Korean nationalism

Korean nationalism refers to nationalism among the Korean people. In the Korean context, this encompasses various movements throughout history to maintain the Korean cultural identity, history, and ethnicity (or "race").

Korean Nationalism
South Korean name
Hangul
Hanja
North Korean name
Chosŏn'gŭl
Hancha

Since at least the mid-20th century, the dominant strand of contemporary Korean nationalism, at least in regards to South Korea, tends to be romantic in nature (specifically ethnic or "racial"), rather than civic. There, the former has been described as competing with the latter and weakening it. Romantic ethnic nationalism in North Korea has strong salience as well, though unlike in South Korea, civic nationalism towards the state and race-based nationalism do not compete but rather co-exist in harmony and are mutually self-reinforcing.

History
No. 50, Ruijin No. 2 Road, Huangpu District, Shanghai, the birthplace of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea

Historically, the central objectives of Korea's nationalist movement were the advancement and protection of Korea's ancient culture and national identity from foreign influence, and the fostering of the independence movement during Colonial Korea.[1] In order to obtain political and cultural autonomy, it first had to promote Korea's cultural dependency. For this reason, the nationalist movement demanded the restoration and preservation of Korea's traditional culture. The Donghak (Eastern Learning) peasant movement, also known as the Donghak Peasant Revolution, that began in the 1870s, could be seen as an early form of what would become the Korean nationalist resistance movement against foreign influences. It was succeeded by the Righteous Army movement and later a series of Korean resistance movements that led, in part, to the current status of the two Korean nations.

National resistance movements
Main article: Korean independence movement

Nationalism in late 19th century Korea was a form of resistance movements, but with significant differences between the north and south. Since the intrusion by foreign powers in the late 19th century, Koreans have had to construct their identity in ways that pitted them against foreigners. They have witnessed and participated in a wide range of nationalist actions over the past century, but all of them have been some form of resistance against foreign influences. During the colonial period, the Korean nationalists carried on the struggle for independence, fighting against Imperial Japan in Korea, China particularly Manchuria and China Proper and Far East Russia. They formed 'governments in exile', armies, and secret groups to fight the imperial Japanese wherever they are.

Partition of Korea
Main articles: Division of Korea and North Korea–South Korea relations

Korea was divided at the 38th parallel between north and south by the Allied powers in 1945 as part of the disarmament of Imperial Japan, and the division persists to this day. The split is perpetuated by rival regimes, opposing ideologies, and global politics; it is further deepened by a differing sense of national identity derived from the unique histories, polities, class systems, and gender roles experienced by Koreans on different sides of the border. As a result, Korean nationalism in the late 20th century has been permeated by the split between North and South. Each regime espouses its own distinctive form of nationalism, different from the opposing side's, that nonetheless seeks to encompass the entire Korean Peninsula in its scope.

Korean reunification
Main article: Korean reunification

With regard to Korean nationalism, the reunification of the two Koreas is a highly related issue. Ethnic nationalism that is prevalent in Korean society is likely to play a significant role in the unification process, if it does occur. As Gi-Wook Shin claims, “Ethnic consciousness would not only legitimize the drive for unification but it could also be a common ground, especially in the early stages of the unification process, that is needed to facilitate a smooth integration of the two systems.”[2]

Korean reunification (Korean: 남북통일) refers to the hypothetical future reunification of North and South Korea under a single government. South Korea had adopted a sunshine policy towards the North that was based on the hope that one day, the two countries would be re-united in the 1990s. The process towards this was started by the historic June 15th North–South Joint Declaration in August 2000, where the two countries agreed to work towards a peaceful reunification in the future. However, there are a number of hurdles in this process due to the large political and economic differences between the two countries and other state actors such as China, Russia, and the United States. Short-term problems such as a large number of refugees that would migrate from the North into the South and initial economic and political instability would need to be overcome.

State-aligned nationalism

North Korea
Further information: Juche
The flag of North Korea. By eschewing racialized historical symbols such as the Taeguk and Rose of Sharon, North Korea has attempted to foster a civic-based patriotic nationalism towards the state, rather than merely towards a race of ethnicity. Unlike South Koreans, North Koreans tend to see the "Korean race" and their state as being coterminous.

In North Korea, nationalism is incorporated as part of the state-sponsored ideology of Juche. The Juche Idea teaches that "man is the master of everything and decides everything",[3] and the Korean people are the masters of Korea's revolution. Juche is a component of North Korea's political system. The word literally means "main body" or "subject"; it has also been translated in North Korean sources as "independent stand" and the "spirit of self-reliance".

