hands of the rebels. Focus then shifted to the west of the country, where bitter fighting continued. After a three-month-long battle, a loyalist siege of rebel-held Misrata, the third largest city in Libya, was broken in large part due to coalition air strikes. The four major fronts of combat were generally considered to be the Nafusa Mountains, the Tripolitanian coast, the Gulf of Sidra,[253] and the southern Libyan Desert.[254]

In late August, anti-Gaddafi fighters captured Tripoli, scattering Gaddafi's government and marking the end of his 42 years of power. Many institutions of the government, including Gaddafi and several top government officials, regrouped in Sirte, which Gaddafi declared to be Libya's new capital.[255] Others fled to Sabha, Bani Walid, and remote reaches of the Libyan Desert, or to surrounding countries.[256][257] However, Sabha fell in late September,[258] Bani Walid was captured after a grueling siege weeks later,[259] and on 20 October, fighters under the aegis of the National Transitional Council seized Sirte, killing Gaddafi in the process.[260] However, after Gaddafi was killed, the Civil War continued.

Syria (2011)

Main article: Civil uprising phase of the Syrian Civil War

Anti-government demonstrations in Baniyas

Protests in Syria started on 26 January 2011, when a police officer assaulted a man in public at "Al-Hareeka Street" in old Damascus. The man was arrested right after the assault. As a result, protesters called for the freedom of the arrested man. Soon a "day of rage" was set for 4–5 February, but it was uneventful.[261][262] On 6 March, the Syrian security forces arrested about 15 children in Daraa, in southern Syria, for writing slogans against the government. Soon protests erupted over the arrest and abuse of the children. Daraa was to be the first city to protest against the Ba'athist government, which has been ruling Syria since 1963.[263]

Thousands of protesters gathered in Damascus, Aleppo, al-Hasakah, Daraa, Deir ez-Zor, and Hama on 15 March,[264][265] with recently released politician Suhair Atassi becoming an unofficial spokesperson for the "Syrian revolution".[266] The next day there were reports of approximately 3000 arrests and a few casualties, but there are no official figures on the number of deaths.[267] On 18 April 2011, approximately 100,000 protesters sat in the central Square of Homs calling for the resignation of President Bashar al-Assad. Protests continued through July 2011, the government responding with harsh security clampdowns and military operations in several districts, especially in the north.[268]

On 31 July, Syrian army tanks stormed several cities, including Hama, Deir Ez-Zour, Abu Kamal, and Herak near Daraa. At least 136 people were killed, the highest death toll in any day since the start of the uprising.[269] On 5 August 2011, an anti-government demonstration took place in Syria called "God is with us", during which the Syrian security forces shot the protesters from inside the ambulances, killing 11 people consequently.[270]

Tunisia (2010–2011)

Main article: Tunisian Revolution

Protesters on Avenue Habib Bourguiba, downtown Tunis on 14 January 2011, a few hours before president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled the country

Following the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Sidi Bouzid, a series of increasingly violent street demonstrations through December 2010 ultimately led to the ousting of longtime President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali on 14 January 2011. The demonstrations were preceded by high unemployment, food inflation, corruption,[271] lack of freedom of speech and other forms of political freedom,[272] and poor living conditions. The protests constituted the most dramatic wave of social and political unrest in Tunisia in three decades[273][274] and resulted in scores of deaths and injuries, most of which were the result of action by police and security forces against demonstrators. Ben Ali fled into exile in Saudi Arabia, ending his 23 years in power.[275][276]

A state of emergency was declared and a caretaker coalition government was created following Ben Ali's departure, which included members of Ben Ali's party, the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD), as well as opposition figures from other ministries. The five newly appointed non-RCD ministers resigned almost immediately.[277][278] As a result of continued daily protests, on 27 January Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi reshuffled the government, removing all former RCD members other than himself, and on 6 February the former ruling party was suspended;[279] later, on 9 March, it was dissolved.[280] Following further public protests, Ghannouchi himself resigned on 27 February, and Beji Caid Essebsi became Prime Minister.

On 23 October 2011 Tunisians voted in the first post-revolution election to elect representatives to a 217-member constituent assembly that would be responsible for the new constitution.[281] The leading Islamist party, Ennahda, won 37% of the vote, and elected 42 women to the Constituent Assembly.[282]

On 26 January 2014 a new constitution was adopted.[283] The constitution is seen as progressive, increasing human rights, gender equality, and government duties toward people, laying the groundwork for a new parliamentary system and making Tunisia a decentralized and open government.[283][284]

On 26 October 2014 Tunisia held its first parliamentary elections since the 2011 Arab Spring[285] and its presidential election on 23 November 2014,[286] finishing its transition to a democratic state. These elections were characterized by a decline in Ennahdha's popularity in favor of the secular Nidaa Tounes party, which became the first party of the country.[287]

Yemen (2011)

Main articles: Yemeni Revolution and Yemeni Crisis (2011–present)

Protestors in Aden calling for reinstatement of South Yemen during Arab Spring.

Protests in Sana'a

Protests occurred in many towns in both the north and south of Yemen starting in mid-January 2011. Demonstrators in the South mainly protested against President Saleh's support of Al Qaeda in South Yemen, the marginalization of the Southern people and the exploitation of Southern natural resources.[288][289][290] Other parts of the country initially protested against governmental proposals to modify the constitution of Yemen, unemployment and economic conditions,[291] and corruption,[292] but their demands soon included a call for the resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh,[292][293][294] who had been facing internal opposition from his closest advisors since 2009.[295]

A major demonstration of over 16,000 protesters took place in Sana'a on 27 January 2011,[296] and soon thereafter human rights activist and politician Tawakel Karman called for a "Day of Rage" on 3 February.[297] According to Xinhua News, organizers were calling for a million protesters.[298] In response to the planned protest, Ali Abdullah Saleh stated that he would not seek another presidential term in 2013.[299]

On 3 February, 20,000 protesters demonstrated against the government in Sana'a,[300][301] others participated in a "Day of Rage" in Aden[302] that was called for by Tawakel Karman,[297] while soldiers, armed members of the General People's Congress, and many protestors held a pro-government rally in Sana'a.[303] Concurrent with the resignation of Egyptian president Mubarak, Yemenis again took to the streets protesting President Saleh on 11 February, in what has been dubbed a "Friday of Rage".[304] The protests continued in the days following despite clashes with government advocates.[305] In a "Friday of Anger" held on 18 February, tens of thousands of Yemenis took part in anti-government demonstrations in the major cities of Sana'a, Taiz, and Aden. Protests continued over the following months, especially in the three major cities, and briefly intensified in late May into urban warfare between Hashid tribesmen and army defectors allied with the opposition on one side and security forces and militias loyal to Saleh on the other.[306]

After Saleh pretended to accept a Gulf Cooperation Council-brokered plan allowing him to cede power in exchange for immunity from prosecution only to back away before signing three separate times,[307][308] an assassination attempt on 3 June left him and several other high-ranking Yemeni officials injured by a blast in the presidential compound's mosque.[309] Saleh was evacuated to Saudi Arabia for treatment and handed over power to Vice President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, who largely continued his policies[310] and ordered the arrest of several Yemenis in connection with the attack on the presidential compound.[309] While in Saudi Arabia, Saleh kept hinting that he could return any time and continued to be present in the political sphere through television appearances from Riyadh starting with an address to the Yemeni people on 7 July.[311] On 13 August, a demonstration was announced in Yemen as "Mansouron Friday" in which hundreds of thousands of Yemenis called for Saleh to go. The protesters joining the "Mansouron Friday" were calling for establishment of "a new Yemen".[312] On 12 September Saleh issued a presidential decree while still receiving treatment in Riyadh authorizing Hadi to negotiate a deal with the opposition and sign the GCC initiative.[313]

On 23 September, three months since the assassination attempt, Saleh returned to Yemen abruptly, defying all earlier expectations.[314] Pressure on Saleh to sign the GCC initiative eventually led to his doing so in Riyadh on 23 November. Saleh thereby agreed to step down and set the stage for the transfer of power to his vice president.[315] A presidential election was then held on 21 February 2012, in which Hadi (the only candidate) won 99.8% of the vote.[316] Hadi then took the oath of office in Yemen's parliament on 25 February.[317] By 27 February Saleh had resigned from the presidency and transferred power to Hadi.[318] The replacement government was overthrown by Houthi rebels on 22 January 2015, starting the Yemeni Civil War and the Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen.

Outcomes

Arab Winter

See also: Arab Winter and Impact of the Arab Spring

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring in various countries, there was a wave of violence and instability commonly known as the Arab Winter[319] or Islamist Winter.[320] The Arab Winter was characterized by extensive civil wars, general regional instability, economic and demographic decline of the Arab League and overall religious wars between Sunni and Shia Muslims.

Areas of control in the Libyan Civil War (2014–present)

Although the long-term effects of the Arab Spring have yet to be shown, its short-term consequences varied greatly across the Middle East and North Africa. In Tunisia and Egypt, where the existing regimes were ousted and replaced through a process of free and fair election, the revolutions were considered short-term successes.[321][322][323] This interpretation is, however, problematized by the subsequent political turmoil that emerged, particularly in Egypt. Elsewhere, most notably in the monarchies of Morocco and the Persian Gulf, existing regimes co-opted the Arab Spring movement and managed to maintain order without significant social change.[324][325] In other countries, particularly Syria and Libya, the apparent result of Arab Spring protests was a complete societal collapse.[321]

Social scientists have endeavored to understand the circumstances that led to this variation in outcome. A variety of causal factors have been highlighted, most of which hinge on the relationship between the strength of the state and the strength of civil society. Countries with stronger civil society networks in various forms underwent more successful reforms during the Arab Spring; these findings are also consistent with more general social science theories such as those espoused by Robert D. Putnam and Joel S. Migdal.[326][327]

One of the primary influences that have been highlighted in the analysis of the Arab Spring is the relative strength or weakness of a society's formal and informal institutions prior to the revolts. When the Arab Spring began, Tunisia had an established infrastructure and a lower level of petty corruption than did other states, such as Libya.[321] This meant that, following the overthrow of the existing regime, there was less work to be done in reforming Tunisian institutions than elsewhere, and consequently it was less difficult to transition to and consolidate a democratic system of government.[324][328]

Also crucial was the degree of state censorship over print, broadcast, and social media in different countries. Television coverage by channels like Al Jazeera and BBC News provided worldwide exposure and prevented mass violence by the Egyptian government in Tahrir Square, contributing to the success of the Egyptian Revolution. In other countries, such as Libya, Bahrain, and Syria, such international press coverage was not present to the same degree, and the governments of these countries were able to act more freely in suppressing the protests.[329][330] Strong authoritarian regimes with high degrees of censorship in their national broadcast media were able to block communication and prevent the domestic spread of information necessary for successful protests. Morocco is a case in point, as its broadcast media at the time of the revolts was owned and operated almost exclusively by political elites with ties to the monarchy.[325]

Countries with greater access to social media, such as Tunisia and Egypt, proved more effective in mobilizing large groups of people, and appear to have been more successful overall than those with greater state control over media.[323][331][332] Although social media played a large role in shaping the events of revolutions social activism did not occur in a vacuum. Without the use of street level organization social activists would not have been as effective.[333] Even though a revolution did take place and the prior government has been replaced, Tunisia's government can not conclude that another uprising will not take place. There are still many grievances taking place today.[334]

Due to tourism coming to a halt and other factors during the revolution and Arab Spring movement, the budget deficit has grown and unemployment has risen since 2011.[335] According to World Bank, "Unemployment remains at 15.3% from 16.7% in 2011, but still well above the pre-revolution level of 13%."[335] Large scale emigration brought on by a long and treacherous civil war has permanently harmed the Syrian economy. Projections for economic contraction will remain high at almost 7% in 2017.[336]

Demonstrators holding the Rabia sign in solidarity with the victims of the August 2013 Rabaa massacre of pro-Morsi sit-ins in Cairo

Still to this day, in countries affected by the Arab Spring, there is great division amongst those who prefer the status quo and those who want democratic change. As these regions dive ever deeper into political conflict time will show if new ideas can be established or if old institutions will still stand strong.[337] The largest change from the pre-revolution to the post-revolution was in the attempt to break up political elites and reshape the geopolitical structure of the middle east. It is speculated that many of the changes brought on by the Arab Spring will lead to a shifting of regional power in the Middle East and a quickly changing structure of power.[338]

The support, even if tacit, of national military forces during protests has also been correlated to the success of the Arab Spring movement in different countries.[322][324] In Egypt and Tunisia, the military actively participated in ousting the incumbent regime and in facilitating the transition to democratic elections. Countries like Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, exhibited a strong mobilization of military force against protesters, effectively ending the revolts in their territories; others, including Libya and Syria, failed to stop the protests entirely and instead ended up in civil war.[322] The support of the military in Arab Spring protests has also been linked to the degree of ethnic homogeneity in different societies. In Saudi Arabia and Syria, where the ruling elite was closely linked with ethnic or religious subdivisions of society, the military sided with the existing regime and took on the ostensible role of protector to minority populations.[339] Even aside from the military issue, countries with less homogeneous ethnic and national identities, such as Yemen and Jordan, seem to have exhibited less effective mobilization on the whole. The apparent exception to this trend is Egypt, which has a sizable Coptic minority.

