Anti-Serb sentiment

Anti-Serb sentiment or Serbophobia (Serbian: србофобија, srbofobija) is a generally negative view of Serbs as an ethnic group. Historically it has been a basis for the persecution of ethnic Serbs.

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Discrimination
Specific forms
 

A distinctive form of anti-Serb sentiment is anti-Serbian sentiment, which can be defined as a generally negative view of Serbia as a nation state for Serbs. Another form of anti-Serb sentiment is a generally-negative view of Republika Srpska, the Serb-majority entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The best known historical proponent of anti-Serb sentiment was the 19th- and 20th-century Croatian Party of Rights. The most extreme elements of this party became the Ustasha in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, a Croatian nazist organization that came to power during World War II and instituted racial laws that specifically targeted Serbs, Jews, Roma and dissidents. This culminated in the genocide of Serbs and members of other minority groups that lived in the Independent State of Croatia (1941–1945).

History

Before World War I

19th and early 20th century in Austro-Hungarian Croatia
Ante Starčević, known as "father of the homeland" in Croatia[1]

Anti-Serbian sentiment coalesced in 19th century Croatia when some of the Croatian intelligentsia planned the creation of a Croatian nation-state.[2] Croatia was at the time a part of the Kingdom of Hungary, an integral part of the Habsburg Monarchy, and Dalmatia and Istria separate Habsburg crown lands. Ante Starčević, the leader of the Party of Rights between 1851 and 1896, believed Croats should confront their neighbors, including Serbs.[3] He wrote, for example, that Serbs were an "unclean race" and with co-founder of his party, Eugen Kvaternik, denied the existence of Serbs or Slovenes in Croatia, seeing their political consciousness as a threat.[4][5] During the 1850s Starčević forged the term Slavoserb (Latin: sclavus, servus) to describe people supposedly ready to serve foreign rulers, initially used to refer to some Serbs and his Croat opponent and later applied to all Serbs by his followers.[6] The Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878 probably contributed to the development of Starčević's anti-Serb sentiment: He believed that it increased chances for the creation of Greater Croatia.[7] David Bruce MacDonald, has put forward a thesis that Starčević's theories could only justify ethnocide and genocide because Starčević intended to assimilate Serbs as "Orthodox Croats", and to exterminate them.[8]

Starčević's ideas formed a basis for the destructive politics of his successor, Josip Frank, a Croatian Jewish lawyer and politician converted to Catholicism[9][10][11] who led numerous anti-Serbian incidents.[3] Josip Frank carried on Starčević's ideology, and defined Croat identity 'strictly in terms of Serbophobia'.[12] He opposed any cooperation between Croats and Serbs, and Djilas described him as "a leading anti-Serbian demagogue and the instigator of the persecution of Serbs in Croatia".[12] His followers, called Frankovci, would go on to become the most ardent Ustashe members.[12] Under Frank's leadership the Party of Rights became obsessively anti-Serb,[13][14] and such sentiments dominated Croatian political life in the 1880s.[15] British historian C. A. Macartney stated that because of the "gross intolerance" toward Serbs who lived in Slavonia, they had to seek protection from Count Károly Khuen-Héderváry, the Ban of Croatia-Slavonia, in 1883.[16] During his reign in 1883–1903, Hungary stimulated division and hatred between Serbs and Croats to further its Magyarization policy.[16] Carmichael writes that ethnic division between the Croats and the Serbs at the turn of the 20th century was stoked by a nationalist press and was "incubated entirely in the minds of extremists and fanatics, with little evidence that the areas in which Serbs and Croats had lived for many centuries in close proximity, such as Krajina, were more prone to ethnically inspired violence."[7] In 1902 major anti-Serb riots in Croatia were caused by an article written by Serbian nationalist writer Nikola Stojanović (1880–1964) titled Do istrage vaše ili naše (Till the destruction of you or us) which forecasted the result of an "inevitable" Serbian-Croatian conflict, that was reprinted in the Serb Independent Party's Srbobran magazine.[17]

Between the mid-19th and early 20th century there were two factions in the Catholic Church in Croatia: the progressive faction which preferred uniting Croatia with Serbia in a progressive Slavic country, and the conservative faction that opposed this.[18] The conservative faction became dominant by the end of the 19th century: The First Croatian Catholic Congress held in Zagreb in 1900 was unreservedly Serbophobic and anti-Orthodox.[18]