The Juche Idea gradually emerged as a systematic ideological doctrine in the 1960s. Kim Il-sung outlined the three fundamental principles of Juche as being:

  1. "independence in politics" (chaju).
  2. "self-sustenance in the economy" (charip).
  3. "self-defense in national defense" (chawi).

Unlike South Koreans, North Koreans generally believe that their (North Korean) state and the "Korean race" (English: 민족, minjok) are analogous. Thus they strengthen each other rather than undermining the other like in South Korea:[4][5]

Thanks in part to decades of skillful propaganda, North Koreans generally equate the race with their state, so that ethno-nationalism and state-loyalty are mutually enforcing. In this respect North Korea enjoys an important advantage over its rival, for in the Republic of Korea ethnonationalism militates against support for a state that is perceived as having betrayed the race.

— Brian Reynolds Myers, North Korea's state-loyalty advantage (2011)[6]

Even North Koreans who may not particularly admire their country's leaders will still be patriotic towards their state.[7] The North Korean state's symbols, such as the national emblem and flag, have been cited as an example of North Korea's attempt to build a civic-based nationalism, in contrast to South Korea's state symbols, which utilize overtly racialized motifs and ethnic symbolism.[6]

South Korea
The flag of South Korea; state-based nationalism in South Korea is weak compared to the more salient race-based nationalism. As a result, in South Korea, the South Korean flag is viewed as representing the "Korean race" first and South Korea second. Thus, the national flag in South Korea is treated with respect there and rarely ever parodied and desecrated by citizens, unlike in other countries.

State-based nationalism (or patriotism) in South Korea is weak, compared with the more salient race-based nationalism.[4][5] As a result, some commentators have described the South Korean state in the eyes of South Koreans as constituting "an unloved republic".[6][8] Whereas in North Korea, most of its citizens view their state and race as being the same thing,[4][5] most South Koreans on the other hand tend to see the "Korean race" and their (South Korean) state as being separate entities due to the existence of a competing Korean state in North Korea. According to Korea scholar Brian Reynolds Myers, a professor at Dongseo University, while race-based nationalism in North Korea strengthens patriotism towards the state and vice-versa,[6] in South Korea it undermines it:

Anglophones tend to use the words nation and state more or less interchangeably, but when one nation is divided into two states, it’s important to stick to the [South] Koreans' own practice of distinguishing clearly between nationalism (minjokjuŭi) and patriotism / state spirit (aeguksim, kukka chŏngsin, kukkajuŭi, etc). Historians do this even in English when discussing the Weimar Republic, where nationalism undermined support for the state — and for liberal democracy — just as it does in South Korea today.

— Brian Reynolds Myers, "On Experts and Exegetes" (September 6, 2017), Sthele Press[9]

Due to traditional state support for race nationalism during the 20th century, South Koreans have come to view positive achievements as being a result of inherent racial characteristics, whereas negative events are attributed to the incompetence, malevolence, and inherent inferiority of the South Korean state:[5][6][10]

South Korean nationalism is something quite different from the patriotism toward the state that Americans feel. Identification with the Korean race is strong, while that with the Republic of Korea is weak.

— Brian Reynolds Myers, "South Korea's Collective Shrug" (May 27, 2010), The New York Times.[4]

It is said that one of the reasons the South Korean state during the 20th century decided to extol race-based nationalism over civic nationalism was that being an authoritarian military junta at the time, it did not want to extol republican principles that might be used to criticize it in turn.[6] That said, civic state-based nationalism was said to have been stronger during those years than in contemporary post-democratization South Korea, albeit still tenuous.

South Koreans' lack of state-based nationalism (or patriotism) manifests itself in various ways in the country's society. For example, there is no national holiday solely commemorating the state itself.[6] The closest analogue, Constitution Day, ceased to be one in 2008.[5] The Liberation Day holiday, which is celebrated each August, shares its date with the establishment of the South Korean state. However, celebrations during the holiday choose to forgo commemorations of the South Korean state or its establishment in favor of focusing and extolling other aspects.[6] As a result, many South Koreans do not know the exact date their own state was established,[6] in contrast to North Koreans, who do.[5] In contrast, a holiday marking the mythological formation of the "Korean race" in 2333 BC is commemorated with a national holiday in South Korea each October.[6]