The presence of a strong, educated middle class has been noted as a correlate to the success of the Arab Spring in different countries.[340] Countries with strong welfare programs and a weak middle class, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, as well as countries with great economic disparity and an impoverished working class—including Yemen, Libya, and Morocco—did not experience successful revolutions. The strength of the middle class is, in turn, directly connected to the existing political, economic, and educational institutions in a country, and the middle class itself may be considered an informal institution.[341] In very broad terms, this may be reframed in terms of development, as measured by various indicators such as the Human Development Index: rentier states such as the oil monarchies of the Persian Gulf exhibited less successful revolutions overall.[342]

Charting what he calls the 'new masses' of the twenty-first century, Sociologist Göran Therborn draws attention to the historical contradictory role of the middle class. The Egyptian middle class has illustrated this ambivalence and contradiction in 2011 and 2013: "The volatility of middle-class politics is vividly illustrated by the sharp turns in Egypt, from acclamation of democracy to adulation of the military and its mounting repression of dissent, effectively condoning the restoration of the ancien régime minus Mubarak.[343]

Long-term aftermath

Sectarianism and collapse of state systems

Yemeni capital Sanaa after Saudi Arabian-led airstrikes against the Shia Houthis, October 2015

Some trends in political Islam resulting from the Arab Spring noted by observers (Quinn Mecham and Tarek Osman) include:

• Repression of the Muslim Brotherhood, not only in Egypt by the military and courts following the forcible removal of Morsi from office in 2013; but also by Saudi Arabia and a number of Gulf countries (not Qatar).[344][345][346] The ambassadors crisis also seriously threatened the GCC's activities, adversely affected its functioning and could arguably even have led to its dissolution.[346]
• Rise of Islamist "state-building" where "state failure" has taken place—most prominently in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen. Islamists have found it easier than competing non-Islamists trying to fill the void of state failure, by securing external funding, weaponry and fighters – "many of which have come from abroad and have rallied around a pan-Islamic identity". The norms of governance in these Islamist areas are militia-based, and the governed submit to their authority out of fear, loyalty, other reasons, or some combination.[344] The "most expansive" of these new "models" is the Islamic State.[344]
• Increasing sectarianism (primarily Sunni-Shia) at least in part from proxy wars and the escalation of the Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict. Islamists are fighting Islamists across sectarian lines in Lebanon (Sunni militants targeting Hezbollah positions), Yemen (between mainstream Sunni Islamists of al-Islah and the Shiite Zaydi Houthi movement), in Iraq (Islamic State and Iraqi Shiite militias)[344]
• Increased caution and political learning in countries such as Algeria and Jordan where Islamists have chosen not to lead a major challenge against their governments. In Yemen, al-Islah "has sought to frame its ideology in a way that will avoid charges of militancy".[344]
• In countries where Islamists did choose to lead a major challenge and did not succeed in transforming society (particularly Egypt), a disinterest in "soul-searching" about what went wrong, in favor of "antagonism and fiery anger" and a thirst for revenge. Partisans of political Islam (although this does not include some prominent leaders such as Rached Ghannouchi but is particularly true in Egypt) see themselves as victims of an injustice whose perpetrators are not just "individual conspirators but entire social groups".[347]

"The repercussions of the 2011 uprisings have influenced Middle Eastern youth’s experiences providing impetus for questioning perennial sacred beliefs and positions, and forging ahead avant-garde views and responses to the constraints they face."[22]

Contrary to the common discourse, Hussein Agha and Robert Malley from The New Yorker argue that the divide in the post-Arab Spring in the Middle East is not sectarianism:

The bloodiest, most vicious, and most pertinent struggles occur squarely inside the Sunni world. Sectarianism is a politically expedient fable, conveniently used to cover up old-fashioned power struggles, maltreatment of minorities, and cruel totalitarian practices.[348]

Agha and Malley point out that even in Syria there has been a misrepresentation of the conflict, that the Assad regime relied on an alliance that included middle class Sunnis along with other religious minorities. Prior to the uprising, the Syrian regime enjoyed some financial and political support from Sunni Gulf states. The "select rich urban bourgeoisie, the Sunni Damascene in particular", according to Tokyo University researcher Housam Darwisheh, "now has a direct interest in preserving stability and their relations with the regime as long as their businesses prosper."[349] In the view of the Arab sociologist Halim Barakat, "the persistence of communal cleavages complicates rather than nullifies social class consciousness and struggles."[350]

Arab Summer (Second Arab Spring)

Arab Spring: Revolution or reform

Very few analysts of the Arab societies foresaw a mass movement on such a scale that might threaten the existing order. In his 1993 sociological study of the Arab societies, culture and state, Barakat stated confidently that "one should expect the first Arab popular revolution to take place in Egypt or Tunisia. This does not, however, exclude the possibility that revolutions may occur in more pluralistic societies as well."[351] What was prevalent, according to the Syrian writer and political dissident Yassin al-Haj Saleh was three 'springs' that ensured the status quo. One of which was a "spring of despotic states that receive assistance and legitimacy from a world system centered around stability".[352] Most democracy protests do not result in reforms.[353]

Two months into the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings, The Economist magazine in a leader article spoke about a new generation of young people, idealists, "inspired by democracy" made revolutions. Those revolutions, the article stated, "are going the right way, with a hopeful new mood prevailing and free elections in the offing".[354] For those on the streets of Egypt the predominant slogan was "bread, freedom and social justice".[355]

Some observers, however, have questioned the revolutionary nature of the 'Arab Spring'. A social theorist specialising in social movements and social change in the Middle East, Asef Bayat, has provided an analysis based on his decades-long of research as "a participant-observer" (his own words). In his appraisal of the Arab revolutions, Bayat discerns a remarkable difference between these revolutions and the revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s in countries like Yemen, Nicaragua and Iran. The Arab revolutions, argues Bayat, "lacked any associated intellectual anchor" and the predominant voices, "secular and Islamists alike, took free market, property relations, and neoliberal rationality for granted" and uncritically.[356] New social movements' define themselves as horizontal networks with aversion to the state and central authority. Thus their "political objective is not to capture the state", a fundamental feature in the twentieth-century revolutionary movements.[357] Instead of revolution or reform, Bayat speaks of 'refolution'.[358]

Wael Ghonim, an Internet activist who would later gain an international fame, acknowledged that what he had intended by founding a Facebook page was a "simple reaction to the events in Tunisia" and that "there was no master plans or strategies" a priori.[359] That the objective was reform to be achieved through peaceful means and not revolution was explicitly put forward by April 6 Movement, one of the leading forces of the Egyptian uprising, in their statements. It called for "coalition and co-operation between all factions and national forces to reach the reform and the peaceful change of the conditions of Egypt".[360] "Even in Tahrir Square with so many people and the rising level of demands," recalls an activist in the movement, "we were very surprised by the people wanting the downfall of the regime; and not a single one us had expected this."[361] In comparing the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria, researcher Housam Darwisheh concludes: "The Egyptian uprising, in neither dismantling the ancien regime nor creating new institutional mechanisms to lead the transition, permitted the so-called 'deep state' to reassert itself while the deepening polarization led many non-Islamists to side with the military against the MB [the Muslim Brotherhood]."[362]

According to Cambridge sociologist Hazem Kandil, the Muslim Brotherhood did not aim at taking power during the events leading up to the toppling of Mubarak. The biggest and most organised organisation in Egypt in fact negotiated with the regime in "infamous talks between Morsi and the then vice-president Omar Suleiman", and "an informal deal was reached: withdraw your members from Tahrir Square, and we allow you to form a political party." Then the Brotherhood wavered whether to file a presidential candidate and did not push for a new constitution, choosing to work with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF):

The Brotherhood and the Salafists went all-out to keep the existing constitution—originating under Sadat— with a few amendments. The result was irrelevant, because the military scrapped the old constitution anyway. But the Brothers managed to persuade over 70 per cent of the voters, so it became clear to the military that they had far more sway on the street than the secular revolutionaries who had brought down Mubarak, yet seemed incapable of much organization once they had done so. For SCAF, the priority was to bring the street under control, so it decided to start working with the Brotherhood to stabilize the country.[363]

George Lawson from the London School of Economics places the Arab uprisings within the post-Cold War world. He characterises the uprisings as "largely unsuccessful revolution" and that they "bare a family resemblance to the 'negotiated revolutions'... Negotiated revolutions ... seek to transform political and symbolic fields of action, but without a concomitant commitment to a program of economic transformation."[364] In this 'negotiated revolution', comments Bayat, "revolutionaries had in effect little part in the 'negotiations'."[365] What has been treated by some analysts as intellectual weakness of the revolutionary movement is partly due to the pre-2011 stifling cultural environment under repressive regimes. Although Egyptian intellectualls enjoyed a bigger margin of freedom than their counterparts in Tunisia, cultural figures sought protection from political players, and instead of leading criticism, they complied.[366]

The post-Cold War era saw the emergence of the idea and practice of gradual reform and liberal agenda. It saw an influx of humanitarian projects, NGOs and charity work, liberal think tanks and emphasis on civil society work. This new juncture seemed to have made the idea and prospect of revolution an outdated project. The focus instead shifted to individual freedoms and free market. The new idea of civil society was different from the kind of civil society Antonio Gramsci, for instance, envisaged: 'a revolution before the revolution'.

In her field study in Yemen, anthropologist Bogumila Hall depicts the effects of what she terms as "the marketization of civil society and its heavy reliance on donors", which "led to a largely depoliticized form of activism that by passed, rather than confronted, the state". Hall, with her focus on the muhammashīn (the marginalized) in Yemen, described how in the 1990s and 2000s international NGOs established charity projects and workshops "to teach slum dwellers new skills and behaviours". But, besides the "modest changes" brought by the NGOs, concludes Hall, "delegating the problem of the muhammashīn to the realm of development and poverty alleviation, without addressing the structural causes underlying their marginalisation, had a depoliticising effect. It led to a widely held assumption, also shared by the muhammashīn, that ending marginalisation was a matter for experts and administrative measures, not politics."[367]

When Arab regimes viewed NGOs' leaders and other similar organisations with suspicion, accusing Western governments of providing funding and training to 'illegal organisations' and fomenting revolution, diplomatic cables reported "how American officials frequently assured skeptical governments that the training was aimed at reform, not promoting revolutions".[368] And when the Egyptian uprising was gaining its momentum, the American president Barack Obama "did not suggest that the 82-year-old leader step aside or transfer power... the argument was that he really needed to do the reforms, and do them fast. Former ambassador to Egypt (Frank G.) Wisner publicly suggested that Mr. Mubarak had to be at the center of any change, and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton warned that any transition would take time."[369] Some activists, who read the American thinker the nonviolence advocate Gene Sharp, obtained training from foreign bodies, including the Serbian opposition movement Otpor!, and April 6 Movement modelled its logo after Otpor's.[369] Otpor, writes Bayat in his discussion of the agencies of the Arab Spring activism in Tunisia and Egypt, obtained funds from well-known American organisations such as the American National Endowment for Democracy, USAID, and the International Republican Institute. Thus Otpur, in line with these organisations' advocacies, "pushed for political reform through nonradical, electoral, and market-driven language and practices".[370]

Early 2019 witnessed two uprisings: one in Algeria and another in Sudan. In Algeria under pressure of weeks of protests, the head of the army forced the ailing twenty-year-serving president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, to abdicate. In Sudan, after four months of protests, the Sudani defense minister ousted longtime President Omar al-Bashir in a coup.[371] Writing about what he calls "a rebirth of Tahrir Square", the prominent Lebanese novelist and critic Elias Khoury, averred that "perhaps the secret of the Arab Spring lies not in its victories or defeats, but in its ability to liberate people from fear." Despite the "faded spirit of Tahrir Square" and an outcome that Khoury describes as a "monarchy that abrogates legal standards", a renaissance of resistance is unstoppable:

The defeat of the Arab Spring has seemed likely to extinguish this glimmer of hope, to return the Arab world to the tyrannical duopoly of military and oil and to crush the will of the people in the struggle between Sunni and Shia, between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The combination has thrown the region into Israelʹs lap. But the defeat cannot and will not stop the renaissance. If the Arab world has reached rock bottom, it canʹt go any lower and it canʹt last forever.[372]

There was a need, suggested Khoury, to turn "the uprisings of the Arab Spring into an intellectual, political and moral project that gives meaning to the goals of freedom, democracy and social justice". From the outset the 2011 Arab uprisings raised the banner of 'social justice'. The concept, what it means and how to achieve it has been a major subject of discussion and contention since then.

