Sinicization

Sinicization, sinicisation, sinofication, or sinification, or sinonization is a process whereby non-Chinese societies come under the influence of Chinese culture, particularly Han Chinese culture, language, societal norms, and ethnic identity. Areas of influence include diet, writing, industry, education, language, law, lifestyle, politics, philosophy, religion, science and technology, culture, and value systems. More broadly, "Sinicization" may refer to policies of acculturation, assimilation, or cultural imperialism imposed by China onto neighboring East Asian countries, and minority ethnic groups inside China. Evidence of this can be seen in the value systems, cuisine, architectural style, and lexicons. This is reflected in the histories of Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, in the adoption of the Chinese writing system, which has long been a unifying feature in the Sinosphere as the vehicle for exporting Chinese culture to these Asian countries.

This article is about cultural assimilation. For the linguistic meaning, see Transcription into Chinese characters.
"Hanhua" redirects here. For the subdistrict in Xinye County, Henan, see Hanhua Subdistrict.
Sinicization
Chinese name
Traditional Chinese漢化
Simplified Chinese汉化
Hanyu Pinyinhànhuà
Literal meaningHan-ization
Alternative Chinese name
Traditional Chinese中國化
Simplified Chinese中国化
Hanyu Pinyinzhōngguóhuà
Literal meaningChinese-ization
Vietnamese name
Vietnamese alphabetHán hóa
Chữ Hán漢化
Literal meaningHan-ization
Korean name
Hangul중국화
Hanja中國化
Literal meaningChinese-ization
Japanese name
Hiraganaちゅうごくか
Kyūjitai中國化
Shinjitai中国化

Integration

The integration or assimilation policy is a type of nationalism aimed at strengthening of the Chinese identity among the population. Proponents believe integration will help to develop shared values, pride in being the country's citizen, respect and acceptance towards cultural differences among citizens of China. Critics argue that integration destroys ethnic diversity, language diversity, and cultural diversity. Analogous to North America with approximately 300 Native American languages and distinct ethnic groups; in China there are 292 non-Mandarin languages spoken by native peoples of the region.[1] There are also a number of immigrant languages, such as Khmer, Portuguese, English, etc.

Historical examples of sinicization

Austronesian peoples

Before sinicization, non-Chinese indigenous peoples of Southern China, collectively termed by the Chinese as Baiyue inhabited the coastline of China from as far north as the Yangtze River to as far south as the Gulf of Tonkin. Analysis of DNA recovered from human remains shows high frequencies of Haplogroup O1 in Liangzhu culture linking this culture to modern Austronesian populations. It is believed that Liangzhu culture was the ancestral homeland of Proto-Austronesian populations before they spread to Taiwan, and Southeast Asia. Over time, the southward spread of Han Chinese led to the sinicization of most of the Baiyue populations that remained in Southern China, whether in the Yangtze Valley or in coastal areas from the mouth of the Yangtze to the Gulf of Tonkin.[2] The remnants of these peoples who were not fully sinicized are now recognized officially as the ethnic minorities of the PRC.

Turkic peoples

Descendants of Uyghurs who migrated to Taoyuan County, Hunan have largely assimilated into the Han Chinese and Hui population and practice Chinese customs, speaking varieties of Chinese as their language.

Han, Jin, and Sixteen Kingdoms period
Main article: Sixteen Kingdoms

From the late Han Dynasty to the early Jin dynasty (265–420), large numbers of non-Chinese peoples living along China's northern periphery settled in northern China. Some of these migrants such as the Xiongnu and Xianbei had been pastoralist nomads from the northern steppes. Others such as the Di and Qiang were farmers and herders from the mountains of western Sichuan of southwest China. As migrants, they lived among ethnic Chinese and were sinified to varying degrees. Many worked as farm laborers. Some attained official positions in the court and military. The numerous tribal groups in the north and northwest who had been heavily drafted into the military then exploited the chaos to seize power by local Chinese warlords.[3]

During Three Kingdoms period, Cao Cao initiated the policy of settling Xiongnu nomads away from the frontier near Taiyuan in modern Shanxi province, where they would be less likely to rebel. The Xiongnu abandoned nomadism and the elite were educated in Chinese-Confucian literate culture.[4] The migrant of Northern Chinese people to the south further settled China as a multi-ethnic empire.