The "Hell Chosun" phenomenon and a desire among many South Koreans to immigrate have also been cited as an example of South Koreans' general lack of nationalistic patriotism towards their state.[8] The lack of state-based nationalism manifests itself in diplomacy as well; the lack of a strong, resolute response by South Korea to North Korea's attacks against it in 2010 (i.e. the sinking of ROKS Cheonan and the bombardment of Yeonpyeong) has been attributed to the former's lack of state-aligned nationalistic sentiment, as these attacks were viewed as mere affronts against the state.[11][12][7] In contrast, Japanese claims to South Korean-claimed territory are seen as affronts against the Korean race and are thus responded to with more vigor from South Koreans.[12]

Even state symbols that are ostensibly civic in nature, such as the national anthem, state emblem, and national flag contain racial nationalist references (such as the mugunghwa flower) instead of republican or civic ones.[6] Thus, the South Korean flag is often seen by South Koreans as representing the "Korean race" rather than merely South Korea itself.[13][14] As a result, the vast majority of South Koreans will almost always treat their national flag with reverence and respect, compared to other countries where citizens would desecrate their own national flags as political statements or in protest.[6] This weak state-based nationalism was reflected in the pre-2011 South Korean military oath and pre-2007 pledge of allegiance, both of which pledged allegiance to the "Korean race" over the state.[15][16][17][5][17][18]

One of the reasons put forth to explain South Koreans' lack of support or affinity for the South Korean state is due to a popular misconception that only North Korea purged its regime of pro-Japanese collaborators of the colonial period and that South Korea did not, while in reality the former did not do so.[4][5][19][7] Another reason given is that South Koreans view their interactions with their state in negative contexts, such as when having to report for mandatory military service or paying fines.[6]

Particular issues

Anti-Japanese sentiment
Main article: Japan–Korea disputes

Contemporary Korean nationalism, at least in South Korea, often incorporates anti-Japanese sentiment as a core component of its ideology,[20] even being described by some scholars as constituting an integral part of South Korea's civil religion.[21]

The legacy of the colonial period of Korean history continues to fuel recriminations and demands for restitution in both Koreas. North and South Korea have both lodged severe protests against visits by Japanese officials to the Yasukuni Shrine, which is seen as glorifying the Class A war criminals whose remains are held there. South Koreans claim that a number of Korean women who worked near Japanese military bases as comfort women were forced to serve as sex slaves against their will for Japanese soldiers during World War II which had been a persistent thorn in the side of Japan-South Korea relations from the 1990s to the 2010s. Disagreements over demands for reparations and a formal apology still remain unresolved despite the previous agreement and compensation in 1965, South Koreans started peaceful vigils in 1992 held by survivors on a weekly basis. Recent Japanese history textbook controversies have emerged as a result of what some see as an attempt at historical negationism with the aim of whitewashing or ignoring Japan's war crimes during World War II. These issues continue to separate the two countries diplomatically, and provide fuel for nationalism in both Koreas as well as anti-Japanese sentiment.

According to Robert E. Kelly, a professor at Pusan National University, anti-Japanese sentiment in South Korea stems not just from Japanese atrocities during the occupation period, but also from the Korean Peninsula's division.[17] As a result, Kelly says, South Koreans take out their anger, whether rising from Korean division or otherwise, against Japan,[17] as due to the racialized nature of Korean nationalism it is considered gauche for South Koreans to be overly hostile towards North Korea.[22][4][5] This view is supported by another professor, Brian Reynolds Myers of Dongseo University.[4][5]

Liancourt Rocks dispute
Main article: Liancourt Rocks dispute

The Liancourt Rocks dispute has been ongoing since the end of World War II after the United States rejected Korea's claim to give sovereignty of the Liancourt Rocks islands, known as Dokdo or Tokto (독도/獨島, literally "solitary island") in Korean and Takeshima in Japanese, to Korea in the 1951.

Since 1954, the South Koreans have administered the islands but bickering on both sides involving nationalism and lingering historical acrimony has led to the current impasse. Adding to this problem is political pressure from conservative politicians and nationalist groups in both South Korea and Japan to have more assertive territorial policies.

With the introduction of the 1994 UN Law of the Sea Convention, South Korea and Japan began to set their new maritime boundaries, particularly in overlapping terrain in the Sea of Japan (East Sea), where some exclusive economic zone (EEZ) borders was less than 400 nautical miles (700 km) apart.[23] Tensions escalated in 1996 when both governments declared a 200-nautical-mile (400 km) EEZ that encompassed the island, which brought Japan-South Korean relations to an all-time low.