Social justice

In its economic and social manifesto, the Tunisian Ennahda Movement states that the movement "adopts the social and solidarised market economy within a national approach based on free economic activity, freedom of ownership, production and administration on the one hand, and social justice and equal opportunities on the other hand" and that "national capital has to be the axis in the development process."[373] The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt mainly focuses on "reform of existing political systems in the Arab world. It embraces the idea of political activism and social responsibility, organising charitable works and social support programmes as part of its outreach to its core support base of lower-income populations."[374]

On its part the International Centre for Transitional Justice has set nine 'concrete and tangible' goals with focus on "accountability for serious violations of human rights, access to justice, facilitating peace processes, advancing the cause of reconciliation and reforming the state and social institutions".[375] One of those goals was taken up by Truth and Dignity Commission (Tunisia) that recorded and submitted to the relevant court the human rights abuses which had been committed by the Tunisian regime. A new climate of freedom of speech, freedom of organisation and elections characterised the political environment of post-Ben Ali Tunisia.

Some observers and social analysts remarked, however, that the issue of social justice remained a rhetoric or was marginalised. In the context of revolution. According to Fathi Al-Shamikhi, an expert in debt issues and founder of the Tunisian association RAID, different social forces played a crucial role in matters related to social demands and achieving social justice. "This role varies between those who advocate these demands and those who reject them, according two the social nature of each of these forces."[376] "Bread, freedom and social justice" were the main slogans of the Arab revolutions. But although social and economic demands were raised, argued researcher and former editor in chief of the Egyptian Al-Shorouq Newspaper, Wael Gamal, "they were pushed aside in the political arena, and more attention was given to issues such as the transfer of power arrangements, the constitution first, the elections first, democratic transformation and the religious-secular conflict."[377]

Counter-revolution and civil wars

Reflecting on what happened first in Tunisia, Egypt and Bahrain and then in Libya, Yemen and Syria, Middle East correspondent and author Patrick Cockburn observed that, eight years later, the protesters in Sudan and Algeria had learned some lessons from the defeats. "Some of the powerful forces determined to stop revolutionary change in the Arab world," stated Cockburn, "are the same in 2019 as they were in 2011. The Arab Spring was a curious mix of revolution and counter-revolution to a degree seldom appreciated in the west."[378]

But with the survival of the regime in Egypt and the rolling back of what was gained in the short period after the overthrow of Mubarak, the persistence, or even the worsening, of the socio-economic conditions that led to the Tunisian uprising, a Saudi-led intervention in Bahrain assisted the defeat of the uprising in the country, and especially the descent of other uprisings into brutal 'civil' wars in Syria, Libya and Yemen, with acute humanitarian crises, there are

many in capitals around the world who find it convenient to insist that a strongman is needed to deal with the peoples of this region. It is a racist, bigoted argument and should be called out as such, but many political leaders of the region are quite comfortable promoting it. Indeed, many of the counterrevolutionary moves in the region happened precisely because they agree with that argument.[379]

Writing in April 2019, amidst an offensive to take Libya's capital Tripoli by Khalifa Haftar who gained the backing of the U.S. president Donald Trump, Marwan Kabalan argued that "counter-revolutionary forces are seeking to resurrect the military dictatorship model the Arab Spring dismantled." Kapalan contended that "regional and world powers have sponsored the return of military dictatorships to the region, with the hope that they would clean up the Arab Spring 'mess' and restore order." He also referred to Western powers' history of backing military rule in the region, and how American interests in the Middle East clashed with French but mainly with British ones, citing the American supported coups in Syria and Egypt, but generally how, as former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice admitted, the United States "pursued stability at the expense of democracy... and achieved neither". Kabalan concluded:

There seems to be a concerted effort to establish a crescent of military-ruled countries from Sudan in northeast Africa to Algeria in the northwest through Egypt and Libya to ward off popular upheaval and keep "Islamist" forces in check.[380]

Analyst H. A. Hellyer atrributes the persistence of autocracy and dictatorship, as well as counter-revolution, to structures that go back to colonialism. But also to the forms the states in the MENA region took in the postcolonial era and the social pacts that were established in the process. What we are seeing today since 2011, argues Hellyer, is a clash between those "inherited structures" and the new "demographic realities" of the populations of the region.[381]

Compromise and dialogue with the entrenched regimes, followed by elections in Tunisia and Egypt have produced either limited change or counter-revolution. In the first quarter of 2019 protests and mass mobilisation in Sudan and Algeria succeeded in toppling the head of states, but it seems there is a dilemma, argues scholar and fellow at Woodrow Wilson Center Marina Ottaway. The demands of the genuine grassroots movements are unlikely, unfortunately, "to be attained through a peaceful process – one without violence and the violation of the human rights of many". Ottaway points out to the experiences of Algeria and Egypt when in the former the regime annulled the results of the elections in the early 1990s and in the latter when the military carried out a bloody repression of the Muslim Brotherhood government during the 2013 coup.

Attempts to bring about radical changes, by punishing and excluding a large part of the old elite, are not possible by democratic means, because such efforts elicit a strong reaction – a counterrevolution – leading to violence and repression.[382]

Space and the city in the Arab uprisings

For contemporary activists, protesting in Tahrir Square in the last decade always meant "a battle to control the space, especially under an authoritarian regime and heavy police state".[383] In an environment where people distrust formal politics, they find the streets almost the only space available to them to express their grievances, discontent and solidarity. As sociologist Bayat puts it, urban streets are not only a physical place for "street politics", but they also "signify a different but crucial symbolic utterance, one that transcends the physicality of street, to convey collective sentiments of a nation or a community".[384] Researcher Atef Said makes a connection between previous events that took place in Tahrir and the 2011 occupation of the Square. "Spaces," writes Said, "carry meanings that are constructed over time, redeployed and reconfigured in the present, and carried forward as inspiration for the future."[385]

In a survey conducted by the National Center for Social and Criminological Research in Egypt, and its results published by the daily al-Masry al-Youm, just a week before the beginning of the uprising, the sample of 2,956 people expressed that achieving justice and political stability, lowering prices, having access to clean drinking water, and providing comfortable transportation topped the list of changes they desired for their country.[386]

See also

• Arab Cold War
• Arab Revolt
• Arab Winter
• Arab Summer (2018–19 Arab protests)
• Civil resistance
• Democracy in the Middle East
• Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict
• List of modern conflicts in North Africa
• List of modern conflicts in the Middle East
• Qatar–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict
• Spillover of the Syrian Civil War
• Takfirism
• Women in the Arab Spring

