Media portrayal of the Ukrainian crisis

Media portrayals of the Ukrainian crisis, including 2014 unrest and the 2014 Ukrainian revolution following the Euromaidan movement, differed widely between Ukrainian, Western and Russian media.[1] The Russian, the Ukrainian, and the Western media were all, to various degrees, accused of propagandizing, and of waging an information war during their coverage of the events.[9] Russian channels were repeatedly criticized for the use of misleading images, false narratives, misrepresentation, suppression,[10] and fabricated news stories, such as a child's crucifixion and the death of a 10-year-old in shelling.[11][12] The BBC reported that Russian state television "appears to employ techniques of psychological conditioning designed to excite extreme emotions of aggression and hatred in the viewer",[13] which, according to The Guardian, is part of a coordinated "informational-psychological war operation".[14][15]

See also: Crucified Boy

A regular theme in the Russian media was that the Ukrainian army, which has many Russian-speaking members, was committing "genocide" against Russian-speakers and that they strongly desired Russia to "protect" them against Kiev.[16][17][18] This presentation contradicted a poll showing that less than 20% of eastern residents wanted Russia's protection.[19] They supported Russia's denials of involvement in the Crimean crisis, until Vladimir Putin boasted about the key role of Russian soldiers, and continue denying its involvement in the war in Donbass, despite evidence that Russia regularly shelled across the border.[20][21]

Media in Russia

The Russian media consistently portrayed the crisis in Ukraine as having been instigated by the post-Yanukovych Ukrainian government,[1][22][23] and represented Euromaidan as being controlled by "ultranationalist", "fascist",[24][25][26] "neo-Nazi", and "anti-Semitic" groups,[27] with Right Sector a common theme.[28] The revolution was depicted as a violent "coup d'etat"[28] fomented by the West in order to overthrow an elected government.[1][29][30] Police brutality against Euromaidan supporters was omitted.[31] Portrayals by the Russia state media were generally close to those by the Russian government; they presented western countries, particularly the United States, as orchestrating events in Ukraine in order to harm Russia.[32][33] Accusations of Russophobia were common in response to criticism of Russian actions.[34] The Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement was depicted as a weapon against the Kremlin, protesters as paid stooges of the United States, and the Vilnius summit as akin to the Munich Agreement.[35] In addition to events in Ukraine, Russia has described other uprisings in eastern Europe which are unfavorable to the Kremlin's interests as being controlled by foreign powers and fascists. In a July 2009 open letter calling Russia "a revisionist power", Vaclav Havel, Lech Walesa, and other former leaders of central and eastern Europe criticized Russia for "[challenging] our claims to our own historical experiences" and "[asserting] a privileged position in determining our security choices."[36] Russian state television has described the Hungarian Revolution of 1956[37] and the Prague Spring of 1968, both stopped by Soviet-led invasions, as orchestrated by the United States and Western European countries. Russian TV presented the invasion of Czechoslovakia "as brotherly help aimed to prevent an invasion by NATO and fascism",[38] provoking outrage in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.[39][40][41][42]

Reporting on a Euromaidan protest attended by over a hundred thousand people, Channel One Russia said that the protests were "dying out" with "only a few hundred" attending.[43][44] The head of Rossiya Segodnya, Dmitry Kiselyov, said, "Information war is now the main type of war, preparing the way for military action"[45] and the Russian Minister of Defense, Sergei Shoigu, described the media as an arm of the Russian military.[46] Russian state media frequently reported stories that were completely made up or used distorted statements by Ukrainian and Western politicians. In 2015 European Union External Action started a periodic publication called "Disinformation Review" documenting such articles by Russian media accompanied by debunking information.[47]

News published in even mainstream media and presented as actual events are frequently based on hearsay, anonymous blogs or intentionally staged shows,[48][49] selectively quoted materials, usually skipping any opinions critical of Russia.[50] Social media are also used in a coordinated way in an attempt to influence public opinion in Russia and other countries.[14][51][52][53][54][55][56]

Following the parliamentary vote in which Arseniy Yatsenyuk was chosen as transitional Prime Minister, RT described Ukrainian government officials as "coup-appointed".[57] Continuing after the election of Petro Poroshenko as President, Russian news outlets regularly described the Ukrainian government as a "junta, "fascist", and "illegitimate".[22][51][58] Kiselyov's two-hour Sunday show Vesti Nedeli "developed a near single-minded fixation on Ukraine" and presented the post-Maidan authorities as "fascist usurpers" who were "propped up" by NATO.[59] Ukraine was often portrayed as "irreparably dysfunctional", "artificial", "deeply divided", or as a failed state.[19][60][61] Russian state media claimed that Kiev authorities had allowed total anarchy to take root in Ukraine and that the country was under the control of "banderovtsy", followers of Ukrainian nationalist Stepan Bandera.[1][58][62][63] According to Boris Nemtsov's report, Putin. War, the rhetoric of World War II was projected onto the crisis, with Russia presented as fighting against "fascism".[64] Eastern Ukrainians were portrayed as desiring Russia's intervention and protection, despite a Gallup poll showing that less than 20% of residents held such views.[19] The Ukrainian government was accused by Russian media of "genocide"[18][65] and "pogroms" against the large Russian-speaking population in eastern and southern Ukraine.[1][29] These "pogroms" were said to have been directed toward churches and synagogues, though local Jewish communities denied that any pogroms took place.[27][66] Russia-1 and RIA Novosti claimed that these "pogroms" and "anarchy" resulted in a "humanitarian crisis" in Ukraine, and predicted that refugees would "flood in".[1] In early March 2014, prior to the war in Donbass, Russian channels said large numbers of refugees were fleeing the "chaos" in Ukraine and portrayed the new Kiev authorities as "fascists," and an RT anchor declared that Russian military intervention was "aimed only at saving Russian lives."[30] Channel One presented footage from Shehyni, at a border crossing between Ukraine and Poland, as Ukrainians escaping to Russia.[67][68][69] Russian state channels depicted Donbass civilians as under attack by Ukrainian forces and made no mention of insurgents firing from residential areas.[70] They described the Ukrainian army's operations as "punitive"[64] and presented the war in Donbass as a "civil war".[71] On Russian citizens fighting against Ukraine, they "repeated the official line that the troops are "volunteers" or traveled to Ukraine on leave rather than in any official capacity" while describing foreigners fighting for Ukraine as "mercenaries".[72] There were frequent mentions of "Slavonic unity" and "Russian brotherhood".[72] A group of Russian nationalists prepared an international exhibition Material Evidence, presented with highly anti-Western and pro-Russian bias.

Writing for The Guardian, British historian Timothy Garton Ash said that Putin "used television to impose his own narrative of a socially conservative, proud Russia threatened by fascists in Kiev, an expansionist NATO and a decadent EU."[73] Joshua Yaffa of The New Republic reported a "propaganda onslaught unprecedented in the post-Soviet era, implying or inventing dark suspicions about Western motives in Ukraine while painting Russia's own meddling as a heroic answer to the call of justice."[59] In an interview with the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Peter Pomerantsev said, "The Kremlin has reinvented the conflict in Ukraine as a genocide against Russians. People believe that the fascists are coming to get them, because that's what they have seen on TV, or that the CIA is behind massacres in Ukraine."[60] Ingo Mannteufel of Deutsche Welle reported that "Kremlin-run media outlets have been hammering the Russian people and foreign audiences with messages that "fascist politicians and US intelligence agencies" have taken over neighboring Ukraine".[74] The Russian media has employed "Soviet language", referring to "traitors", "fascists", and "fifth columns".[75] In an open letter to Vladimir Putin, Ukrainian Jews, a mostly Russian-speaking community, said the Russian media had fabricated stories of forced Ukrainization, bans on the Russian language, and growth of anti-Semitism, and suggested that Putin had "confused Ukraine with Russia, where Jewish organizations have noticed growth in anti-Semitic tendencies last year."[76]

The Russian media focused particularly on Right Sector, portraying the group as powerful, fascist, and neo-Nazi and saying that it was persecuting Russian-speakers and Jews.[58][77][78] Writing for Foreign Policy, Hanna Kozlowska stated that Russian propaganda tried to demonize the Ukraine government and build a case for the annexation of Crimea by depicting Right Sector as a powerful neo-Nazi group which might take control of Ukraine.[78] During the first half of 2014, Right Sector was the second-most mentioned political group in online Russian mass media.[78] The Associated Press and other international news organizations found no evidence that the group had committed hate crimes.[77] Right Sector and other far-right candidates had poor results in both the 2014 Ukrainian presidential election and parliamentary elections.[79][80] Josef Zissels, chairman of the Vaad Association of Jewish Organization and Communities of Ukraine, stated: "The failure of the ultranationalists reflects a reality which we have been trying to represent all the time despite Russian propaganda's attempt to portray Ukrainian society as intolerant."[81] After the parliamentary election, Vyacheslav Likhachev of the Euro-Asian Jewish Congress said that "Russian propaganda speaks of a 'Ukrainian Fascist junta,' but in reality there are more voters for the far-right in the European Union than in Ukraine."[80] Jillian Kay Melchior of the National Review found the claims of discrimination against Russian-speakers "absurd," saying the Russian language was prevalent even in Kiev.[82]

During the Crimean crisis, Russian media supported the Russian government's assertions that Russian troops were not involved.[20] Russian channels declared that Ukrainian nationalists from western Ukraine and Kiev were assaulting and killing Russians in Crimea; they claimed that a bus in Simferopol was carrying members of Right Sector who were attacking Crimean residents, although the footage showed a bus with Crimean license plates transporting men armed with Russian weapons, after roads to Crimea had been blocked by Russian soldiers.[67][68] Russia 24 used footage of Maidan square in Kiev to support its claims of chaos in Simferopol, Crimea.[68] Claims of violence and suppression against Russian-speakers in Ukraine were used as justification for the Russian military intervention in Crimea.[83] Russian media claimed that the western media ignored the apparent "violence", and that demonstrators in Crimea were protesting for democratic rights. In reference to this, Russian sources consistently refer to the events as the "Russian Spring", harking back to pro-democracy movements like the Prague Spring and Arab Spring.[84] The annexation of Crimea was portrayed as the will of the people and a "reunification".[85] Pro-Russian protesters in eastern Ukraine, including those who were armed and had taken journalists hostage, were portrayed as peaceful "pro-federalization" activists.[57]

At the same time some Russian media were promoting anti-western and pro-war views: Channel Rossiya 2 aired a short simulation of a Topol-M rocket hitting London while channel 5 simulated a conventional invasion on Warsaw, Berlin and Baltic states.[86]

Anti-government groups in eastern and southern Ukraine have been consistently characterized as "local people bravely fighting for their rights", as "self-defence forces", and as "supporters of federalization".[1][23][87][88] According to broadcasts by the Russia-1 state television channel, "Kiev threatened the citizens of Donetsk with psychological attacks from the air. Periodically, military helicopters and planes circle menacingly over the towns of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk".[1] In addition, the Ukrainian army, which has launched various offensives against militants in Donetsk Oblast, has been continually portrayed as having "low morale", and being "disorganized".[87] NTV, a television channel owned by Russian state oil company Gazprom, reported that "Ukrainian troops refused to take orders from their commanders, and sided with pro-Russian militiamen".[87]

In July 2014, ITAR-TASS, RIA Novosti, and LifeNews reported that pro-Russian separatists had shot down a Ukrainian military plane over Torez.[64][89] When news emerged about the MH17 crash, Russian channels began promoting various theories, all of which suggested Ukraine was responsible.[89][90] They considered the crash to be part of a U.S. conspiracy against Russia.[75] Russian media claimed in late September that "hundreds of unmarked graves of civilians executed by Ukrainian army" were found and verified by OSCE monitors, a claim that was debunked by the OSCE and DPR officials.[91][92][93] Other top stories, usually based on hearsay, with no accompanying evidence and illustrated by photos taken from unrelated incidents[14] included a "three-year-old boy crucified by Ukrainian servicemen", "parcel of land and two Russian slaves for Ukrainian soldiers," a woman with five different names and stories, "Spanish air controller in Kiev", "satellite photo of Ukrainian fighter jet firing at Boeing", "Ukrainian fighter jet pilot confession" (spread in Russian media as a viable explanations for the MH17 crash), Dmytro Yarosh winning the 2014 Ukrainian presidential election, and Yarosh threatening to set off a grenade in Parliament.[94][95][96][97] Rossiya Segodnya's Ukraina.ru website claimed that Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko had links with Lucifer. The story was later retracted from the original website.[98] In August 2015 Komsomoloskaya Pravda published an alleged wiretap of two named CIA operatives planning an attack on MH17 but, which was ridiculed in Western media as the English used by both "agents" was very unnatural for a native speaker and resembled "Google translated Russian phrases read from a script".[99]

Main article: Malaysia Airlines Flight 17

In March 2015, TASS published a false report that the Carpatho-Rusyns had held a congress during which they decided to seek autonomy.[100][101] Russian state media were also criticized for their reporting on Odessa Oblast, particularly claims of riots and persecution of ethnic minorities.[102] Russia-1 presented Poroshenko's statement that Ukrainian would remain the only state language as a violation of the right to speak Russian freely, although a survey found that even Donbass and eastern oblasts preferred Russian to have the status of a second official language in particular regions over "state language" status.[103] In April 2015, Russian media widely reported a death of a 10-year-old girl killed by Ukrainian artillery but Russian reporters on the site interviewed by the BBC admitted that "the girl never existed" and they were reporting this fake story because they "were instructed" to do so.[12] Further fake news in Russian media included alleged "fascist attacks" on Greek population in Crimea (which Greek embassy denied) and "four American soldiers" raping two underage girls in Ukraine.[104][105] In May 2015, Izvestiya allegedly "disclosed" a letter from US Embassy to LGBT activists in Russia written in English with so many errors, that the US Departament of State republished it marking the errors in red with a dedication in Russian, suggesting that the authors ask for help while writing such letters next time.[106]

The BBC reported that the Russian state media had a "tendency to focus on events in Ukraine to the almost complete exclusion of problems at home."[107] In May 2015, Slovak monitoring group MEMO 98, Internews Ukraine, and Yerevan Press Club of Armenia completed a report on Russian TV channels for the Civil Society Forum of the Eastern Partnership. MEMO 98's Rasťo Kužel observed that Russian media "diverted attention from important domestic issues and scared the population with the possibility of a war and the need of Russia to protect itself against an external enemy."[32] In an interview for Deutsche Welle, OSCE observer Paul Picard stated: "We often see how Russian media outlets manipulate our statements. They say that we have not seen Russian troops crossing the borders. But that only applies to two border crossings. We have no idea what is going on at the others" (Russia having refused to allow the OSCE to expand its mission).[108]

Leaked emails of Kristina Potupchik, former Nashi spokeswoman, later employee of President Vladimir Putin's administration, revealed wide-scale monitoring of any critical articles in Russia opposition media, placing paid comments and trolling by web brigades coordinated by Potupchik[109] (according to earlier leaks she was involved in similar activities at least since 2012).[110] For example, Potupchik reported to her supervisors about alleged irregularities in Alexei Navalny's passport application form, attaching its scans to the email. As noted by The Insider, she had no legal way to obtain these forms as they are considered sensitive documents, and a few days later LifeNews reported exactly these irregularities as part of campaign against Navalny.[111] According to Alexander Sytnik, a former member of the Russian Institute for Strategic Research, his organization was one of the channels for "illegal funding of pro-Russian analysts in Ukraine through third parties".[112]

On a number of occasions, Vladimir Putin, Dmitry Rogozin and Nikolai Patrushev have given examples of Western prejudice and hostility against Russia; one of these examples was an alleged statement by Madelaine Albright about Russia "controlling too much of Siberia's resources". As Russian independent media shortly found out, this phrase was never voiced by Albright, but instead by a former Russian security services officer Boris Ratnikov, who in 2006 gave examples of what kind of "secret" information he was able to extract from Western leaders using experimental "remote mind control" research. Even though the origins of the claim were traced in 2007, Russian leaders repeatedly used it as if it were a real statement. Asked by a journalist about this particular statement, Putin replied that "I know this is what they think in their minds".[113][114]

According to a linguistic analysis by Vasily Gatov, top Russian politicians started reusing classical language habits of Bolshevik leaders, such as self-questioning ("a question arises ..."), metonymy ("some countries ...") and expressions or anecdotes from criminal subculture.[115]

In September 2015, Alexandr Bastrykin, head of the Investigative Committee of Russia, gave an interview in which he presented a version of events around the arrest of Nadia Savchenko that included her "voluntarily crossing the Russian border" and "living for 4 days in hotels" on the territory of Russia before she was arrested, and completely contradicted previous reports by Donetsk People's Republic militia of her being taken prisoner of war, including videos of her interrogation. In the same interview Bastrykin also accused Arseniy Yatsenyuk of taking part in the First Chechen War[116] which, due to its surreal character was widely ridiculed in Ukrainian and Russian media, including a number of memes portraying Yatseniuk as a Chechen warlord.[117] These accusations were based on testimonies from Mykola Karpyuk and Stanislav Klykh, Ukrainian citizens held in Russia since 2014, and forced using torture and extortion. Another Ukrainian citizen, Serhiy Litvinov, is also held in Russia and his forced testimonies were used by Russian media as a 'proof' of 'genocide of Russian nationals' as Litvinov was also charged with murdering twenty 'unidentified people' and a rape. By the end of 2014, most of the charges against him were dropped, leaving one robbery charge.[118] According to Alexander Cherkasov, the prosecution statement in Karpyuk and Klykh contains errors and inconsistencies suggesting that it was written based on the Russian Wikipedia article on Salman Raduyev instead of any actual evidence.[119]

Themes of Russia's "information war" include Russia having the right to a "sphere of influence" and "only laying claim to what is rightfully hers", its neighbors being "failed states", Europe "harming" its economy and security by building ties with them, "moral equality" between Putin and the West, "Western decadence" and threats to "traditional" ways of life, Europe being most harmed by sanctions, Putin's government being "legitimate" and "successful", and obscuring Russia's role in post-Soviet crises by presenting them as ethnic conflicts.[120] Descriptions of the Ukrainian government as "illegitimate" or "self-appointed" and the country as "fascist" were common in Russian reports during much of the conflict, but had declined sharply by the end of 2015.[121] Ukraine was the main subject of negative reports until the Russian media shifted their attention to Turkey.[121]