This has not only complicated bilateral relations but heightened nationalist sentiments on both sides. In spite of generational change and the passage of time, the institutionalization of Korean collective memory is causing young Koreans to be as anti-Japanese, if not more so, than the older generation.[24][25] For Koreans, "historical memory and feelings of han (resentment) run deeply and can influence Korea's relations with its neighbors, allies, and enemies in ways not easily predicted by models of policy-making predicated on realpolitik or other geo-strategic or economic concerns."[26][27]

Due to Korea's colonial past, safeguarding the island has become equivalent to safeguarding the nation-state and its national identity. A territory's value and importance is not limited to its physical dimensions but also the psychological value it holds as a source of sovereignty and identity.[28] Triggered by perceptions and strong feelings of injustice and humiliation, Korean nationalistic sentiment has become involved in the dispute. The island itself has become to symbolize South Korean national identity and pride, making it an issue even more difficult to resolve.[29] South Korea's claim to the island holds emotional content that goes beyond material significance, and giving way on the island issue to Japan would be seen as compromising the sovereignty of the entire peninsula. The dispute has taken on the form of a national grievance rather than a simple territorial dispute.

The South Korean government has also played a role in fanning nationalism in this dispute. President Roh Moo-hyun began a speech on Korea-Japan relations in April 2006 by bluntly stating, “The island is our land” and “for Koreans, the island is a symbol of the complete recovery of sovereignty.”[30] The issue of the island is clearly tied to the protection of the nation-state that was once taken away by Japan. President Roh emphasizes this point again by saying:

“Dokdo for us is not merely a matter pertaining to territorial rights over tiny islets but is emblematic of bringing closure to an unjust chapter in our history with Japan and of the full consolidation of Korea’s sovereignty.”[30]

Later on in his speech Roh also mentions the Yasukuni Shrine and Japanese history textbook controversy, saying that they will be dealt with together.[31] Having placed the Liancourt Rocks issue "in the context of rectifying the historical record between Korea and Japan" and "the safeguarding of [Korea's] sovereignty", compromise becomes impossible.[32] As the French theorist Ernest Renan said, "Where national memories are concerned, griefs are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common effort."[33]

The Liancourt Rocks dispute has affected the Korean and Japanese perceptions of each other. According to a 2008 survey by Gallup Korea and the Japan Research Center, 20% of Koreans had friendly feelings towards Japan and 36% of Japanese the same towards Korea. When asked for the reason of their antipathy, most Koreans mentioned the territorial dispute over the island, and the Japanese the anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea. This is in contrast to a 2002 survey (post 2002 FIFA World Cup) conducted by the Chosun Ilbo and Mainichi Shimbun, where 35% of Koreans and 69% of Japanese had friendly views of the other country.[34]

Anti-U.S. sentiment
Main article: Anti-American sentiment in Korea

Anti-Americanism in Korea began with the earliest contact between the two nations and continued after the division of Korea. In both North Korea and South Korea, anti-Americanism after the Korean War has focused on the presence and behavior of American military personnel (USFK), aggravated especially by high-profile accidents or crimes by U.S. servicemembers, with various crimes including rape and assault, among others.

The 2002 Yangju highway incident especially ignited Anti-American passions.[35] The ongoing U.S. military presence in South Korea, especially at the Yongsan Garrison (on a base previously used by the Imperial Japanese Army during Colonial Korea) in central Seoul, remains a contentious issue. While protests have arisen over specific incidents, they are often reflective of deeper historical resentments. Robert Hathaway, director of the Wilson Center's Asia program, suggests: "the growth of anti-American sentiment in both Japan and South Korea must be seen not simply as a response to American policies and actions, but as reflective of deeper domestic trends and developments within these Asian countries."[36]

Korean anti-Americanism after the war was fueled by American occupation of USFK troops and support for the authoritarian rule of Park Chung-hee, and what was perceived as an American endorsement of the brutal tactics used in the Gwangju massacre.[37] Speaking to the Wilson Center, Katherine Moon was noted by Hathaway as suggesting that "anti-Americanism also represents the collective venting of accumulated grievances that in many instances have lain hidden for decades", but that despite the "very public demonstrations of anger toward the United States [...] the majority of Koreans of all age groups supports the continuation of the American alliance."[38]