Northern and Southern dynasties
Main article: Northern and Southern dynasties

The Northern and Southern dynasties was a period in the history of China that lasted from 386 to 589, following the tumultuous era of the Sixteen Kingdoms period. Though an age of civil war and political chaos, it was also a time of flourishing arts and culture, advancement in technology, and the spread of Mahayana Buddhism and Daoism. The period saw large-scale migration of Han Chinese to the lands south of the Yangtze. The period came to an end with the unification of all of China proper by Emperor Wen of the Sui dynasty. During this period, the process of sinicization accelerated among the non-Chinese arrivals in the north and among the indigenous people in the south. This process was also accompanied by the increasing popularity of Buddhism (introduced into China in the 1st century)and Daoism in both northern and southern China.[5]

Tang dynasty

During the 8th and 9th centuries in the Tang dynasty, Chinese male soldiers moved into Guizhou (formerly romanized as Kweichow) and married native non-Chinese women, their descendants being known as Lao-han-jen (original Chinese), in contrast to new Chinese people who colonized Guizhou at later times. They still spoke an archaic dialect as of 1929.[6] Many immigrants to Guizhou were descended from these soldiers in garrisons who married non-Chinese women.[7]

Yuan dynasty

The Mongol Yuan dynasty appointed a Muslim from Bukhara, Ajall Shams al-Din Omar, as governor of Yunnan after conquering the Bai Kingdom of Dali. Sayyid Ajjall then promoted Sinicization and Confucianization of the non-Han Chinese peoples in Yunnan during his reign. Sayyid Ajall founded a "Chinese style" city where modern Kunming is today, called Zhongjing Cheng. He ordered that a Buddhist temple, a Confucian temple, and two mosques be built in the city.[8] Advocating Confucianism was part of his policy. The Confucian temple that Sayyid Ajall built in 1274, which also doubled as a school, was the first Confucian temple ever to be built in Yunnan.[9]

Both Confucianism and Islam were promoted by Sayyid Ajall in his "civilizing mission" during his time in Yunnan.[10] Sayyid Ajall viewed Yunnan as "backward and barbarian" and utilized Confucianism, Islam, and Buddhism for "civilizing" the area.[11]

In Yunnan, the widespread presence of Islam is credited to Sayyid Ajall's work.[12]

Sayyid Ajall was first to bring Islam to Yunnan. He promoted Confucianism and Islam by ordering construction of mosques and temples of Confucianism.[13] Sayyid Ajall also introduced Confucian education into Yunnan.[14][15] He was described as making 'the orangutans and butcherbirds become unicorns and phoenixes and their felts and furs were exchanged for gowns and caps', and praised by the Regional Superintendent of Confucian studies, He Hongzuo.[16]

Shams al-Din constructed numerous Confucian temples in Yunnan, and promoted Confucian education. He is best known among Chinese for helping sinicize Yunnan province.[17] He also built multiple mosques in Yunnan. Sayyid Ajall also introduced Confucian rituals and traditions to Yunnan,[18] including Chinese social structures, Chinese funeral rituals and Chinese marriage customs.[11][19]

The aim of Sayyid Ajall's policy of promoting Confucianism and education in Yunnan was to "civilize" the native "barbarians". Confucian rituals were taught to students in newly founded schools by Sichuanese scholars, and Confucian temples were built.[20][21] The natives of Yunnan were instructed in Confucian ceremonies like weddings, matchmaking, funerals, ancestor worship, and kowtow by Sayyid Ajall. The native leaders has their "barbarian" clothing replaced by clothing given to them by Sayyid Ajall.[21][22]

Both Marco Polo and Rashid al-Din Vatvat recorded that Yunnan was heavily populated by Muslims during the Yuan Dynasty, with Rashid naming a city with all Muslim inhabitants as the 'great city of Yachi'.[23] It has been suggested that Yachi was Dali City (Ta-li). Dali had many Hui Muslim people.[24]

Sayyid Ajall's son Nasir al-Din became Governor of Yunnan in 1279 after his death.[25][26]