References

1. "Peddler's martyrdom launched Tunisia's revolution". Reuters. 19 January 2011.
2. "Uprisings in the region and ignored indicators". Payvand.
3. Ruthven, Malise (23 June 2016). "How to Understand ISIS". New York Review of Books. 63 (11). Archived from the original on 7 August 2016. Retrieved 12 June 2016.
4. Abulof, Uriel (10 March 2011). "What Is the Arab Third Estate?". Huffington Post. Archived from the original on 7 June 2011. Retrieved 1 May 2011.
5. Dawn Brancati and Adrian Lucardi. 2019. "Why Democracy Protests Do Not Diffuse." ``'Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(1):2354-2389.
6. "Egypt protests: Internet service disrupted before large rally". The Telegraph. 28 January 2011.
7. Skinner, Julia (10 December 2011). "Social Media and Revolution: The Arab Spring and the Occupy Movement as Seen through Three Information Studies Paradigms". Association for Information Systems AIS Electronic Library (AISeL): 3.
8. "Many wounded as Moroccan police beat protestors". Reuters. Reuters UK. 23 May 2011. Archived from the original on 10 January 2012. Retrieved 12 June 2011.
9. "Syria's crackdown". The Irish Times. 31 May 2011. Archived from the original on 26 October 2011. Retrieved 12 June 2011.
10. "Bahrain troops lay siege to protesters' camp". CBS News. 16 March 2011. Archived from the original on 19 March 2011. Retrieved 12 June 2011.
11. "Syria clampdown on protests mirrors Egypt's as thugs join attacks". Ahram Online. 19 April 2011. Archived from the original on 22 February 2012. Retrieved 12 June 2011.
12. Almasmari, Hakim (16 March 2011). "Yemeni government supporters attack protesters, injuring hundreds". The Washington Post. Sanaa. Archived from the original on 5 March 2012. Retrieved 12 June 2011.
13. Parks, Cara (24 February 2011). "Libya Protests: Gaddafi Militia Opens Fire on demonstrators". Huffington Post. Archived from the original on 1 March 2011. Retrieved 12 June 2011.
14. Karber, Phil (18 June 2012). Fear and Faith in Paradise. ISBN 978-1-4422-1479-8. Archived from the original on 28 February 2017. Retrieved 23 October 2014.
15. "Arab Winter". America Staging. Archived from the original on 26 October 2014. Retrieved 23 October 2014.
16. "Analysis: Arab Winter is coming to Baghdad". The Jerusalem Post. Archived from the original on 24 October 2014. Retrieved 23 October 2014.
17. "Egypt and Tunisia's new 'Arab winter'". Euro news. Archived from the original on 22 October 2014. Retrieved 23 October 2014.
18. "Yemen's Arab winter". Middle East Eye. Archived from the original on 24 October 2014. Retrieved 23 October 2014.
19. "Tracking the "Arab Spring": Why the Modest Harvest?". Journal of Democracy. Retrieved 27 October 2019.
20. Hoyle, Justin A. "A Matter of Framing: Explaining The Failure of Post-Islamist Social Movements in the Arab Spring." DOMES: Digest of Middle East Studies 25.2 (2016): 186–209. Academic Search Complete. Web. 18 November 2016.
21. Filkins, Dexter (2 April 2018). "A Saudi Prince's Quest to Remake the Middle East". The New Yorker. Retrieved 9 May 2018.
22. Hassan, Islam; Dyer, Paul (2017). "The State of Middle Eastern Youth". The Muslim World. 107 (1): 3–12. doi:10.1111/muwo.12175.
23. "The Long Arab Spring". jacobinmag.com. Retrieved 17 September 2019.
24. Middle East Eye
25. TRT World
26. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/12/us-caesar-act-sanctions-and-could-devastate-syrias-flatlining-economy US ‘Caesar Act' sanctions could devastate Syria’s flatlining economy. Critics say legislation is being used for US strategy and could cause further problems for country and wider region. Martin Chulov, The Guardian, June 12, 2020.
27. Libya has a chance at peace but Russia and the US are in the way Haftar seems to be on his way out, while Turkey risks creating a new Afghanistan on Europe’s southern flank, by Ahmed Aboudouh, June 9, 2020. Russia’s ally, General Khalifa Haftar, commander of the self-proclaimed National Libyan Army, has lost his 14-month military campaign to capture the capital Tripoli. His rivals in the Government of National Accord (GNA) forces, backed by -extremist militias, managed to chase his troops deep into the east of the country.
28. Danger of ‘miscalculation’ as global powers scramble for position in Libya. Fighting moves from west to centre and south of country, as Egypt advances towards border, and Tripoli ignores truce calls.Borzou Daragahi, Oliver Carroll. June 8, 2020.
29. Yemen’s Government demands UN action regards Houthi violation of deal ,Yemen’s government has demanded UN action against Iran-backed Houthi militants for violating the Hodeidah deal, state news agency Saba New reported.Yemen’s Economic Council – a state advisory body composed of cabinet members – said the militants looted the central bank in Hodeidah city and were delaying the fuel and food that arrive at the Hodeidah port.The looted funds were supposed to be used to pay salaries of public workers, who have not received payments for months, according to the report.This money will now “feed the militia’s pointless war,” the council said.On Wednesday, Yemen’s Information Minister Muammar Al-Eryani said Houthis are looting and extorting the private healthcare sector.
30. Krauthammer, Charles (21 March 2005): "The Arab Spring of 2005" Archived 10 September 2013 at the Wayback Machine. The Seattle Times. Retrieved 7 July 2013.
31. Massad, Joseph (29 August 2012). "The 'Arab Spring' and other American seasons". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 30 August 2012. Retrieved 29 August 2012.
32. Marc Lynch (2012). The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East. New York: PublicAffairs. p. 9. ISBN 978-1-61039-084-2.
33. Marc Lynch (6 January 2011). "Obama's 'Arab Spring'?". Archived from the original on 25 August 2012.
34. The Atlantic: Muslim Protests: Has Obama Helped Bring On an Anti-U.S. 'Islamist Spring'? Archived 10 October 2016 at the Wayback Machine, 23 September 2012, retrieved 30 November 2012
35. Foreign Policy: Learning to Live With the Islamist Winter Archived 19 October 2014 at the Wayback Machine, 19 July 2012, retrieved 30 November 2012
36. Cook, Steven A. "How Do You Say 1989 in Arabic? Archived 14 July 2012 at the Wayback Machine" From the Potomac to the Euphrates. Council on Foreign Relations. 28 March 2011. Retrieved 25 June 2012.
37. Landler, Mark. "Obama Cites Poland as Model for Arab Shift Archived 23 July 2016 at the Wayback Machine." The New York Times. 28 May 2011. Retrieved 25 June 2012.
38. Sullivan, Charles J. "Riding the Revolutionary Wave: America, The Arab Spring and the Autumn of 1989 Archived 24 November 2012 at the Wayback Machine." The Washington Review of Turkish and Eurasian Affairs. Rethink Institute. April 2011. Retrieved 25 June 2012.
39. "Open for Business? Archived 9 April 2012 at the Wayback Machine" The Economist. 23 June 2011. Retrieved 25 June 2012.
40. Davies, Thomas Richard (2014). "The failure of strategic nonviolent action in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya and Syria: 'political ju-jitsu' in reverse" (PDF). Global Change, Peace & Security. 26 (3): 299–313. doi:10.1080/14781158.2014.924916.
41. Guéhenno, Jean-Marie. "The Arab Spring is 2011, Not 1989 Archived 21 October 2016 at the Wayback Machine." The New York Times. 21 April 2011. Retrieved 25 June 2012.
42. "Similarities and Differences between Eastern Europe in 1989 and the Middle East in 2011 Archived 12 November 2012 at the Wayback Machine". Summarized remarks from a panel discussion sponsored by Middle East Studies @ American University. 30 May 2011. Retrieved 25 June 2012.
43. • The Arab Spring—One Year Later: The CenSEI Report analyzes how 2011's clamor for democratic reform met 2012's need to sustain its momentum. Archived 26 April 2013 at the Wayback Machine The CenSEI Report, 13 February 2012
44. • "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 23 January 2017. Retrieved 24 February 2017.CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link) The New York Times, 14 April 2011
45. "Alexander Kazamias, 'The "Anger Revolutions" in the Middle East: an answer to decades of failed reform', Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 13:2, June 2011, pp.143–156". www.academia.edu. Retrieved 20 February 2016.
46. Cockburn, Alexander (18–20 February 2011). "The Tweet and Revolution". Archived from the original on 27 February 2011.
47. Korotayev A; Zinkina J (2011). "Egyptian Revolution: A Demographic Structural Analysis". Entelequia. Revista Interdisciplinar. 13: 139–165. Archived from the original on 20 October 2016.
48. "Demographics of the Arab League, computed by Wolfram Alpha".
49. Courtney Radsch (2013). "Digital Dissidence and Political Change: Cyberactivism and Citizen Journalism in Egypt". SSRN 2379913. Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
50. Reverchon, Antoine; de Tricornot, Adrien (13 April 2011). "La rente pétrolière ne garantit plus la paix sociale". Archived from the original on 17 March 2011.
51. Is Turkey the best model for Arab democracy? Archived 18 January 2012 at the Wayback Machine| by Mark LeVine| aljazeera.com| 19 September 2011
52. Perez, Ines (4 March 2013)."Climate Change and Rising Food Prices Heightened Arab Spring" Archived 17 October 2014 at the Wayback Machine. Scientific American.
53. Friedman, Thomas (7 April 2012)."The Other Arab Spring" Archived 29 November 2016 at the Wayback Machine. The New York Times.
54. Natalini, Jones & Bravo (14 April 2015)."Quantitative Assessment of Political Fragility Indices and Food Prices as Indicators of Food Riots in Countries" Archived 1 May 2015 at the Wayback Machine. Sustainability.
55. Merchant, Brian (26 October 2015). "Climate Change and Rising Food Prices Heightened Arab Spring". Motherboard. Vice Media. Archived from the original on 8 March 2016. Retrieved 7 February 2016.
56. Ross, Alec; Ben Scott (2011). "Social Media: Cause, Effect and Response". NATO Review Magazine. NATO Review Magazine. Archived from the original on 3 November 2011.
57. Schillinger, Raymond (20 September 2011). "Social Media and the Arab Spring: What Have We Learned?". Huffington Post. Archived from the original on 13 May 2012. Retrieved 21 May 2012.
58. "CNN at SXSW: Social media in Arab Spring" (Online video clip). YouTube. 12 March 2013. Archived from the original on 13 January 2015.
59. "Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of Social Media During the Arab Spring?". Ictlogy.net. 22 May 2012. Archived from the original on 31 July 2013. Retrieved 30 May 2013.
60. "The Arab Spring and the impact of social media". Albanyassociates.com. 23 March 2012. Archived from the original on 12 May 2013. Retrieved 30 May 2013.
61. Himelfarb, Sheldon. "Social Media in the Middle East". United States Institute of Peace. Archived from the original on 25 September 2012. Retrieved 16 May 2012.
62. Stepanova, Ekaterina (May 2011). "The Role of Information Communication Technologies in the "Arab Spring"" (PDF). Pircenter.org/. Archived (PDF) from the original on 18 May 2015. Retrieved 17 May 2015.
63. Salem, Fadi, Mourtada. "Civil Movements: The Impact of Facebook and Twitter". Dubai School of Government. Archived from the original on 16 May 2012. Retrieved 16 May 2012.CS1 maint: uses authors parameter (link)
64. "Participatory Systems: Introduction" (PDF). Retrieved 30 May 2013.
65. Online Collective Action: Dynamics of the Crowd in Social Media Archived 9 February 2013 at Archive.today
66. Wellman, Barry; Rainie, Lee (2014). Networked. Boston, MA: The MIT Press. p. 207.
67. "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 10 June 2016. Retrieved 2 July 2016.CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
68. Kirkpatrick, David D.; Sanger, David E. (13 February 2011). "Egyptians and Tunisians Collaborated to Shake Arab History". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on 1 February 2016. Retrieved 4 February 2016.
69. Rainie, Lee; Wellman, Barry (2014). Networked. Boston, MA: The MIT Press. p. 207.
70. Wellman, Barry; Rainie, Lee (2014). Networked. Boston, MA: The MIT Press. p. 208.
71. Mellen, Roger (2013). "Modern Arab Uprisings and Social Media: An Historical Perspective on Media and Revolution". Explorations in Media Ecology.
72. Keller, Jared (18 June 2010). "Evaluating Iran's Twitter Revolution". The Atlantic. The Atlantic. Archived from the original on 17 January 2016. Retrieved 4 February 2016.
73. "Debate flares on 'Twitter revolutions,' Arab Spring." Agence France-Presse 10 March 2013. NewsBank. Web. 26 October 2016.
74. "Twitter Devolutions". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on 7 October 2016. Retrieved 27 October 2016.
75. Stevens, Jonathan (20 October 2010). "Webeaucracy: The Collaborative Revolution" (PDF). Thesis at San Diego State University.
76. Demidov, Oleg (2012). "Social Networks in International and National Security". Security Index. 18 (1): 22–36. doi:10.1080/19934270.2012.634122. ISSN 1993-4270.
77. "Middle East Historians and the Arab Spring: Early-Days Assessment". Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies (MDC). 2011. Retrieved 2 April 2019.
78. Niklas Albin Svensson. "Tunisia: the protests continue". In Defence of Marxism. Archived from the original on 15 January 2011.
79. "Tunisian government faces growing dissent in mining region". NewsLibrary.com. 4 August 2008. Retrieved 19 March 2011.
80. "Labor movement drives Egypt, Tunisia protests". The Detroit News. 10 February 2011. Retrieved 19 March 2011.
81. Ford, Robert (19 December 2007). "An ailing and fragile Algerian regime drifts into 2008". WikiLeaks. WikiLeaks cable: 07ALGIERS1806. Archived from the original on 7 January 2011. Retrieved 4 January 2011. Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
82. Chikhi, Lamine (21 January 2011). "Algeria army should quit politics: opposition". Reuters. Reuters Africa. Archived from the original on 19 January 2012. Retrieved 22 January 2011.
83. Belhimer, Mahmoud (17 March 2010). "Political Crises but Few Alternatives in Algeria". Arab Reform Bulletin. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Archived from the original on 13 February 2011. Retrieved 13 February 2011.
84. "Mass exodus" from Western Sahara cities Archived 23 October 2010 at the Wayback Machine. Afrol News, 21 October 2010.
85. "Saharawi protests, violence and blackmail Moroccan". On the News. 20 May 2011. Archived from the original on 27 July 2011. Retrieved 6 June 2011.
86. "Tunisia suicide protester Mohammed Bouazizi dies". BBC News. 5 January 2011. Archived from the original on 24 January 2011.
87. Hardy, Roger (2 February 2011). "Egypt protests: an Arab spring as old order crumbles". BBC. Archived from the original on 22 March 2011. Retrieved 9 March 2011.
88. Ashley, Jackie (8 March 2011). "The Arab spring requires a defiantly European reply". The Guardian. UK. Archived from the original on 21 September 2013. Retrieved 9 March 2011.
89. "Arab Spring – Who lost Egypt?". The Economist. 1 March 2011. Archived from the original on 8 March 2011. Retrieved 9 March 2011.
90. Miller, Aaron. "What Is Palestine's Next Move in the New Middle East?". Moment Magazine. Archived from the original on 14 June 2011. Retrieved 5 June 2011.