Manchuria and Gando disputes

Historical Korean claims of Manchuria can be traced back to the late Joseon dynasty. It was common in late Joseon dynasty to write about old lands of Goguryeo, an expression of nostalgia for the north. In early 20th century, Korean nationalist historians like Shin Chaeho, advocated a complete unification of Korean peninsula and Manchuria in order to restore the ancient lands of Dangun.[39]

Today, Irredentist Korean nationalist historians have claimed that Manchuria (now called Northeast China), in particular Gando (known in China as Jiandao), a region bordering China, North Korea, and Russia, and home to the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture should be part of Korea, based on ancient Gojoseon, Goguryeo and Balhae control of the area.[40][41] The term Greater Korea, sometimes used in nationalist works, usually enompasses those regions located.[42][41] The claim for Gando is said to be stronger than the claim for the whole of Manchuria, due to later Balhae presence in Gando after the fall of the Koguryo kingdom, the current area population's consisting of 1/3 ethnic Koreans,[43] and the circumstances of the 1909 Gando Convention that relegated the area to Chinese control.[44] While the Manchurian claims have not received official attention in South Korea, claims for Gando were the subject of a bill introduced in 2004, at a time when China had been claiming that Balhae and Koguryo had been "minority states" within China and the resulting controversy was at its height.[45] The legislation proposed by 59 South Korean lawmakers would have declared the Gando Convention signed under Japanese rule to be "null and void".[46] Later that year, the two countries reached an understanding that their governments would refrain from further involvement in the historical controversy.[47]

Ethnic nationalism
Main article: Korean ethnic nationalism
A BBC poll from 2016 of various countries, asking what the most important factor in self identity was. South Korea has the highest proportion given for "race or culture" at 25%.

Ethnic nationalism emphasizes descent and race. Among many Koreans, both in the North and South, ethnicity is interpreted on a racial basis, with "blood", and is usually considered the key determinant in defining "Koreanness" in contemporary Korean nationalist thought.[48][26][49][4][5][15][16][17][50] In South Korea, ethnic nationalism has salience to the point where it has been described as being a part of the country's civil religion.[4][5] Despite its contemporary salience, ethnic Korean nationalism is a relatively recent development.[6][51]

Importance of blood

The term "pure blood" refers to the belief that Korean people are a pure race descended from a single ancestor. First invoked during the period of resistance to colonial rule, the idea of having pure blood gave Koreans an impetus for developing a sense of ethnic homogeneity and national pride, as well as a potential catalyst for racial discrimination and prejudice.[52] As a way of resisting colonial rule, Shin Chaeho published his book Joseon Sanggosa in the 1920s, proclaiming that Korean descent is based on the Goguryeo kingdom, formed from the intermingling of the descendants of Dangun Joseon with the Buyeo kingdom. This raised a sense of ethnic homogeneity which persists as a major element in the politics and foreign relations of both Koreas.[53] A survey in 2006 showed that 68.2% of respondents considered "blood" the most important criterion of defining the Korean nation, and 74.9% agreed that "Koreans are all brothers and sisters regardless of residence and ideology."[26]

Noted Korea scholar Brian Reynolds Myers argues in his 2010 book The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why It Matters that the North Korean ideology of a purest race arose from 20th century Japanese fascism. Japanese collaborators are said to have introduced the notion of racial unity in an effort to assert that Japanese and Koreans came from the same racial stock. After Japan relinquished control of Korea, Myers argues, the theory was subsequently adjusted to promote the idea of a pure Korean race.[54]

A poll by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in 2015 found that only 5.4% of South Koreans in their twenties said they saw North Koreans as people sharing the same bloodline with South Koreans The poll also found that only 11 percent of South Koreans associated North Korea with Koreans, with most people associating them with words like military, war or nuclear weapons. It also found that most South Koreans expressed deeper feelings of "closeness" with Americans and Chinese than with North Koreans.[55]

Nationalist historiography
Main article: Korean nationalist historiography
Shin Chaeho (1880–1936), founder of Korea's nationalist historiography

Shin Chaeho was the first historian to focus on the Korean minjok ("race" or ethnicity), and narrated Korean history in terms of its minjok history. There is no direct English language equivalent for the word minjok, though commentators have offered "race" and "ethnicity" as being the closest analogues.[56] For Shin, minjok and history were mutually defining and as he says in the preface of the Doksa Sillon, “if one dismisses the minjok, there is no history.” Shin emphasized the ancientness of the Korean minjok history, elevated the status of the semi-legendary figure, Dangun, as the primordial ancestor of the Korean people and located the host minjok, Puyo.[57] Shin launched a vision of the Korean nation as a historically defined minjok or ethnicity entity.[58] In an attempt to counter China's controversial Northeast Project and Goguryeo controversies that ensued, the South Korean government in 2007 incorporated the founding of Gojoseon of the year 2333 BCE into its textbooks.[59]