Critical reactions in Russia

See also: Crucified Boy

According to war reporter and veteran of the First Chechen War Arkadiy Babchenko, Russian mass media played a significant role in starting the war in Donbass stating that "this is the first war in history started exclusively by Goebbels-like propaganda".[122][123] Writing in March 2014 for Gazeta.ru, Yekaterina Bolotovskaya said the Russian media was presenting an "apocalyptic" image of Ukraine.[124] After a Russian channel claimed Ukrainians had crucified a child in Slovyansk, the former chief editor of Lenta.ru, Galina Timchenko, said, "This is an egregious violation of professional ethics. Not only is there no proof anywhere -- this is not even being questioned."[11] In March 2014, former economic minister Andrei Nechayev wrote, "Our propaganda on state channels is really running wild."[125] In July 2014, Andrei Malgin wrote in The Moscow Times: "I worked for Soviet newspapers during the terms of four Soviet leaders, from Leonid Brezhnev to Mikhail Gorbachev, and this is the first time the authorities have lied so brazenly and shamelessly. They have truly reached a new low."[126] Boris Nemtsov stated that Vladimir Putin and the directors of Channel One Russia and Rossiya Segodnya employed "Goebbels-style propaganda. If we are talking about the responsibility for spilling both Russian and Ukrainian blood, it lies not only with Putin, but also with such gentlemen as Konstantin Ernst or Dmitry Kiselyov. They operate in accordance with the simple principles of Joseph Goebbels: Play on the emotions; the bigger the lie, the better; lies should be repeated many times."[127] Russian hacker group Shaltay Boltay published leaked Kremlin documents telling journalists to justify the Crimean annexation, praise Vladimir Putin's development plans, and depict Ukraine as swarming with fascists.[128] Delovoi Petersburg and a journalist interviewed by Der Spiegel reported that several "Ukrainian" news sites, such as the Kharkov News Agency, were based in Russia.[129][130] The head of the Levada Center, Lev Gudkov, stated, "The successful propaganda campaign we are witnessing here surrounding the Ukraine crisis is unique and highly sophisticated, even compared to Soviet standards."[131] Maksim Trudolyubov, writing in Vedomosti, said "Today's state-run media in Russia is a continuation of the KGB but much smarter than previous incarnations. They use modern tools, misinformation, confusion, and conflicting signals to prevent any collective responses and actions of citizens."[132] In 2016 Dmitry Kiselyov admitted using fake documents in his program.[133]

Writing for Sobesednik, Dmitriy Bykov said "the language of today's propaganda has become full of artificial connections. If you're against Russia's covert war in Ukraine then you must be for gluttony, against the motherland, and for soulless American fast food, only protesting against war because you want foie gras."[134] In February 2015, Irina Prokhorova, leader of the opposition party Civic Platform, commented that nationalism and "us vs. them" thinking had grown among Russian media, saying: "If I participate in some talk on television, they start accusing immediately, 'you're not patriotic, you're not a true citizen."[135] Vladislav Inozemtsev wrote, "The rhetoric of aggression and arguments justifying the use of force have become part of Russia's standard informational milieu."[136] Maria Alekhina from Pussy Riot[137] and Max Skibinsky[138] also criticized the Russian media's style of reporting.

Novaya Gazeta, Slon.ru, Grani.ru and Ekho Moskvy published some criticism of Russia's policy in Crimea and then Donbass. A number of them (such as Grani.ru) were placed on Russia's Internet blacklist as a result. Journalists who wrote commentary critical of the Russian government's actions usually experienced ostracism and were accused of being traitors or fascists by the mainstream media. Some experienced violence.[139][140] In March 2014, Vedomosti published an article by a Moscow university professor, Andrey Zubov, who was subsequently fired, in which he compared Russia's military intervention in Crimea with Nazi Germany's Anschluss.[141] Russian historians Alexandr Skobov and Andrey Piontkovski commented on the ideology of the self-declared Federal State of Novorossiya and concluded that its basic features (nationalism, imperialism) bear strong similarities with 20th century fascist movements.[142][143] On 28 July, Skobov was assaulted by unknown perpetrators and received several stab wounds in St. Petersburg.[144]

Commenting for Ekho Moskvy in July 2014, a Russian military expert, Vadim Lukashevich, ridiculed the MH17 crash theories proposed by Russian media.[145] Roskomnadzor issued a warning to the radio station after two journalists, Sergei Loiko and Timur Olevskiy, discussed the battle for Donetsk Airport.[146] Vitaliy Portnikov, writing in Grani.ru, mocked justifications of Russia's seizures of land.[147] Alexander Podrabinek wrote that Putin had a history of using wars to increase and maintain his power and was now using a war with Ukraine to deflect opposition in Russia.[148] In 2014, Boris Nemtsov wrote that the Kremlin demonstrated hypocrisy by advocating federalism for Ukraine, stating "Russia itself has not had any sort of federal state for a long time, since 2004", and said Putin sought to "punish" Ukraine in order to discourage a revolution against corruption from taking place in Russia.[149] In Profile.ru, Georgy Kunadze stated that "If a country as similar to us as Ukraine will be able to overcome the post-Soviet syndrome and becomes a successful contemporary state, its example could prove infectious for Russia."[150] In October 2014, Russian economic expert Stepan Demura criticized the Russian invasion of Ukraine and 2014 Crimean crisis, saying they would harm the Russian economy.[151] Russian politician Leonid Gozman, commenting on Ekho Moskvy's blog, said that the only way to save Russia from the generals covertly sending soldiers to die in Ukraine is to "give Ukraine advanced arms".[152]

On 14 February 2015 a Russian journalist Roman Saponkov published a video of separatist artillery shelling Ukrainian positions from Debaltseve, laughing in the background about "what will RT say", "they must be using dummy ammunition, it's truce now". Russian media have widely reported that and, as result, RT and TASS agencies who worked with Saponkov previously both publicly condemned his comments.[153]

In April 2015 former Russian minister of finance Alexey Kudrin noted that the citizens are now victims of an information war started by the Russian government "against its own citizens", commenting on the process of pushing some independent media stations (TV Rain, Tomsk TV-2) out of the public sphere.[154]

In June 2015 a NTV journalist, Konstantin Goldenzweig, left his position after 12 years of work, apologizing publicly for "taking part in a collective propaganda madness".[155]

Opponents of the war in Russia frequently face discrimination and coordinated hate campaigns,[156] with the most extreme example being the assassination of Boris Nemtsov, which his daughter Zhanna Nemtsova blamed on Putin and Russian media.[157] Writing for Vedomosti, she stated that "Russian propaganda kills. It kills reason and common sense but it also kills human beings."[158] She said that Putin's "information machine" "employs criminal propaganda techniques to sow hatred, which in turn spawns violence and terror. Its modus operandi? To dehumanize the target."[158] In June 2015 Alexandr Byvshev, a poet whose anti-war works were banned as "extremist" earlier, was added to an official "list of terrorists and extremists" maintained by the Federal Service for Financial Monitoring (Rosfinmonitoring) and a "spontaneous collective condemnation" campaign, described as Soviet-style by independent media, began in his village.[159][160]

International reactions

The Russian media's portrayal of the unrest in Ukraine has received wide criticism from Asian, European, Ukrainian, and North American media and governments, with the coverage often described as "propaganda", and "filled with omissions and inaccuracies".[69][76][161][162][163][164] The BBC reported on the use of misleading images, false narratives, misrepresentation and suppression.[10] The New York Times referred to Russian reporting as a "disinformation campaign" by the Russian government and the Associated Press called it a "Kremlin-led smear campaign."[29][88] Critics said the coverage aimed to discredit pro-democracy protesters and justify a Russian military intervention.[125][165] Der Spiegel wrote that Russian state TV "has no qualms about blatantly fabricating the news."[131] Writing for Reuters, Lucian Kim said "Lying – blatantly and repeatedly – is considered a legitimate weapon in the arsenal of hybrid warfare that Putin has unleashed in the struggle for Ukraine."[18]

According to Luc Maffre and Peter Pomerantsev, Russia's narrative has roots in Soviet dezinformatsiya and active measures.[45][166] Some commentators believed that Russian state-controlled media attempted to sow confusion.[14][167][168][169] Casey Michel said that they were trying "to confuse and complicate, to muddle and muddy the facts on the ground, to create multiple realities to back manifold predispositions."[170] Edward Lucas and Ben Nimmo called it "information warfare" designed to "confuse, befuddle and distract", "to provoke doubt, disagreement and, ultimately, paralysis."[171] Some said that Russian state media were disseminating hatred.[172][173] Stephen Ennis of the BBC stated that Russian state TV "appears to employ techniques of psychological conditioning designed to excite extreme emotions of aggression and hatred in the viewer."[13]

In July 2014, The New Yorker reported that "nearly all Russians derive their news and their sense of what is going on in the world" from Russian state channels, whose broadcasts were described as "feverish anti-Ukrainian, anti-American, and generally xenophobic" and "full of wild exaggeration about Ukrainian "fascists"."[174] According to Sergey Golunov, such portrayals are part of a long-term trend that started in the early 2000s:

Most geopolitical textbooks that include conspiracy theories portray the United States as the primary conspirator against Russia and, accordingly, as a threat to Russia's existence, independence, and territorial integrity. Other conspirators cited include China, Germany, and Japan, as well as certain 'alliances' of states in international organisations and the Muslim world. Beyond risks to Russia's territorial integrity, some theories outline support for ethnic and/or religious separatist movements in and around Russia. Since the mid-2000s, many textbooks have also denounced a supposed 'fifth column' inside Russia.

— Sergey Golunov, Open Democracy, 13 April 2015[175]

Many western and Ukrainian media outlets have accused Russian media of fabrications and misusing images and videos.[65][67][176] Reporting for Watson.ch in Switzerland, Jürg Vollmer wrote, "For months, Russian propaganda has spread numerous false reports, fake photos and videos of Ukraine."[177] In March 2014, alumni and students at the Kyiv-Mohyla School of Journalism started a project to identify false reports, StopFake.org.[178][179][180][181] In April 2014, Russia-1 presented a man by the name of Andrei Petkov as a pro-Russia activist who had been attacked by Ukrainians while NTV (Russia) called the same man Andrei Petkhov and said he was funding pro-Ukrainian extremists.[182][183] Maria Tsypko appeared in various roles on Russian channels during the Ukrainian crisis.[178][184] In May 2014, Russia-1 used footage from a 2012 conflict in the Russian region of Kabardino-Balkaria in a report alleging Ukrainian abuses against Russians;[131][185] the deputy chief described it as an "accidental error" after a Ukrainian website, InfoResist.org, found the 2012 news report.[186] The Kyiv Post reported that a journalist from the same channel, Yevgeni Poddubny, was involved in a plot to frame the Ukrainian army for the death of a Red Cross worker.[187] Russian media also presented images from military conflicts in Georgia, South Ossetia, and Syria as being from Ukraine.[180][188] Telekrytyka said an analysis of Russia-1's video of a gun battle in Crimea indicated it was staged.[124] The same channel falsely presented a construction site as a "concentration camp"[189] and a man critical of Euromaidan as a Ukrainian former diplomat, Andriy Veselovskyi.[190]

Multiple Russian news outlets have been criticized for producing unsubstantiated reports of atrocities. In June 2014, LifeNews aired footage which it said was evidence of Ukrainian forces using white phosphorus to attack a village named Semenyovka, near Sloviansk. Human Rights Watch analysts rejected the claim, saying that the footage was inconsistent with white phosphorus or an incendiary weapon.[191] Other Russian news organizations aired footage of white phosphorus in Iraq to support their allegations against Ukraine.[191] In July 2014, Channel One Russia stated that Ukrainian soldiers had crucified a three-year-old boy in Lenin Square in Sloviansk, although there is no such square in Sloviansk and the only witness to the alleged atrocity lied that she was a refugee from the town.[192] The same channel used a 1995 photo of a mass grave in Chechnya to depict Ukraine.[193] In August 2014, Russia's Zvezda channel was accused of editing footage of a failed rocket launch in Baikonur, Kazakhstan to use in a report claiming Ukraine attacked civilians in Makiivka.[194] In September 2014, the BBC reported that REN TV had used images of MH17 plane crash victims to support its claims of atrocities by Ukrainian soldiers in eastern Ukraine.[195] NTV (Russia)'s documentary 13 Friends of the Junta (August 2014), which described anti-war activists and critics of Russia's policies in Ukraine as "traitors" and supporters of "fascists", also received criticism. The Moscow Times reported that footage of Andrei Makarevich's concert in Sviatohirsk "was merged with images of the fighting that he supposedly endorsed. The program never mentions that the concert was for the benefit of Ukraine's internally displaced children."[196] Ukrayina aired a documentary demonstrating how the NTV movie attributed actions of Russia-backed separatists to Ukrainian armed forces and used numerous other manipulations.[197] StopFake.org reported that Rossiya Segodnya's Ukraina.ru mixed in images of the 2004 Beslan massacre, in southern Russia, into their documentary on Ukrainian children.[198]

BBC News found that Russian TV coverage of the 2 May 2014 Odessa clashes was misleading, noting that it "either completely ignored or seriously misrepresented the street clashes that preceded the fatal fire, thus giving the impression that the attack by pro-Ukraine activists on Trade Union House was completely unprovoked", made it seem that all the victims were pro-Russians, used manipulated or questionable evidence to support claims that several people had been murdered, and failed to mention that some pro-Ukrainian activists had attempted to help dying people.[199] Halya Coynash of the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group said that the Russian state media's coverage disregarded the evidence and a United Nations report[200] and she believed that "fascist" accusations were "an attempt to justify Ukraine's dismemberment."[201]

Particular controversy erupted over English-language television channel RT, which is owned by the Russian government. Referred to as the "primary hub of Russian propaganda in the West",[202] it was accused of distortions and omissions,[31][203] aligning its coverage to suit the Russian government, and fueling paranoia.[51][177][204][205] The British communications authority Ofcom reviewed four news bulletins from early March 2014 and found that RT "failed to preserve due impartiality."[206] A presenter for the channel, Liz Wahl, resigned on air after saying that she disagreed with the channel's "whitewashing" of the Russian government's actions during the 2014 Crimean crisis.[1][207] In July 2014, RT aired a controversial program, The Truthseeker: Genocide in Eastern Ukraine, which it later removed after heavy criticism. Halya Coynash of the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group said it was "full of lies" and called it "a truly sick broadcast".[208] In September 2014, Ofcom said it had launched an investigation.[209] RT also received criticism after publishing a story based on a document found on a conspiracy website, which stated that the RAND Corporation was advising the Ukrainian government to carry out "ethnic cleansing" and set up internment camps for eastern Ukrainians.[45] Der Spiegel wrote that Ivan Rodionov, the head of RT's video news agency Ruptly, "[defended] President Vladimir Putin so vehemently that one could be forgiven for confusing him with a Kremlin spokesperson."[131] Having reported Rodionov's claim that the Ukrainian government held "radical right-wing views", Der Spiegel noted that his news site "featured "right-wing radicals like Britain's Nick Griffin or German far-right extremist Olaf Rose, an ideologist with the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party (NPD), stirring up hatred towards the European Union and its Ukraine policies."[131] In 2015, RT falsely reported that Ukrainian officers had the right to shoot deserters.[203] Glenn Greenwald said that RT was no worse than the leading British media but Casey Michel stated "This trope – stating that all outlets are equally biased, and equally fallacious – exists firmly within the camp of whataboutism".[170] The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies described RT and Sputnik News as "vital elements of the Russian propaganda machine".[210]

In May 2014, Cathy Young of The Daily Beast reported that journalists were being abducted and "subjected to bizarre propaganda rituals on Russian television."[211] Irma Krat, a journalist and Euromaidan activist who was held prisoner from April to July 2014 by pro-Russian militants, said that LifeNews interrogated her after she had been injected with a drug and that NTV (Russia) had manipulated footage: "The interview was cut and spliced so that it makes me appear to have almost admitted to being a killer, a sadist, and as if I was renouncing the Maidan."[212] Interpretermag.com said that some Russian reporters were involved in serious violations of journalism ethics.[213][214] After pro-Kremlin station LifeNews approvingly filmed the abuse of Ukrainian POWs by pro-Russian forces, Dunja Mijatović of the OSCE said that the station's portrayal amounted to "unethical and inadmissible reporting" and an "abuse of journalists' rights and privileges."[215]

Some Russian media have been accused of employing whataboutism as a response to criticism of Russia's actions in Ukraine.[31][192][216] The firing of Galina Timchenko, chief editor of Russian news website Lenta.ru, after she published an interview with one of Right Sector's leaders, Andriy Tarasenko, was cited by western media as an incident of censorship.[217][218] She also faced pressure to use material from Russia's state-run media.[82] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty wrote that Russia-24's editing of RFERL's interviews was "a useful case study in how a video's context can be shifted to represent one particular point of view."[219] Rossiya Segodnya published an interview with Igor Girkin after removing his statements on working for Russia's Federal Security Service and chaos among pro-Russian militants.[220]

Following the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, an article in the Indonesian version of Business Insider described the way that Russia Today was covering the incident as "ridiculous" and "in the only way it knows how: Blaming everyone except for the Russian government"[162] while Daniel Drezner noted how the Russian media narrative of the Malaysian airline shoot-down was a "grab bag of conspiracy theories" and suggested that Putin could become trapped by the nationalist rhetoric created over the incident.[221] Moreover, an RT reporter, Sara Firth, resigned in protest against the network's coverage of the crash, which she said was heavily biased.[222] She stated, "We are lying every single day at RT. There are a million different ways to lie, and I really learned that at RT."[223] The Associated Press reported that the theories presented by Russian broadcasters and newspapers "vary wildly in content" but "all point the finger at Ukraine. None admits the possibility that Russia may bear responsibility."[90] Julia Ioffe of The New Republic wrote that they were "peddling conspiracy theories" and "trying to muddy the water".[75] Writing for The Atlantic, Peter Pomerantsev said "[Russian media] were trying not so much to convince viewers of any one version of events, but rather to leave them confused, paranoid, and passive—living in a Kremlin-controlled virtual reality that can no longer be mediated or debated by any appeal to 'truth.'"[167]