Ottoman Kosovo Vilayet

Anti-Serb sentiment in the Kosovo Vilayet grew as a result of the Ottoman-Serb and Ottoman-Greek conflicts during the period of 1877–1897. With the liberation of Vranje in 1878, thousands of Ottoman Albanian troops and Albanian civilians retreated into the Eastern part of Ottoman held Kosovo Vilayet.[19] These displaced persons known as (Alb. muhaxhirë, Turk. muhacir, Serb. muhadžir) were highly hostile towards the Serbs in the areas they retreated to, given the fact that they were expelled from the Vranje area due to the Ottoman-Serb conflict.[20] This animosity fuelled anti-Serb sentiment which resulted in Albanians committing widespread atrocities including murder, looting and rape against Serb civilians across the entire territory, including parts of Pristina and Bujanovac.[21]

Atrocities against Serbs in the region also peaked in 1901 after the region was flooded with weapons not handed back to the Ottomans after the Greco-Turkish War of 1897.[22] Albanians committed numerous atrocities including: massacres, rapes, looting and expulsion of Serbs in the Pristina and Northern Kosovo region.[23] Little suggests that the actions of Albanians at the time constituted ethnic cleansing as they attempted to create a homogoneous area free of Christian Serbs.[24]

Ottoman Macedonia

The Society Against Serbs was a Bulgarian nationalist organization, established in 1897 in Thessaloniki, Ottoman Empire. The organization's activists were both "Centralists" and "Vrhovnists" of the Bulgarian revolutionary committees (the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization and the Supreme Macedonian-Adrianople Committee), and had by 1902 murdered at least 43 and wounded 52, owners of Serbian schools, teachers, Serbian Orthodox clergy, and other notable Serbs in the Ottoman Empire.[25] Bulgarians also used the term "Serbomans" for a people from notserbian origin, but with Serbian self-determination in Macedonia.

World War I
Excerpt from a 1913 Austro-Hungarian order, that banned numerous social-democratic and ethnic Serb cultural societies in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Austro-Hungarian propaganda postcard saying "Serbs, we'll smash you to pieces!"

After the Balkan Wars in 1912–1913, anti-Serb sentiment increased in the Austro-Hungarian administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[26] Oskar Potiorek, governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina, closed many Serb societies and significantly contributed to the anti-Serb mood before the outbreak of World War I.[26] [27]

The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and Sophie, Duchess of Hohenberg in 1914 led to the Anti-Serb pogrom in Sarajevo, where angry Croats and Muslims engaged in violence during the evening of 28 June and much of the day on 29 June. This led to a deep division along ethnic lines unprecedented in the city's history. Ivo Andrić refers to this event as the "Sarajevo frenzy of hate."[28] The crowds directed their anger principally at Serb shops, residences of prominent Serbs, the Serbian Orthodox Church, schools, banks, the Serb cultural society Prosvjeta, and the Srpska riječ newspaper offices. Two Serbs were killed that day.[29] That night there were anti-Serb riots in other parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire[30] including Zagreb and Dubrovnik. [31] In the aftermath of the Sarajevo assassination anti-Serb sentiment ran high throughout the Habsburg Empire.[32] Austria-Hungary imprisoned and extradited around 5,500 prominent Serbs, sentenced 460 to death, and established the predominantly Muslim[33] special militia Schutzkorps which carried on the persecution of Serbs.[34]

The Sarajevo assassination became the casus belli for World War I.[35] Taking advantage of an international wave of revulsion against this act of "Serbian nationalist terrorism," Austria-Hungary gave Serbia an ultimatum which led to World War I. Although the Serbs of Austria-Hungary were loyal citizens whose majority participated in its forces during the war, anti-Serb sentiment systematically spread and members of the ethnic group were persecuted all over the country.[36] Austria-Hungary soon occupied the territory of the Kingdom of Serbia, including Kosovo, boosting already intense anti-Serbian sentiment among Albanians whose volunteer units were established to reduce the number of Serbs in Kosovo.[37] A cultural example is the jingle "Alle Serben müssen sterben" ("All Serbs Must Die"), which was popular in Vienna in 1914. (It was also known as "Serbien muß sterbien").[38]