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See also

References
  1. Ryu Tongshik (1999) - While Japanese scholars were pursuing colonialist aims in research on Korea culture, Korean scholars on the other hand began their own research in order to discover in the traditional culture the spiritual basis for the independence movement against Japan.
  2. Shin, Gi-Wook (2006). Ethnic Nationalism in Korea. California: Stanford University Press. p. 203. ISBN 0-8047-5407-1.
  3. Lee, Kyo Duk (2004). "'Peaceful Utilization of the DMZ' as a National Strategy". The successor theory of North Korea. Korean Institute for National Reunification. p. 4. ISBN 898479225X.
  4. Myers, Brian Reynolds (27 May 2010). "South Korea's Collective Shrug". The New York Times. New York: The New York Times Company. Archived from the original on April 19, 2015. Retrieved April 19, 2015.
  5. Myers, Brian Reynolds (14 September 2010). "South Korea: The Unloved Republic?". Archived from the original on May 19, 2013. Retrieved 19 May 2013.
  6. Myers, Brian Reynolds (September 22, 2011). "North Korea's state-loyalty advantage". Journal of International Affairs. Archived from the original on May 20, 2018. Retrieved June 26, 2019.
  7. "B.R. Myers Interview, Part II: Focus on North Korea's Ideology & Propaganda, Not Personalities | NKnet: Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights". April 23, 2012. Archived from the original on April 23, 2012.
  8. Myers, Brian Reynolds (December 28, 2016). "Still the Unloved Republic". Sthele Press. Sthele Press. Retrieved June 26, 2019.
  9. Myers, Brian Reynolds (September 6, 2017). "On Experts and Exegetes". Sthele Press. Sthele Press. Retrieved June 26, 2019.
  10. Jing Yin, Seow (2013). "Pride of the People: South Korea and Korean Nationalism" (PDF). ISIS Malaysia.
  11. "BR Myers - Current Issues". February 24, 2014 – via YouTube.
  12. "Taking North Korea at its Word | NK News - North Korea News". February 13, 2016. Archived from the original on February 13, 2016.
  13. O'Carroll, Chad (2014). "BR Myers - Current Issues". YouTube. Retrieved September 11, 2017. [T]he South Korean flag continues to function, at least in South Korea, not as a symbol of the state but as a symbol of the race.
  14. Marshall, Colin (2017). "How Korea got cool: The continued rise of a country named Hanguk". The Times Literary Supplement. Retrieved June 24, 2019. When people wave the South Korean flag, in other words, they wave the flag not of a country but of a [ethnic] people.
  15. "New Pledge of Allegiance to Reflect Growing Multiculturalism". The Chosun Ilbo. South Korea. 18 April 2011. Archived from the original on April 20, 2011. Retrieved 20 April 2011. The military has decided to omit the word 'minjok,' which refers to the Korean race, from the oath of enlistment for officers and soldiers, and replace it with 'the citizen.' The measure reflects the growing number of foreigners who gain Korean citizenship and of children from mixed marriages entering military service.
  16. Doolan, Yuri W. (June 2012). "Being Amerasian in South Korea: Purebloodness, Multiculturalism, and Living Alongside the U.S. Military Empire" (PDF). The Ohio State University. p. 63. Retrieved 3 March 2016.
  17. Kelly, Robert E. (4 June 2015). "Why South Korea is So Obsessed with Japan". Real Clear Defense.
  18. Jeong, Jeong-hun (2006). "A pledge to a nation, or a gang oath?". The Hankyoreh. South Korea: The Hankyoreh Media Company. Archived from the original on March 15, 2016. Retrieved March 15, 2016.
  19. Myers, Brian Reynolds (March 4, 2019). "On that March First Speech". Sthele Press. Sthele Press. Retrieved June 26, 2019. We always knew anyway that there was no shortage of former collaborators in the North. The personality cult has long praised the Great Leader for giving them a second chance. In my own research I have shown that former pro-Japanese intellectuals of some notoriety made it with Kim’s blessing to the top of the cultural apparatus, where they exerted a formative influence on the North.
  20. Cha, Victor D. Peaceful Korea (PDF). p. 230. Retrieved 24 June 2019. Because [South] Korean nationalism is anti-Japanism, difficulties in the relationship remain prevalent despite seemingly compelling material forces for less friction ...
  21. "What North Korea Wants". Reuters War College. SoundCloud. April 2017. The South needs to retire the conventional civic religion here, which is anti-Japanese pan-Korean nationalism ...