In early March 2014, Shaun Walker of The Guardian reported, "Russian state television has gone out of its way to manufacture an image of the protests as a uniquely sinister phenomenon; a far-right movement backed by the west with the ultimate goal of destabilising Russia. ... On the ground in Crimea, what is particularly odd is that the most vociferous defenders of Russian bases against supposed fascists appear to hold far-right views themselves."[224] In August 2014, BBC News reported, "Russian state TV's coverage of the crisis has been consistently sensationalist, using a wide repertoire of propaganda techniques to incite revulsion and hostility towards the authorities in Kiev."[58] The Institute of Modern Russia wrote, "Inside Russia, and in areas of eastern Ukraine where Russian television is popular, the Kremlin's political technologists have managed to create a parallel reality where "fascists" have taken power in Kiev, ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine are in mortal danger and the CIA is waging a war against Moscow."[51] In March 2014, historian Timothy D. Snyder rejected the claims of a "fascist coup", stating "Although one can certainly debate the constitutional nuances, this process was not a coup. And it certainly was not fascist. Reducing the powers of the president, calling presidential elections, and restoring the principles of democracy are the opposite of what fascism would demand."[17] Some observers were critical of the Russian media's heavy focus on radical and right-wing groups during Euromaidan, finding that the protests were broad-based.[30] Commenting in the Kyiv Post on "fascist" accusations against Ukraine, Lily Hyde wrote, "Today's Russia, with its focus on a strong leader, primacy of the state, and aggressive imperial ambitions, is far more text-book "fascist" than Ukraine."[225] The Kyiv Post's Oleg Sukhov and BBC News' Stephen Ennis accused Russian media of "demonization" of Ukrainians.[226][227] Sukhov said Russian media regularly used fascist labels "without pointing out the relatively low support for far-right groups among the Ukrainian population or the presence of neo-Nazis among Russian-backed insurgents," and he criticized their presentation of the Ukrainian crisis as "orchestrated by the United States while ignoring Russia's direct involvement in support of separatists."[226] Bernard-Henri Levy said the claims of "fascism" in Ukraine were part of a "misinformation campaign."[228] Sergei Loiko, a Los Angeles Times correspondent interviewed by Novoye Vremya Ukraine, criticized Russian channels, saying "there were no reasons for [this war]. They are all fictional. They are built on lies, spread by Russian television. There was no reason for people to kill each other. It is a theatre of the absurd."[229] In an article for The Irish Times, Conor O'Clery wrote, "When leafing through Zhirinovsky's rag in Vnukovo airport it occurred to me how close his extreme outpourings are to those emanating from the mainstream Russian media."[230]

Timothy D. Snyder criticized the presentation of Russian-speakers in Ukraine as ethnic Russians who desired Russia's "protection."[17] In October 2014, Taras Kuzio wrote in the Financial Times that "the world view created by Putin's state controlled media has never corresponded to reality. Putin always mixed up "Russian speakers" with "Russians" in Ukraine, believing they were one and the same. So he was always unable to fathom the fact that a large proportion of Ukrainian armed forces and National Guard are Russian speakers."[16] The Russian media's depiction of the mainly Russophone city of Kharkiv as eager to join Russia was called "wishful thinking" by Katya Soldak of Forbes, who said that events in the city and a survey conducted by Alexei Navalny did not support the portrayal.[231] The University of Helsinki's Michael Gentile and Lucian Kim of Reuters were critical of the focus on ethnicity and language to explain the conflict in Donbas. Gentile stated that "rather than being divided between Ukrainians and Russians, the Donbas is divided between people who believe in the concept of Ukrainian sovereign statehood and those who are nostalgic of the Soviet past."[232] Kim wrote, "As strenuously as the Kremlin propaganda machine raises the hobgoblin of Ukrainian nationalism, the conflict between Ukraine and Russia isn't about ethnicity or language — it's about the kind of country that people want to live in."[233] Pierre Vaux, writing in Left Foot Forward, criticized "the efforts of Kremlin propagandists to portray the Ukrainian government as waging a war on Russian speakers", stating that "large swathes of the government are Russian speakers. So are many of the military leaders in the east, including commanders of volunteer formations, such as Semyon Semyonchenko".[234] In addition to Russophones from Ukraine, about a hundred Russian citizens joined pro-Ukrainian forces, "[discrediting] incessant Kremlin propaganda that Russian speakers are being persecuted in Ukraine", according to the Kyiv Post.[235]

Assertions that the West had broken an agreement against NATO enlargement were criticized by some commentators. Pavel Stroilov, who copied Kremlin documents, said that "if the idea of a broken promise is being used as casus belli in Ukraine, it is being used fraudulently."[236] Citing a 1995 article from The New York Times, Anne Applebaum said the suggestion that the EU and NATO had provoked Russia was "based on revisionist history promoted by the current Russian regime—and it is wrong. For the record: No treaties prohibiting NATO expansion were ever signed with Russia. No promises were broken."[237][238] In 2014 interviews with Russia Beyond the Headlines and Germany's ZDF, Mikhail Gorbachev also dismissed claims of a non-expansion pledge and said the idea that the West had deceived him was "a myth. The press had a hand in it."[239][240] According to Ben Nimmo of the Central European Policy Institute, the Russian media was "distorting Western perceptions of the conflict. Claims that NATO promised not to expand into Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) after German reunification, and that Russia's fear of that enlargement is justifiable, have entered the mainstream media, creating the impression that the West is to blame for Russia's direct assault on Ukraine."[33] Applebaum and French intellectual Bernard-Henri Lévy rejected assertions that Russia had suffered "humiliation" and "encirclement".[237][241] In an article for the Guardian, Christopher Clark and Kristina Spohr wrote that "misframing the past as a narrative of deceptions, betrayals and humiliations is a profoundly dangerous move" which undermined "the entire fabric of treaties and settlements that make up the post-cold war order."[242] Accused of trying to "encircle" Russia and deepening divisions by accepting new members, NATO said that the statement "ignores the facts of geography. Russia's land border is just over 20,000 kilometres long. Of that, 1,215 kilometres, or less than one-sixteenth, face current NATO members" and referred to the "Helsinki Final Act which says that every state has the right "to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance." And by signing the NATO-Russia Founding Act, Russia agreed to respect states' "inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security.""[243]

Edward Lucas and Peter Pomerantsev noted that Russia's portrayal borrowed from Soviet narratives and terminology. "By telling Russians that, as in 1941-45, they are fighting fascists, the Kremlin aims both to galvanize its own population but also to delegitimize any dissenters: to speak against the war is to betray Russia itself."[28] Accusations of "provocation" appeared frequently in Russian discourse, turning "the dynamics of the conflict ... upside down: the attacker becomes the victim and the victim is accused of starting the conflict."[28]

On 2 December 2014, the Ukrainian government created the Ministry of Information; according to its Minister, Yuriy Stets, one of its goals is "active counteraction to the Russian information aggression".[244][245] In December 2014, Latvia's foreign minister, Edgars Rinkēvičs, said that Russian news channels had become "very aggressive in what can no longer be considered normal news or normal journalism, but is more information warfare and propaganda" and said the EU was discussing whether "to invest jointly in alternative sources of information — not alternative propaganda sources, but an alternative normal European TV channel, with entertainment, with news, but with very factually accurate news."[161] Peter Pomerantsev said Russian reporting of the proposal sought to "draw equivalence," adding, "Just by saying, 'There's an information war,' it implies two sides doing equally naughty things, so it's OK for Russia to abuse information to spread disinformation."[198] Andrew Kornbluth, writing in The Moscow Times, said that "Russian messaging has worked by exploiting vulnerabilities in precisely those mechanisms of self-criticism and skepticism which are considered so essential to the functioning of a democratic society."[246] The Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society said that the Russian media "fueled" and "legitimized" the war and was "surprisingly successful in distorting the war and the way it is perceived and understood."[247] CEPI's Ben Nimmo described four Russian propaganda tactics ("dismiss the critic, distort the facts, distract from the main issue and dismay the audience") and reported that the campaign "relies heavily on the Kremlin-controlled media, and paid or sympathetic commentators in the West, to pass its messages."[33]

Russia-1's Crimea: The Road to the Homeland, which aired in March 2015, was criticized for distorting a March 2014 incident in which a man named Oleg Gorshkov attempted to stop a truck from breaking through a Crimean checkpoint,[248] for unsupported claims of an anti-Crimean "pogrom" in Korsun-Shevchenkivskyi,[249] and for a "sycophantic" Putin interview.[250] The same month, three Russian channels claimed that a 10-year-old girl had been killed by shelling in the Petrovsky region of Donetsk; BBC News said that the story had been "made up".[12]

Writing for Lithuania's Delfi, Viktoras Denisenko stated that "Some Russian propaganda narratives are identifiable and exposed, but quite a lot of them are stealthy and reach their audience and successfully make their way into mass perception where they become entrenched."[251] In April 2015, Lithuania's Radio and Television Commission banned RTR-Planeta for three months, stating that it had violated the law against "war propaganda, hatred and inciting discord" and ignored repeated warnings.[173][252] Some Ukrainians responded to Russian reporting with humour while others found it inappropriate.[102][253]

In September 2015 Linas Linkevičius called for more response and debunking to claims of Russian media, adding that "a lie is not an alternative point of view", which is an argument frequently used by media presenting "Russian point of view".[254] According to the Centre for Eastern Studies, "information campaigns using the stereotype of Russophobia are leading to a consolidation of political nationalism" in Russia; "attacking 'Russophobes' is a way of protecting Russian society itself from having any doubts about the Kremlin's policy", "mobilising them in the face of real or alleged threats", and "restoring psychological comfort" after a failure.[34]

In May 2016 Canal+ reviewed a number of reports by Rossiya 24 from France, verifying them with people interviewed by Russian journalists, and found out that their opinions were severely misrepresented by the Russian channel, either by manipulative editing or intentionally distorted translation. After the Canal+ program was aired, Rossiya 24 silently removed some of the most offending parts from the on-line version of their program.[255][256][257]

Media in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada

Many in the Western media described Ukrainian society as deeply "divided".[258] Most reported the Euromaidan as a protest movement against corruption and for democracy, with a minority presence of far-right groups,[259][260] though some suggested that they played the decisive role in armed confrontations.[261] Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych's accumulation of wealth received coverage.[262] Moscow's claims of fascism and western conspiracies were often included for balance.[14]

Russian president Vladimir Putin was described variously as a "bully,"[263][264] "imperialist,"[265][266] and a "brilliant" and skilled leader.[267][268][269] As of December 2014, BBC News and Reuters take no position on whether Russia is a party to the armed conflict, saying simply that Russia is "accused" by "Ukraine and its Western allies."[270][271] A few days after the OSCE's Observer Mission wrote that it "continued to observe high numbers of dumper trucks transporting coal from the Luhansk region to the Russian Federation,"[272] Reuters reported on Russia's offer to sell coal to Ukraine, saying "months of fighting a pro-Russian uprising has disrupted coal supplies" but not mentioning the OSCE's observations.[273] In 2015, the BBC and The Guardian continued to portray Odessa and Kharkiv as deeply divided,[274] despite polls showing that supporters of separatism or joining Russia were a small minority.[275] Western media avoided describing anti-Ukrainian foreign fighters as foreigners invading Ukraine, preferring to describe them as "rebels" or "separatists".[276] The Daily Telegraph described a Russian citizen, who had no connection to Ukraine prior to taking up arms against its government, as a "pro-Russian rebel".[277]

Some western sources stated that the pro-Russian unrest was fomented by the Russian government and Russian special forces.[1] Canada's The Globe and Mail accused Russia of "manufacturing of chaos in Ukraine" and described the chaos as "made in Moscow."[278][279] Some outlets proclaimed a "new cold war".[280] Seeing similarities with Adolf Hitler's annexation of various lands with German-language speakers, such as Austria and the Sudetenland, some called the annexation of Crimea Russia's Anschluss.[281] On Tony Brenton's proposal to make a deal with Putin, Con Coughlin of The Telegraph wrote, "This seems uncomfortably similar to the appeasement arguments that were made in the 1930s – rather than confront Hitler over his threatening behaviour towards Germany's European neighbours, we should reach an accommodation with the Nazis."[282]

Ian Birrell, writing in The Independent, criticized Western leaders, saying they had done "little more than talk tough" and "Their failure is symbolized by verbal acrobatics as they avoid using the word "invasion", talking instead of "incursion" and "aggression.""[283] Commenting on Barack Obama's refusal to send weapons to Ukraine as part of his policy of "no military solution" and avoiding escalation, The Washington Post said, "weak U.S. and European support has allowed Russian President Vladimir Putin to impose his own military solution as he has repeatedly escalated his aggression."[284] Foreign Policy stated "The West has dithered under the assumption that providing lethal aid to Ukraine would escalate the conflict. But a sanctions-dominant approach clearly has not prevented escalation. Indeed, with France's determination to sell the Mistral ships to Russia, the West is in the peculiar position of arming the aggressor and forbidding arms to the victim."[264] Paul A. Goble was critical of Western governments' response, saying "by signalling that it will not oppose a particular case of aggression, the West has taught Putin and his regime a lesson, but very much the wrong one: aggression works and after "a decent interval" will be ignored, have no consequences for relations with the West, and then can be repeated."[285] In September 2014, GlobalPost's Gregory Feifer commented on the Ukrainian perspective, stating, "the arguments of some in the West who preach tolerance for Putin are generating anguish and disbelief – and increasingly outrage and hostility – toward the countries whose values Ukrainians believe they're being left alone to defend."[286] In February 2015, Charles Crawford of The Telegraph concluded that Putin had been "rewarded for his bullying."[287]

In Foreign Policy, Oliver Bullough said that Western countries, including the UK, Austria, and Switzerland, had enabled the theft of billions by the Yanukovych government and were making little effort to track and return Ukrainian money, concluding, "If cynicism spreads among Ukrainians and they conclude that the West and Russia are as bad as each other -- and that, in essence, Westerners say pretty things but in reality care only for money -- then the revolution will fail."[288]

A number of U.K. and U.S. commentators reflected the Russian state media's portrayal of the Ukrainian crisis. Seumas Milne, John Pilger, John Mearsheimer, Stephen Cohen, and others blamed "neo-Nazis" in Ukraine and "NATO expansion", expressed understanding for Putin whom the West had "provoked", and presented Ukraine as a pawn which Russia was entitled to treat as its sphere of influence.[261][289][290][291]

Seumas Milne of The Guardian criticized NATO's eastward expansion, and stated that "it is hardly surprising that Russia has acted to stop the more strategically sensitive and neuralgic Ukraine falling decisively into the western camp, especially given that Russia's only major warm-water naval base is in Crimea".[261] Likewise, John J. Mearsheimer, writing for The New York Times, suggested that "to save Ukraine and eventually restore a working relationship with Moscow, the West should seek to make Ukraine a neutral buffer state between Russia and NATO", and "take ... NATO expansion off the table".[292]

Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former American National Security Advisor, said "We have to convey to the Russians our concern that those words spoken by Putin are terribly reminiscent of what Hitler was saying about Austria before the Anschluss."[293] Garry Kasparov criticized Western politicians, saying that many were "lining up to become a new Chamberlain."[294][295]

The referendum on Crimean independence was considered "illegitimate", "un-democratic", and "under the barrel of a gun".[296][297] Many western sources state that the anti-government groups were actually Russian special forces incognito, referred to as "little green men", and that the unrest was intentionally fomented by the Russian government.[1][298]

Reactions

Russian criticism frequently involved claims that the western media ignored the influence of right-wing nationalist groups like Right Sector and the right to self-determination of those in eastern and southern Ukraine and[1][299][300] misrepresented Euromaidan as "peaceful".[1][280] Seumas Milne, writing for The Guardian, perceived "demonization" of Putin and Russia by the Western media: "the anti-Russian drumbeat has now reached fever pitch", "Putin has now become a cartoon villain and Russia the target of almost uniformly belligerent propaganda across the western media", and "anyone who questions the dominant narrative on Ukraine ... is dismissed as a Kremlin dupe".[301] In Left Foot Forward, Pierre Vaux described Milne's article as "the distorted apologia of a Kremlin advocate, one who performs front-of-house PR duties with the president himself" and questioned The Guardian's decision to publish it despite its own editorial criticizing moral relativism and disinformation.[234] In a piece that appeared in The Guardian, former British Ambassador to Russia Tony Brenton wrote that the western media "routinely downplayed the Russian side of the story", and that the "confrontational course" that the British government had taken on Ukraine "had been undoubtedly eased by ministers knowing they are playing a largely anti-Russian press".[302]

To counter Russian propaganda, Ukrainian journalists suggested that the European Union support the development of "a new generation of scholars focused on Eastern Europe as opposed to those seeing Eastern Europe through Russian lenses."[303] Salome Samadashvili of the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies stated that the West's "view of the realities in the former captive nations of the USSR is often clouded by years of exposure to the Russian point of view."[120]

Some writers for western newspapers, including Stephen F. Cohen of The Nation and columnists for The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, were accused of apologism for Russia—justifying its actions.[202][216][304][305][306] According to Isaac Chotiner of the New Republic, Cohen's writing implied that "some sort of control over Ukraine is a requirement of Russian greatness. And then, after explaining this, [Cohen] says the whole crisis was "imposed" on Putin! This is apologetics done well: first you explain why bad behavior is actually sensible, and then you say that the bad behavior wasn't really under the control of the bad actor."[307] Pomerantsev and Weiss said that Cohen was using "willful misinterpretations" of statements by Ukrainian officials.[51] James Kirchick of The Daily Beast described The Nation as "Pravda, in English".[308] Cohen responded to criticism by stating that he sees Washington's hostility towards Russia as counterproductive and dangerous to both Russia and the US: "Before this began, Putin was the best potential partner we had anywhere in the world to pursue our national security", and "American national security still runs through Moscow".[309] Some critics said pro-Russian western media used whataboutism and focused disproportionately on the minority of Euromaidan protestors who belonged to the far-right.[216][310] The portrayal of the situation in Ukraine as primarily a conflict between the West and Russia, minimizing Ukraine, also received criticism.[311] Julia Ioffe of The New Republic wrote: "Ukraine, you see, is just "a former Soviet republic" and a catalyst for feelings between Russia and the West. It's a thing that can be "smuggled into NATO" because its desire or non-desire to be in NATO is automatically less important than how that "smuggling" would make Russia feel."[311]