The historian Jacqueline Armijo-Hussein has written on Sayyid Ajall's Confucianization and Sinicization policies, in her dissertation Sayyid 'Ajall Shams al-Din: A Muslim from Central Asia, serving the Mongols in China, and bringing 'civilization' to Yunnan,[27] the paper The Origins of Confucian and Islamic Education in Southwest China: Yunnan in the Yuan Period,[28] and The Sinicization and Confucianization in Chinese and Western Historiography of a Muslim from Bukhara Serving Under the Mongols in China.[29]

Ming dynasty
Main articles: Ming conquest of Yunnan and Miao Rebellions (Ming Dynasty)

During the Ming conquest of Yunnan Chinese military soldiers were settled in Yunnan, and many married the native women.

Qing dynasty

The rulers of the Qing dynasty were ethnic Manchus who adopted the norms of the Mandate of Heaven to justify their rules. The "orthodox" historical view emphasized the power of Han Chinese to "sinicize" their conquerors, although more recent research such as the New Qing History school revealed Manchu rulers were savvy in their manipulation of their subjects and from the 1630s through at least the 18th century, the emperors developed a sense of Manchu identity and used Central Asian models of rule as much as Confucian ones. There is also evidence of sinicization, however. For example, Manchus originally had their own separate style of naming from the Han Chinese, but eventually adopted Han Chinese naming practices.

Manchu names consisted of more than the two or one syllable Chinese names, and when phonetically transcribed into Chinese, they made no sense at all.[30] The meaning of the names that Manchus used were also very different from the meanings of Chinese names.[31] The Manchus also gave numbers as personal names.[32]

Eventually, the Qing royal family (the Aisin Gioro) gave their children Chinese names, which were separate from the Manchu names, and even adopted the Chinese practice of generation names, although its usage was inconsistent and error ridden. Eventually they stopped using Manchu names.[33]

The Niohuru family of the Manchu changed their family name to Lang, which sounded like "wolf" in Chinese, since wolf in Manchu was Niohuru; thus forming a translation.[34]

Although the Manchus replaced their Manchu names with Chinese personal names, the Manchu bannermen followed their traditional practice in typically used their first/personal name to address themselves and not their last name, while Han Chinese bannermen used their last name and first in normal Chinese style.[35][36]

Usage of surnames was not traditional to the Manchu while it was to the Han Chinese.[37]

Nguyen dynasty Vietnam

Vietnamese Nguyen Emperor Minh Mạng sinicized ethnic minorities such as Cambodians, Chams and Montagnards, claimed the legacy of Confucianism and China's Han dynasty for Vietnam, and used the term Han people 漢人 to refer to the Vietnamese.[38] Minh Mang declared that "We must hope that their barbarian habits will be subconsciously dissipated, and that they will daily become more infected by Han [Sino-Vietnamese] customs."[39] These policies were directed at the Khmer and hill tribes.[40] The Nguyen lord Nguyen Phuc Chu had referred to Vietnamese as "Han people" in 1712 when differentiating between Vietnamese and Chams.[41]

Minh Mang used the name "Trung Quốc" 中國 (the same hànzì as for "China") to refer to Vietnam.[42]

Chinese clothing was adapted by the Vietnamese people under Nguyễn.[43][44][45][46]

Modern examples of sinicization

Kuomintang

The Kuomintang pursued a sinicization policy, which foreign observers understood as "the time had come to set about the business of making all natives either turn Chinese or get out." It was noted that "Chinese colonization" of "Mongolia and Manchuria" led to the conclusion "to a conviction that the day of the barbarian was finally over."[47][48][49]

Ma Clique

Hui Muslim General Ma Fuxiang created an assimilationist group and encouraged the integration of Muslims into Chinese society.[50] Ma Fuxiang was a hardcore assimilationist and said that Hui should assimilate into Han.[51]

Xinjiang
Main article: Xinjiang conflict
See also: Xinjiang re-education camps and Cultural genocide of Uyghurs

The Hui Muslim 36th Division (National Revolutionary Army) governed southern Xinjiang in 1934–1937. The administration that was set up was colonial in nature, putting up street signs and names in Chinese, which used to be in only Uighur language. They lived much like Han Chinese, importing Han cooks and baths.[52] The Hui also switched carpet patterns from Uyghur to Han in state owned carpet factories.[53]