91. "The Arab awakening – Spotlight". Al Jazeera English. Archived from the original on 4 July 2012. Retrieved 5 July 2012.
92. "Arab Awakening?". American Thinker. 2 June 2011. Archived from the original on 17 June 2012. Retrieved 5 July 2012.
93. "The Arab awakening reaches Syria". The Economist. 21 March 2011. Archived from the original on 22 April 2011.
94. Laila Lalami (17 February 2011). "Arab Uprisings: What the February 20 Protests Tell Us About Morocco". The Nation. Retrieved 5 July 2012.
95. "Democracy's hard spring". The Economist. 10 March 2011. Archived from the original on 27 May 2011.
96. Fahim, Kareem (22 January 2011). "Slap to a Man's Pride Set Off Tumult in Tunisia". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 21 May 2012. Retrieved 1 February 2011.
97. Noueihed, Lin (19 January 2011). "Peddler's martyrdom launched Tunisia's revolution". Reuters UK. Archived from the original on 9 February 2011. Retrieved 1 February 2011.
98. Raghavan, Sudarsan (27 January 2011). "Inspired by Tunisia and Egypt, Yemenis join in anti-government protests". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 30 April 2011. Retrieved 1 February 2011.
99. "Yemenis square off in rival 'Day of Rage' protests". Arab News. 3 February 2011. Archived from the original on 7 July 2011. Retrieved 6 February 2011.
100. "Police in south Yemen disperse 'day of rage' protests". Aden, Yemen. Agence France-Presse. 11 February 2011. Archived from the original on 14 February 2011. Retrieved 13 February 2011.
101. Murphy, Brian (13 February 2011). "Bahrain moves to foil anti-government rallies". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 9 November 2013.
102. Bayat, Asef (2017). Revolution without Revolutionaries: Making Sense of the Arab Spring. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-1-5036-0258-8.
103. A. Murat Agdemir. "The Arab Spring and Israel's Relations with Egypt. Israel Council of Foreign Affairs, 2016. Vol.10, No.2, pp. 223–235
104. "Tunisia's Ben Ali flees amid unrest". Al Jazeera. 15 January 2011. Archived from the original on 19 March 2012.
105. Peterson, Scott (11 February 2011). "Egypt's revolution redefines what's possible in the Arab world". The Christian Science Monitor. Archived from the original on 23 July 2011. Retrieved 12 June 2011.
106. Spencer, Richard (23 February 2011). "Libya: civil war breaks out as Gaddafi mounts rearguard fight". The Daily Telegraph. London. Archived from the original on 30 March 2011. Retrieved 12 June 2011.
107. Bakri, Nada; Goodman, J. David (28 January 2011). "Thousands in Yemen Protest Against the Government". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 9 November 2016.
108. "Protester killed in Bahrain 'Day of Rage'". Reuters. 14 February 2011. Archived from the original on 18 February 2012.
109. "'It Will Not Stop': Syrian Uprising Continues Despite Crackdown". Der Spiegel. 28 March 2011. Archived from the original on 10 June 2011. Retrieved 12 June 2011.
110. "Algeria protest draws thousands". CBC News. 12 February 2011. Archived from the original on 12 May 2011. Retrieved 12 June 2011.
111. McCrummen, Stephanie (25 February 2011). "13 killed in Iraq's 'Day of Rage' protests". The Washington Post. Baghdad. Archived from the original on 30 April 2011. Retrieved 12 June 2011.
112. "Thousands protest in Jordan". Al Jazeera. 28 January 2011. Archived from the original on 17 November 2011. Retrieved 12 June 2011.
113. "Kuwaiti stateless protest for third day". Middle East Online. 20 February 2011. Archived from the original on 22 February 2011. Retrieved 12 June 2011.
114. "Morocco King on holiday as people consider revolt". Afrol. 30 January 2011. Archived from the original on 2 February 2011. Retrieved 1 February 2011.
115. Vaidya, Sunil (27 February 2011). "One dead, dozen injured as Oman protest turns ugly". Gulf News. Archived from the original on 5 March 2011. Retrieved 12 June 2011.
116. "Sudan police clash with protesters". Al Jazeera. 30 January 2011. Archived from the original on 1 February 2011. Retrieved 25 September 2013.
117. "Mauritania police crush protest – doctors announce strike". Radio Netherlands Worldwide. 9 March 2011. Archived from the original on 5 December 2012. Retrieved 23 March 2011.
118. "Man dies after setting himself on fire in Saudi Arabia". BBC News. 23 January 2011. Archived from the original on 25 January 2011. Retrieved 29 January 2011.
119. Manson, Katrina (20 February 2011). "Pro-democracy protests reach Djibouti". Financial Times. Archived from the original on 24 February 2011. Retrieved 1 June 2011.
120. "New clashes in occupied Western Sahara". Afrol. 27 February 2011. Archived from the original on 7 July 2011. Retrieved 12 June 2011.
121. "Mali coup: Arab Spring spreads to Africa". United Press International. 26 March 2012. Archived from the original on 2 December 2013. Retrieved 31 March 2012.
122. "Party: Bashir is not standing for re-election". Gulf Times. 22 February 2011. Archived from the original on 3 April 2011. Retrieved 22 February 2011.
123. "Iraq PM plans no re-election". Voice of Russia. 5 February 2011. Archived from the original on 11 January 2012. Retrieved 27 February 2011.
124. "Iraq angered protesters call for Maliki resignation". Al Sumaria. 26 February 2011. Archived from the original on 25 September 2011. Retrieved 27 February 2011.
125. "Jordanians stage anti-gov't sit-in in Amman". Xinhua News Agency. 30 January 2011. Archived from the original on 2 February 2011. Retrieved 13 April 2011.
126. "Jordan's king 'appoints new prime minister'". Al Jazeera. 17 October 2011. Archived from the original on 18 October 2011. Retrieved 17 October 2011.
127. "Jordan king appoints new PM, government quits". Reuters. 1 February 2011. Archived from the original on 4 February 2011. Retrieved 2 February 2011.
128. "Kuwait's prime minister resigns after protests". BBC News. 28 November 2011. Archived from the original on 29 November 2011. Retrieved 28 November 2011.
129. Mounassar, Hammoud (27 January 2011). "Thousands of Yemenis call on president to quit". ABS-CBN News. Sanaa. Agence France-Presse. Archived from the original on 6 February 2011. Retrieved 14 January 2012.
130. "Arab protests attract Nobel interest". News24. Oslo. 31 January 2011. Archived from the original on 9 February 2011. Retrieved 8 February 2011.
131. "TIME's Person of the Year 2011". Time. 14 December 2011. Archived from the original on 20 January 2012. Retrieved 20 January 2012.
132. Keene, Jamie (10 February 2012). "World Press Photo presents Samuel Aranda with photo of the year award". The Verge. Archived from the original on 13 April 2012. Retrieved 19 June 2012.
133. Willsher, Kim (27 February 2011). "Tunisian prime minister Mohamed Ghannouchi resigns amid unrest". The Guardian. London. Archived from the original on 26 February 2017.
134. "Tunisia forms national unity government amid unrest". BBC News. 17 January 2011. Archived from the original on 19 January 2011.
135. "Tunisia dissolves Ben Ali party". Al Jazeera. 9 March 2011. Archived from the original on 10 November 2011. Retrieved 9 March 2011.
136. Beaumont, Peter (19 January 2011). "Tunisia set to release political prisoners". The Guardian. London. Archived from the original on 13 March 2016.
137. "Tunisia election delayed until 23 October". Reuters. 8 June 2011. Archived from the original on 15 August 2011. Retrieved 8 June 2011.
138. "Report: 338 killed during Tunisia revolution". Associated Press. 5 May 2012.
139. "Algeria's state of emergency is officially lifted". Bloomberg L.P. 24 February 2011. Retrieved 25 February 2011.
140. "Algeria repeals emergency law". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 17 November 2011. Retrieved 23 February 2011.
141. Krause, Flavia (27 January 2011). "Obama Poised to Step Up Criticism of Mubarak If Crackdown Is Intensified". Bloomberg. Archived from the original on 29 January 2011. Retrieved 28 October 2011.
142. Blomfield, Adrian (1 February 2011). "King Abdullah II of Jordan sacks government amid street protests". The Telegraph. London. Archived from the original on 2 July 2012.
143. Nuri Yesilyurt, "Jordan and the Arab Spring: Challenges and Opportunities," Perceptions 19, no. 4 (1 December 2014): 169–194.
144. Derhally, Massoud A. (17 October 2011). "Jordan's King Appoints PM After Cabinet Resigns". Bloomberg. Archived from the original on 20 October 2011. Retrieved 28 October 2011.
145. "Jordan's prime minister resigns". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 16 June 2012. Retrieved 28 September 2012.
146. "Jordan's king appoints new PM to form new government – CNN.com". Edition.cnn.com. 11 October 2012. Archived from the original on 1 June 2013. Retrieved 30 May 2013.
147. "Region – World – Ahram Online". English.ahram.org.eg. Archived from the original on 29 May 2013. Retrieved 30 May 2013.
148. "Oman takes measures to address public grievances". Khaleej Times. 27 February 2011. Archived from the original on 8 June 2011. Retrieved 6 March 2011.
149. "Oman boosts student benefits". Agence France-Presse. Archived from the original on 22 December 2011. Retrieved 27 February 2011.
150. "Oman shuffles cabinet amid protests". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 23 December 2011. Retrieved 27 February 2011.
151. "Oman's ruler dismisses ministers". Al Jazeera. 5 March 2011. Archived from the original on 24 November 2011. Retrieved 5 March 2011.
152. "Oman's Sultan Granting Lawmaking Powers to Councils". Voice of America. 13 March 2011. Archived from the original on 26 September 2011. Retrieved 28 October 2011.
153. Surk, Barbara. "Police in Oman fire tear gas, rubber bullets at protesters seeking political reform; 1 killed". Canadian Press. Archived from the original on 3 March 2011. Retrieved 27 February 2011.
154. "Deaths in Oman protests". Al Jazeera. 27 February 2011. Archived from the original on 2 December 2011. Retrieved 27 February 2011.
155. "Oman clashes: Two killed during protests in Gulf state". BBC News. 8 February 2011. Archived from the original on 27 February 2011. Retrieved 27 February 2011.
156. "Egypt's prime minister quits, new govt soon-army". Forexyard.com. Archived from the original on 1 May 2011. Retrieved 5 March 2011.
157. Egypt's Mubarak Steps Down; Military Takes Over Archived 15 February 2011 at the Wayback Machine, The Wall Street Journal, 11 February 2011.
158. "Egypt's military moves to dissolve parliament, suspend constitution". Haaretz. Reuters. 13 February 2011. Archived from the original on 14 February 2011. Retrieved 24 February 2011.
159. "Egyptian state security disbanded". Al Jazeera. 15 March 2011. Archived from the original on 17 November 2011. Retrieved 15 March 2011.
160. "Egypt dissolves former ruling party". Al Jazeera English. 16 April 2011. Archived from the original on 16 March 2011. Retrieved 1 July 2016.
161. "How the mighty have fallen". Ahram. 2 February 2011. Archived from the original on 1 May 2011. Retrieved 23 March 2011.
162. Kirkpatrick, David D.; Stack, Liam (13 March 2011). "Prosecutors Order Mubarak and Sons Held". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 16 April 2011. Retrieved 13 April 2011.
163. "Mubarak to be tried for murder of protesters". Reuters. 24 May 2011. Archived from the original on 31 May 2011. Retrieved 24 May 2011.
164. "Egypt's state of emergency ends after 31 years". The Daily Telegraph. London. 31 May 2012. Archived from the original on 15 June 2012. Retrieved 19 June 2012.
165. "Mohammed Morsi sworn in as Egypt's president". CBS News. 30 June 2012. Archived from the original on 13 July 2012. Retrieved 28 September 2012.
166. "Egypt unrest: 846 killed in protests – official toll". BBC. 19 April 2011. Archived from the original on 28 November 2014.
167. "Syrian activist Haitham al-Maleh freed under amnesty". BBC News. 8 March 2011. Archived from the original on 11 March 2011. Retrieved 8 March 2011.
168. "Syria frees 80-year-old former judge in amnesty". Reuters. 8 March 2011. Archived from the original on 13 March 2011. Retrieved 8 March 2011.
169. "Unrest continues in Syria". Al Bawaba. 23 March 2011. Archived from the original on 31 May 2011. Retrieved 24 March 2011.
170. "Assad attempts to appease minority Kurds". Al Jazeera. 8 April 2011. Archived from the original on 12 November 2011. Retrieved 24 April 2011.
171. "Syrian cabinet resigns amid unrest". 29 March 2011. Archived from the original on 7 April 2011.
172. "2011 Syrian protests: Security forces shoot at mourners". BBC News. 23 April 2011. Archived from the original on 24 April 2011. Retrieved 23 April 2011.
173. "Syrian army units 'clash over crackdown'". Al Jazeera. 28 April 2011. Archived from the original on 3 May 2011. Retrieved 28 April 2011.
174. Yemen MPs resign over violence Archived 23 May 2012 at the Wayback Machine, Al Jazeera, 23 February 2011.
175. "Military restructuring in Yemen: Unravelling a tangled web | Comment Middle East". Commentmideast.com. Archived from the original on 4 December 2012. Retrieved 28 September 2012.
176. Kasinof, Laura (21 January 2012). "Yemen Legislators Approve Immunity for the President". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 22 January 2012. Retrieved 21 January 2012.
177. Yemen says more than 2,000 killed in uprising. The Washington Post. (19 March 2012).
178. "Djiboutians rally to oust president". Al Jazeera. 18 February 2011. Archived from the original on 13 December 2014.
179. "Sudan's Bashir will not stand in next election: party official". BBC News. Agence France-Presse. 21 February 2011. Archived from the original on 21 February 2011.
180. Abdelaziz, Khalid. "Sudan's Bashir chosen by ruling party as candidate for 2015 elections" Archived 21 October 2014 at the Wayback Machine, Reuters, 21 October 2014. Retrieved on 21 October 2014.
181. "UN rights monitor condemns deadly Sudan crackdown". Daily News Egypt. 4 October 2013. Archived from the original on 16 October 2014.
182. "BBC News – Palestinian PM 'willing to resign' after protests". BBC. 7 September 2012. Archived from the original on 10 September 2012. Retrieved 28 September 2012.
183. "Abbas asks caretaker Palestinian PM to stay on". Agence France-Presse. 13 August 2013. Retrieved 19 February 2014.
184. "Iraqi prime minister won't run for third term". NBC News. 5 February 2011.
185. "Governor of third Iraqi province quits over protests". The Gulf Today. 27 February 2011. Archived from the original on 4 March 2011.
186. "Bahrain's king gives out cash ahead of protests". Reuters. 11 February 2011. Archived from the original on 16 February 2011.
187. Bahrain's king to free political prisoners as protests continue Archived 23 February 2011 at the Wayback Machine, Monsters and Critics, 22 February 2011.
188. Bahrain sacks ministers amid protests Archived 1 March 2011 at the Wayback Machine, Press TV, 26 February 2011.
189. "Still rich but no longer so calm". The Economist. 3 December 2011. Archived from the original on 28 December 2011. Retrieved 1 January 2012.
190. "Bahrain creates panel to study unrest report". Al Jazeera. 27 November 2011. Archived from the original on 11 January 2012. Retrieved 14 January 2012.
191. Check Casualties of the Bahraini uprising (2011–present) for comprehensive list