Some portrayals of Ukrainians were described as "patronizing", reducing Ukrainians to "pawns" of the CIA.[281] Alexander J. Motyl of World Affairs criticized articles by Andranik Migranyan in The National Interest and Katrina vanden Heuvel and Stephen F. Cohen in The Nation, saying that "None of the texts sees Ukrainians as agents with a voice: they are marionettes, following the dictates of Washington. ... Putin and Migranyan probably can't see that this is racism. Vanden Heuvel and Cohen, who rightly rail against racism on the pages of the Nation, should know better."[291] Some commenters criticized Western media who blamed EU and NATO "expansionism" into Russia's "sphere of influence".[234][281][310] Anton Shekhovtsov, writing for Searchlight, said Ukrainians were deprived of agency and portrayed as a "mob allegedly manipulated by the West against Russia."[310] Fabio Belafatti, a lecturer at Vilnius University, was critical of Western media: "Reading many of the articles that accuse the West of "causing" the Ukrainian chaos by "provoking" Russia in its strategic interests and wounding its pride of great power, it's clear how the authors write from a distorted, hierarchical and, ultimately, orientalist (if not outright racist) perspective on the small countries of Eastern Europe."[312]

James Bloodworth of The Daily Beast criticized British newspapers, saying a perception of Russia as mistreated "extends deep into the Conservative press" and added that "the left has its own share of useful idiots."[304] He felt their writing implied "any Ukrainian desire for self-determination can go to hell: Putin is right to be concerned about the loss of his "sphere of influence.""[304] Historian Timothy D. Snyder found that both far-right and far-left publications echoed the positions of the Kremlin and Yanukovych.[313] Canadian historian Stephen Velychenko saw double standards, saying: "Latin Americans or Asians who reject US-Corporate hegemony are celebrated and supported as freedom fighters while eastern Europeans who reject Russian domination are condemned as extremists and Nazis."[314] In an interview with New Eastern Europe, Andrew Wilson said, "The way that the left talks about Russia's "legitimate interests" in Ukraine is bizarre. They would never say the same about Britain's legitimate interests in India or France's legitimate interests in Algeria."[315] John Mearsheimer's article for Foreign Affairs was criticized by Anders Åslund of the Peterson Institute,[316] Mariana Budjeryn of World Affairs,[317] Alexander J. Motyl of World Affairs,[318] and Tom Nichols of Thefederalist.com.[319] Aslund said it showed "contempt for democracy, national sovereignty, and international law. His thesis is that Russia has the right to decide the fate of the countries in its neighborhood in its own interest. ... Mearsheimer is denying countries their right to self-defense or to join NATO."[316] Budjeryn also dismissed Mearsheimer's argument that the EU and NATO had provoked the conflict: "That the Russians failed to design a model of development and a security arrangement that would be equally attractive and did not require arm-twisting to keep together is not the West's fault. Turns out, democracy and rule of law is not the West's property to peddle around the world, but a political model post-Communist societies chose to pursue when they were free to do so."[317] Motyl criticized Mearsheimer's article for "empirically preposterous claims" and "evidentiary cherry-picking, citing only those Russian claims that support realism, while ignoring the many others that do not."[318] Thefederalist.com's Tom Nichols questioned the depiction of Putin as a Russian nationalist and realist, writing that Putin had "reminded a previously slumbering NATO why it exists," "invigorated Ukrainian nationalism," "[violated] almost every rule of competent strategy" ("needless multiplication of enemies" and "letting emotion overcome policy"), and was drawing the US into the conflict, saying Barack Obama's administration "has no interest in a fight and would just as well walk away from European affairs if only given half a chance."[319]

In March 2014, Alan Yuhas wrote in The Guardian, "The occupation of Crimea by pro-Russian forces has been accompanied by a remarkable propaganda push by Moscow – an effort that has infiltrated western media and helped redefine the debate in Russia's favor."[25] In World Affairs, Arthur Milikh criticized Western journalism, saying "much of the Western media, unwittingly complicit, maintain a spirit of scepticism to avoid open accusations against [Putin]. For example, many of those labeled Ukrainian "separatists" are in fact Russian-trained and -equipped troops."[320] Some suggested false balance in Western reports on Ukraine. Paul A. Goble wrote that "Putin's lies have defined the situation rather than facts on the ground, and the Western media's focus on balance – on presenting all sides of the case even if one or more is untrue – gives thuggish leaders like him an opening."[285] Razom said that "Western media prides itself on showing all sides of any story, and so disseminates propaganda in a doe-eyed pursuit of unbiased reporting."[321] According to Chatham House, "the emphasis on 'balance' in many Western media ensures that Russian narratives, no matter how patently fraudulent, are repeated to European and American audiences by their own media."[322]

Occidental College's Agnia Grigas and the Cicero Foundation's Marcel Van Herpen wrote that Russian propaganda "has insinuated itself into and been internalized by the Western media, complementing Russia's military tactics in achieving Putin's expansionist goals."[22] Laas Leivat of Estonian Life also found that Western media were "internalizing" Russia's portrayal of Ukraine as an "irreparably dysfunctional" and "deeply divided" country.[19] Interpretermag.com's Catherine A. Fitzpatrick said mainstream media ignored allegations that Russian reporters had committed serious violations of journalism ethics.[213] In March 2015, Garry Kasparov said "Western media inexplicably continue to air, unchallenged, statements by [Putin's] cadre of propagandists."[323] According to a May 2015 report by the Atlantic Council, Moscow had succeeded in "setting the terms of the narrative for the Ukrainian conflict: international media typically refer to the separatists in Ukraine as if they are a distinct party to the conflict rather than an instrument of the Kremlin. When the Ukrainian government or even Western governments discuss the presence of Russian weapons or soldiers in the east, the media present their statements and then the Russian denial as if they were of equal value, but they are not."[71]

Newsweek was criticized for articles by Damien Sharkov and Felicity Capon.[203][324] Sharkov and the executive director of Human Rights Watch, Kenneth Roth, falsely claimed that Ukrainian lawmakers had passed a motion allowing deserters to be shot.[203] Halya Coynash of the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group found western reporting of the 2015 Ukraine bus attack lacking: "The BBC and other western media reports present the Ukrainian side, then the militant denial, leaving out any detail about the labyrinth of different versions from the latter."[325]

Casey Michel stated that many Western media "maintained a bulwark against Russian obfuscation" but others were "pushing Russia's fantasies" such as "Russia is the victim!"[170] Yuri M. Zhukov said that "ethnocentric" western and Russian portrayals of the war in Donbass, i.e. focusing on language and ethnicity, were not supported by data on the violence, which showed a stronger connection with local economic factors.[326]

Media in Ukraine

Ukrainian media stated that the unrest in Ukraine was manufactured by Russia.[1] They have consistently accused Russia of being a provocateur, and of controlling the anti-government groups behind the scenes.[327] The annexation of Crimea was viewed as illegitimate and illegal.[328] Following the start of the War in Donbass, the Ukrainian government and some media described the armed groups of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic as "terrorists" and "separatists" and referred to the military operation against the DPR and LPR as an "anti-terrorist" operation.[1][329]

In September 2014, Kyiv Post was critical of the West's response to the crisis, stating "Ukraine can never surrender its nation and the West should be ashamed of its ongoing appeasement of Putin, who is trying to veto the Western, democratic aspirations of Ukrainians who do not share his warped dream of recreating a version of the Soviet Union."[330]

The Ukrainian media published some fake news stories and false reports, including a dead rebel photograph with a Photoshop-painted tattoo which allegedly indicated that he belonged to Russian Special Forces[331] and the threat of a Russian nuclear attack against the Ukrainian troops.[4]

Halya Coynash of the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group criticized Russia's calls for "federalization" of Ukraine while quickly suppressing autonomy initiatives within Russia.[332] Ukrainian media widely condemned the November 2014 Donbass general elections, with comparisons to elections in the Soviet Union, and Oleksiy Matsuka, chief editor of Donbass News called the poll "votes for vegetables."[333]

Reactions

In April 2014, historian Timothy D. Snyder stated that "Ukraine is now the site of the largest and most important free media in the Russian language, since all important media in Ukraine appear in Russian, and since freedom of speech prevails. Putin's idea of defending Russian speakers in Ukraine is absurd on many levels, but one of them is this: people can say what they like in Russian in Ukraine, but they cannot do so in Russia itself."[334] In August 2014, BBC News stated that Ukrainian coverage depicted Russia in a "negative light but language has been restrained in comparison to that on Russian TV."[58] They reported that Ukrainian media were increasingly airing "direct accusations" and "harsh criticism" of Russia but "alternative opinions are also aired, and presenters make no attempt to block dissent."[58] Conversely, Joseph L. Black, the Distinguished Research Professor at the Carleton University, stated that Ukrainian media used dehumanizing language towards the rebels, referring to them as "Colorado beetles" and calling for their "extermination as vermin"; in his view, the "Russian official press releases and websites were less inflammatory in their language".[4] Likewise, Mikhail A. Molchanov, professor and former chair of the Department of Political Science at St. Thomas University, said that the Ukrainian media consistently portrays Russia as an Asiatic "other" of "European" Ukraine and the West, referring to it as a "madhouse" and "Mordor", and to the Russians as "not a people, but a rabble".[335]

In December 2014, Reporters Without Borders condemned the creation of the Ukrainian Ministry of Information, which is intended to counteract "Russian propaganda", observing that "In a democratic society, the media should not be regulated by the government."[336]

Media in other countries

In September 2014, Japan's Yomiuri Shimbun said, "The latest ceasefire accord is defective in that it does not mention the withdrawal of thousands of Russian troops from eastern Ukraine. ... It is essential to ensure the withdrawal of Russian troops and end Russia's provision of arms to the rebels to maintain the integrity of Ukrainian sovereignty and territory."[337] France's Le Figaro wrote that Vladimir Putin's policies were "pushing Ukraine into the arms of NATO."[338] In Switzerland's Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Volker Pabst wrote: "Putin needs an external enemy to suppress criticism and to keep his corrupt system going. He is therefore increasingly provoking foreign policy crises."[339]

Jan C. Behrends of Zeitgeschichte-online wrote, "To hold on to Ostpolitik, Berlin has over the past 20 years ignored warning signs from Chechnya to Georgia and the authoritarian restructuring of the Russian state. The "modernization partnership" was pursued at any cost. Warnings from Poland or the Baltic states were dismissed as doomsday predictions." He stated, "Of course, the Kremlin bears responsibility for the war in Ukraine" but blamed Germany's and Europe's weakness on Berlin: "For too long, the Foreign Ministry followed comfortable patterns of thinking, engaged in too much appeasement, integrated too deeply with a power over which we ultimately have no control."[340] In New Eastern Europe, Dustin Dehez said that the German government was interested primarily in preserving its economic ties with Russia and "seemed ready to sacrifice not just the territorial integrity of Ukraine, but also its relationship with its Eastern European allies."[341] In his article for Die Zeit, Boris Schumatsky said, "Putin triumphs when other world leaders allow the lies to go unchallenged. Of course Putin knows that at least some politicians are wise to his ways. But to him the crucial thing is this: they don't call the fraud a fraud, nor the invasion an invasion, nor the hybrid war a war."[342] Volodymyr Valkov said EU and NATO policies "cannot be considered as "provocative policies" against Russia to excuse Russian annexation of Crimea and occupation of Ukraine's eastern regions. Many former Soviet republics and Warsaw pact countries have chosen democracy and joined the alliances that best represent their interests and aspirations. Ukraine has a right to follow the same path and defend its choice."[306]

Agence France-Presse presented the toppling of Communist monuments as "anti-Russian sentiment".[343]

Reactions

In an article published in February 2014 by RFERL, Glenn Kates said some media's maps, such as one presented by Al Jazeera, oversimplified the divisions in Ukraine.[344] Andriy Portnov said, "The German, as well as British or French media, quite often publish misleading maps of 'ethnic zones'" and "automatically [ascribe] the preferred language of everyday communication to political preferences and even ethnicity."[345]

In May 2014, Der Spiegel reported that "when German talk shows invite Russian journalists to speak about the Ukraine crisis, they are almost always pundits who could have been taken directly out of the Kremlin propaganda department."[131] Munich University's Fabian Burkhardt studied the presentation of the Ukraine crisis on German talks shows, reviewing 81 guests from December 2013 to April 2014. He reported a "heavy lean towards pro-Russia guests," with many having "economic ties to Russia," and found that of the 27 guests who were journalists, none were from Ukraine, compared to eight from Russia, while most of the German journalists were experts on Russia rather than Ukraine.[51][346] In December 2014, a statement signed by over 140 German intellectuals criticised "superficial reporting and frequent appearances of Kremlin mouthpieces in television discussions on Ukraine" which had resulted in "misinformation and biased interpretations regarding Ukraine" becoming "anchored in the minds of many ordinary people".[347]

By January 2015, media coverage of events in Ukraine had decreased significantly.[348] The former Prime Minister of Sweden Carl Bildt said, "It's striking how most media just avoid the battles in eastern Ukraine. It's ongoing aggression in Europe. It must not be seen as normal."[349]

In New Eastern Europe, Sławomir Budziak stated that new pro-Russian media outlets had appeared in the Czech Republic, publishing "far-fetched claims, speculations, conspiracy-mongering, lies, defamation and propaganda" which fostered "a state of doubt" and "mistrust" in readers.[350]

Terminology

Western media have generally referred to armed anti-government and pro-Russian groups in Ukraine as "rebels" or "separatists."[351] Reuters describes the events in eastern Ukraine as an "uprising" and "revolt" by "separatists."[271] Casey Michael of The Moscow Times questioned the use of "Ukrainian" and "rebels" to describe the armed pro-Russian groups, saying that their leadership and many fighters were "outsiders and usurpers, men with either mercenary or imperial motivations."[351] Laas Leivat of Estonian Life criticised the use of the term "separatists," saying it "obscures the reality of the situation" and "supports the Kremlin's version of events."[19] As of December 2014, BBC News and Reuters prefer the terms "crisis" and "conflict" over "war".[270][271] The word "invasion" was usually avoided, a choice criticized by Garry Kasparov, Ian Birrell of The Independent, and Trudy Rubin of The Philadelphia Inquirer.[283][352][353] In April 2015, Julian Reichelt of Bild.de wrote that the "deceptive language of politics" (e.g. efforts "to prevent a war in Ukraine") often influenced reporting, making journalists "complicit in disguising what is actually happening in Ukraine, where a war is already in full swing."[354]

Peter Dickinson stated that the Western media was "enabling" Russian aggression against Ukraine.[355] He called it "absurd" that Western media described a foreigner who had arrived from Russia to fight against Ukraine, such as Arsen Pavlov, as a "pro-Russian separatist" and stated that the media was "creating the impression of a Russia-leaning local who was defending his democratic rights."[276]

Russia's actions were described as terrorism by Alexander J. Motyl of World Affairs,[356] Marius Laurinavičius writing for Lithuanian Delfi,[357] and Taras Kuzio in New Eastern Europe.[358] Brian Bonner, chief editor of the Kyiv Post, decided to avoid the term, stating "While I certainly believe Russia and its proxies are committing terror in the east and are guilty of war crimes, the label "terrorist" does nothing to illuminate the reasons for their actions or present the combatants as human beings."[359] He also avoids the term "rebel", finding it "too gentle", and "civil war", saying "This conflict simply would not be happening if it were not instigated by Russia. There is no fratricidal conflict in the east among Ukrainians, nor is there much support for any kind of secessionist movement in the Donbas."[359] Anne Applebaum, in The Washington Post, also questioned the use of "civil war", describing the war in eastern Ukraine as "an artificial conflict, run by Russian security and enhanced by a sophisticated pan-European disinformation campaign."[360] Criticizing the term's use in German media, Reichelt wrote that it "comes straight out of Putin's propaganda machine, which frames the war as a national issue rather than an act of aggression. Calling it a [civil war] is an insult to the people who are being attacked, to our readers, and to our profession."[354]

Public reactions and social media

According to an April 2014 poll by the Razumkov Centre in Ukraine, the Russian media was trusted by 12.7% of respondents, the western media by 40.4%, and the Ukrainian media by 61.5%.[361] After a survey conducted from 5–13 September 2014, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems reported 5% of Ukrainians had a "great deal" or "fair amount" of confidence in the Russian media, 42% in the Western media, and 67% in media based in Ukraine.[362]

The Russian media had more influence in parts of Donbass.[18][45] Having spoken to anti-Kiev protesters in Donetsk in March 2014, Lucian Kim of Reuters said, "In my 20 years as a journalist, I had never experienced such hostility – especially from a group that was supposedly facing persecution. ... Besides a few stock phrases about a "referendum" and "the illegitimate Kiev junta," I also got no answers as to their motivations. It was like trying to have a conversation with a TV – Russian state TV."[18]