Strict surveillance and mass detentions of Uighurs in the re-education camps is a part of the ongoing sinicization policy by the Communist Party of China.[54]

Since 2015, it has been estimated that over a million Uyghurs have been detained in Xinjiang re-education camps.[55][56][57][58] The camps were established under General Secretary Xi Jinping's administration with the main goal of ensuring adherence to national ideology.[59] Critics of China's treatment of Uyghurs have accused the Chinese government of propagating a policy of sinicization in Xinjiang in the 21st century, calling this policy an ethnocide or a cultural genocide of Uyghurs.[60][61][62][63]

Taiwan

After the Republic of China took control of Taiwan in 1945 and relocated its capital to Taipei in 1949, the intention of Chiang Kai-shek was to eventually go back to mainland China and retake control of it. Chiang believed that to retake mainland China, it would be necessary to re-Sinicize Taiwan's inhabitants who had undergone assimilation under Japanese rule. Examples of this policy included the renaming of streets with mainland geographical names, use of Mandarin Chinese in schools and punishments for using other regional languages (such as the fāngyán of Hakka and Hokkien), and teaching students to revere traditional ethics, develop pan-Chinese nationalism, and view Taiwan from the perspective of China.[64][65] Other reasons for the policy were to combat the Japanese influences on the culture that had occurred in the previous 50 years, and to help unite the recent immigrants from mainland China that had come to Taiwan with the KMT and among whom there was a tendency to be more loyal to one's city, country or province than to China as a nation.[66]

The process of re-asserting non-Chinese identity, as in the case of ethnic groups in Taiwan, is sometimes known as desinicization. This is an issue in, for example, the Taiwan independence movement and Taiwan localization movements.

Tibet
Main article: Sinicization of Tibet

The sinicization of Tibet is the change of Tibetan society to Han Chinese standards by means of state propaganda, police presence, cultural assimilation, religious persecution, immigration, population transfer and political reform.[67][68][69][70] It has been underway since the Chinese invasion of Tibet by the Tibetan Government in Exile,[71] in 1951. In present-day Tibet traditional Tibetan festivals have "been turned into a platform for propaganda and political theater” where "government workers and retirees are barred from engaging in religious activities, and government workers and students in Tibetan schools are forbidden from visiting local monasteries.”[72] According to president of the Central Tibetan Administration, Lobsang Sangay, with the ongoing expulsion of monks and nuns from monasteries and nunneries, and destruction of the Larung Gar monastery,[73] Tibet's largest Buddhist institution, "unfortunately what is happening is that the Chinese government is reviving something akin to cultural revolution in Tibet."[74][75]

Religion

In April 2016, Chinese Communist Party general secretary Xi Jinping declared that in order to “actively guide the adaptation of religions to socialist society, an important task is supporting China’s religions’ persistence in the direction of sinicization.”[76][77] He later reiterated this plan to the 19th Communist Party Congress saying “We will fully implement the Party’s basic policy on religious affairs, insist on the sinicization of Chinese religions, and provide active guidance for religion and socialism to coexist.”[76][78]

Protestantism

The Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) of Protestant churches in China has described the Boxer Rebellion and the anti-Christian movement of 1922-27 as early efforts to sinicize Christianity.[79]

The TSPM and China Christian Council arranged a conference in Shanghai on August 4–6, 2014, commemorating the anniversary of the TSPM. This conference included a seminar on the sinicizaton of Christianity, with Fu Xianwei, chairman of the TSPM, saying “churches in China will continue to explore the sinicization of Christianity [and] ensure Christianity takes root in the soil of Chinese culture, ethnicity, and society... To advance the sinicization of Christianity, churches will need guidance and support from government agencies in charge of religious affairs.”[80][81]

In 2019, TSPM chairman Xu Xiaohong made a pledge to eliminate any Western "imprint" from Chinese faith saying "[We] must recognise that Chinese churches are surnamed ‘China’, not ‘the West’" and "No matter how much effort or time it takes, our resolution in upholding the Sinicisation of Protestantism will never change, and our determination to walk a path that is adapted to a socialist society will never waver."[79]