192. "NATO Withdrawal from Libya". New Europe. 31 October 2011. Archived from the original on 6 January 2012. Retrieved 31 October 2011.
193. "Fighters clash again near Tripoli, several dead". Reuters. 12 November 2011. Archived from the original on 2 December 2013.
194. Ian Black (8 January 2013). "Libyan revolution casualties lower than expected, says new government". Guardian. London. Retrieved 2 October 2013.
195. "Kuwait Government resigns". Business Week. 28 November 2011. Archived from the original on 1 February 2012.
196. "Kuwait to hold early general election on 2 February". Agence France-Presse. 18 December 2011. Archived from the original on 25 May 2012.
197. "30 wounded in Kuwait protests on Friday". MSN. Archived from the original on 22 February 2011.
198. Moroccan king to make reforms with constitutional body Archived 23 February 2011 at the Wayback Machine, Middle East Online, 22 February 2011;
199. Karam, Souhail (20 March 2011). "Thousands in Morocco march for rights". The Independent. London. Archived from the original on 25 March 2011.
200. Miller, David (7 June 2011). "Demonstrator's death energizes Moroccan protesters". The Jerusalem Post. Archived from the original on 31 October 2012. Retrieved 11 June 2011.
201. "Mauritania's Bouazizi died today". Dekhnstan.wordpress.com. 23 January 2011. Archived from the original on 30 August 2011. Retrieved 28 October 2011.
202. "Saudi King Boosts Spending, Returns to Country". Voice of America. 23 February 2011. Archived from the original on 9 March 2011. Retrieved 23 February 2011.
203. "King's order to benefit 180,000 temporary employees". Arab News. 28 February 2011. Archived from the original on 1 March 2011. Retrieved 28 February 2011.
204. al-Suhaimy, Abeed (23 March 2011). "Saudi Arabia announces municipal elections". Asharq al-Awsat. Archived from the original on 1 May 2011. Retrieved 2 April 2011.
205. Abu-Nasr, Donna (28 March 2011). "Saudi Women Inspired by Fall of Mubarak Step Up Equality Demand". Bloomberg. Archived from the original on 2 April 2011. Retrieved 2 April 2011.
206. "Saudis vote in municipal elections, results on Sunday". Oman Observer. Agence France-Presse. 30 September 2011. Archived from the original on 19 January 2012. Retrieved 14 December 2011.
207. "Kingdom a country of moderate Islam". Saudigazette. 24 October 2017. Retrieved 26 March 2018.
208. "Saudi Arabia will finally allow women to drive". The Ecoomist. 27 September 2017. Retrieved 26 March 2018.
209. Check casualties of the Saudi Arabian protests for comprehensive list
210. "Syria says 23 dead as Israel opens fire on Golan". France 24. Agence France-Presse. 6 June 2011. Archived from the original on 9 June 2011. Retrieved 12 June 2011.
211. "UN's Pillay condemns Israeli 'Naksa' killings". Al Jazeera. 8 June 2011. Archived from the original on 10 June 2011. Retrieved 12 June 2011.
212. "Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry". BICI. Archived from the original on 2 September 2013.
213. "Bahrain mourners call for end to monarchy". The Guardian. London. 18 February 2011. Archived from the original on 18 February 2011.
214. "Day of transformation in Bahrain's 'sacred square'". BBC News. 19 February 2011. Archived from the original on 5 April 2011.
215. "Bangladeshis complain of Bahrain rally 'coercion'". BBC News. 17 March 2011. Archived from the original on 19 May 2012.
216. "Gulf States Send Force to Bahrain Following Protests". BBC News. 14 March 2011. Archived from the original on 20 April 2011. Retrieved 15 April 2011.
217. "Bahrain declares state of emergency after unrest". Reuters. 15 March 2011. Archived from the original on 23 October 2012.
218. "Curfew Follows Deadly Bahrain Crackdown". Al Jazeera. 16 March 2011. Archived from the original on 14 April 2011. Retrieved 16 April 2011.
219. Farmer, Ben (18 March 2011). "Bahrain authorities destroy Pearl Roundabout". The Daily Telegraph. London. Archived from the original on 22 March 2011.
220. Chulov, Martin (1 June 2011). "Bahrain sees new clashes as martial law lifted". The Guardian. London. Archived from the original on 18 January 2017.
221. "Thousands rally for reform in Bahrain". Reuters. 11 June 2011. Archived from the original on 22 October 2012.
222. "Bahrain live blog 25 Jan 2012". Al Jazeera. 25 January 2012. Archived from the original on 5 December 2012. Retrieved 17 February 2012.
223. "Heavy police presence blocks Bahrain protests". Al Jazeera. 15 February 2012. Archived from the original on 7 August 2012. Retrieved 17 February 2012.
224. "Bahrain protesters join anti-government march in Manama". BBC. 9 March 2012. Archived from the original on 25 April 2012.
225. "Mass pro-democracy protest rocks Bahrain". Reuters. 9 March 2012. Archived from the original on 23 October 2012.
226. Law, Bill (6 April 2011). "Police Brutality Turns Bahrain Into 'Island of Fear' Archived 15 April 2011 at the Wayback Machine. Crossing Continents (via BBC News). Retrieved 15 April 2011.
227. Press release (30 March 2011). "USA Emphatic Support to Saudi Arabia" Archived 4 April 2011 at the Wayback Machine. Zayd Alisa (via Scoop). Retrieved 15 April 2011.
228. Cockburn, Patrick (18 March 2011). "The Footage That Reveals the Brutal Truth About Bahrain's Crackdown" Archived 21 March 2011 at the Wayback Machine. The Independent. Retrieved 15 April 2011.
229. Wahab, Siraj (18 March 2011). "Bahrain Arrests Key Opposition Leaders". Arab News. Retrieved 15 April 2011. Archived 7 March 2012 at the Wayback Machine
230. Law, Bill (22 March 2011). "Bahrain Rulers Unleash 'Campaign of Intimidation'" Archived 15 April 2011 at the Wayback Machine. Crossing Continents (via BBC News). Retrieved 15 April 2011.
231. (registration required) "UK – Bahrain Union Suspends General Strike" Archived 27 August 2011 at the Wayback Machine. Financial Times. 22 March 2011. Retrieved 9 April 2011.
232. Chick, Kristen (1 April 2011). "Bahrain's Calculated Campaign of Intimidation" Archived 5 April 2011 at the Wayback Machine. The Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved 15 April 2011.
233. "Bahrain inquiry confirms rights abuses". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 4 October 2012. Retrieved 19 June 2012.
234. Applying pressure on Bahrain Archived 2 February 2014 at the Wayback Machine, 9 May 2011, Retrieved 9 May 2011
235. "Bahrain protesters join anti-government march in Manama". BBC. 9 March 2012. Archived from the original on 25 April 2012. Retrieved 11 March 2012.
236. "Report: Doctors targeted in Bahrain". Al Jazeera. 18 July 2011. Archived from the original on 18 July 2011. Retrieved 20 July 2011.
237. "Bahrain delays U.N. investigator, limits rights group visits". Reuters. 1 March 2012. Archived from the original on 15 May 2012.
238. Gregg Carlstrom (23 April 2012). "Bahrain court delays ruling in activists case" Archived 25 June 2012 at the Wayback Machine. Al Jazeera. Retrieved 14 June 2012.
239. Shenker, Jack (20 January 2011). "Warning Egypt could follow Tunisia". The Age. Melbourne. Archived from the original on 1 February 2011.
240. Dainotti; et al. (2011). "Analysis of Country-wide Internet Outages Caused by Censorship" (PDF). ACM. Archived (PDF) from the original on 17 June 2012.
241. "Egypt: AP Confirms Government has Disrupted Internet Service". pomed.org. Archived from the original on 1 February 2011. Retrieved 28 January 2011.
242. "EGYPT: US Embassy to begin voluntary evacuation flights Monday". Los Angeles Times. 30 January 2011. Archived from the original on 25 July 2013. Retrieved 13 September 2013.
243. "Egypt Program Evacuation Timeline" (PDF). News & Updates: IFSA-Butler. 31 January 2011. Archived from the original (PDF) on 3 December 2013. Retrieved 13 September 2013.
244. "Egypt's Mubarak refuses to quit, hands VP powers". MyWay. Associated Press. Archived from the original on 24 May 2011. Retrieved 11 February 2011.
245. Bly, Laura (11 February 2011). "Sharm el-Sheikh resort in world spotlight as Egypt's Mubarak flees Cairo". USA Today. Archived from the original on 11 February 2011. Retrieved 11 February 2011.
246. Wan, William; Walker, Portia (4 March 2011). "In Egypt, crowd cheers newly appointed prime minister Essam Sharaf". The Washington Post. Cairo. Archived from the original on 5 March 2011. Retrieved 20 July 2011.
247. "EGYPT: Protests continue but activists divided over goals". Los Angeles Times. 15 July 2011. Archived from the original on 18 July 2011. Retrieved 20 July 2011.
248. Kirkpatrick, Patrick D. (2 June 2012). "New Turmoil in Egypt Greets Mixed Verdict for Mubarak". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 5 June 2012. Retrieved 2 June 2012.
249. "New president: Egypt turns page to new era". CNN Wire Staff. CNN. 30 June 2012. Archived from the original on 30 June 2012. Retrieved 30 June 2012.
250. Kingsley, P.; Chulov, M. (3 July 2013). "Mohamed Morsi ousted in Egypt's second revolution in two years". The Guardian. London. Archived from the original on 30 July 2013. Retrieved 3 July 2013.
251. "HIGHLIGHTS – Libyan TV address by Saif al-Islam Gaddafi". Rabat. Reuters India. 21 February 2011. Archived from the original on 14 May 2012. Retrieved 14 January 2012.
252. "Ex Libyan minister forms interim govt-report". LSE. 26 February 2011. Archived from the original on 13 May 2011. Retrieved 27 February 2011.
253. Blomfield, Adrian (6 July 2011). "Rebels wage a secret night-time war on the streets of Tripoli". The Vancouver Sun. Archived from the original on 6 February 2012. Retrieved 20 July 2011.
254. Levinson, Charles (20 July 2011). "Rebels Move Toward Gadhafi Stronghold". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 12 August 2011.
255. "From voice said to be Gadhafi, a defiant message to his foes". CNN. 1 September 2011. Archived from the original on 10 November 2012. Retrieved 1 September 2011.
256. "Gaddafi loyalists flee Sebha to Niger". News24. 22 September 2011. Archived from the original on 24 September 2011. Retrieved 24 September 2011.
257. "Rebels to seek return of Gaddafi family from Algeria". Reuters. 29 August 2011. Archived from the original on 30 August 2011.
258. "NTC 'captured' Sabha as loyalists flee to Niger". Hürriyet Daily News. 22 September 2011. Archived from the original on 25 September 2011. Retrieved 20 October 2011.
259. "Libya conflict: NTC forces claim Bani Walid victory". BBC News. 17 October 2011. Archived from the original on 20 October 2011. Retrieved 20 October 2011.
260. "Qaddafi dead after Sirte battle, PM confirms". CBS News. 20 October 2011. Archived from the original on 20 October 2011. Retrieved 20 October 2011.
261. "'Day of rage' protest urged in Syria". NBC News. Retrieved 3 February 2011.
262. ""Day of Rage" planned for Syria; protests scheduled for Feb 4–5". aysor.am. Archived from the original on 5 May 2011. Retrieved 3 February 2011.
263. "Daraa: The spark that lit the Syrian flame". CNN. 1 March 2012. Archived from the original on 22 June 2012. Retrieved 19 June 2012.
264. "ردّدوا هتافات تدعو لمحاربة الفساد وفتح باب الحريات". Al Arabiya. Archived from the original on 3 April 2011. Retrieved 15 March 2011.
265. "الاف السوريين يثورون في قلب دمشق و المحافظات مطالبين بالحرية". Sawt Beirut. Archived from the original on 19 March 2011. Retrieved 16 March 2011.
266. "مظاهرة احتجاج في دمشق تطالب بالحريات". BBC. Archived from the original on 16 March 2011. Retrieved 15 March 2011.
267. "معلومات عن سقوط شهداء في تظاهرات الثلاثاء في سوريا". Sawt Beirut. Archived from the original on 16 May 2011. Retrieved 16 March 2011.
268. Amos, Deborah (15 July 2011). "In Syria, Opposition Stages Massive Protests". NPR. Archived from the original on 16 July 2011. Retrieved 18 July 2011.
269. Wemple, Erik (2 August 2011). "Syria's Ramadan massacre". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 20 October 2011.
270. 11 were killed on a Friday of 'God is with us' Archived 30 May 2013 at the Wayback Machine, Al Arabiya, 5 August 2011
271. Spencer, Richard (13 January 2011). "Tunisia riots: Reform or be overthrown, US tells Arab states amid fresh riots". The Daily Telegraph. London. Retrieved 14 January 2011.
272. Ryan, Yasmine. "Tunisia's bitter cyberwar". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 10 November 2011. Retrieved 14 January 2011.
273. "Tunisia's Protest Wave: Where It Comes From and What It Means for Ben Ali". Foreign Policy. 3 January 2011. Archived from the original on 8 January 2011. Retrieved 14 January 2011.
274. Borger, Julian (29 December 2010). "Tunisian president vows to punish rioters after worst unrest in a decade". The Guardian. UK. Archived from the original on 31 December 2010. Retrieved 29 December 2010.
275. Davies, Wyre (15 December 2010). "Tunisia: President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali forced out". BBC News. Archived from the original on 15 January 2011. Retrieved 14 January 2011.
276. "Uprising in Tunisia: People Power topples Ben Ali regime". Indybay. 16 January 2011. Archived from the original on 11 March 2011. Retrieved 26 January 2011.
277. "Tunisia announces withdrawal of 3 ministers from unity gov't: TV". People's Daily. 18 January 2011. Archived from the original on 22 January 2011. Retrieved 20 January 2011.
278. "Protests hit Tunisia amid mourning". Al Jazeera. 21 January 2011. Archived from the original on 22 January 2011. Retrieved 21 January 2011.
279. "Tunisian minister suspends ex-ruling party". NBC News. Associated Press. Retrieved 21 May 2012.
280. "Tunisia disbands party of ousted president". USA Today. 9 March 2011. Archived from the original on 25 June 2011. Retrieved 24 March 2011.
281. Cunningham, Erin. "Tunisia elections seen as litmus test for Arab Spring". Global Post. Archived from the original on 31 December 2011. Retrieved 5 January 2012.
282. Deeter, Jessie (16 February 2012). "Post-Revolution Tunisia attempts painful transition to democracy". Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting. Archived from the original on 27 November 2012. Retrieved 16 February 2012.
283. "New Tunisian Constitution Adopted". Tunisia Live. 26 January 2014. Archived from the original on 27 January 2014. Retrieved 26 January 2014.
284. Tarek Amara p (27 January 2014). "Arab Spring beacon Tunisia signs new constitution". Reuters. Archived from the original on 28 January 2014. Retrieved 27 January 2014.
285. "Tunisie : les législatives fixées au 26 octobre et la présidentielle au 23 novembre". Jeune Afrique. 25 June 2014. Archived from the original on 18 March 2015.
286. "Tunisia holds first post-revolution presidential poll". BBC News. Archived from the original on 23 November 2014. Retrieved 23 November 2014.
287. النتائج النهائية للانتخابات التشريعية [Final results of parliamentary elections] (PDF) (in Arabic). 20 November 2014. Archived from the original (PDF) on 26 November 2014. Retrieved 21 November 2014.
288. Rice-Oxley, Mark (21 March 2011). "WikiLeaks cable links defecting Yemeni general to smuggling rackets". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 27 February 2019.
289. "Feature-South Yemen separatists find hope in spreading unrest". Reuters. 2 March 2011. Retrieved 27 February 2019.
290. "Yemen: The tie that binds". Public Radio International. Retrieved 27 February 2019.