Orders issued on 3 and 13 October 1914 banned the use of Serbian Cyrillic in the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia, limiting it to use in religious instruction. A decree was passed on 3 January 1915, that banned Serbian Cyrillic completely from public use. An imperial order on 25 October 1915, banned the use of Serbian Cyrillic in the Condominium of Bosnia and Herzegovina, except "within the scope of Serb Orthodox Church authorities".[39][40]

Interwar period

Fascist Italy

In the 1920s, Italian fascists accused Serbs of having "atavistic impulses" and they claimed that the Yugoslavs were conspiring together on behalf of "Grand Orient masonry and its funds". One anti-Semitic claim was that Serbs were part of a "social-democratic, masonic Jewish internationalist plot".[41]

Croats in Kingdom of Yugoslavia

The relations between Croats and Serbs were stressed at the very beginning of the Yugoslav state.[42] Opponents to the Yugoslav unification in the Croatian elite portrayed Serbs negatively, as hegemonists and exploiters, introducing Serbophobia into Croatian society.[42] It was reported that in Lika, there were serious tension between Croats and Serbs.[43] In post-war Osijek, the Šajkača hat was banned by the police but the Austro-Hungarian cap was freely worn, and in the school and judicial system the Orthodox Serbs were termed "Greek-Eastern".[44] There was voluntary segregation in Knin.[45]

A 1993 study made in the United States stated that Belgrade's centralist policies for the Kingdom of Yugoslavia led to increased anti-Serbian sentiment in Croatia.[46]

World War II

Nazi Germany

Serbs as well as other Slavs (mainly Poles and Russians) as well as non-Slavic peoples (such as Jews and Roma) were not considered Aryans by Nazi Germany. Instead, they were considered subhuman, inferior races (Untermenschen) and foreign races and as a result, they were not considered part of the Aryan master race.[47][48][49][50][51][52][53][54][55][56][57][58][59][60][61] Anti-Serb sentiment increasingly infiltrated German Nazism after Adolf Hitler's appointment as chancellor in 1933. The roots of this sentiment can be found in his early life in Vienna,[62] and when he was informed about the Yugoslav coup d'état that was conducted by a group of pro-Western Serb officers in March 1941, he decided to punish all Serbs as the main enemies of his new Nazi order.[63] The propaganda ministry of Joseph Goebbels, with the support of the Bulgarian, Italian, and Hungarian press, was given the task of stimulating anti-Serb sentiment among the Croats, Slovenians and Hungarians.[64] The propaganda of the Axis powers accused the group of persecuting minorities and establishing concentration camps for ethnic Germans in order to justify an attack on Yugoslavia and Nazi Germany portrayed itself as a force which would save the Yugoslav people from the threat of Serb nationalism.[64] In 1941 Yugoslavia was invaded and occupied by the Axis powers.

Independent State of Croatia and Ustashe
Main article: Genocide of Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia
A Serb family slaughtered in their home in an Ustasha raid, 1941

The Axis occupation of Serbia enabled the Ustashe, a Croatian fascist[65] and terrorist organization, to implement its extreme anti-Serbian ideology in the Independent State of Croatia.[66] Its anti-Serb sentiment was racist and genocidal.[67][68] The new Croatian government adopted racial laws, similar to those in Nazi Germany, and aimed them at Jews, Roma people and Serbs, who were all defined as being "aliens outside the national community"[69] and persecuted throughout World War II throughout the Independent State of Croatia (NDH).[70] Between 100,000[71] and 700,000[72] Serbs were killed in Croatia by the Ustaše and their Axis allies. Overall, the number of Serbs who were killed in Yugoslavia during World War II was about 700,000, the majority of whom were massacred by various fascist forces.[71][73] Many historians and authors describe the Ustaše regime's mass killings of Serbs as meeting the definition of genocide, including Raphael Lemkin who is known for coining the word genocide and initiating the Genocide Convention.[74][75][76][77][78][79][80][81][82][83] Sisak concentration camp was set up on 3 August 1942 by the Ustaše government following the Kozara Offensive and it was specially formed for children.[84][85][86]

Some priests in the Croatian Catholic Church participated in these Ustaša massacres and the mass conversion of Serbs to Catholicism.[87] During the war, about 250,000 people of the Orthodox faith who were living within the territory of the NDH were either forced or coerced into converting to Catholicism by the Ustaša authorities.[88] One of the reasons for the close cooperation of a part of the Catholic clergy was its anti-Serb position.[89]