Catholicism

In December 2016, the Ninth National Congress of the Chinese Catholic Representatives reaffirmed their plan for the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association to uphold the principle of independence and self-governance, along with the promotion of sinicization.[82][83]

In March 2018, Archbishop Paul Gallagher, Secretary for Relations with States within the Holy See's Secretariat of State, said that "two expressions or, more precisely, two principles stand out, which should interact with each other, namely “Sinicization” and “inculturation”. I am convinced that an important intellectual and pastoral challenge arises in an almost natural way from the bringing together of these two terms, which indicate two real visions of the world."[84][85]

In June 2018, the Bishops' Conference of the Catholic Church in China and the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association ) issued a "Five-Year Plan on Carrying Forward the Catholic Church's Adherence to the Direction of Sinicization in Our Country".[86][87] This document includes provisions forbidding worship outside of designated church structures and government-authorized times, as well as participation of minors under the age of 18 in any religious services. Churches in Hebei province and the Yibin Diocese of Sichuan province began holding training seminars immediately.[88][89]

Islam

In 2015, paramount leader Xi Jinping first raised the issue of "Sinicization of Islam". In 2018, a confidential directive was issued ordering local officials to "prevent Islam from interfering with secular life and the state’s functions".[90]

Yang Faming, leader of the Islamic Association of China, said in a 2018 speech that "We must allow traditional Chinese culture to permeate Islam and jointly guard the spiritual homeland of the Chinese people."[91] He encouraged Chinese characteristics to be present in religious ceremony, culture, and architecture.[76]

In some forms of fiction, due to China's communist statehood, Soviet-themed characters are de-Sovietized and switched over to become Chinese to fit modern (post-Cold War) times. The original cut of the 2012 Red Dawn remake depicted a Chinese invasion before having said information leaked to the Global Times, sparking controversy in China and threatening its airing in the country (the invaders were changed to North Koreans).[92] In 2006, Chinese versions of the Crimson Dynamo and the Abomination were created and made members of the Liberators in Marvel Comics, the comic book The Ultimates 2.

gollark: Hmm.
gollark: Are most of the golds/silvers between or at 5min drops?
gollark: I think the way it works is that you either have no slots and good stuff or slots and not so good stuff.
gollark: Noooo! The Fish of Suns is powerless against the evil forces of Egglock!
gollark: I mean, gold, orange, not much difference.