291. "Protests erupt in Yemen, president offers reform". Reuters Africa. 11 January 2011. Archived from the original on 22 January 2011. Retrieved 20 January 2011.
292. "Yemen protests: 'People are fed up with corruption'". BBC News. 27 January 2011. Archived from the original on 5 April 2011.
293. Bakri, Nada (27 January 2011). "Thousands in Yemen Protest Against the Government". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 9 November 2016.
294. Bryan, Angie (28 December 2009). "Yemeni tribal leader: for Saleh, Saudi involvement in Sa'ada comes not a moment too soon". WikiLeaks. WikiLeaks cable: 09SANAA2279. Archived from the original on 31 December 2010. Retrieved 31 January 2011. Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
295. "Yemenis urge leader's exit". Al Jazeera. 23 January 2011. Archived from the original on 27 December 2011. Retrieved 14 February 2011.
296. "Yemenis in anti-president protest". The Irish Times. 27 January 2011. Archived from the original on 20 May 2011.
297. "New protests erupt in Yemen". Al Jazeera. 29 January 2011. Archived from the original on 29 January 2011. Retrieved 30 January 2011.
298. "Yemen reinforces forces around capital amid fear of protest escalation". Xinhua News. 2 February 2011. Archived from the original on 6 February 2011. Retrieved 2 February 2011.
299. Sudam, Mohamed (2 February 2011). "Yemeni president signals he won't stay beyond 2013". Reuters. Archived from the original on 3 February 2011. Retrieved 2 February 2011.
300. Daragahi, Borzou (3 February 2011). "Yemen, Middle East: Tens of thousands stage rival rallies in Yemen". Los Angeles Times. Archived from the original on 14 February 2011. Retrieved 4 February 2011.
301. Sinjab, Lina (29 January 2011). "Yemen protests: 20,000 call for President Saleh to go". BBC News. Archived from the original on 3 February 2011. Retrieved 4 February 2011.
302. "Opposing protesters rally in Yemen". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 15 October 2012. Retrieved 4 February 2011.
303. "Saleh partisans take over Yemen protest site". Oneindia News. 3 February 2011. Archived from the original on 13 February 2011. Retrieved 4 February 2011.
304. Lubin, Gus (11 February 2011). "YEMEN: Protests revived in 'Friday of Rage'". Los Angeles Times. Archived from the original on 11 February 2011. Retrieved 11 February 2011.
305. Lubin, Gus (15 February 2011). "Protests rage in Yemen, Bahrain; Iran hard-liners want foes executed". Los Angeles Times. Archived from the original on 17 February 2011. Retrieved 16 February 2011.
306. Johnston, Cynthia (26 May 2011). "Analysis: Yemen civil war likely without swift Saleh exit". Reuters. Archived from the original on 29 July 2011. Retrieved 20 July 2011.
307. Hatem, Mohammed (23 April 2011). "Yemen's Saleh Agrees to Step Down in Exchange for Immunity, Official Says". Bloomberg. Archived from the original on 13 August 2011. Retrieved 28 October 2011.
308. "Yemeni Peace Process Collapses". The Australian. 2 May 2011. Archived from the original on 26 April 2013. Retrieved 2 May 2011.
309. "Several Arrested in Yemen for Alleged Role in an Assassination Attempt on Saleh". Fox News Channel. 13 June 2011. Archived from the original on 17 June 2011. Retrieved 20 July 2011.
310. Leyne, Jon (5 June 2011). "Yemen crisis: One-way ticket for Saleh?". BBC News. Archived from the original on 6 June 2011. Retrieved 5 June 2011.
311. Al Qadhi, Mohammed (8 July 2011). "Saleh appears on Yemen TV, bandaged and burnt". The National. Archived from the original on 9 July 2011. Retrieved 20 July 2011.
312. Massive protests against Yemeni President on "Mansouron" Friday, Alghad Newspaper, 13 August 2011
313. "Yemen president authorizes deputy to negotiate power transfer". CNN World. 12 September 2011. Archived from the original on 10 January 2013. Retrieved 6 December 2011.
314. "Yemen President Ali Abdullah Saleh returns to Sanaa". BBC News. 23 September 2011. Archived from the original on 12 December 2011. Retrieved 6 December 2011.
315. "Yemeni President Saleh signs deal on ceding power". BBC News. 23 November 2011. Archived from the original on 5 December 2011. Retrieved 6 December 2011.
316. "February 2012". Rulers.org. Archived from the original on 22 May 2012. Retrieved 19 June 2012.
317. "New Yemen President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi takes oath". Bbc.co.uk. 25 February 2012. Archived from the original on 21 August 2013. Retrieved 30 May 2013.
318. "Yemen's Saleh formally steps down after 33 years". Agence France-Presse. 27 February 2012. Archived from the original on 25 May 2012. Retrieved 19 June 2012.
319. "Middle East review of 2012: the Arab Winter". Telegraph.co.uk. 31 December 2012. Archived from the original on 24 April 2014.
320. "Arab Spring into Islamist Winter: Implications for U.S. Policy". The Heritage Foundation. Archived from the original on 30 October 2014.
321. Anderson, Lisa (May 2011). "Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya". Foreign Affairs. 90 (3): 2–7.
322. Haseeb, Khair El-Din (13 March 2012). "The Arab Spring Revisited". Contemporary Arab Affairs. 5 (2): 185–197. doi:10.1080/17550912.2012.673384.
323. Hussain, Muzammil M; Howard, Philip N (2013). "What Explains Successful Protest Cascades? ICTs and the Fuzzy Causes of the Arab Spring" (PDF). International Studies Review. 15: 48–66. doi:10.1111/misr.12020. hdl:2027.42/97489.
324. Bellin, Eva (January 2012). "Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring". Comparative Politics. 44 (2): 127–149. doi:10.5129/001041512798838021. JSTOR 23211807.
325. Kausch, Kristina (2009). "Morocco: Smart Authoritarianism Refined". In Emerson, Michael; Youngs, Richard (eds.). Democracy's Plight in the European Neighbourhood: Struggling Transitions and Proliferating Dynasties. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies. pp. 140–147. ISBN 9789290799269.
326. Migdal, Joel S (1988). Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-01073-1.
327. Putnam, Robert D (2001). Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 978-0-7432-0304-3.
328. North, Douglass C (1992). Transaction costs, institutions, and economic performance. San Francisco: ICS Press. p. 13.
329. Hearns-Branaman, Jesse Owen (2012), 'The Egyptian Revolution did not take place: On live television coverage by Al Jazeera English', International Journal of Baudrillard Studies Vol 9, no 1 "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 21 March 2015. Retrieved 17 May 2015.CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
330. McCann, Colum (23 December 2011). "YEAR IN PICTURES: Arab Spring". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 15 November 2012. Retrieved 16 May 2012.
331. Lotan, Gilad; Graeff, Erhardt; Ananny, Mike; Gaffney, Devin; Pearce, Ian; Boyd, Danah (2011). "The Revolutions Were Tweeted: Information Flows During the 2011 Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions". International Journal of Communication. 5: 1375–1405.
332. Khondker, Habibul Haque (October 2011). "Role of the New Media in the Arab Spring". Globalizations. 8 (5): 675–679. doi:10.1080/14747731.2011.621287.
333. Comunello, Francesca; Anzera, Giuseppe (2012), "Will the revolution be tweeted? A conceptual framework for understanding the social median the Arab Spring", Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 23:4 (4): 454–470, doi:10.1080/09596410.2012.712435
334. Fahmy, Nabil. "Managing compromise in Middle East – Managing compromise in Middle East." Daily Star, The (Beirut, Lebanon) 25 Oct. 2016, Commentary: 7. NewsBank. Web. 24 October 2016.
335. "Tunisia Overview". www.worldbank.org. Archived from the original on 9 October 2016. Retrieved 27 October 2016.
336. "East Med." Middle East Monitor: East Med 26.11 (2016): 1–8. Business Source Complete. Web. 18 November 2016.
337. Aras, Bülent; Falk, Richard (2016). "Five years after the Arab Spring: a critical evaluation". Third World Quarterly. 37 (12): 2252–2258. doi:10.1080/01436597.2016.1224087.
338. Aras, Bülent, and Emirhan Yorulmazlar. "State, Region And Order: Geopolitics of the Arab Spring." Third World Quarterly 37.12 (2016): 2259–2273. Business Source Complete. Web. 18 November 2016.
339. Gause III, F. Gregory (July 2011). "Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: The Myth of Authoritarian Stability". Foreign Policy. 90 (4): 81–90. JSTOR 23039608.
340. Campante, Filipe R; Chor, David (Spring 2012). "Why was the Arab World Poised for Revolution? Schooling, Economic Opportunities, and the Arab Spring". The Journal of Economic Perspectives. 26 (2): 167–187. doi:10.1257/jep.26.2.167. JSTOR 41495309. S2CID 41753996.
341. Acemoglu, Daron; Johnson, Simon; Robinson, James (4 January 2006). "Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth". In Aghion, Philippe; Durlauf, Steven N (eds.). Handbook of Economic Growth, Volume 1A. North-Holland. pp. 385–472. ISBN 978-0-444-52041-8.
342. Ruach, James E; Kostyshak, Scott (Summer 2009). "The Three Arab Worlds". Journal of Economic Perspectives. 23 (3): 165–188. doi:10.1257/jep.23.3.165.
343. Göran Therborn (2014). "New Masses". New Left Review, No.85.
344. Mecham, Quinn (24 October 2014). "The evolution of Islamism since the Arab uprisings". Washington Post. Archived from the original on 12 October 2015. Retrieved 28 October 2015.
345. "Rethinking Political Islam". brookings.edu. Brookings. Archived from the original on 28 October 2015. Retrieved 29 October 2015.
346. Islam Hassan (31 March 2015). "GCC's 2014 Crisis: Causes, Issues and Solutions". Gulf Cooperation Council's Challenges and Prospects. Al Jazeera Research Center. Archived from the original on 4 September 2015. Retrieved 4 June 2015.
347. Osman, Tarek (2016). Islamism: What It Means for the Middle East and the World. Yale University Press. p. 244. ISBN 978-0-300-19772-3. Retrieved 18 October 2016.
348. Agha, Hussein; Malley, Robert (11 March 2019). "The Middle East's Great Divide is not Sectarianism". The New Yorker. Retrieved 31 March 2019.
349. Darwisheh, Housam (2013). "From Authoritarianism to Upheaval: the Political Economy of the Syrian Uprising and Regime Persistence". Institute of Developing Economics, Japan. Retrieved 31 March 2019.
350. Barakat, Halim (1993). The Arab World: Society, Culture and State (PDF). Berkeley, University of California Press. p. 19.
351. Barakat 1993, pp. 15–17.
352. al-Haj Saleh, Yassin (19 February 2016). "Syria and the World: Reactionarism is Back, and Progressing". Retrieved 15 April 2019.
353. Dawn Brancati. 2016. Democracy Protests: Origins, Features, and Significance. New York: Cambridge University Press.
354. "Islam and the Arab revolutions". The Economist. 31 March 2011. Retrieved 16 April 2019.
355. "Bread, freedom and social justice". Mediterranean Affairs. 5 February 2015. Retrieved 16 April 2019.
356. Bayat, Asef (2017). Revolution without Revolutionaries: Making Sense of the Arab Spring. Stanford University Press. p. 11. ISBN 978-1-5036-0258-8.
357. Abdelrahman, Maha (September 2015). "Social Movement and the Quest for Organisation: Egypt and Everywhere" (PDF). LSE Middle East Centre Paper Series, 08. pp. 6–7. Retrieved 6 April 2019.
358. Bayat, Asef (2013). "Revolution in Bad Times". New Left Review (80, March–April 2013). Retrieved 15 April 2019.
359. Ghonim, Wael (2012). Revolution 2.0: The Power of the People is Greater than People in Power. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, New York. pp. 204–205.
360. "about us (see reply in comments)". shabab6april.wordpress.com. 2011. Retrieved 7 April 2019.
361. Hashem Rabi', Amr (2011). Thawra 25 January: Qira'a Awwaliyya wa Ru'ya Mustaqbaliyya (January 25 Revolution: An Initial Interpretation and Future Prospect) (in Arabic). Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo. p. 429.
362. Darwisheh, Housam (2014). "Trajectories and Outcomes: Comparing Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria". IDE Discussion Paper. Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization. 456: 10. Retrieved 8 April 2019.
363. kandil, Hazem (2016). "Sisi'Egypt" (PDF). New Left Review, November–December 2016 (102): 29–30.
364. Lawson, George (2015). "Revolution, non-violence, and the Arab Uprisings" (PDF). Mobilization: An International Quarterly: 24. ISSN 1086-671X. Retrieved 6 April 2019.
365. Bayat 2017, p. 161. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFBayat2017 (help)
366. Mehrez, Samia (Summer 2001). "Take Them Out of the Ball Game". Middle East Report 219. Retrieved 6 April 2019.
367. Hall, Bogumila (2017). "This is our homeland": Yemen's marginalized and the quest for rights and recognition". Arabian Humanities (9). doi:10.4000/cy.3427. Retrieved 8 April 2019.
368. Nixon, Ron (14 April 2011). "U.S. Groups Helped Nurture Arab Uprisings". The New York Times. Retrieved 10 April 2019.
369. "Tunisian-Egyptian Link That Shook the Arab History". The New York Times. 14 February 2011. Retrieved 10 April 2019.
370. Bayat 2017, p. 177. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFBayat2017 (help)
371. "Omar al-Bashir ousted: How Sudan got there". BBC. 11 April 2019. Retrieved 13 April 2019.
372. Khoury, Elias (2019). "The Rebirth of Tahrir Square". Qantara.de. Retrieved 12 April 2019.
373. "اللائحة الاقتصادية الاجتمعاية" (in Arabic). ennahda.tn. Retrieved 17 April 2019.
374. "What is the Muslim Brotherhood?". aljazeera.com. Retrieved 17 April 2019.
375. "About us". International Centre for Transitional Justice. 15 February 2011. Retrieved 20 April 2019.
376. "Social Justice in the Light of the Revolutionary Process in Tunisia in Social Justice Concept and Policies After the Arab Revolutions" (PDF). Arab Forum for Alternative Studies, Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. 2014. p. 93. Retrieved 20 April 2019.
377. "Social Justice and the Arab Revolutions: The Complexities of the Concept and Policies in Social Justice Concept and Policies After the Arab Revolutions" (PDF). Arab Forum for Alternative Studies, Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. 2014. p. 15. Retrieved 20 April 2019.
378. Cockburn, Patrick (23 April 2019). "What Revolutionaries in the Middle East Have Learnt Since the Arab Spring". CounterPunch. Retrieved 23 April 2019.
379. Hellyer, H. A. (25 April 2019). "Until the Arab world enjoys fundamental rights, there will be many more springs to come". The Globe and Mail. Retrieved 27 April 2019.
380. Kabalan, Marwan (29 April 2019). "In the Middle East, a new military crescent is in the making". al-Jazeera.com. Retrieved 1 April 2019.
381. Hellyer, 2019 & Globe and Mail. sfn error: no target: CITEREFHellyer2019Globe_and_Mail (help)
382. Ottaway, Marina (1 May 2019). "Algeria and Sudan: The revolutionary dilemma". Middle East Eye. Retrieved 3 May 2019.
383. Atef Said (2015). "We ought to be here: Historizing space and mobilization in Tahrir Square". International Sociology. SAGE Publication. 30 (4): 348–366. doi:10.1177/0268580914551306.
384. Bayat, Asef (2010). Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East. Stanford University Press, US. p. 212.
385. Said 2015. sfn error: no target: CITEREFSaid2015 (help)
386. Riham al-Iraqi. "استطلاع رسمي يرصد أحلام المصريين". al-Masry al-Youm. Retrieved 31 March 2019.