A controversy developed over some reactions by the public to the media's coverage. In March 2014, the Polish version of Newsweek expressed suspicion that Russia was employing people to "bombard" its website with pro-Russian comments on Ukraine-related articles.[363] Poland's governmental computer emergency response team later confirmed that pro-Russia commentary had "flooded" Polish internet portals at the start of the Ukrainian crisis.[168] In May 2014, The Guardian noted a large number of pro-Kremlin comments on news articles relating to Ukraine, which the newspaper believed was an "orchestrated pro-Kremlin campaign".[364] Süddeutsche Zeitung, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Der Spiegel, and Reuters reported that German-language media websites had been "flooded" with pro-Russia comments since March 2014.[131][365][366][367] Novaya Gazeta, BuzzFeed, Yle, Moi Raion, Agence France-Presse, Associated Press, Der Spiegel, The New York Times, and others reported on allegations that a Russian company, the Internet Research Agency, employed hundreds of workers to write comments in both Russian and western news sites.[53][130][368][369][370] Dubbed a "troll factory/house/farm" by the media,[130][370] it operates out of a building on Savushkin Street in Saint Petersburg, following a move from the outskirts of the city.[369] The agency may also have a location in Moscow.[130] Jürg Vollmer of Watson.ch reported that Putin had developed the company since 2011 to "systematically manipulate public opinion on the Internet."[177] Ilya Klishin of Dozhd said his sources suggested that Russian expats in Germany, India, and Thailand were also involved.[371] Russian blogger Anton Nosik said in August 2014 that "Comments were already serving as a well-financed Kremlin instrument of war against the opposition, even five years ago ... But what's absolutely clear is that now they're spending more money on Ukraine than they ever spent against Aleksei Navalny, or Ekho Moskvy, "Kommersant," gazeta.ru, and all the rest."[372] Paid commenters may earn 45,000 roubles a month or 65,000 if they know a foreign language.[52] Their tasks included presenting Ukraine as a tool to weaken Russia, the Ukrainian government as fascist, Vladimir Putin as superior to leaders of other countries, and Western countries as depraved.[369][373] The Kremlin is also active on Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, LiveJournal, VK.com, and Odnoklassniki.[130][374][375][376]

A poll conducted in December 2014 found that 63% of Germans have "little or no trust" in the coverage by German media of the Ukrainian conflict. This is compared to 53% for the coverage of the Islamic State and 40% for coverage about the recent strike of German locomotive drivers. When respondents who said that they do not trust German media when it comes to Ukraine were asked why they have mistrust, 31% gave the reason as "coverage is one-sided/not objective", 18% said that "the coverage does not correspond to reality", and 9% said "the coverage is imprecise/not sufficiently comprehensive".[377][378]

Assaults, intimidation, and restrictions on press freedom

Ukraine

Some journalists were physically assaulted or intimidated during the Ukrainian crisis. Tetiana Chornovol, a journalist who was one of the leaders of the Euromaidan protests, was severely beaten and sustained a concussion in December 2013 in Boryspil.[379] Also during Euromaidan, Ihor Lutsenko was attacked by unknown assailants and RFERL journalists were injured by riot police.[380] According to Reporters Without Borders, Vyacheslav Veremyi (Vesti) died after he was pulled from his taxi and shot by unknown assailants and 27 other journalists were injured in Kiev on 18 and 19 February in attacks mostly by Berkut and unknown assailants.[381] Oleksandr Yaroshenko (writing as Serhiy Levitanenko), an Odessa journalist who was critical of Vladimir Putin, was beaten on three occasions in the first half of 2014 and his apartment set on fire.[382]

Journalists were particularly vulnerable in eastern parts of Ukraine.[383][384] In April 2014, staff of Provintsiya, the local newspaper in Kostiantynivka, Donetsk Oblast, were threatened for reporting critically on the Donetsk People's Republic and the newsroom was burned down.[385] In May 2014, The Daily Beast reported that pro-Russian militants were conducting "systematic abductions" of journalists.[211] Irma Krat was held by insurgents from April to July 2014, accused of beheading Berkut members, and injected with a drug before being interrogated.[212] After Oleksiy Matsuka reported on links between pro-Russian separatists and Moscow, his car was set on fire and leaflets calling him a traitor were circulated in his hometown, Donetsk.[386] Pro Gorod, a pro-Ukraine newspaper in Torez, was attacked in April 2014.[387] On 21 April 2014, pro-Russian insurgents in Sloviansk abducted Simon Ostrovsky of Vice News, holding him in a basement and beating him before releasing him on 24 April.[388] Vyacheslav Ponomarev said Ostrovsky "needs to learn a lesson" and Ponomarev's spokeswoman, Stella Khorosheva, accused Ostrovsky of "not reporting in a correct way."[389][390] In May 2014, German journalist Stefan Scholl and Pavel Kanygin of Novaya Gazeta were abducted in Artemivsk by four men who accused Kanygin of "failure to make it clear that the insurgents were good guys fighting fascist oppression."[211] Scholl was soon released and Kanygin was also released after the abductors were paid.[211] Serhiy Lefter, a Ukrainian journalist for Poland's Open Dialogue Foundation, was kidnapped and held for three weeks by insurgents in Sloviansk.[391] Sergey Zakharov, an artist from Donetsk whose work satirized pro-Russian fighters, was held for six weeks and tortured.[392]

Other journalists who disappeared in militant-controlled areas included Roman Cheremsky, Valery Makeyev, Yehor Vorobyov, Yury Lelyavsky, Dmitry Potekhin, and Oleksandr Bilokobylsky.[393] Taken prisoner by LPR militants on 9 January 2015, Luhansk journalist Maria Varfolomeyeva was accused in March of spying for the Ukrainian military in late January, although she was in captivity at the time.[394] Sometimes family members of journalists were also seized. In August 2014, when militants of the Donetsk People's Republic were unable to find Donetsk journalist Viktoria Ishchenko, who had moved to Kiev, they took her parents.[395] The same month, militants from the Luhansk People's Republic seized Luhansk journalist Serhiy Sakadynsky, holding him until January 2015, and his wife, Mariya Havak, holding her for two months.[396] The Institute for Mass Information and the Independent Media Union of Ukraine – which began holding annual Enemies of the Press awards in 2007 – reported in June 2015 that the DPR and LPR were the most dangerous places in Ukraine for the media, citing 64 cases of abducted journalists, 21 cases in which journalists were beaten up, and 35 attacks on media offices which refused to cooperate with militants.[397]

Some journalists and media workers died during the war in eastern Ukraine. On 24 May 2014, an exchange of mortar fire near Sloviansk resulted in the deaths of Italian photojournalist Andrea Rocchelli and his interpreter, Andrey Mironov, and leg wounds to French photographer William Roguelon.[398] Rossiya 24 journalist Igor Kornelyuk and sound engineer Anton Voloshin died on 17 June 2014 during mortar fire near Luhansk.[65] Anatoliy Klyan of Channel One Russia died on 29 June 2014 in Donetsk Oblast when his bus came under fire while approaching a Ukrainian military unit in the middle of the night.[399] Andrei Stenin died in unclear circumstances.[213] Serhiy Nikolayev, a photojournalist for Segodnya, died on 28 February 2015 from wounds sustained during shelling in Pisky, Donetsk Oblast.[400]

The Ukrainian television journalist Ruslan Kotsaba was arrested by Ukrainian authorities on suspicion of treason for posting a video on YouTube urging people to dodge the new military draft. He faces imprisonment of up to fifteen years.[401][402] On March 18, the editor of The Working Class and former deputy of the Verkhovna Rada Alexander Bondarchuk was arrested under paragraph 1, article 110 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, "Violation of territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine", for publishing two articles in his newspaper.

In May 2016, the Ukrainian hacker website Myrotvorets, which is curated by SBU and Ukrainian authorities, published a list of journalists who received press accreditation in Donetsk People's Republic in order to cover war on both sides; the journalists have been labeled as "collaborators with terrorists". Since the publication, a number of these journalists (including Hromadske.TV reporter Yekaterina Sergatskova and freelance journalist Roman Stepanovich) received death threats in emails and phone calls. The data publication was condemned by David Weisbrot, the chair of the Australian Press Council, as well as G7 ambassadors to Kiev and an international group of journalists, including the BBC, The New York Times, The Daily Beast, and The Economist.[403][404]

Following Russia's annexation of Crimea, the Committee to Protect Journalists found a rise in attacks on the press.[405] Roskomnadzor required that news outlets register as Russian entities by 1 April 2015. The body granted registration to 232 out of 3,121 outlets (8%) by that date.[405] The Institute for Mass Information and the Independent Media Union of Ukraine noted 32 cases of censorship, 13 abductions or illegal detentions of journalists, and 11 attacks on editorial offices.[397] Media were threatened with denial of registration if they criticized the annexation or described the situation as an "annexation" or "occupation" of Crimea.[406] They were prevented from taking photographs or recording video of pro-Ukrainian gatherings.[406]

Russia

Some journalists were assaulted and intimidated in Russia, including Vladimir Romensky (Dozhd), Ilya Vasyunin (Russkaya Planeta), Nina Petlyanova (Novaya Gazeta), Irina Tumakova (Fontanka.ru), Sergey Kovalchenko and Sergey Zorin (Telegraph agency).[407] Alexandr Skobov was stabbed in July 2014 after writing an article for Grani.ru criticising the ideology of the self-declared Federal State of Novorossiya.[144] In August 2014, Arseniy Vesnin sustained a concussion in an attack while he was reporting for Ekho Moskvy on demonstrators supporting Ukraine in Saint Petersburg.[408] Lev Shlosberg (Pskovskaya Guberniya) was beaten unconscious in August 2014 in Pskov while investigating the alleged deaths of Russian paratroopers in eastern Ukraine.[140][407] A BBC crew was attacked in September 2014 in Astrakhan, also while investigating Russian soldiers' deaths.[409] Ksenia Batanova, a journalist and producer for Dozhd, a channel which reported extensively on the deaths, was attacked the same month in central Moscow, sustaining a fractured skull and concussion.[410] Timur Kuashev, a journalist for Dosh magazine and human rights activist, openly criticized the invasion of Eastern Ukraine as well as abuses by security services in southern Russia. On 1 August 2014 he was kidnapped in Nalchik and killed by unknown perpetrators.[139]

