Muʿtazila

Muʿtazila (Arabic: المعتزلة‎ al-muʿtazilah) is a rationalist school of Islamic theology[1][2] that flourished in the cities of Basra and Baghdad, both now in Iraq, during the 8th to the 10th centuries.[1]

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The adherents of the Muʿtazili school, known as Muʿtazilites, are best known for rejecting the doctrine of the Qur'an as uncreated and co-eternal with God,[3] asserting that if the Quran is the word of God, he logically "must have preceded his own speech".[4]

The philosophical speculation of the Muʿtazilites centre on the concepts of divine justice (Al-'adl) and divine unity (Tawhid).[5] The school worked to resolve the theological "problem of evil": how to reconcile the justice of an all-powerful God with the reality of evil in the world, in accordance to the guidance of the Quran.[6] Mu'tazilites reasoned that, since God is believed to be just and wise, and since he cannot command what is contrary to reason or act with disregard for the welfare of His creatures, evil must be regarded as something that stems from errors in human acts, arising from man's divinely bestowed free will.[7][8]

Muʿtazilites believe that good and evil are not always determined by revealed scripture or interpretation of scripture, but they are rational categories that could be "established through unaided reason";[6][9][10][11] because knowledge is derived from reason; reason, alongside scripture, was the "final arbiter" in distinguishing right from wrong.[12] This part alone made them the enemy of those who follow the Hadith (by far the majority of Muslims today, including all Sunni and Shia sects).

The Muʿtazili school of Kalam considered the injunctions of God to be accessible to rational thought and inquiry and that reason, not "sacred precedent", is the effective means to determine what is just and religiously obligatory.[12]

The movement reached its political height during the Abbasid Caliphate during the mihna, the period of religious persecution instituted by the 'Abbasid Caliph al-Ma'mun in AD 833 in which religious scholars (such as Sunnis and Shias) were punished, imprisoned, or even killed unless they conformed to Muʿtazila doctrine. The policy lasted for fifteen years (833–848 CE) as it continued through the reigns of al-Ma'mun's immediate successors, al-Mu'tasim and al-Wathiq, and two years of al-Mutawakkil who reversed it in 848 (or possibly 851).[13]

In contemporary Salafi jihadism, the epithet or supposed allegations of being a Muʿtazilite have sometimes been used between rival groups as a means of denouncing their credibility.[14]

Name

The name Muʿtazili is derived from the reflexive stem VIII (iftaʿala) of the triconsonantal root ع-ز-ل "separate, segregate", as in اعتزل iʿtazala "to separate (oneself); to withdraw from".[15]

The name is derived from the founder's "withdrawal" from the study circle of Hasan al-Basra over a theological disagreement: Wāṣil ibn ʿAṭā' asked about the legal state of a sinner: is a person who has committed a serious sin a believer or an unbeliever? Hasan answered the person remains a Muslim. Wasil dissented, suggesting that a sinner was neither a believer nor an unbeliever and withdrew from the study circle. Others followed to form a new circle, including ʿAmr ibn ʿUbayd. Hasan's remark, "Wāṣil has withdrawn from us", is said to be the origin of the movement's name.[16][17]

The group later referred to themselves as Ahl al-Tawḥīd wa l-ʿAdl (اهل التوحيد و العدل, "people of monotheism and justice", and the name muʿtazili was first used by its opponents.

The verb iʿtizal is also used to designate a neutral party in a dispute (as in "withdrawing" from a dispute between two factions). According to the Encyclopædia Britannica, "The name [Mutazilah] first appears in early Islāmic history in the dispute over ʿAlī's leadership of the Muslim community after the murder of the third caliph, ʿUthmān (656). Those who would neither condemn nor sanction ʿAlī or his opponents but took a middle position were termed the Muʿtazilah." Nallino (1916) argued that the theological Mu'tazilism of Wasil and his successors was merely a continuation of this initial political Mu'tazilism.[18]

History

Origin

According to Sunni sources, Muʿtazili theology originated in the eighth century in Basra (now in Iraq) when Wāṣil ibn ʿAṭā' (d. 131 AH/748 AD) left the teaching lessons of Hasan al-Basri after a theological dispute regarding the issue of al-Manzilah bayna al-Manzilatayn (a position between two positions).[16] Though Muʿtazilis later relied on logic and different aspects of early Islamic philosophy, ancient Greek philosophy, and Indian philosophy, the basics of Islam were their starting point and ultimate reference.[19][20] The accusations leveled against them by rival schools of theology that they gave absolute authority to extra-Islamic paradigms reflect more the fierce polemics between various schools of theology than any objective reality. For instance, Muʿtazilis adopted unanimously the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, contrary to certain Muslim philosophers who, with the exception of al-Kindi, believed in the eternity of the world in some form or another.[20]