Albania

Xhafer Deva recruited Kosovo Albanians to join the Waffen-SS.[90] The 21st Waffen Mountain Division of the SS Skanderbeg (1st Albanian) was formed on 1 May 1944,[91] composed of ethnic Albanians, named after Albanian national hero Skanderbeg who fought the Ottomans in the 15th century.[92] The division had a strength of 6,500 men at the time of its creation[93] and was better known for murdering, raping, and looting in predominantly Serbian areas than for participating in combat operations on behalf of the German war effort.[94] With the Allied victory in the Balkans imminent, Deva and his men attempted to purchase weapons from withdrawing German soldiers in order to organize a "final solution" of the Slavic population of Kosovo. Nothing came of this as the powerful Yugoslav Partisans prevented any large-scale ethnic cleansing of Slavs from occurring.[95]

After World War II

Nearly four decades later, in the 1986 draft of the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, concern was expressed that Serbophobia, together with other things, could provoke the restoration of Serbian nationalism with dangerous consequences.[96] The 1987 Yugoslav economic crisis, and different opinions within Serbia and other republics about what were the best ways to resolve it, exacerbated growing anti-Serbian sentiment among non-Serbs, but also enhanced Serbian support for Serbian nationalism.[97]

Breakup of Yugoslavia
Burned and destroyed Serbian Orthodox church and houses in Prizren during the 2004 unrest in Kosovo
Remnants of a formerly Serb-inhabited house in Croatia

During the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, anti-Serb sentiment flooded Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo,[98] and because of its independence and its historical association with Serbophobia, the Independent State of Croatia would sometimes serve as a rallying symbol for people who intended to proclaim aversion towards Serbia.[99] It also worked vice versa. And while the Serbian nationalism of the time is well-known, anti-Serb sentiment was present in all non-Serb republics of Yugoslavia during its breakup.[100] Bookocide of works written in Serbian took place in Croatia, with as many as 2,8 million books destroyed.[101]

In 1997 the FR Yugoslavia submitted claims to the International Court of Justice in which it charged that Bosnia and Herzegovina was responsible for the acts of genocide which were committed against the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, acts which were incited by anti-Serb sentiment and rhetoric which was communicated through all forms of the media. For example, The Novi Vox, a Muslim youth paper, published a poem titled "Patriotic Song" with the following verses: "Dear mother, I'm going to plant willows; We'll hang Serbs from them; Dear mother, I'm going to sharpen knives; We'll soon fill pits again."[102] The paper Zmaj od Bosne published an article with a sentence saying "Each Muslim must name a Serb and take oath to kill him."[102] The radio station Hajat broadcast "public calls for the execution of Serbs."[102]

In the summer of 1995 the French president, Jacques Chirac. was criticized because, when he commented on the Bosnian War, he called Serbs "a nation of robbers and terrorists".[103][104] Anti-Serbian sentiment remained largely present in the United Kingdom and other European states for many years after the Yugoslav wars ended.[105]

During the war in Croatia, French Jewish writer Alain Finkielkraut insinuated that Serbs were inherently evil, comparing Serb actions to the Nazis during World War II. According to MacDonald, Finkielkraut's unwavering support of the Tudjman regime during this time was "bizarre" given Tudjman's Holocaust revisionism and authoritarian tendencies.[106]

During the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, columnist Thomas Friedman wrote the following in The New York Times on 23 April 1999: "Like it or not, we are at war with the Serbian nation (the Serbs certainly think so), and the stakes have to be very clear: Every week you ravage Kosovo is another decade we will set your country back by pulverizing you. You want 1950? We can do 1950. You want 1389? [referring to the Battle of Kosovo] We can do 1389 too." Friedman urged the US to destroy "in Belgrade: every power grid, water pipe, bridge [and] road", annex Albania and Macedonia as "U.S. protectorates", "occupy the Balkans for years," and "[g]ive war a chance."[107] Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) labeled Friedman's remarks "war-mongering" and "crude race-hatred and war-crime agitation".[108]

Outside the Balkans, Noam Chomsky observed that not just the government of Serbia, but also the people, were reviled and threatened. He described the jingoism as "a phenomenon I have not seen in my lifetime since the hysteria whipped up about 'the Japs' during World War II".[109]