See also

• Active measures

References

1. "The Media War Behind the Ukraine Crisis". The Moscow Times. 11 March 2014. Retrieved 8 May 2014.
2. Higgins, Andrew (16 April 2014). "In Ukraine, Russia Plays a Weighted Word Game". The New York Times. Retrieved 2 May 2014.
3. Dougherty, Jill (July 2014). "Everyone Lies: The Ukraine Conflict and Russia's Media Transformation" (PDF). Shorenstein Center.
4. J. L. Black, Michael Johns (2016). The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, The West and Russia. Routledge. Retrieved 18 August 2017.
5. Dejevsky, Mary (11 April 2014). "News of a Russian arms buildup next to Ukraine is part of the propaganda war". The Guardian.
6. "Is western media coverage of the Ukraine crisis anti-Russian?". The Guardian. 4 August 2014.
7. Oliver Boyd-Barrett (2016). Western Mainstream Media and the Ukraine Crisis: A Study in Conflict Propaganda. Routledge. ISBN 9781317195993.
8. Richard Sakwa (2014). Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands. I.B.Tauris. ISBN 9780857738042.
9. [2][3][4][5][6][7][8]
10. Ennis, Stephen (22 April 2015). "How Russian TV misleads viewers about Ukraine". BBC News.
11. "Russian TV sparks outrage with Ukraine child 'crucifixion' claim". Agence France-Presse. 14 July 2014.
12. Antelava, Natalia; Abdurasulov, Abdujalil (8 April 2015). "Reports of 10-year-old killed in Ukraine 'made up'". BBC News.
13. Ennis, Stephen (4 February 2015). "How Russian TV uses psychology over Ukraine". BBC.
14. Peter Pomerantsev (9 April 2015). "Inside the Kremlin's hall of mirrors". The Guardian. Retrieved 1 January 2016.
15. Octavian Manea (15 September 2015). "Vasily Gatov: Deconstructing the Russian Infowar and mindset". StopFake.org. Retrieved 1 January 2016.
16. Kuzio, Taras (9 October 2014). "Five reasons why Putin's objectives in Ukraine have backfired and failed". Financial Times.
17. Snyder, Timothy (7 March 2014). "Crimea: Putin vs. Reality". The New York Review of Books.
18. Kim, Lucian (14 November 2014). "Putin waging information war in Ukraine worthy of George Orwell". Reuters.
19. Leivat, Laas (22 February 2015). "Russian propaganda: twisted, fabricated, insidious". Estonian Life. Estonian World Review.
20. "Putin's Confessions on Crimea Expose Kremlin Media". Time. 20 March 2015. Retrieved 10 January 2016.
21. Satter, Raphael (21 December 2016). "Report: Russians regularly shelled eastern Ukraine in 2014". Associated Press.
22. Grigas, Agnia; Van Herpen, Marcel (17 September 2014). "The Media Has Swallowed Five Russian Myths That Have Helped Putin Win In Ukraine". Forbes. Retrieved 4 January 2015.
23. "Russian Media Accused of Using Propaganda in Ukraine Reporting". NPR. 15 April 2014. Retrieved 8 May 2014.
24. Simon Shuster (29 October 2014). "Russians Re-write History to Slur Ukraine Over War". Time. Retrieved 30 October 2014.
25. Yuhas, Alan (17 March 2014). "Russian propaganda over Crimea and the Ukraine: how does it work?". The Guardian.
26. Snyder, Timothy (20 March 2014). "Fascism, Russia, and Ukraine". The New York Review of Books. Retrieved 22 July 2014.
27. Frum, David (26 March 2014). "Ukraine's Phantom Neo-Nazi Menace". The Atlantic.
28. Lucas, Edward; Pomeranzev, Peter (August 2016). "Winning the Information War: Techniques and Counter-strategies to Russian Propaganda in Central and Eastern Europe". Center for European Policy Analysis. pp. 15–20.
29. Leonard, Peter (15 March 2014). "Russian Propaganda War in Full Swing Over Ukraine". Associated Press. Archived from the original on 12 May 2014. Retrieved 8 May 2014.
30. Olearchyk, Roman; Cienski, Jan; Buckley, Neil (3 March 2014). "Russia wages propaganda war over Ukraine". Financial Times.
31. Miller, Christopher (29 April 2015). "Russian media is loving the Baltimore riots". Mashable.
32. "Western plot against Russia? (Monitoring of Russian TV channels in 2015: Final report)". MEMO 98, Internews Ukraine, Yerevan Press Club of Armenia. memo98.sk. 18 May 2015.
    • "Full report" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 30 May 2015.
    • "Charts and results" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 30 May 2015.
33. Nimmo, Ben (15 May 2015). "Anatomy of an info-war: How Russia's propaganda machine works, and how to counter it". Central European Policy Institute. Archived from the original on 20 May 2015. Retrieved 30 May 2015.
34. Darczewska, Jolanta; Żochowski, Piotr (October 2015). "Russophobia in the Kremlin's strategy" (PDF). Point of View (56). Centre for Eastern Studies.
35. Seddon, Max (5 December 2013). "Russian TV Goes Crazy Over Ukraine Protests". Buzzfeed.
36. Valdas Adamkus, Martin Bútora, Emil Constantinescu, Pavol Demeš, Luboš Dobrovský, Mátyás Eörsi, István Gyarmati, Václav Havel, Rastislav Káčer, Sandra Kalniete, Karel Schwarzenberg, Michal Kováč, Ivan Krastev, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, Mart Laar, Kadri Liik, János Martonyi, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, Alexandr Vondra, Lech Wałęsa (15 July 2009). "An Open Letter to the Obama Administration from Central and Eastern Europe". Gazeta Wyborcza.CS1 maint: uses authors parameter (link)
    • "An Open Letter". Radio Free Europe.
37. "Hungary summons Russian ambassador over uprising remarks". Deutsche Welle. 25 October 2016.
38. "Fico to return to Moscow to meet Putin, Medvedev". Czech News Agency. Prague Post. 1 June 2015.
39. "Russian TV doc on 1968 invasion angers Czechs and Slovaks". BBC News. 1 June 2015.
40. "Russian Documentary On 'Helpful' 1968 Invasion Angers Czechs". Radio Free Europe. 1 June 2015.
41. Mortkowitz Bauerova, Ladka; Ponikelska, Lenka (1 June 2015). "Russian 1968 Prague Spring Invasion Film Angers Czechs, Slovaks". bloomberg.com.
42. "Statement of the Speaker of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic on the documentary film of the Russian television about the 1968 invasion". Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic. 31 May 2015. Archived from the original on 25 September 2015.
43. Seddon, Max (8 December 2013). "Russian TV Scrambles To Play Down Ukraine Protests". Buzzfeed.
44. Bigg, Claire (9 December 2013). "Ukraine's 'Euromaidan' Through The Lens Of Russian Television". Radio Free Europe. Retrieved 13 March 2015.
45. Pomerantsev, Peter (4 January 2015). "Inside Putin's Information War". Politico.
46. Portnikov, Vitaly (28 March 2015). "ЗМІ як один із видів Збройних сил Росії" [Media as an arm of the Russian armed forces]. Radio Svoboda (in Ukrainian).
47. "European Union - EEAS (European External Action Service) | "Disinformation Review" - new EU information product". eeas.europa.eu. Archived from the original on 9 November 2015. Retrieved 5 November 2015.
48. "Russian and Separatist Media Continue Citing Anonymous Blogs as Official Media". StopFake.org. 2 September 2015. Retrieved 1 January 2016.
49. Oli Smith (26 August 2015). "Russia's fake Ukraine war report exposed in Putin PR disaster". StopFake.org. Retrieved 1 January 2016.
50. "How Russian TV propaganda is made". StopFake.org. 26 August 2015. Retrieved 13 September 2015.
51. Pomerantsev, Peter; Weiss, Michael (22 November 2014). "The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture, and Money". Institute of Modern Russia.
52. Volchek, Dmitry; Sindelar, Daisy (25 March 2015). "One Professional Russian Troll Tells All". RFERL.
53. Seddon, Max (2 June 2014). "Documents Show How Russia's Troll Army Hit America". BuzzFeed.
54. Alexander, Lawrence (13 July 2015). "Open-Source Information Reveals Pro-Kremlin Web Campaign". Global Voices. Retrieved 24 January 2018.
55. Weisburd, Andrew Aaron (7 September 2015). "#KremlinTrolls and Other Acquaintances of RU EMB Canada". Kremlintrolls.com. Archived from the original on 17 September 2015. Retrieved 12 September 2015.
56. "Everything you wanted to know about trolls but were afraid to ask". ShareAmerica. 4 November 2015. Retrieved 24 January 2018.
57. Kates, Glenn (25 April 2014). "RT Claims 'Substantiated' In Four Tweets And A Video". Radio Free Europe.
58. "Ukraine conflict: Turning up the TV heat". BBC News. 11 August 2014. Retrieved 12 June 2015.
59. Yaffa, Joshua (1 July 2014). "Dmitry Kiselev Is Redefining the Art of Russian Propaganda". New Republic.
60. Peled, Daniella (14 January 2015). "How Russia Fights its Information War". Institute for War and Peace Reporting.
61. "Alternative reality". The Economist. 30 May 2015.
62. Alpert, Lukas I.; Cullison, Alan; Shishkin, Philip (2 May 2014). "Ukraine Launches Offensive to Regain Slovyansk". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 2 May 2014.
63. Kramer, Andrew E. (17 April 2014). "Demands That Jews Register in Eastern Ukraine Are Denounced, and Denied". The New York Times. Retrieved 2 May 2014.
64. Nemtsov, Boris; Yashin, Ilya; Shorina, Olga (May 2015). Putin. War – Based on materials from Boris Nemtsov (PDF) (Report). Free Russia Foundation. Archived from the original (PDF) on 29 May 2015. Retrieved 29 May 2015.
65. Coynash, Halya (18 June 2014). "Cynical propaganda mileage from journalist's death". Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group.
66. Higgins, Andrew (8 April 2014). "Among Ukraine's Jews, the Bigger Worry Is Putin, Not Pogroms". The New York Times.
67. Shynkarenko, Olga (3 March 2014). "Putin's Crimea Propaganda Machine". The Daily Beast.
68. Hilliar, Andrew; Myakinchenko, Polina (4 March 2014). "The fanciful claims of Russian propaganda amid Ukraine's crisis". France 24.
69. "'Just like the West.' Russia defends its propaganda war over Ukraine". CBC News. 18 March 2014. Retrieved 8 May 2014.
70. Rainsford, Sarah (20 January 2015). "Ukraine conflict: Is Russia stoking war or pushing peace?". BBC News.
71. Czuperski, Maksymilian; Herbst, John; Higgins, Eliot; Polyakova, Alina; Wilson, Damon (27 May 2015). Hiding in Plain Sight: Putin's War in Ukraine (PDF) (Report). Atlantic Council. Archived from the original (PDF) on 24 February 2019. Retrieved 1 January 2016.
72. Morgan, Martin (5 September 2014). "Russian TV lauds 'volunteers' fighting in Ukraine". BBC News.
73. Garton Ash, Timothy (1 February 2015). "Putin must be stopped. And sometimes only guns can stop guns". The Guardian.
74. Mannteufel, Ingo (9 May 2015). "Opinion: Instrumentalizing history - Moscow and May 9". Deutsche Welle.
75. Ioffe, Julia (20 July 2014). "The Russian Public Has a Totally Different Understanding of What Happened to Malaysia Airlines Flight 17". New Republic.
76. "Open letter of Ukrainian Jews to Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin". Euro-Asian Jewish Congress. 5 March 2014. Archived from the original on 15 September 2015. Retrieved 19 December 2014.
77. Danilova, Maria (14 March 2014). "After Ukraine protest, radical group eyes power". Associated Press. Archived from the original on 20 March 2014. The radical ultranationalist group ... [has been] demonized by Russian state propaganda as fascists and accused of staging attacks against Russian speakers and Jews. ... The AP and other international news organizations have found no evidence of hate crimes.
78. Kozlowska, Hanna (2 June 2014). "The Fascists are coming, the Fascists are coming!". Foreign Policy. D.C.
79. David Adesnik (29 May 2014). "Ukraine Election Results Discredit Kremlin Propaganda". Forbes.com. Retrieved 1 January 2016.
80. "Ukrainian Jews satisfied with far-right's crash in elections". Jewish Telegraphic Agency. 31 October 2014. Retrieved 1 January 2016.
81. "Ukraine's Jewish leaders celebrate defeat of far right". Jewish Telegraphic Agency. Times of Israel. 27 May 2014. Retrieved 1 January 2016.
82. Melchior, Jillian Kay (16 April 2014). "Putin's Propaganda Campaign". National Review.
83. "World media offer divergent views on Ukraine crisis". BBC News. 4 March 2014. Retrieved 8 May 2014.
84. "Русская весна" на Юго-Востоке Украины ["Russian Spring" in southeast Ukraine]. Russian News and Information Agency (in Russian). 3 March 2014. Retrieved 10 April 2014.
85. Niland, Paul (15 March 2015). "Why TASS is wrong". Kyiv Post.
86. "From cold war to hot war". The Economist. 14 February 2015. ISSN 0013-0613. Retrieved 5 May 2015.
87. "Media poles apart in Ukraine crisis". BBC News. 16 April 2014. Retrieved 8 May 2014.
88. Chivers, C. J.; Sneider, Noah (5 May 2014). "Deadly Clashes Erupt in Ukraine as Troops Push Toward a Rebel-Held City". The New York Times. Retrieved 8 May 2014.
89. Miller, Christopher (1 May 2015). "Russia's pro-Putin media darling loves his new life in Brooklyn — minus the hipsters". Mashable.
90. Mills, Laura (22 July 2014). "Russians fed conspiracy theories on Ukraine crash". Associated Press. Archived from the original on 23 July 2014.
91. "Murders and Gang Rapes: Moscow Spins OSCE Probe Into Ukraine 'Mass Graves'". RFERL. 3 October 2014. Retrieved 3 October 2014.
92. "OSCE Refutes Claims of Mass Graves in Donetsk: 'OSCE expert' never worked for the organization". Ukraine Today. 2 October 2014. Retrieved 3 October 2014.
93. Fitzpatrick, Catherine A. (29 September 2014). "Russia This Week: Moscow Accuses Ukraine of Atrocities; Media Distorts OSCE Report". Interpreter Mag.
94. "The Kremlin's Top 75 Lies About The Ukraine Crisis". RFERL. 12 December 2014.
95. "Top 5 Russian fake reports of 2014". Ukraine Today. 30 December 2014. Retrieved 30 December 2014.
96. Rudenko, Olga (6 January 2015). "Most freakish Russian lies about Ukraine now listed on Facebook". Kyiv Post. Retrieved 6 January 2015.
97. Фейк російських ЗМІ: про Яроша і гранату у Верховній Раді [Fake: Yarosh and the grenade in the Verkhovna Rada]. Radio Svoboda (in Ukrainian). 8 January 2015.
98. Дочерний проект МИА «Россия сегодня» рассказал о связи Порошенко с Люцифером [Rossiya Segodnya project reports on Poroshenko's links with Lucifer]. Meduza (in Russian). 29 January 2015.
99. Reid Standish. "Propaganda Watch: Listen to Two Russians Badly Impersonate CIA Spies to Pin MH17 on U.S." Foreign Policy. Retrieved 14 August 2015.
100. • "Fake: Carpatho-Rusyns Region Demands Autonomy". StopFake.org. 17 March 2015.
     • "Long live Ruthenia: The Russian press cooks up ethnic separatism in Transcarpathia". The Economist. 3 April 2015.
101. Ayres, Sabra (4 May 2015). "'Nobody here is asking to leave Ukraine': Minorities see Russian meddling". Al Jazeera.
102. Coynash, Halya (31 March 2015). "Fake Odessa 'mass riots' staged for Russian TV". Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group.
     • Coynash, Halya (17 April 2015). "Odesa minorities cry foul as new 'people's council' report their persecution". Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group.
103. Halya Coynash (13 April 2015). "Bad News for Moscow on the Language Front". Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group. Retrieved 1 January 2016.
104. Paul Goble (19 April 2015). "Kremlin's Five Top Lies Last Week about Ukraine". The Interpreter Magazine. Retrieved 20 April 2015.
105. "Russia's top 160 lies about Ukraine". RussiaLies. 26 July 2015. Retrieved 26 July 2015.
106. "Izvestiya Fake" (PDF). Departament of State.
107. Ennis, Stephen (28 April 2015). "Satirists mock Russian TV fixation with Ukraine". BBC News.
108. Theise, Eugen (24 June 2015). "OSCE caught in the crossfire of the Ukraine propaganda war". Deutsche Welle.
109. Toler, Aric (27 December 2014). "Meet the Kremlin's Snitch". Global Voices Online. Retrieved 5 January 2015.
110. ""Nashi" spokeswoman caught red-handed planning attacks on pro-opposition paper". Gazeta.ru. 9 February 2012. Archived from the original on 5 January 2015. Retrieved 5 January 2015.
111. Анатомия пропаганды: взломанная почта Потупчик объяснила многое [Anatomy of the propaganda: hacked Potupchik's mailbox explains a lot] (in Russian). The Insider. 26 December 2014. Retrieved 5 January 2015.
112. Dzutsev, Valery (20 January 2015). "Analyst Provides Insider View of Russian Government Think Tank". Eurasia Daily Monitor.
113. Mackey, Robert (18 December 2014). "Putin Cites Claim About U.S. Designs on Siberia Traced to Russian Mind Readers". New York Times. Retrieved 26 June 2015.
114. Smolchenko, Anna (7 November 2007). "Putting Words in Albright's Mouth". The Moscow Times. Retrieved 26 June 2015.
115. Gatov, Vasily (25 July 2015). "Russia's Stalinist Diplospeak". The Daily Beast. Retrieved 3 August 2015.
116. Natalia Kozlova (8 September 2015). Кто управляет хаосом:: Александр Бастрыкин: нас не пугает информационное давление со стороны [Who manages chaos:: Alexander Bastrykin: We're not scared of pressure from information outlets] (in Russian). Russian Gazette.ru. Retrieved 1 January 2016.
117. "The Chilling side to Russia's claims about Yatsenyuk as Chechnya fighter". 9 September 2015. Retrieved 12 September 2015.
118. Halya Coynash (15 July 2015). "Arrest a Ukrainian – Russia's Investigative Committee will do the rest". khpg.org. Retrieved 1 January 2016.
119. Cherkasov, Alexander (27 October 2015). "Самый правдивый человек на свете". Ekho Kavkaza. Ukrainians, according to the prosecution, trained in "Raduyev camp" from Spring 1999 till May 2000. There's one small problem. Salman was arrested by FSB during the night from 12 to 13 March 2000.
120. Samadashvili, Salome (June 2015). "Muzzling the bear: Strategic Defence for Russia's Undeclared Information War on Europe". Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies.
121. "Russian media refers to Turkey in a hostile context more often than the USA and Ukraine". Meduza. 29 December 2015.
122. Babchenko, Arkadiy (15 April 2015). Аркадий Бабченко: «Если бы не российское телевидение, этой войны бы не было» [Arkadiy Babchenko, "If it were not for Russian TV, this war would not have occurred"] (in Russian). OpenRussia. Retrieved 24 April 2015.
123. Denis Volkov (10 September 2015). "Supporting a War that isn't: Russian Public Opinion and the Ukraine Conflict". StopFake.org. Retrieved 12 September 2015.
124. Ennis, Stephen (12 March 2014). "Ukraine hits back at Russian TV onslaught". BBC.
125. Malpas, Anna (3 March 2014). "'Propaganda' war". Agence France-Presse. Buenos Aires Herald.
126. Malgin, Andrei (30 July 2014). "Putin's Media Lives in an Alternate Reality". The Moscow Times.
127. Kacewicz, Michał (28 February 2015). "A Final Interview With Boris Nemtsov". Newsweek.
128. Rothrock, Kevin (28 March 2014). "'Anonymous International' Leaks Kremlin's Instructions to Russian TV". Global Voices Online.
129. Toler, Aric (19 November 2014). "Fake 'Ukrainian' News Websites Run by Russian 'Troll Army' Offshoots". Global Voices Online.
130. Bidder, Benjamin (1 June 2015). "Paid as a Pro-Kremlin Troll: 'The Hatred Spills over into the Real World'". Der Spiegel.
131. Gathmann, Moritz; Neef, Christian; Schepp, Matthias; Stark, Holger (30 May 2014). "The Opinion-Makers: How Russia Is Winning the Propaganda War". Der Spiegel.
132. Trudolyubov, Maksim (6 February 2015). Русское сопротивление. Vedomosti (in Russian).
133. "Pro-Kremlin TV Host Kiselyov Admits Using Fake Documents in His Show News". The Moscow Times. Retrieved 16 May 2016.
134. Bykov, Dmitriy (12 August 2014). Слава Крыма и позор России [Crimean glory]. sobesednik.ru (in Russian).
135. Susan Ormiston (4 February 2015). "Russian government propaganda stokes anti-West sentiment". Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Retrieved 1 January 2016.