Ahl al-kalām

Scholar Daniel Brown describes the Muʿtazili as "the later ahl al-kalām", suggesting the ahl al-kalām were forerunners of the Muʿtazili.[21] The ahl al-kalām are remembered in Islamic history as opponents of Al-Shafi‘i and his principle that the final authority of Islam was the hadith of Muhammad,[22] so that even the Qur'an was "to be interpreted in the light of [the hadith], and not vice versa."[23][24] Ahl al-kalām argued to the contrary, that the book of God was an explanation of everything (16:89), and that verses in the Qur'an ordering Muslims to obey the Messenger meant that Muslims should obey the Qur'an, which God had revealed through Muhammad.[25]

Historical development

Abu al-Hudhayl al-'Allaf (d. 235 AH/849 AD), who came a couple of generations after Wāṣil ibn ʿAtāʾ (واصل بن عطاء) and ʿAmr ibn ʿUbayd, is considered the theologian who systematized and formalized Muʿtazilism in Basra.[26] Another branch of the school found a home in Baghdad under the direction of Bishr ibn al-Mu'tamir (d. 210 AH/825 AD); the instigators thought it was the Caliph's own scheme:[27][28][29][30] under Ma`mun the Great (813-833), "Muʿtazilism became the established faith.

The first Caliph however to adopt the principles of the Mu’tazilite doctrine was the Umayyad Caliph Al-Walid II.[31]

The Muʿtazilites maintained man's creating[32] free will, as did the Qadarites of the later Omayyad period. The Muʿtazilites also maintained that justice and reason must form the foundation of the action God takes toward men. Both of these doctrines were repudiated by the later orthodox school of the Ashʿarites."[33]

The persecution campaign, nonetheless, cost them their theology and generally, the sympathy of the Muslim masses. As the number of Muslims increased throughout the Islamic empire, and in reaction to the excesses of this newly imposed rationalism, theologians began to lose ground. The problem was exacerbated by the Mihna, the inquisition launched under the Abbasid caliph al-Ma'mun (d. 218 AH/833 AD). Ahmad ibn Hanbal, the Sunni jurist and founder of the Hanbali school of thought was a victim of Ma'mun's Mihna. Due to his rejection of Ma'mun's demand to accept and propagate the Muʿtazila creed, ibn Hanbal was imprisoned and tortured by the Abbasid rulers.[34] Under Caliph al-Mutawakkil (847-861), "who sought to reestablish the traditional Moslem faith" (intentionally wanted to restore his legitimacy due to backlash towards Ahmad Ibn Hanbal's persecution under previous Caliphs), Muʿtazilite doctrines were repudiated; their professors persecuted; Shias, Christians and Jews were also persecuted."[35]

Muʿtazilism today

Today, Mu‘tazilism persists mainly in the Maghreb among those who call themselves the Wasiliyah, referencing Wasil ibn ‘Ata the reputed founder of Mu‘tazila, the movement uses the mantle of the Mu‘tazila primarily as an identity marker.[36]

Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) was one of the key founding figures of Islamic Modernism that contributed to a revival of Muʿtazilite thought, although he does not seem to have called himself a Muʿtazilite.[37] After he was appointed Grand Mufti of Egypt in 1899, he attempted to adapt Islam to the modern times and to introduce changes in its teaching, in particular at Al-Azhar University.[38] His reforms met with much opposition from the traditional establishment but, even though his immediate successors, such as Rashid Rida (1865-1935), did not follow in his steps, he was a source of inspiration for later modernist and reformist scholars and philosophers[39] such as Fazlur Rahman (1919-1988),[40] Farid Esack (born 1959),[41] and in particular Harun Nasution (1919-1998)[42] and Nasr Abu Zayd (1943-2010),[43] who openly espoused Muʿtazilite views.

The Association for the Renaissance of Mu'tazilite Islam (French: Association pour la renaissance de l’Islam mutazilite, ARIM)[44] was founded in France in February 2017.