At a 2012 book signing in Prague, Madeleine Albright, the United States Secretary of State during the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, received backlash from a pro-Serbian Czech organization whose protesters carried photos of Serbian victims of the Kosovo War. She was filmed responding to them with, "disgusting Serbs, get out!"[110]

Contemporary and recent issues

At a football game between Kosovo and Croatia played in Albania in October 2016, the fans together chanted murderous slogans against Serbs.[111] Both countries face FIFA hearings due to the incident.[112] Croat and Ukrainian sports fans have put up hate messages towards Serbs and Russians during a match of their national teams in the 2018 World Cup qualifier.[113]

Kosovo Albanians
Main articles: March Pogrom and Destruction of Serbian heritage in Kosovo
Road signs that depict Serbian names of locations across Kosovo are commonly vandalised.

The worst ethnic violence in Kosovo since the end of the 1999 conflict erupted in the partitioned town of Mitrovica, leaving hundreds wounded and at least 14 people dead. UN peacekeepers and Nato troops scrambled to contain a raging gun battle between Serbs and ethnic Albanians.[114] Within hours the province was immersed in anti-Serb and anti-UN rioting and had regressed to levels of violence not seen since 1999. In Serbia the events were also called the March Pogrom (Serbian: Мартовски погром / Martovski pogrom). International courts in Pristina have prosecuted several people who attacked several Serbian Orthodox churches, handing down jail sentences ranging from 21 months to 16 years.[115] Numerous Serbian cultural sites in Kosovo were destroyed during and after the Kosovo War. According to the International Center for Transitional Justice, 155 Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries were destroyed by Kosovo Albanians between June 1999 and March 2004.[116]

Kosovo Albanian media depict Serbia and Serbs as threat to state frame and security, as disrupting institutional order, draining resources, being extremists, tied to criminal activities (in North Kosovo), and in retrospect as perpetrators of war crimes and violations of humans rights (reminding the public of Serbs as enemies). Serbs are blamed for inducing the Kosovo War, and since the war are negatively characterized as uncooperative, aggressive, extremist while the Serbian crimes in the war are termed "genocide".[117]

In April 2019, Vlora Çitaku, ambassador of Kosovo to United States, commenting on The Long Night, compared Serbia with White Walkers, the main villains in the Game of Thrones that are portrayed as a supernatural threat to humankind.[118][119]

Croatia
Entrance to "Zagrebački zbor" in 1942, it served as a transit camp during the existence of Independent State of Croatia.

Croatian nationalist propaganda, especially the Catholic Church supported groups, often advocates anti-Serb views.[120][121] In 2015 Amnesty International reported that Croatian Serbs continued to face discrimination in public sector employment and the restitution of tenancy rights to social housing vacated during the war.[122] In 2017 they again pointed Serbs faced significant barriers to employment and obstacles to regain their property. Amnesty International also said that right to use minority languages and script continued to be politicized and unimplemented in some towns and that heightened nationalist rhetoric and hate speech contributed to growing ethnic intolerance and insecurity.[123] According to the 2018 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance report, racist and intolerant hate speech in public discourse is escalating; and one of the main targets are Serbs.[124] Due to persistent demonization and discrimination, many younger Serbs in Croatia have converted from Orthodox Christianity to Catholicism in order to "become Croats", some changing their names to look more Croatian.[125]

The Croatian usage of the Ustashe salute Za dom spremni, the equivalent of Nazi salute Sieg Heil, is not banned. It is frequently used by Croatian nationalists and sports fans.[126] Some Croats, including politicians, have attempted to deny and to minimise the magnitude of the genocide perpetrated against Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia.[127] Since 2016, anti-fascist groups, leaders of Croatia's Serb, Roma and Jewish communities and former top Croat officials have boycotted the official state commemoration for the victims of the Jasenovac concentration camp because, as they said, Croatian authorities refused to denounce the Ustasha legacy explicitly and they downplayed and revitalized crimes committed by Ustashe.[128][129][130][131]

In 2013 it was reported that a group of right-wing extremists had taken over the Croatian Wikipedia, editing mostly articles related to the Ustashe, whitewashing their crimes, and articles targeting Serbs.[132][133] In the same year there were protests in several Croatian cities against introducing Serbian language and Cyrillic script as official in Vukovar.[134] Later signs with Cyrillic on administrative buildings were destroyed by Croatian veterans.[135] In 2019, Ivan Penava, Mayor of Vukovar, presented the conclusion that conditions have not been met to introduce special rights on the equal use of the Serbian minority's language and script in Vukovar.[136]