See also

References
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  13. (Original from the University of Virginia) Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Jāmi'at al-Malik 'Abd al-'Azīz. Ma'had Shu'ūn al Aqallīyat al-Muslimah (1986). Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Volumes 7–8. The Institute. p. 385. Retrieved December 20, 2011. certain that Muslims of Central Asian originally played a major role in the Yuan (Mongol) conquest and subsequent rule of south-west China, as a result of which a distinct Muslim community was established in Yunnan by the late 13th century AD. Foremost among these soldier-administrators was Sayyid al-Ajall Shams al-Din Umar al-Bukhari (Ch. Sai-tien-ch'ih shan-ssu-ting). a court official and general of Turkic origin who participated in the Mongol invasion of Szechwan ... And Yunnan in c. 1252, and who became Yuan Governor of the latter province in 1274–79. Shams al-Din—who is widely believed by the Muslims of Yunnan to have introduced Islam to the region—is represented as a wise and benevolent ruler, who successfully "pacified and comforted" the people of Yunnan, and who is credited with building Confucian temples, as well as mosques and schools
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  17. Michael Dillon (1999). China's Muslim Hui community: migration, settlement and sects. Richmond: Curzon Press. p. 23. ISBN 0-7007-1026-4. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
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  23. (Original from the University of Virginia) Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Jāmi'at al-Malik 'Abd al-'Azīz. Ma'had Shu'ūn al Aqallīyat al-Muslimah (1986). Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Volumes 7–8. The Institute. p. 174. Retrieved December 20, 2011. from the Yuan Dynasty, and indicated further Muslim settlement in northeastern and especially southwestern Yunnan. Marco Polo, who travelled through Yunnan "Carajan" at the beginning of the Yuan period, noted the presence of "Saracens" among the population. Similarly, the Persian historian Rashid al-Din (died 1318 AD) recorded in his Jami' ut-Tawarikh that the 'great city of Yachi' in Yunnan was exclusively inhabited by Muslims.
  24. (Original from the University of Virginia) Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Jāmi'at al-Malik 'Abd al-'Azīz. Ma'had Shu'ūn al Aqallīyat al-Muslimah (1986). Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Volumes 7–8. The Institute. p. 387. Retrieved December 20, 2011. when Maroco Polo visited Yunnan in the early Yuan period he noted the presence of "Saracens" among the population while the Persian historian Rashid al-Din (died 1318 AD) recorded in his Jami' ut-Tawarikh that 'the great city of Yachi' in Yunnan was exclusively inhabited by Muslims. Rashid al-Din may have been referring to the region around Ta-li in western Yunnan, which was to emerge as the earliest centre of Hui Muslim settlement in the province.
  25. ( )Thant Myint-U (2011). Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia. Macmillan. ISBN 978-1-4668-0127-1. Retrieved December 20, 2011. In this way, Yunnan became known to the Islamic world. When Sayyid Ajall died in 1279 he was succeeded by his son Nasir al-Din who governed for give years and led the invasion of Burma. His younger brother became the Transport Commissioner and the entire family entrenched their influence.
  26. (Original from the University of Virginia) Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Jāmi'at al-Malik 'Abd al-'Azīz. Ma'had Shu'ūn al Aqallīyat al-Muslimah (1986). Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Volumes 7–8. The Institute. p. 385. Retrieved December 20, 2011. On his death he was succeeded by his eldest son, Nasir al-Din (Ch. Na-su-la-ting, the "Nescradin" of Marco Polo), who governed Yunnan between 1279 and I284. While Arab and South Asian Muslims, pioneers of the maritime expansion of Islam in the Bay of Bengal, must have visited the
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  30. Mark C. Elliott (2001). The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (illustrated, reprint ed.). Stanford University Press. p. 242. ISBN 0-8047-4684-2. Retrieved March 2, 2012. famous Manchu figure of the early Qing who belonged to the Niohuru clan) would have been the unwieldy "Niu-gu-lu E-bi-long" in Chinese. Moreover, the characters used in names were typically chosen to represent the sounds of Manchu, and not to carry any particular meaning in Chinese. For educated Han Chinese accustomed to names composed of a familiar surname and one or two elegang characters drawn from a poem or a passage from the classics, Manchu names looked not just different, but absurd. What was oneo to make of a name like E-bi-long, written in Chinese characters meaning "repress-must flourish," or Duo-er-gun, meaning "numerous-thou-roll"? S.... To them they looked like nonsense.... But they are not nonsense in Manchu: "E-bi-long" is the transcription of ebilun, meaning "a delicate or sickly child," and "Duo-er-gun" is the Chinese transcription of dorgon, the Manchu word for badger.
  31. Mark C. Elliott (2001). The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (illustrated, reprint ed.). Stanford University Press. p. 242. ISBN 0-8047-4684-2. Retrieved March 2, 2012. Thus we find names like Nikan (Chinese), Ajige (little), Asiha (young), Haha (nale), Mampi (knot—a reference to the hair?), Kara (black), Fulata (red-eyed), Necin (peaceful), Kirsa (steppe fox), Unahan (colt), Jumara (squirrel), Nimašan (sea eagle), Nomin (lapis lazuli), and Gacuha (toy made out of an animal's anklebone).44 Names such as Jalfungga (long-lived), Fulingga (lucky one), Fulungga (majestic), and Hūturingga (fortunate), were not unknown, either, particularly after the seventeenth century. Although mightily foreign when written as Zha-la-feng-a, Fu-ling-a, Fu-long-a, or Hu-tu-ling-ga