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The Five Principles

According to a "leading Muʿtazilite authority" of the end of the ninth century (Al-Khayyat),[45] and "clearly enunciated for the first time by Abu al-Hudhayl",[2] five basic tenets make up the Mu'tazilite creed:

  1. monotheism,[46]
  2. justice and unity,[46]
  3. the inevitability of the threats and promises of God (or "the warning and the promise"),[46]
  4. the intermediary position (i.e. Muslims who die without repentance after committing a grave sin are neither mu'mineen (believers), nor kuffar (non-believers), but in an intermediate position),[46]
  5. the injunction of right, and the prohibition of wrong.[46]

Monotheism

All Muslim schools of theology faced the dilemma of affirming divine transcendence and divine attributes, without falling into anthropomorphism on the one hand or emptying scriptural references to those attributes of all concrete meaning.[47]

The doctrine of Tawhīd, in the words of the prominent Muʿtazili scholar Chief Justice Qadi Abd al-Jabbar (d. 415 AH/1025 AD), is:

the knowledge that God, being unique, has attributes that no creature shares with him. This is explained by the fact that you know that the world has a creator who created it and that: he existed eternally in the past and he cannot perish while we exist after being non-existent and we can perish. And you know that he was and is eternally all-powerful and that impotence is not possible for him. And you know that he is omniscient of the past and present and that ignorance is not possible for him. And you know that he knows everything that was, everything that is, and how things that are not would be if they were. And you know that he is eternally in the past and future living, and that calamities and pain are not possible for him. And you know that he sees visible things, and perceives perceptibles, and that he does not have need of sense organs. And you know that he is eternally past and in future sufficient and it is not possible for him to be in need. And you know that he is not like physical bodies, and that it is not possible for him to get up or down, move about, change, be composite, have a form, limbs and body members. And you know that he is not like the accidents of motion, rest, color, food or smells. And you know that he is One throughout eternity and there is no second beside him, and that everything other than he is contingent, made, dependent, structured, and governed by someone/thing else. Thus, if you know all of that you know the oneness of God.[48]

Divine justice

Facing the problem of existence of evil in the world, the Muʿtazilis pointed at the free will of human beings, so that evil was defined as something that stems from the errors in human acts. God does nothing ultimately evil, and he demands not from any human to perform any evil act. If man's evil acts had been from the will of God, then punishment would have been meaningless, as man performed the will of God no matter what he did. Muʿtazilis did not deny the existence of suffering that goes beyond human abuse and misuse of their free will granted to them by God. In order to explain this type of "apparent" evil, Muʿtazilis relied on the Islamic doctrine of taklif — "God does not order/give the soul of any of his creation, that which is beyond its capacity." [Qur'an 2:286] This entailed the existence of an "act of god" to serve a greater good, or the existence of evil acts to prevent a far greater evil. In conclusion, it comprised life is an ultimate "fair test" of coherent and rational choices, having a supremely just accountability in one's current state, as well as the hereafter.

Humans are required to have belief, iman, secure faith and conviction in and about God, and do good works, amal saleh, to have iman reflected in their moral choices, deeds, and relationship with God, fellow humans, and all of the creation in this world. If everyone is healthy and wealthy, then there will be no meaning for the obligations imposed on humans to, for example, be generous, help the needy, and have compassion for the deprived and trivialized. The inequalities in human fortunes and the calamities that befell them are, thus, an integral part of the test of life. Everyone is being tested. The powerful, the rich, and the healthy are required to use all their powers and privileges to help those who suffer and to alleviate their suffering. In the Qiyamah (Judgment Day), they will be questioned about their response to Divine blessings and bounties they enjoyed in their lives. The less fortunate are required to patiently persevere and are promised a compensation for their suffering that, as the Qur'an puts it in 39:10, and as translated by Muhammad Asad, is "beyond all reckoning".

The test of life is specifically for adults in full possession of their mental faculties. Children may suffer, and are observed to suffer, given the nature of life but they are believed to be completely free from sin and liability. Divine justice is affirmed through the theory of compensation. All sufferers will be compensated. This includes non-believers and, more importantly, children, who are destined to go to Paradise.