Controversial memorial plaque in Jasenovac with Croatian Ustashe salute Za dom spremni

Ruža Tomašić, member of the European Parliament commenting on the statement by Serbian Labour Minister Aleksandar Vulin, who said Croatia cannot give lessons to Serbia about war crimes, said: "Let them pray to God that we do not clean up our yard because if we start to clean our yard you will have a lot more Serbs from Croatia who will have to go to Serbia.[137][138]

Serbian politicians have recently accused Croatian politicians of anti-Serbian sentiment.[139] The US State Department has warned about pro-Ustashe and anti-Serb sentiment in Croatia.[140] According to the Serbian National Council, hate speech, threats and violence against Serbs rose by 57% in 2016.[141] On 12 February 2018, when Serbian President Vučić was to meet with Croatian government representatives in Zagreb, hundreds of demonstrators chanted the salute Za dom spremni! at the city square.[142]

Marko Perković and band Thompson created controversy by performing songs that openly glorifies the Ustasha regime and the Genocide of Serbs.[143] The band performed Jasenovac i Gradiška Stara, which celebrate the massacres at the Jasenovac and Stara Gradiška, which were among the largest extermination camps in Europe.[144]

On 7 January 2019, Ivan Djakic, the son of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) MP Josip Djakic, posted a private "Orthodox Christmas greeting" message on Facebook, with a photograph of a World War II fascist Ustasa movement fighter holding the severed head of a Serb soldier, with a message that read: "Happy Christmas to all Serb 'friends'".[145] After widespread condemnation, he was sentenced to 11 months of probation for hate speech and for an earlier incident in which he attacked a journalist.[145] In February of that year, a group of men attacked three Red Star Belgrade water polo players in the coastal city of Split. Video footage and photos on the website of Croatian newspaper Slobodna Dalmacija showed the Red Star goalkeeper in the sea seemingly trying to elude attackers.[146] In June, five members of Hajduk Split's fan club Torcida attacked four seasonal workers in the town of Supetar, two of whom were Serbs, singled out by the attackers due to the dialect they were using.[145] That same month, Radoje Petkovic, vice-president of the Serbian National Minority Council which represents the Croatian Serb minority for the town of Kastav, was beaten to death by a Croat.[145] A hate motivated attacked on Serbs who were watching Crvena Zvezda football match took place in August 2019, near Knin.[147][148][149] Five people were injured, including a minor.[150]

In June 2020, four people were detained by Croatian police after a photo showing a group of youths in Zagreb displaying Ustaše symbols and a banner which read "We will fu** Serbian women and children" circulated online. The group, apparently fans of the Dinamo Zagreb football club, also reportedly chanted "kill, kill the Serb".[151]

Montenegro under Milo Đukanović

Some observers have described Milo Đukanović, the longtime ruler of Montenegro, as a Serbophobe.[152][153] Serbs of Montenegro have supposedly been pressured to declare themselves Montenegrins, following the 2006 referendum.[154] The acquisition of Montenegro's independence has renewed the dispute over the ethnic and linguistic identity.[155][156][157][158] Although the majority of citizens in Montenegro declare themselves to speak Serbian language, it is not recognized as an official language.[159] A number of Serbian writers have recently been removed from the school curriculum in Montenegro, which was described as creation of an "anti-Serb atmosphere" by a Serbian MP.[160]

In June 2019, Mirna Nikčević, first adviser to the Embassy of Montenegro in Turkey, commented on protests in front of the Cathedral of the Resurrection of Christ in Podgorica against the announced controversial religious law: "Honestly, I would burn the temple and all the cattle there".[161] A few days later, Zoran Vujović, an actor of the Montenegrin National Theatre, has posted a lot of insults against the Serbs on his Facebook profile, saying that they were „nothingness, ignorant, degenerate, poisonous".[162][163] According to some reporters, pro-Serbian medias have faced discrimination.[164]