  32. Mark C. Elliott (2001). The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (illustrated, reprint ed.). Stanford University Press. p. 243. ISBN 0-8047-4684-2. Archived from the original on January 5, 2014. Retrieved March 2, 2012. While Chinese names, too, sometimes ended in characters with the sounds "zhu," "bao," and "tai," more often than not, such names in the Qing belonged to Manchus and other bannermen (Chinese bannermen and Mongols sometimes took Manchu-sounding names), even if the attached meaning is not clear (it is not certain that all names in fact had a specific meaning). Giving "numeral names" was another unique Manchu habit. These were names that actually referred to numbers. Sometimes they were given using Manchu numbers—for example, Nadanju (seventy) or Susai (fifty). Other times number names used the Manchu transcriptions of Chinese numbers, as in the name Loišici (= Liushi qi, "sixty-seven"), Bašinu (= bashi wu, "eight-five").45 Such names, unheard of among the Han, were quite common among the Manchus, an appeared from time to time among Chinese bannermen. Popular curiosity about this odd custom in Qing was partly satisfied by the nineteenth-century bannerman-writer Fu-ge, who explained in his book of "jottings" that naming children for their grandparents' ages was a way of wishing longevity to the newly born.46
  33. Edward J. M. Rhoads (2001). Manchus & Han: ethnic relations and political power in late Qing and early republican China, 1861–1928 (reprint, illustrated ed.). University of Washington Press. p. 56. ISBN 9780295804125. Archived from the original on January 5, 2014. Retrieved March 2, 2012. At Xiuyan, in eastern Fengtian, the Manchus in the seventh or eighth generation continued as before to give their sons polysyllabic Manchu personal names that were meaningless when transliterated into Chinese, but at the same time they began to also give them Chinese names that were disyllabic and meaningful and that conformed to the generational principle. Thus, in the seventh generation of the Gūwalgiya lineage were sons with two names, one Manchu and one Chinese, such as Duolunbu/Shiman, Delinbu/Shizhu, and Tehengbu/Shizhen. Within the family and the banner, these boys used their Manchu name, but outside they used their Han-style name. Then, from the eight or ninth generation one, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Gūwalgiya at Xiuyan stopped giving polysyllabic Manchu names to their sons, who thereafter used Chinese names exclusively.
  34. Edward J. M. Rhoads (2001). Manchus & Han: ethnic relations and political power in late Qing and early republican China, 1861–1928 (reprint, illustrated ed.). University of Washington Press. p. 56. ISBN 9780295804125. Archived from the original on January 5, 2014. Retrieved March 2, 2012. and when the ancient and politically prominent Manchu lineage of Niohuru adopted the Han-style surname Lang, he ridiculed them for having "forgotten their roots." (The Niohuru, whose name was derived from niohe, Manchu for wolf," had chosen Lang as their surname because it was a homophone for the Chinese word for "wolf.")
  35. Edward J. M. Rhoads (2001). Manchus & Han: ethnic relations and political power in late Qing and early republican China, 1861–1928 (reprint, illustrated ed.). University of Washington Press. p. 56. ISBN 9780295804125. Archived from the original on January 5, 2014. Retrieved March 2, 2012. Manchu men had abandoned their original polysyllabic personal names infavor of Han-style disyllabic names; they had adopted the Han practice of choosing characters with auspicious meanings for the names; and they had assigned names on a generational basis.... Except among some Hanjun such as the two Zhao brothers, bannermen still did not, by and large, use their
  36. Edward J. M. Rhoads (2001). Manchus & Han: ethnic relations and political power in late Qing and early republican China, 1861–1928 (reprint, illustrated ed.). University of Washington Press. p. 57. ISBN 9780295804125. Archived from the original on January 5, 2014. Retrieved March 2, 2012. family name but called themselves only by their personal name—for example, Yikuang, Ronglu, Gangyi, Duanfang, Xiliang, and Tieliang. In this respect, most Manchus remained conspicuously different from Han.
  37. Mark C. Elliott (2001). The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (illustrated, reprint ed.). Stanford University Press. p. 241. ISBN 0-8047-4684-2. Archived from the original on December 31, 2013. Retrieved March 2, 2012. Chinese names consist typically of a single-character surname and a given name of one or two characters, the latter usually chosen for their auspicious meaning. Manchu names were different. For one thing, Manchus did not commonly employ surnames, identifying themselves usually by their banner affiliation rather than by their lineage. Even if they had customarily used both surname and given name, this would not have eliminated the difference with Han names, since Manchu names of any kind were very often longer than two characters—that is, two syllables— in length. Where a Han name (to pick at random two names from the eighteenth century) might read Zhang Tingyu or Dai Zhen, the full name of, say, Ebilun (a
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