  22. Chotiner, Isaac (3 January 2018). "Sympathy for North Korea: Why South Koreans might just be willing to align with Kim Jong-un". Slate. Retrieved 25 June 2019. Trump’s rhetoric has also encouraged sympathy with Pyongyang in South Korea, where people balk at harsh criticism of their ethnic brethren.
  23. Min Gyo Koo. Following the introduction of the UN Law of the Sea in 1994, South Korea and Japan both began proceeding to set their new maritime boundaries, particularly in overlapping terrain in the East Sea/Sea of Japan, where the distance between some EEZ baselines was less than 400nm.
  24. Berger (2005 paper)
  25. Barbari, Jamal (December 2017). "Anti-Japanese Sentiment among Graduates of South Korean Public Schools". SIT | Digital Collections.
  26. Larsen, Kirk (2006 talk)
  27. Huer, Jon. "Psychology of Korean Han". The Korea Times.
  28. Wang (2003), page 391.
  29. Min Gyo Koo. In addition, the symbolic attachment of territory to national identity and pride has made the island dispute all the more intractable and difficult to resolve.
  30. Speech by Roh Moo-hyun (April 2006)
  31. Speech by Roh Moo-hyun (April 2006) - The government will revisit the entirety of our response with regard to the matter of Dokdo. Together with the distortion of Japanese history textbooks and visits to the Yasukuni shrine, the matter of Dokdo will be dealt with head on. It will be reviewed in the context of rectifying the historical record between Korea and Japan and historical awareness building, our history of self-reliance and independence, and the safeguarding of our sovereignty.
  32. Speech by Roh Moo-hyun (April 2006) For this is a matter where no compromise or surrender is possible, whatever the costs and sacrifices may be.
  33. Ernest Renan (October 17, 2010) [1882]. "The Nationalism Project - Ernest Renan Defining the Nation". - Delivered as a lecture at the Sorbonne in 1882.
  34. "Friendliness Between Japan and Korea Withering". Chosun Ilbo. May 17, 2007. Archived from the original on March 31, 2008.
  35. Don Kirk (2002) for the International Herald Tribune. "Basically, the entire country is galvanized behind this incident," said a U.S. official in Seoul, speaking anonymously. "It will be forever brought up in news articles that we callously ran over these two girls. I don't think we are going to recover from this." .
  36. Wilson Center
  37. Kristof (1987), for the New York Times
  38. Wilson Center. This is Hathaway's summary; it does not appear to be a direct quote from Moon
  39. Korea Between Empires, 1895-1919 By Andre Schmid
  40. Lankov, Andrei (2006) for the Asia Times Online. Since long ago, the more radical Korean nationalist historians have paid much attention to the "Manchurian question", insisting that the vast lands of China's northeast, which once were realms of the Koguryo rulers, should be returned to the "lawful owner" - that is, to the present-day Korean state.
  41. Lankov, Andrei (2007-07-01). "China's Korean Autonomous Prefecture and China-Korea Border Politics | The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus". apjjf.org. The Asia Pacific Journal. Retrieved 2017-01-21.
  42. Yun, Peter (2016-02-28). "Guest Editor's Introduction: Manchuria and Korea in East Asian History". International Journal of Korean History. 21 (1): 1–9. doi:10.22372/ijkh.2016.21.1.1. ISSN 1598-2041.
  43. Lankov, Andrei (2006) for the Asia Times Online. It does not help that the claimed territory already has a large Korean presence, with ethnic Koreans constituting about a third of all Kando residents. At this stage it seems that their loyalties overwhelmingly remain with Beijing, but the Korean activity in the area is unnerving for Chinese policy planners.
  44. Lankov, Andrei (2006) for the Asia Times Online. In 1909, the Japanese, acting "on behalf" of the Koreans, agreed to complete Chinese sovereignty over the area. In recent years it became clear that a large number of Koreans were demanding the revision of the 1909 treaty.
  45. Lankov, Andrei (2006) for the Asia Times Online. in 2004, the Koreans discovered that both Koguryo and its quasi-successor state of Parhae are presented in the new Chinese-language books as parts of China, as "minority states" that existed within the supposedly single Chinese nation. Statements to this effect even appeared on the Chinese Foreign Ministry website.