136. Inozemstev, Vladislav (11 January 2015). "Russia Must Stop Glorifying War in Ukraine". The Moscow Times.
137. Alekhina, Maria (19 July 2014). "Russian media is covering up Putin's complicity in the MH17 tragedy". The Guardian.
138. Skibinsky, Max (20 July 2014). "No Russian". Retrieved 22 July 2014.
139. "Russian journalist's body found after disappearance". The Guardian. 5 August 2014. Retrieved 10 September 2014.
140. "Inquisitive Pskov Lawmaker Beaten Unconscious". The Moscow Times. 31 August 2014. Retrieved 10 September 2014.
141. Zubov, Andrey (1 March 2014). Это уже было. Vedomosti (in Russian).
142. Skobov, Aleksandr (21 July 2014). "Реконструкция ада" [Reconstruction of hell]. Grani.ru. Archived from the original on 28 July 2014. Retrieved 21 July 2014.
143. Piontkovsky, Andrei (18 July 2014). "Июльские БУКи". Kasparov.info. Retrieved 21 July 2014.
144. "Известный петербургский оппозиционер Александр Скобов госпитализирован после нападения неизвестных". Gazeta.Spb. 28 July 2014. Archived from the original on 11 August 2014. Retrieved 28 July 2014.
145. Lukashevich, Vadim (9 July 2014). Кто и как нам врет [Who is lying to us and how] (in Russian). Echo Moskvy. Retrieved 31 October 2014.
146. Isachenkov, Vladimir (1 November 2014). "Russia's top radio station slapped by government". Associated Press. Archived from the original on 3 November 2014.
147. Portnikov, Vitaliy (5 September 2014). Законы продвижения. grani.ru (in Russian).
     • Translation: "'Optimists' Continue to Deceive Themselves and Others about Putin and Thus Facilitate His Aggression, Portnikov Says". interpretermag.com.
148. Podrabinek, Aleksandr (16 September 2014). Большой взрыв. grani.ru (in Russian).
149. Nemtsov, Boris (1 March 2015). "Boris Nemtsov: 'This is Vladimir Putin's war'". Kyiv Post.
150. Sukhov, Ivan (15 September 2014). В перспективе возвращение Крыма неизбежно. profile.ru (in Russian).;
     • Translation: "Kremlin Demand for Role in Ukrainian Affairs 'Unheard Of,' Former Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Says". interpretermag.com.
151. "Быков у нас много, только все импотенты" [We have plenty of bulls, but all are impotent]. Neuromir TV. 9 October 2014.
152. Gozman, Leonid (11 February 2015). "Спасите наших солдат - дайте оружие Украине" [Save our soldiers - give arms to Ukraine]. Ekho Moskvy. Retrieved 15 February 2015.
153. ""По полигону работают, котла-то нету". RT и ТАСС прокомментировали смех журналистов при обстреле Дебальцева". TV Rain. 16 February 2015. Retrieved 17 February 2015.
154. "Кудрин заявил об информационной войне государства с российскими гражданами". Meduza. 25 April 2015. Retrieved 25 April 2015.
155. "Корреспондент НТВ попросил прощения за участие в "пропагандистском безумии" и уволился с канала". Retrieved 10 June 2015.
156. "Russian Youth Pays Price For Speaking Out Over Ukraine". Radio Free Europe. Retrieved 13 June 2015.
157. "Nemtsov daughter: Putin 'politically' to blame for murder". BBC. 12 March 2015. Retrieved 13 June 2015.
158. Nemtsova, Zhanna (19 June 2015). "My father was killed by Russian propaganda, says Nemtsov's daughter". The Guardian.
159. "Росфинмониторинг - Перечень террористов и экстремистов (действующие)". www.fedsfm.ru. Retrieved 10 June 2015.
160. Neef, Christian; Schepp, Matthias (22 April 2014). "The Propaganda War: Opposition Sings Kremlin Tune on Ukraine". Spiegel Online. Retrieved 10 June 2015.
161. Smith, Ben (31 December 2014). "The EU Is Plotting A New TV Channel To Counter Russian Propaganda In Europe". Buzzfeed.
162. Szoldra, Paul (18 July 2014). "Here's The Ridiculous Way Russia's Propaganda Channel Is Covering The Malaysia Airlines Crash". Business Insider. Archived from the original on 20 July 2014.
163. Ragozin, Leonid (4 March 2014). "Ukraine, Putin TV and the Big Lie". Politico.
164. Martyn-Hemphill, Richard; Morisseau, Etienne (4 April 2015). "Baltics in front line of Information War". The Baltic Times.
165. Bigg, Claire (5 May 2014). "Putin Awards 300 Journalists For 'Objective' Crimea Coverage". RFERL.
166. Maffre, Luc (21 October 2016). "To inform, or disinform: Russia's new propaganda war". New Eastern Europe. Archived from the original on 27 October 2016. Retrieved 1 November 2016.
167. Pomerantsev, Peter (9 September 2014). "Russia and the Menace of Unreality". The Atlantic.
168. Czekaj, Matthew (29 April 2015). "Russia's Hybrid War Against Poland". jamestown.org.
     • "Raport o stanie bezpieczeństwa cyberprzestrzeni RP w 2014 roku" [Report on the state of Poland's internet security in 2014] (PDF) (in Polish). cert.gov.pl. March 2015.
169. Whitmore, Brian (3 June 2015). "Why Eston Kohver Matters". Radio Free Europe.
170. Michel, Casey (26 June 2015). "Russian Propaganda in American Media". Intersection Project.
171. Lucas, Edward; Nimmo, Ben (November 2015). "Information Warfare: What Is It and How to Win It?" (PDF). Center for European Policy Analysis. Archived from the original (PDF) on 19 October 2017. Retrieved 30 November 2015.
172. "How Vladimir Putin tries to stay strong". The Economist. 18 April 2015. Retrieved 1 January 2016.
173. "Lithuania bans Russian TV station for 3 months". Associated Press. 8 April 2015. Archived from the original on 9 April 2015.
174. Remnick, David (17 July 2014). "After the Crash". The New Yorker.
175. Sergey Golunov (13 April 2015). "What Russian students learn about Russia's enemies". Open Democracy. Retrieved 14 April 2015.
176. "Why Russia's Propaganda Machine Is Loving a NYT Report". ABC News. 5 May 2014. Retrieved 8 May 2014.
177. Vollmer, Jürg (22 June 2014). "Putins Propagandatruppe: So arbeitet das geheime Netzwerk der Russland-Propaganda" [Putin's propaganda troops: This is how the secret Russia-propaganda network operates] (in German). watson.ch.
178. Raab, Josh (8 July 2014). "In Ukraine, A Battle of Words and Images". Time.com.
179. • de Mareschal, Edouard (11 March 2014). "Stopfake.org, le site d'étudiants ukrainiens qui démonte la propagande russe". Le Figaro (in French).
     • Hory, Julien (4 June 2014). "StopFake, le site ukrainien qui démonte la propagande russe". Libération (in French).
     • Álvarez, Sonja (9 June 2014). "Manipulierte Nachrichten im Ukrainekonflikt". Tagesspiegel (in German).
     • Sommerbauer, Jutta (8 December 2014). "Ukraine: Fakten-Check im Propagandakrieg". Die Presse (in German).
180. Chimbelu, Chiponda (5 June 2014). "Fake news can ruin lives, says Stopfake.org founder". Deutsche Welle.
181. Reid, Alaistair (14 March 2014). "How journalism is facing its own battle in Ukraine". journalism.co.uk.
182. "Russia TV stations air 'impostor' protester in two guises". BBC News. 11 April 2014.
183. Gregory, Paul Roderick (12 April 2014). "Russian TV Propagandists Caught Red-Handed: Same Guy, Three Different People (Spy, Bystander, Heroic Surgeon)". Forbes.
184. Pancevski, Bojan (1 March 2015). "It's her again: Kremlin's war-zone fake". thesundaytimes.co.uk.
185. Najibullah, Farangis (20 May 2014). "Russian TV Blames Nymphs For Retread 'Ukraine' Footage". RFERL.
186. Dolgov, Anna (20 May 2014). "Kiselyov Defends TV Network After Caucasus Footage Labeled as Ukraine". The Moscow Times.
187. "Authorities: Russian proxies discuss framing Ukrainian military over death of Red Cross delegate in Donetsk (VIDEO)". Kyiv Post. 4 October 2014.
188. "Struggle against fake information about events in Ukraine". StopFake.org.
189. "How Russian Media Turned Construction Site Into 'Concentration Camp'". RFERL. 2 May 2014.
190. Російська пропаганда використала прізвище українського дипломата, щоб розповісти про "жахи Євромайдану" [Ukrainian diplomat impersonated on Russian TV] (in Ukrainian). pravda.com.ua. 24 November 2014.
191. Denber, Rachel (20 June 2014). "Dispatches: White Phosphorus, White Lies, or What?". Human Rights Watch.
192. Matthews, Owen (26 July 2014). "Vladimir Putin's empire of lies". The Spectator.
193. Schreck, Carl (27 October 2014). "Ukraine Unspun: Chechnya War Pic Passed Off As Ukraine Atrocity By Hackers, Russian TV". RFERL.
194. "A 'Ukrainian Missile' Or A Failed Russian Space Launch?". RFERL. 22 August 2014.
195. "TV uses crash pictures in 'mass grave' reports". BBC. 30 September 2014.
196. Anna Dolgov (26 August 2014). "Russian Rock Star Makarevich Slammed in State TV Smear Campaign". The Moscow Times.
197. Zimbardo, Filip (21 February 2015). Обыкновенные зомби. Как работает ложь [Standard zombies. How lies work] (in Russian). Ukrayina (TV channel). Retrieved 1 January 2016.
198. Quinn, Allison (13 January 2015). "Russia's Reaction to EU 'Counter-Propaganda' Channel Hints at Fear". The Moscow Times.
199. Ennis, Stephen (7 May 2015). "Russian TV's coverage of Odessa clashes". BBC News.
200. • Coynash, Halya (11 August 2014). "Odessa "Massacre" Propaganda vs. the Facts". Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group.
     • Coynash, Halya (6 May 2014). "What Russian TV won't show about the events in Odessa". Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group.
201. Coynash, Halya (17 April 2014). "East Ukraine crisis and the 'fascist' matrix". Al Jazeera.
202. Chait, Jonathan (14 April 2014). "The Pathetic Lives of Putin's American Dupes". New York.
203. Фейк: Украинские офицеры получили право расстреливать своих солдат [Fake: Ukrainian officers have the right to shoot their own soldiers]. StopFake.org (in Russian). 8 February 2015.
204. Julia Ioffe (2 March 2014). "Kremlin TV Loves Anti-War Protests—Unless Russia Is the One Waging War". The New Republic. Retrieved 12 June 2015.
205. Gray, Rosie (13 March 2014). "How The Truth Is Made At Russia Today". Buzzfeed.
206. "Ofcom Broadcast Bulletin, Issue number 266" (PDF). Ofcom. 10 November 2014. p. 43.
207. "Anchor quits: I can't be part of network 'that whitewashes' Putin's actions". CNN. 6 March 2014. Retrieved 8 May 2014.
208. Coynash, Halya (16 July 2014). "Russia Today's "Genocide in Eastern Ukraine": Sick, distorted and deleted". Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group.
209. "Ofcom Broadcast Bulletin, Issue 261" (PDF). Ofcom. 8 September 2014.
210. Sijbren de Jong; Willem Oosterveld; Artur Usanov (20 April 2015). "Beyond the Cold War of Words". The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. Retrieved 1 January 2016.
     • Sijbren de Jong; Willem Th. Oosterveld; Artur Usanov; Katarina Kertysova; Ihor Ilko; Juncal Fernández-Garayzábal González (2015). Beyond the Cold War of Words - How online media can make a difference in the post-Soviet space (PDF). The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. ISBN 978-94-92102-15-7. Retrieved 5 May 2015.
211. Young, Cathy (18 May 2014). "Ukraine Journalists Still Enduring Brutal Kidnappings, Imprisonment, and Maybe Worse". The Daily Beast.
212. Volchek, Dmitry; Najibullah, Farangis (7 August 2014). "'It'd Be Better To Die' -- Ukrainian Journalist Talks About Ordeals In Captivity". RFERL.
213. Fitzpatrick, Catherine A. (30 September 2014). "Andrei Stenin and His Fellow Travelers: How Russian State Media Help Fight the War Against Ukraine". Interpretermag.com.
214. "Life of Bryan: How an RT Columnist Tries to Influence the Debate on Russia and Ukraine". Interpretermag.com. 29 October 2014.
215. Coynash, Halya (23 January 2015). "Sinister Remake: Blood and POW Humiliation for the Cameras". Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group.
216. Moynihan, Michael (9 March 2014). "How to Justify Russian Aggression". The Daily Beast.
217. "Russia Lenta.ru editor Timchenko fired in Ukraine row". BBC News. 12 March 2014. Retrieved 8 May 2014.
218. "We have ways of making you talk". The Economist. 14 March 2014. Retrieved 8 May 2014.
219. Kates, Glenn (21 June 2014). "Russian State TV Adds Its Own Twist To RFE/RL Video". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
220. "Rebel Leader's Claim Of FSB Ties Omitted By Russian Media". RFERL. 2 December 2014.
221. "Putin gets trapped by his own propaganda". Blogginghead.TV. Retrieved 23 December 2014.
222. "Russia Today reporter resigns in protest at MH17 coverage". The Guardian. 18 July 2014. Retrieved 18 July 2014.
223. Altman, Alex (21 July 2014). "Russian Television Under Spotlight After Malaysia Airlines Crash in Ukraine". Time.com.
224. Walker, Shaun (4 March 2014). "Russian propaganda and Ukrainian rumour fuel anger and hate in Crimea". The Guardian.
225. Hyde, Lily (9 September 2014). "Fascism is not sexy". Kyiv Post. Archived from the original on 14 January 2015.
226. Sukhov, Oleg (11 September 2014). "Army of Propagandists Speaks Fluent Kremlin". Kyiv Post.
227. Ennis, Stephen (15 November 2014). "Russia's global media operation under the spotlight". BBC News.
228. Lévy, Bernard-Henri (26 February 2014). "Bernard-Henri Levy: Ukraine's Revolutionaries Are Not Fascists". The Daily Beast.
229. Berdinskikh, Kristina (1 November 2014). "Такого, как в Донецком аэропорту, я не видел ни на одной войне - журналист LA Times Сергей Лойко". Novoye Vremya (Ukraine) (in Russian).; "Translation". 2 November 2014.
230. O'Clery, Conor (6 September 2014). "Putin's expansionist war in Europe". The Irish Times.
231. Soldak, Katya (28 September 2014). "Ukrainian Crowds Topple Lenin Statue (Again)". Forbes.
232. Gentile, Michael (10 February 2015). "Ukraine's Proxy War Against The Soviet Union". Vox Ukraine.
233. Kim, Lucian (2 March 2014). "How war in Ukraine led to Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov's death". Reuters.
234. Vaux, Pierre (March 2015). "Projecting the Kremlin line". Left Foot Forward.
235. Sukhov, Oleg (24 April 2015). "Foreigners Who Fight And Die For Ukraine: Russians join Ukrainians to battle Kremlin in Donbas". Kyiv Post.
236. Stroilov, Pavel (6 September 2014). "Revealed: the Kremlin files which prove that Nato never betrayed Russia". The Spectator.
237. Applebaum, Anne (17 October 2014). "Don't Accept Putin's Version of History". Slate.
238. Zelikow, Philip (10 August 1995). "NATO Expansion Wasn't Ruled Out". The New York Times.
239. Korshunov, Maxim (16 October 2014). "Mikhail Gorbachev: I am against all walls". Russia Beyond the Headlines.
240. "Gorbatschow: Nato-Erweiterung war 1990 kein Thema" [Gorbachev: NATO-expansion was not an issue in 1990]. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (in German). Deutsche Presse-Agentur. 8 November 2014.
241. Lévy, Bernard-Henri (9 February 2015). "Bernard-Henri Levy: Why Putin is a danger to Europe". Kyiv Post.
242. Clark, Christopher; Spohr, Kristina (24 May 2015). "Moscow's account of Nato expansion is a case of false memory syndrome". The Guardian.
243. NATO responses
     • "NATO-Russia relations: the facts". NATO. 17 December 2015.
     • "Russia's accusations - setting the record straight, Fact Sheet - April 2014". NATO. 12 May 2014.
244. "Rada supports coalition-proposed government lineup". Interfax-Ukraine. 2 December 2014."Rada approves new Cabinet with three foreigners". Kyiv Post (in Ukrainian). 2 December 2014."Rada has voted in the new Cabinet". Ukrayinska Pravda. 2 December 2014.
245. "Ukraine must establish Information Policy Ministry". National Radio Company of Ukraine. 2 December 2014. Archived from the original on 2 December 2014.
246. Andrew Kornbluth (26 March 2015). "Russian Propaganda Exploits Western Weakness". The Moscow Times. Retrieved 1 January 2016.
247. Fedor, Julie; Portnov, Andriy; Umland, Andreas (April 2015). "The Russian Media and the War in Ukraine". Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society.
248. Ennis, Stephen (16 March 2015). "Russian TV's Crimea film falsifies hero story". BBC News.
249. Goncharova, Olena (18 March 2015). "Debunking the Kremlin myth about the 'Korsun pogrom' (VIDEO)". Kyiv Post.
250. Kim, Lucian (19 March 2015). "Kremlin TV". slate.com.
251. Denisenko, Viktoras (26 January 2015). "Opinion: New Russian propaganda - primitive but effective". Delfi (web portal).
252. Zivile Kropaite (9 April 2015). "Lithuania bans Russian TV station". EUobserver. Retrieved 1 January 2016.
253. Peron, Laetitia (26 May 2015). "Full-house in Kiev bar inspired by Russian propaganda". Agence France-Presse. Yahoo News. Archived from the original on 29 May 2015.
254. "No freedom to lie". Retrieved 12 September 2015.
255. "French TV channel busts Russian journos on facts distortion". uatoday.tv. Retrieved 24 May 2016.
256. Canal+. "Quand la plus grosse chaine d'info russe manipule des images françaises - Le Petit Journal du 20/05". Canalplus.fr. Retrieved 23 May 2016.
257. ""Мы этого не говорили!" — французы не узнали себя на канале "Россия" - РОССИЯ - RFI". RFI (in Russian). 22 May 2016. Retrieved 23 May 2016.
258. Mayer, Andre (9 December 2013). "Divided Ukraine roiled by protest, love-hate with 'Mother Russia'". CBC News.
259. "Ukraine protesters surrounded by riot police". CBC News. 19 January 2014.
260. "The innocence and violence of EuroMaidan: notes from Kyiv". University College London. 31 January 2014. Retrieved 8 May 2014.
261. Milne, Seumas (5 March 2014). "The clash in Crimea is the fruit of western expansion". The Guardian.
262. Fisher, Matthew (25 February 2014). "Another colossal monument to Viktor Yanukovych's vanity unveiled as hunt continues for ousted Ukrainian president". Postmedia News. The National Post.
263. Reifowitz, Ian (17 December 2013). "Vladimir Putin is Just the Latest Bully in the Thousand Year Struggle for Ukrainian Nationhood". Huffington Post.
264. Stacey, Jeffrey A.; Herbst, John (16 August 2014). "How to Beat Down a Bully". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on 17 August 2014.
265. "Crimea: Mr Putin's imperial act". The Guardian. 18 March 2014.
266. Bendle, Mervyn F. (23 July 2014). "The imperialist ideologue driving Putin's brain". The Australian.
267. MacGillis, Alec (18 July 2014). "Where Are Putin's American Admirers Now?". New Republic.
268. Neef, Christian; Schepp, Matthias (16 December 2013). "Maintaining Russian Power: How Putin Outfoxed the West". Der Spiegel.
269. Friedman, Thomas L. (20 December 2014). "Who's Playing Marbles Now?". The New York Times.
270. "Ukraine crisis: Shaky ceasefire holds as talks expected". BBC News. 9 December 2014.
271. Chambers, Madeline (28 December 2014). "Russia must influence separatists to end Ukraine crisis, says Merkel". Reuters.
272. "Weekly update from the OSCE Observer Mission at Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk based on information as of 10:00 (Moscow time), 24 Dec. 2014". OSCE. 24 December 2014.
273. "Russia says to supply coal, electricity to Ukraine". Reuters. 27 December 2014.
274. Amos, Howard (22 May 2015). "Ukraine fears spread of separatist conflict amid hostility towards Kiev". The Guardian.
     • Stern, David (2 May 2015). "Lethal divisions persist in Ukraine's Odessa". BBC News.
275. Лише 3% українців хочуть приєднання їх області до Росії [Only 3% of Ukrainians want their region to become part of Russia]. Dzerkalo Tyzhnia (in Ukrainian). 3 January 2015.
     • Navalny, Alexei (23 September 2014). Соцопрос ФБК по Харьковской и Одесской областям. Европа, Россия, Новороссия [Survey of Kharkov and Odessa Oblasts] (in Russian). navalny.com. Archived from the original on 23 September 2014.
276. Dickinson, Peter (21 October 2016). "There They Go Again: International Media Enables Russian Aggression in Ukraine". Atlantic Council. Archived from the original on 1 November 2016. Retrieved 1 November 2016.