As of late December 2019, the newly proclaimed religion law or officially Law on Freedom of Religion or Belief and the Legal Status of Religious Communities, which de jure transfers the ownership of church buildings and estates from the Serbian Orthodox Church to the Montenegrin state,[165][166] sparked a series of peaceful nationwide protests which continued to February 2020.[167] The Freedom House described the adoption of the law, which is widely seen to target the Serbian Orthodox Church, as "questionable decision".[168] Eighteen opposition MPs, mostly Serbs, were arrested prior to the voting, under the charge for violently disrupting the vote.[168][169][170] Some church officials were attacked by the police[171][172] and a number of journalists, opposition activists and protesting citizens were arrested.[173][174][175] President Milo Đukanović called the protesting citizens "a lunatic movement".[176][177][178]

Hate speech and derogatory terms

Among derogatory terms for Serbs are "Vlachs" (Власи / Vlasi)[179] and "Chetniks" (четници / četnici) used by Croats and Bosniaks;[180] Shkije by Albanians;[181][182] while Čefurji is used in Slovenia for immigrants from other former Yugoslav republics.[183]

Anti-Serb slogans
Graffiti calling for murder of Serbs, in front of the Archbishopric bookshop in Split, Croatia.

The slogan Srbe na vrbe! (Србе на врбе), meaning "Hang Serbs from the willow trees!" (lit. '"Serbs on willows!"') originates from a poem by the Slovene politician Marko Natlačen published in 1914, at the beginning of the Austro-Hungarian war against Serbia.[184][185] It was popularized before World War II by Mile Budak,[186] the chief architect of Ustaše ideology against Serbs. During World War II there were mass hangings of Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia as part of the Ustaše persecution of the Serbs.

In present-day Croatian nationalists and people who oppose the return of Serb refugees often use the slogan. Graffiti with the phrase is common, and was noted in the press when it was found painted on a church in 2004,[187] 2006,[188] and on another church in 2008.[189] In 2010, a banner displaying the slogan appeared in the midst of tourist season at the entrance to Split, a major tourist hub in Croatia, during a Davis Cup tennis match between the two countries. It was removed by police within hours,[190] and the banner's creator was later apprehended and charged with a felony.[191][192] A Serbian Orthodox church in Geelong, Australia, was spray-painted with the slogan, along with other neo-Nazi symbols, in 2016.[193]

Criticism and controversy

Some controversy with the term purportedly corresponds to its interplay with perceived historical revisionism practiced by the government of Slobodan Milošević in the 1990s and its later apologists, and the contention that Serbian writers constructed the "myth of Serbophobia," as "an anti-Semitism for Serbs, making them victims throughout history."[194] According to MacDonald, in the 1980s Serbs increasingly began to compare themselves to Jews as fellow victims in world history, which involved tragedising historic events, from the 1389 Battle of Kosovo to the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, as every aspect of history was seen as yet another example of persecution and victimisation of Serbs at the hands of external negative forces.[195] The association with Jewish suffering is probably linked to the Croatian death camp, Jasenovac where it is estimated that 50,000–70,000 Serbs were killed in extremely cruel circumstances, along with fellow inmates who were Jews and Roma. The disputed historical facts of the camp are the subject of allegations of "Holocaust Denial" by the Croatian authorities.[196]

Critics associate the use of the term Serbophobia with the politics of Serbian nationalist victimization of the late 1980s and 1990s as described, for example, by former director of the International Crisis Group in the Balkans, Christopher Bennett.[197] According to Bennett, the idea of historic Serb martyrdom grew out of the thinking and writing of Dobrica Ćosić who developed a complex and paradoxical theory of Serb national persecution, which evolved over two decades between the late 1960s and the late 1980s into the Greater Serbian programme.[197] Serbian nationalist politicians have made associations to Serbian "martyrdom" in history (from the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 to the genocide during World War II) to justify Serbian politics of the 1980s and 1990s; these associations were exemplified in Milošević's Gazimestan speech at Kosovo Polje in 1989. The reaction to this speech as well as to the use of the associated term Serbophobia remains a matter of heated debate.[197]

In late 1988, months before the Revolutions of 1989, Milošević accused his critics like the Slovenian leader Milan Kučan of "spreading fear of Serbia" as a political tactic.[198] Political scientist David Bruce MacDonald stated that Serbophobia was often likened to anti-Semitism, and expressed itself as a re-analysis of history where every event that had a negative effect on the Serbs was likened to a tragedy, and used to justify territorial expansion into neighbouring regions.[199]