  46. Lankov, Andrei (2006) for the Asia Times Online. In late 2004, when the first round of the "history war" reached its height, a group of 59 South Korean lawmakers even introduced a bill that declared the 1909 Sino-Japanese treaty "null and void" and demanded recognition of Korean territorial rights over Kando.
  47. Lankov, Andrei (2006) for the Asia Times Online. Finally, in August 2004, the sides reached an agreement: the bureaucracies promised to refrain from waging "history wars", leaving arguments to the historians.
  48. "Global Citizenship a growing sentiment among citizens of emerging economies: Global Poll" (PDF). GlobeScan. 2016-04-27. Retrieved 2016-10-20.
  49. Shin, Gi-Wook (2006). Ethnic Nationalism in Korea. California: Stanford University Press. ISBN 0-8047-5407-1.
  50. Marshall, Colin (2017). "How Korea got cool: The continued rise of a country named Hanguk". The Times Literary Supplement. Retrieved June 24, 2019. Breen rates ethnicity, and more specifically “the belief in a unique bloodline”, as the first standout characteristic of Korea’s special brand of nationalism...
  51. Myers, Brian Reynolds (2010). The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why It Matters. pp. 25–26. Korean schoolchildren in North and South learn that Japan invaded their fiercely patriotic country in 1905, spent forty years trying to destroy its language and culture, and withdrew without having made any significant headway. This version of history is just as uncritically accepted by most foreigners who write about Korea. Yet the truth is more complex. For much of the country's long history its northern border was fluid and the national identities of literate Koreans and Chinese mutually indistinguishable. Believing their civilization to have been founded by a Chinese sage in China's image, educated Koreans subscribed to a Confucian worldview that posited their country in a position of permanent subservience to the Middle Kingdom. Even when Korea isolated itself from the mainland in the seventeenth century, it did so in the conviction that it was guarding Chinese tradition better than the Chinese themselves. For all their xenophobia, the Koreans were no nationalists.
  52. Gi-wook Shin (2006 op-ed). The principle of bloodline or "jus sanguinis" still defines the notion of Korean nationhood and citizenship, which are often inseparable in the mind of Koreans. In its formative years Koreans developed the ethnic base of nation without a corresponding attention to the political notion of citizenship. also see The Korean nationality law is still based on jus sanguinis and legitimizes, consciously or unconsciously, ethnic discrimination against foreign migrant workers.
  53. Gi-wook Shin (2006 op-ed). According to him, the Korean people were descendants of Dangun Joseon, who merged with Buyo of Manchuria to form the Goguryeo people. This original blend, Shin contended, remained the ethnic or racial core of the Korean nation and also see Even today, Koreans maintain a strong sense of ethnic homogeneity based on shared blood and ancestry, and nationalism continues to function as a key resource in Korean politics and foreign relations.
  54. Cockrell (2010). But in the early 20th century the Japanese annexed Korea and launched a campaign to persuade the peninsula's people that they were of the same pure racial stock as the Japanese themselves, said Myers. Then, when Japan left Korea at the end of WWII, pro-Japanese collaborators Koreanized the notion of a pure blood line, promoting pride in a morally superior Korean race.
  55. Cheng, Jonathan (2015-01-26). "In South Korea, Reunification Call Misses the Jackpot". WSJ. Retrieved 2019-07-31.
  56. Eberstadt, Nicholas; Kristol, Bill (2 March 2018). "NICHOLAS EBERSTADT TRANSCRIPT". Conversations with Bill Kristol. Virginia: Conversations with Bill Kristol. Retrieved 25 June 2019. The hum in their ideology is the Korean word minjok, which they would translate for us as 'nationality,' but is much closer in the way they use it to race.
  57. Schmid (1997)
  58. Chang (1986)
  59. Kim (2007). The move is apparently a response to recent efforts by Chinese scholars to strengthen their claim over the heritage of Kojoson and other kingdoms such as Koguryo (37 B.C. - A.D. 668), which Korea states are part of its national history.; see also The new history books write that Kojoson was set up in 2333 B.C. and adds that "it is recorded by Samgukyusa and Tongguktonggam that Kojoson was established by Tangun."

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