277. Losh, Jack (17 October 2016). "'Declaration of war' in Ukraine as pro-Russian rebel commander Arseniy 'Motorola' Pavlov is assassinated in Donetsk lift bombing". The Telegraph. The Daily Telegraph. Retrieved 21 October 2016.
278. Saunders, Doug (18 July 2014). "The world must put a stop to Russia's manufacturing of chaos in Ukraine". The Globe and Mail. Toronto.
279. "Ukraine's chaos is 'Made in Moscow'". The Globe and Mail. Toronto. 18 July 2014.
280. "Ukraine: western media coverage's bias should be held into account". The Guardian. 11 March 2014. Retrieved 8 May 2014.
281. Kirchick, James (5 January 2015). "Oliver Stone's Latest Dictator Suckup". The Daily Beast.
282. Coughlin, Con (19 December 2014). "The EU needs a complete rethink on Russia". The Telegraph. London.
283. Birrell, Ian (1 September 2014). "Why do we stand by and watch Putin?". The Independent. London.
284. Board, Editorial (19 September 2014). "Provide Ukraine with the military aid it needs to deter Russia's aggression". The Washington Post.
285. Goble, Paul (23 September 2014). "Putin Cleverly Exploits Three Weaknesses of the West". Interpreter Mag.
286. Feifer, Gregory (23 September 2014). "Why is Ukraine having such a hard time getting its message across?". GlobalPost.
287. Crawford, Charles (13 February 2015). "Vladimir Putin has been rewarded for his bullying". The Telegraph. London.
288. Bullough, Oliver (9 September 2014). "Want to Help Ukraine? Stop Accepting Its Stolen Cash". ForeignPolicy.com.
289. Pilger, John (13 May 2014). "In Ukraine, the US is dragging us towards war with Russia". The Guardian.
290. Mearsheimer, John J. (September–October 2014). "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault". Foreign Affairs (September/October 2014).
291. Motyl, Alexander J. (10 July 2014). "Contradictions Define Kremlin Apologists". World Affairs. Archived from the original on 15 July 2014.
292. Mearsheimer, John (8 February 2015). "Don't Arm Ukraine". The New York Times.
293. "Putin's words over Crimea 'terribly reminiscent of Hitler'". Euronews. 20 March 2014. Retrieved 8 May 2014.
294. Vale, Paul (8 December 2014). "Kasparov Likens West's Response To Putin To Chamberlain's Appeasement Of Hitler's Germany". The Huffington Post.
295. Gera, Vanessa (20 November 2014). "Kasparov likens Putin to Hitler, urges West to act". Associated Press. Archived from the original on 19 December 2014.
296. "Crimean authorities work under barrel of a gun - Ukraine leader". Reuters. 6 March 2014. Retrieved 8 May 2014.
297. "Obama: Crimea progress cannot come from 'barrel of a gun'". Polskie Radio. 13 March 2014. Retrieved 8 May 2014.
298. "Little Green Men". Open Democracy. 21 April 2014. Archived from the original on 23 April 2014. Retrieved 8 May 2014.
299. "How the corporate media whitewashes Ukraine". Russia: RT. 6 May 2014. Retrieved 9 May 2014.
300. "Russia and US take their petty war of words over Ukraine on to Twitter". The Guardian. 9 April 2014. Retrieved 9 May 2014.
301. Milne, Seumas (4 March 2015). "The demonisation of Russia risks paving the way for war". The Guardian.
302. "Is western media coverage of the Ukraine crisis anti-Russian?". The Guardian. 4 August 2014. Retrieved 7 September 2014.
303. "Ukraine's ideas for countering Russian propaganda and unfair journalism". Ukraine World / Euromaidan Press. 6 June 2015.
304. Bloodworth, James (15 August 2014). "Putin's Useful (British) Idiots". The Daily Beast.
305. Young, Cathy (24 July 2014). "Putin's Pal". Slate.
306. Valkov, Volodymyr (5 September 2014). "A Test on the Abandonment of Ukraine". New Eastern Europe. Archived from the original on 10 September 2014. Retrieved 10 September 2014.
307. Isaac Chotiner (2 March 2014). "Meet Vladimir Putin's American Apologist". New Republic. Retrieved 12 June 2015.
308. Kirchick, James (31 March 2015). "Putin Bootlickers Assemble in D.C." The Daily Beast.
309. Schlanger, Zoë (3 October 2014). "The American Who Dared Make Putin's Case". Newsweek.
310. Shekhovtsov, Anton (Autumn 2014). "Assessing the Role and Consequences of the Far Right's Involvement in the Ukrainian Revolution". Searchlight.
311. Ioffe, Julia (1 May 2014). "Putin's American Toady at 'The Nation' Gets Even Toadier". The New Republic.
312. Belafatti, Fabio (27 October 2014). "Orientalism reanimated: colonial thinking in Western analysts' comments on Ukraine". Euromaidan Press.
313. Snyder, Timothy (1 March 2014). "Ukraine: The Haze of Propaganda". The New York Review of Books.
314. Velychenko, Stephen (31 January 2015). "Oliver Stone's Ukraine: Coming soon to a cinema near you". krytyka.com.
     • "An open letter to Oliver Stone". krytyka.com. 1 January 2015.
     • "Kremlin propaganda: Fellow travellers and the third Russo-Ukrainian War". UCIPR. 15 March 2015. Archived from the original on 17 March 2015. Retrieved 17 March 2015. (Velychenko, Stephen. "Alternate link". Cite journal requires |journal= (help))
315. Wilson, Andrew (17 December 2014). "Island Russia". New Eastern Europe. Archived from the original on 10 February 2015. Retrieved 10 February 2015.
316. Åslund, Anders (20 August 2014). "Is the West to Blame for Russia's Aggression in Ukraine? Of Course Not!". Peterson Institute for International Economics.
317. Budjeryn, Mariana (September 2014). "Did the West Provoke Putin? Apologists and Facts". World Affairs. Archived from the original on 20 February 2015. Retrieved 29 October 2014.
318. Motyl, Alexander J. (January 2015). "The Surrealism of Realism: Misreading the War in Ukraine". World Affairs.
319. Nichols, Tom (2 September 2014). "Russia's Leader Is Neither A Realist Nor A Nationalist". Thefederalist.com.
320. Milikh, Arthur (September 2014). "Putin Attacks the West's Soft Underbelly". World Affairs. Archived from the original on 1 September 2018.
321. "A User's Guide to Russian Propaganda" (PDF). Razom. April 2014. Archived (PDF) from the original on 12 August 2014.
322. Giles, Keir; Hanson, Philip; Lyne, Roderic; Nixey, James; Sherr, James; Wood, Andrew (June 2015). The Russian challenge (PDF). London: Chatham House. ISBN 978-1-78413-054-1. Retrieved 14 March 2016.
323. Kasparov, Garry (1 March 2015). "Putin's Culture of Fear and Death". The Wall Street Journal.
324. Järvenpää, Pauli (26 May 2015). "Anatomy of a News Item". International Centre for Defence and Security (Estonia). Archived from the original on 30 May 2015.
325. Coynash, Halya (15 January 2015). "Propaganda, distortion and diplomatic silence over Volnovakha shelling". Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group.
326. Zhukov, Yuri M. (10 November 2015). "The Economics of Rebellion in Eastern Ukraine". Vox Ukraine.
     • Zhukov, Yuri M. (23 October 2015). "Trading hard hats for combat helmets: The economics of rebellion in eastern Ukraine". Journal of Comparative Economics. 44 (1): 1–15. doi:10.1016/j.jce.2015.10.010.
327. "Ukraine's May Day Danger". National Review. 1 May 2014. Retrieved 9 May 2014.
328. "Russian annexation of Ukraine's Crimea illegal: UN General Assembly". Global News. 27 March 2014. Retrieved 9 May 2014.
329. Piper, Elizabeth (8 May 2014). "Ukraine ready for talks with the east, not with 'terrorists'". Reuters. Retrieved 9 May 2014.
330. "No surrender". Kyiv Post. 11 September 2014.
331. "Ukrainian site Censor.net published edited photo of a Russian soldier". StopFake.org. 30 July 2014.
332. Coynash, Halya (30 September 2014). "Federalization as a 'Terrorist' Act". Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group.
333. "Ukraine and Russia media split on rebel vote". BBC News. 4 November 2014.
334. Snyder, Timothy (16 April 2014). "Putin's Project". Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.
335. Molchanov, Mikhail (5 May 2015). "Russia as Ukraine's 'Other': Identity and Geopolitics". E-International Relations.
336. "RWB Opposes Creation of Information Ministry". Reporters without Borders. 2 December 2014. Retrieved 17 December 2014.
337. "U.S., European nations must stop Russia's intervention in Ukraine". Yomiuri Shimbun. The Japan News. 7 September 2014. Archived from the original on 17 September 2014.
338. Lasserre, Isabelle (4 September 2014). "La politique de Vladimir Poutine précipite l'Ukraine dans les bras de l'Otan". Le Figaro (in French).
339. Pabst, Volker (9 May 2014). "Russlands patriotische Revolution". Neue Zürcher Zeitung (in German). Archived from the original on 31 August 2014.
340. Behrends, Jan C. (September 2014). "Das Ende der Ostpolitik: Zur Kritik eines deutschen Sonderweges" [The end of Ostpolitik]. Zeitgeschichte-online (in German).
341. Dehez, Dustin (19 August 2014). "Why Germany Won't Get Real with Russia". New Eastern Europe. Archived from the original on 24 September 2014. Retrieved 24 September 2014.
342. Schumatsky, Boris (1 October 2014). "Lupenrein verlogen". Die Zeit (in German).
     • "English translation". schumatsky.de. Archived from the original on 22 February 2015. Retrieved 24 February 2015.
343. "Lenin statues toppled in government-held east Ukraine". Agence France-Presse. Yahoo News. 18 April 2015. Retrieved 1 January 2016.
344. Kates, Glenn (27 February 2014). "Ukraine's East-West Divide: It's Not That Simple". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
345. Portnov, Andriy (24 November 2014). "Germany and the disinformation politics of the Ukraine crisis". Open Democracy.
346. Bukhardt, Fabian (2014). Освещение кризиса в Украине в немецких ток-шоу [Presentation of Ukraine crisis in German talk-shows] (PDF). Forum of New Eastern European History and Culture, № 1 (in Russian). Retrieved 23 December 2014.
347. Umland, Andreas (December 2014). "Securing Peace Instead of Rewarding Expansion". World Affairs.
348. Goble, Paul A. (6 January 2015). "Ukrainian Crisis Disappears from Western News Giving Putin a Victory". Interpretermag.com.
349. Bildt, Carl (18 January 2015). "It's striking how most media just avoid the battles ..." Twitter. It's striking how most media just avoid the battles in eastern Ukraine. It's ongoing aggression in Europe. It must not be seen as normal.
350. Budziak, Sławomir (30 March 2015). "Czech Echoes of the Kremlin's Information War". New Eastern Europe. Archived from the original on 2 April 2015. Retrieved 2 April 2015.
351. Michael, Casey (28 July 2014). "'Ukrainian Rebels' Aren't Ukrainian or Rebels". The Moscow Times.
352. Kasparov, Garry (30 August 2014). "Garry Kasparov: It's a War, Stupid!". Time.com.
353. Rubin, Trudy (23 November 2014). "The invasion that dare not say its name". The Philadelphia Inquirer. The Desert Sun.
354. Reichelt, Julian (27 April 2015). "Putin's war on truth". politico.eu.
355. Dickinson, Peter (3 August 2016). "How the International Media Enables Russian Aggression in Ukraine". Atlantic Council. Archived from the original on 11 October 2016. Retrieved 1 November 2016.
356. Motyl, Alexander J. (14 April 2014). "Putin's Russia as a State Sponsor of Terrorism". World Affairs.
     • Motyl, Alexander J. (30 January 2015). "Putin's War on Civilians Defines Terrorism". World Affairs.
357. Laurinavičius, Marius (17 December 2014). "Putin's Russia. Why it is worth to reconsider links between Kremlin and international terrorism". Delfi (web portal).
358. Kuzio, Taras (22 January 2015). "Is Russia a State Sponsor of Terrorism?". New Eastern Europe. Archived from the original on 23 January 2015. Retrieved 22 January 2015.
359. Bonner, Brian (9 February 2015). "Brian Bonner: The terminology of war". Kyiv Post.
360. Applebaum, Anne (8 February 2015). "The long view with Russia". The Washington Post.
361. Українці вірять церкві, армії і українським ЗМІ [Ukrainians believe the church, the army and the Ukrainian media]. Ukrayinska Pravda (in Ukrainian). 19 May 2014.
362. "Public Opinion in Ukraine September 2014". International Foundation for Electoral Systems. September 2014. Archived from the original (PDF) on 29 September 2014.
363. Wachnicki, Michał; Olwert, Paweł (4 March 2014). "Wynajęci Rosjanie cyber-bombardują polski internet?" [Hired Russians cyber-bombarding the Polish internet?]. Newsweek (Polish version) (in Polish). Archived from the original on 7 March 2016. Retrieved 22 January 2015.
364. Elliott, Chris. "The readers' editor on ... pro-Russia trolling below the line on Ukraine stories". The Guardian. Retrieved 23 December 2014.
365. Hans, Julian (13 June 2014). "Putins Trolle" [Putin's trolls]. Süddeutsche Zeitung (in German).
366. Bracher, Katharina (29 June 2014). "Prorussische Propaganda aus der Schweiz: Twittern für den Kreml" [Pro-Russian propaganda from Switzerland: Twittering for the Kremlin]. Neue Zürcher Zeitung (in German).
367. Barkin, Noah; Rinke, Andreas (25 November 2014). "Merkel hits diplomatic dead-end with Putin". Reuters. German media have been complaining for months about their news sites being bombarded with pro-Russian comments. German security sources say they are part of an organized offensive steered from the Kremlin.
368. • Aro, Jessikka; Mäkeläinen, Mika (20 February 2015). "Yle Kioski Traces the Origins of Russian Social Media Propaganda". Yle. Archived from the original on 7 March 2019. Retrieved 17 March 2015.
     • Toler, Aric (14 March 2015). "Inside the Kremlin Troll Army Machine: Templates, Guidelines, and Paid Posts". Global Voices Online.
     • Rezunkov, Viktor (16 March 2015). "The Trolls Who Came In From The Cold". RFERL.
     • Subbotovska, Iuliia (29 May 2015). "Russia steps up propaganda push with online "Kremlin trolls"". Associated Press.
     • Chernov, Sergey (4 June 2014). "Leaked Correspondence Shows Agency's 'Trolling'". The St. Petersburg Times. Archived from the original on 27 July 2014.
369. Koreneva, Marina (5 April 2015). "Trolling for Putin: Russia's information war explained". Agence France-Presse. Yahoo News.
370. Chen, Adrian (2 June 2015). "The Agency". The New York Times.
371. Klishin, Ilya (21 May 2014). "The Kremlin's Trolls Go West". The Moscow Times.
372. Sindelar, Daisy (12 August 2014). "Do Trolls Matter?". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
373. Walker, Shaun (2 April 2015). "Salutin' Putin: inside a Russian troll house". The Guardian.
374. Alexander, Lawrence (2 April 2015). "Social Network Analysis Reveals Full Scale of Kremlin's Twitter Bot Campaign". Global Voices Online.
375. Klishin, Ilya (30 January 2015). "How Putin Secretly Conquered Russia's Social Media Over the Past 3 Years". Global Voices.
376. Shevchenko, Vitaly (13 May 2015). "Ukrainians petition Facebook against 'Russian trolls'". BBC News.
     • "Ukraine accuses Facebook of pro-Russia bias". Agence France-Presse. Yahoo News. 15 May 2015.
377. "ZAPP Studie: Vertrauen in Medien ist gesunken" [ZAPF study: Trust in media has sunk]. NDR (in German). 17 December 2014. Archived from the original on 25 December 2014. Retrieved 17 December 2014.
378. "Vertrauen in Medien-Berichterstattung über den Ukraine-Konflikt" [Trust in media coverage of the conflict in Ukraine] (PDF) (in German). ZAPP. 16 December 2014. Retrieved 17 December 2014.
379. "Outrage in Ukraine after brutal attack on opposition reporter". Telegraph. London. Agence France-Presse. 25 December 2013. Retrieved 25 January 2014.
380. Bigg, Claire; Shtogrin, Iryna (23 January 2014). "Abducted And Left To Die: Euromaidan Supporter Found Dead In Forest". RFERL.
381. "International Partnership Mission condemns the violence against journalists". Reporters Without Borders. 19 February 2014.
382. "Odessa journalist beaten, his flat set alight for anti-Putin stand". Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group. 13 May 2014.
383. "Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine" (PDF). Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 15 May 2014.
384. "Anti-press attacks rise as tensions escalate in Ukraine". Committee to Protect Journalists. 14 April 2014.
385. "In Ukraine, another journalist missing, newsroom destroyed". Committee to Protect Journalists. 23 April 2014.
386. Ward, Olivia (2 December 2014). "Award winning journalist says truth is under fire in Ukraine". Toronto Star.
387. Miletitch, Nicolas (20 April 2014). "Beatings, arson target pro-Kiev reporters in Ukraine's rebel east". Agence France-Presse. Yahoo News.
388. "Simon Ostrovsky on His Kidnapping, Detainment, and Release". Vice News. 28 April 2014.
389. Dettmer, Jamie (23 April 2014). "Putin's Men in Ukraine Seize U.S. Journalist". The Daily Beast.
390. Schreck, Carl; Johnson, Luke (24 April 2014). "Simon Ostrovsky: From Frontline Journalist To Human Shield". RFERL.
391. Volchek, Dmitry (12 May 2014). "Interview: Three Weeks A Hostage In Slovyansk". RFERL.
392. Standish, Reid (21 October 2014). "The Banksy of Donetsk Documents His Torture". Foreign Policy.
393. Halya Coynash (18 September 2014). "Journalist missing in Luhansk". Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group. Retrieved 1 January 2016.
394. Coynash, Halya (6 April 2015). "Luhansk militants hold journalist hostage, threaten 15-year 'sentence'". Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group.
395. Halya Coynash (13 August 2014). "Kremlin-backed militants seize parents of a local journalist". Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group. Retrieved 1 January 2016.
396. Halya Coynash (6 January 2015). "Luhansk journalist freed after 5 months in captivity". Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group. Retrieved 1 January 2016.
397. Coynash, Halya (6 June 2015). "Ukraine's Old and New Enemies of the Press". Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group.
398. "Italian journalist and Russian fixer killed in eastern Ukraine". Reporters Without Borders. 26 May 2014.
399. Coynash, Halya (3 July 2014). "Sent to be shot". Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group.
400. Vasilyeva, Nataliya (28 February 2015). "Ukrainian photojournalist killed in shelling in restive east". Associated Press. Archived from the original on 1 March 2015.
401. "Ukraine arrests journalist after call to dodge draft". Japan Times. AFP. 9 February 2015. Retrieved 11 April 2015.
402. "Amnesty International insists on reveal of a journalist calling the mobilization illegal". 10 February 2016. Archived from the original on 18 April 2015. Retrieved 11 April 2015.
403. Nemtsova, Anna (5 May 2016). "Ukraine Tries to Terrify Journalists Who Cover the War". Daily Beast.
404. Berry, Lynn (5 May 2016). "Ukrainian hackers publish info on thousands of journalists". Washington Post.
405. Simon, Joel (29 April 2015). "In Crimea, press freedom deteriorates at a rapid pace". Committee to Protect Journalists.
406. Bilych, Ivanna; Neumann, Andreas; Okpara, Victor C.; Pichaipillai, Ajitha; de Moura Sena, Matheus; Sharvan, Olena (15 June 2015). "Human Rights on Occupied Territory: Case of Crimea". Razom.
407. Mijatović, Dunja (27 November 2014). "Regular Report to the Permanent Council". Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
408. "Journalist Attacked While Covering Pro-Ukrainian Pickets In St.Petersburg". RFERL. 25 August 2014.
409. "BBC team under attack in southern Russia". BBC News. 18 September 2014.
410. Seddon, Max (14 September 2014). "Russian Journalist Hospitalized After Violent Street Attack". Buzzfeed.