Further reading

• Aa. Vv. (2011), The New Arab Revolt: What Happened, What It Means, and What Comes Next, Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, Maggio-Giugno.
• Abaza, M. (2011), Revolutionary Moments in Tahrir Square, American University of Cairo, 7 May 2011, www.isa-sociology.org.
• Abdih, Y. (2011), Arab Spring: Closing the Jobs Gap. High youth unemployment contributes to widespread unrest in the Middle East Finance & Development, in Finance & Development (International Monetary Fund), Giugno.
• Alfadhel, Khalifa. The Failure of the Arab Spring (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016). ISBN 978-1-4438-9789-1
• Anderson, L (May–June 2011). "Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya". Foreign Affairs. 90 (3).
• Beinin, J. – Vairel, F. (2011), (a cura di), Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa, Stanford, CA, Stanford University press.
• Brownlee, Jason; Masoud, Tarek; Reynolds, Andrew (2013). The Arab Spring: the politics of transformation in North Africa and the Middle East. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Browers, Michaelle (2009). Political Ideology in the Arab World: Accommodation and Transformation. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-76532-9.
• Cohen, R. (2011), A Republic Called Tahrir, in New York Times.
• Dabashi, Hamid. The Arab Spring: The End of Postcolonialism (Palgrave Macmillan; 2012) 182 pages
• Darwish, Nonie (28 February 2012). The demon We Don't Know: The Dark Side of Revolutions in the Middle East. John Wiley & Sons.
• Davies, Thomas Richard (2014). "The failure of strategic nonviolent action in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya and Syria: 'political ju-jitsu' in reverse" (PDF). Global Change, Peace & Security. 26 (3): 299–313. doi:10.1080/14781158.2014.924916.
• Gardner, David (2009). Last Chance: The Middle East in the Balance. London: I.B. Tauris. ISBN 978-1-84885-041-5.
• Gause, F. G. (2011), Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: The Myth of Authoritarian Stability, in Foreign Affairs, July/August.
• Goldstone, Jack A.; Hazel, John T., Jr. (14 April 2011). "Understanding the Revolutions of 2011: Weakness and Resilience in Middle Eastern Autocracies". Foreign Affairs (May/June 2011).
• Haddad, Bassam; Bsheer, Rosie; Abu-Rish, Ziad, eds. (2012). The Dawn of the Arab Uprisings: End of an Old Order?. London: Pluto Press. ISBN 978-0-7453-3325-0.
• Kaye, Dalia Dassa (2008). More Freedom, Less Terror? Liberalization and Political Violence in the Arab World. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. ISBN 978-0-8330-4508-9.
• Krüger, Laura-Theresa, and Bernhard Stahl. "The French foreign policy U-turn in the Arab Spring–the case of Tunisia." Mediterranean Politics 23.2 (2018): 197-222 online.
• Lutterbeck, Derek. (2013). Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil-Military Relations. Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 39, No. 1 (pp. 28–52)
• Ottaway, Marina; Choucair-Vizoso, Julia, eds. (2008). Beyond the Façade: Political Reform in the Arab World. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. ISBN 978-0-87003-239-4.
• Pelletreau, Robert H. (24 February 2011). "Transformation in the Middle East: Comparing the Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Bahrain". Foreign Affairs.
• Phares, Walid (2010). Coming Revolution: Struggle for Freedom in the Middle East. New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 978-1-4391-7837-9.
• Posusney, Marsha Pripstein; Angrist, Michele Penner, eds. (2005). Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. ISBN 978-1-58826-317-9.
• Roberts, Adam, Michael J. Willis, Rory McCarthy and Timothy Garton Ash (eds.), Civil Resistance in the Arab Spring: Triumphs and Disasters, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016. ISBN 978-0-19-874902-8. Arabic language edition published by All Prints Publishers, Beirut, 2017. ISBN 978-9953-88-970-2.
• Rosiny, S. and Richter, T. (2016). "The Arab Spring: Misconceptions and Prospects". GIGA Focus Middle East No. 4/2016
• Steinitz, Chris and McCants, William (2014). Reaping the Whirlwind: Gulf State Competition after the Arab Uprisings. Arlington, VA: CNA Corporation.
• Struble Jr., Robert (22 August 2011). "Libya and the Doctrine of Justifiable Rebellion". Catholic Lane.
• Tausch, Arno (2015). Globalization, the environment and the future "greening" of Arab politics. Connecticut: REPEC.
• Tausch, Arno (Fall 2013). "A Look at International Survey Data About Arab Opinion". Middle East Review of International Affairs. 17 (3): 57–74. SSRN 2388627.
• Tausch, Arno (Spring 2016). "The Civic Culture of the Arab World: A Comparative Analysis Based on World Values Survey Data". Middle East Review of International Affairs. 20 (1): 35–59. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2827232. SSRN 2827232.
• Tausch, Arno (2015). The political algebra of global value change. General models and implications for the Muslim world. With Almas Heshmati and Hichem Karoui (1st ed.). Nova Science Publishers, New York. ISBN 978-1-62948-899-8.
• United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on International Operations and Organizations, Human Rights, Democracy, and Global Women's Issues. (2012). Women and the Arab Spring: Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Organizations, Human Rights, Democracy, and Global Women's Issues and the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, November 2, 2011. Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O.
• Amanda Jacoby, Tamil (2013). "Israel's relations with Egypt and Turkey during the Arab Spring: Weathering the Storm". Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs. VII (2): 29–42. doi:10.1080/23739770.2013.11446550.

External links

• Arab Spring
• Right to Nonviolence
• United States Institute of Peace
• Civil Movements: The Impact of Facebook and Twitter
• Middle East Constitutional Forum

Live blogs

• Middle East at Al Jazeera
• Middle East protests at BBC News
• Arab and Middle East protests live blog at The Guardian
• Middle East Protests at The Lede blog at The New York Times
• Middle East protests live at Reuters

Ongoing coverage

• A (Working) Academic Arab Spring Reading List collected peer-reviewed academic articles on the impact of social media on the Arab Spring
• Constitutional Transitions Timeline Collected legal and political changes and short analysis at Middle East Constitutional Forum
• Unrest in the Arab World collected news and commentary at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
• Issue Guide: Arab World Protests, Council on Foreign Relations
• Middle East protests collected news and commentary at the Financial Times
• Unrest in the Arab World collected map, news and commentary at CNN
• Arab and Middle East unrest collected news and commentary at The Guardian
• Arab and Middle East unrest – interactive timeline collected news and commentary at The Guardian
• Rage on the Streets collected news and commentary at Hurriyet Daily News and Economic Review
• Middle East Unrest collected news and commentary at The National
• Middle East Uprisings collected news and commentary at Showdown in the Middle East website
• "The Arab Revolution collected news and commentary". Der Spiegel.
• The Middle East in Revolt collected news and commentary at Time

Other

• Hassan, Oz (2015). "Undermining the transatlantic democracy agenda? The Arab Spring and Saudi Arabia's counteracting democracy strategy". Democratization. 22 (3): 479–495. doi:10.1080/13510347.2014.981161. ISSN 1351-0347.
• The Arab Spring—One Year Later: The CenSEI Report analyzes how 2011's clamor for democratic reform met 2012's need to sustain its momentum. The CenSEI Report, 13 February 2012
• Interface journal special issue on the Arab Spring, Interface: a journal for and about social movements, May 2012
• "The Shoe Thrower's index (An index of unrest in the Arab world)". The Economist. 9 February 2011.
• "Interview with Tariq Ramadan: 'We Need to Get a Better Sense of the Trends within Islamism'". Qantara.de. 2 February 2011. Archived from the original on 26 February 2011. Retrieved 4 March 2011.
• Sadek J. Al Azm, "The Arab Spring: Why Exactly at this Time?" Reason Papers 33 (Fall 2011)
• Tracking the wave of protests with statistics, RevolutionTrends.org
• Arab uprisings: 10 key moments from BBC Middle East Editor Jeremy Bowden (10 December 2012)
• How to Start a Revolution, documentary directed by Ruaridh Arrow