  • Serbien muss sterbien! ("Serbia must die!"), an Austrian caricature, drawn after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria in 1914, depicting Serbia as an ape-like terrorist.
  • Devastated and robbed shops owned by Serbs in Sarajevo during the Anti-Serb pogrom in Sarajevo.
  • Austro-Hungarian soldiers executing Serb civilians during World War I.
  • The remains of Serbs executed by Bulgarian soldiers in the Surdulica massacre during World War I. An estimated 2,000–3,000 Serbian men were killed in the town during the first months of the Bulgarian occupation of southern Serbia.[200]
  • Order for Serbs and Jews to move out of their home in Zagreb, in the Nazi puppet state during World War II. Also, a warning of forcible expulsion for Serbs and Jews who fail to comply.
  • Ustaše saw off the head of a Serb, Branko Jungić, in Grabovac, near the town of Bosanska Gradiška.
  • Ruins of the Church of Holy Salvation, Prizren which was built circa 1330 and destroyed during the 2004 unrest in Kosovo.
  • 14th-century icon from Our Lady of Ljeviš in Prizren, which was damaged in 2004 by rioters.
gollark: CEASE.
gollark: Where's the evolutionary pressure for more accurate dreams?
gollark: I'm assuming I'm not dreaming now, since clocks work properly, books are consistent, and I seem to be experiencing the normal missing-from-dreams sensations like floors being slightly rough and whatnot, but I can't *tell*.
gollark: There was that one time I dreamed I was dreaming then dreamed I was waking up. I think possibly repeatedly?
gollark: Mine are just confusing.

See also

References
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  2. Kurt Jonassohn; Karin Solveig Björnson (January 1998). Genocide and Gross Human Rights Violations: In Comparative Perspective. Transaction Publishers. p. 281. ISBN 978-1-4128-2445-3. Anti-Serbian sentiment had already been expressed throughout the nineteenth century when Croatian intellectuals began to make plans for their own national state. They viewed the presence of more than one million Serbs in Krajina and Slavonia as intolerable.
  3. Meier 2013, p. 120.
  4. Carmichael 2012, p. 97
    For Starčević... Serbs were 'unclean race' ... Along with ... Eugen Kvaternik he believed that 'there could be no Slovene or Serb people in Croatia because their existence could only be expressed in the right to a separate political territory.
  5. John B. Allcock; Marko Milivojević; John Joseph Horton (1998). Conflict in the former Yugoslavia: an encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO. p. 105. ISBN 978-0-87436-935-9. Starcevic was extremely anti-Serb, seeing Serb political consciousness as a threat to Croats.
  6. Tomasevich (2001), p. 3
    In polemics of the 1850s, Starčević also coined a misleading term – "Slavoserb", derived from the Latin word "sclavus" and "servus" to denote persons ready to serve foreign rulers against their own people.
  7. Carmichael 2012, p. 97.
  8. MacDonald 2002, p. 87.
  9. Ognjen Kraus (1998, p. 174)
  10. Gregory C. Ference (2000). "Frank, Josip". In Richard Frucht (ed.). Encyclopedia of Eastern Europe: From the Congress of Vienna to the Fall of Communism. New York & London: Garland Publishing. pp. 276–277.
  11. (in Croatian) "Eugen Dido Kvaternik, Sjećanja i zapažanja 1925–1945, Prilozi za hrvatsku povijest.", Dr. Jere Jareb, Starčević, Zagreb, 1995., ISBN 953-96369-0-6, str. 267.: Josip Frank pokršten je, kad je imao 18 godina.
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  13. Robert A. Kann (1980). A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526–1918. University of California Press. p. 447. ISBN 978-0-520-04206-3. ... in the case of Frank's followers... strongly anti-Serb
  14. Stephen Richards Graubard (1999). A New Europe for the Old?. Transaction Publishers. p. 59. ISBN 978-1-4128-1617-5. Under Josip Frank, who carried the rightists into a new era, the party became obsessively anti- Serbian.
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    Thus, from the mid-nineteenth century until the 1920s, the church in Croatia was riven into two factions: the progressives, who favored the incorporation of Croatia into a liberal Slavic state ... and the conservatives,... who were loath to bind Catholic Croatia to Orthodox Serbia. ... By 1900 the exclusivist orientation seems to have gained the upper hand in Catholic circles and the First Croatian Catholic Congress, held in Zagreb that year, was implicitly anti-Orthodox and anti-Serb.
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  22. Skendi 2015, p. 293.
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