The doctrine of 'Adl in the words of ʿAbd al-Jabbar:[49] It is the knowledge that God is removed from all that is morally wrong (qabih) and that all his acts are morally good (hasana). This is explained by the fact that you know that all human acts of injustice (zulm), transgression (jawr), and the like cannot be of his creation (min khalqihi). Whoever attributes that to him has ascribed to him injustice and insolence (safah) and thus strays from the doctrine of justice. And you know that God does not impose faith upon the unbeliever without giving him the power (al-qudra) for it, nor does he impose upon a human what he is unable to do, but he only gives to the unbeliever to choose unbelief on his own part, not on the part of God. And you know that God does not will, desire or want disobedience. Rather, he loathes and despises it and only wills obedience, which he wants and chooses and loves. And you know that he does not punish the children of polytheists (al-mushrikin) in Hellfire because of their fathers' sin, for he has said: "Each soul earns but its own due" (Qur'an 6:164); and he does not punish anyone for someone else's sin because that would be morally wrong (qabih), and God is far removed from such. And you know that he does not transgress his rule (hukm) and that he only causes sickness and illness in order to turn them to advantage. Whoever says otherwise has allowed that God is iniquitous and has imputed insolence to him. And you know that, for their sakes, he does the best for all of his creatures, upon whom he imposes moral and religious obligations (yukallifuhum), and that He has indicated to them what he has imposed upon them and clarified the path of truth so that we could pursue it, and he has clarified the path of falsehood (tariq l-batil) so that we could avoid it. So, whoever perishes does so only after all this has been made clear. And you know that every benefit we have is from God; as he has said: "And you have no good thing that is not from Allah" (Qur'an 16:53); it either comes to us from him or from elsewhere. Thus, when you know all of this you become knowledgeable about justice from God.[50]

Promise and warning

This comprised questions of the Last day, or in Arabic, the Qiyamah (Day of Judgment). According to 'Abd al-Jabbar,[51] The doctrine of irreversible Divine promises and warnings, is fashioned out the Islamic philosophy of human existence. Humans, (or insan in Arabic) are created with an innate need in their essence to submit themselves to something. Also, it is seen as an innate need of all humans to pursue an inner peace and contentment within the struggles of an imperfect world. Knowledge of God, truth, and choices, in relation to one's innate need of submission is seen in Islam as the promise and recompense of God (al-thawab) to those who follow. His warning is looked at as a conscious decision by a human submitting themselves, and choosing a varying principle which he had given a clear warning to. He will not go back on his word, nor can he act contrary to his promise and warning, nor lie in what he reports, in contrast to what the Postponers (Murjites) hold.

Intermediate position

That is, Muslims who commit grave sins and die without repentance are not considered as mu'mins (believers), nor are they considered kafirs (non-believers), but in an intermediate position between the two. The reason behind this is that a mu'min is, by definition, a person who has faith and conviction in and about God, and who has his/her faith reflected in his/her deeds and moral choices. Any shortcoming on any of these two fronts makes one, by definition, not a mu'min. On the other hand, one does not become a kafir (i.e. rejecter; non-believer), for this entails, inter alia, denying the Creator — something not necessarily done by a committer of a grave sin. The fate of those who commit grave sins and die without repentance is Hell. Hell is not considered a monolithic state of affairs but as encompassing many degrees to accommodate the wide spectrum of human works and choices, and the lack of comprehension associated to The Ultimate Judge (one of the other names in Islam of God.) Consequently, those in the intermediate position, though in Hell, would have a lesser punishment because of their belief and other good deeds. Muʿtazilites adopted this position as a middle ground between Kharijites and Murjites. In the words of ʿAbd al-Jabbar, the doctrine of the intermediate position is[52] the knowledge that whoever murders, or fornicates (zina), or commits serious sins is a grave sinner (fasiq) and not a believer, nor is his case the same that of believers with respect to praise and attributing greatness, since he is to be cursed and disregarded. Nonetheless, he is not an unbeliever who cannot be buried in our Muslim cemetery, or be prayed for, or marry a Muslim. Rather, he has an intermediate position, in contrast to the Seceders (Kharijites) who say that he is an unbeliever, or the Murjites who say that he is a believer.

The enjoining of right and prohibiting of wrong

These two tenets, like the "intermediate position" follow logically (according to scholar Majid Fakhry) from the basic Muʿtazilite concepts of divine unity, justice and free will, of which they are the logical conclusion.[45] Even though they are accepted by most Muslims, Muʿtazilites give them a specific interpretation in the sense that, even though God enjoins what is right and prohibits what is wrong, the use of reason allows a Muslim in most cases to identify for himself what is right and what is wrong, even without the help of revelation.[53] Only for some acts is the revelation necessary to determine whether a certain act is right or wrong. This is discussed in further details below.

The use of reasoning and logic

Muʿtazilites based the analysis of all religious texts and doctrines to be analysed by sane mind and solid logic and if there is a discrepancy then the texts or doctrines should be rejected. This part alone made them the enemy of state and orthodox Muslims who conservatively follow the Hadith (by far the majority of Muslims today, including all Sunni and Shia sects).

Theory of interpretation

Muʿtazilah relied on a synthesis between reason and revelation. That is, their rationalism operated in the service of scripture and Islamic theological framework. They, as the majority of Muslim jurist-theologians, validated allegorical readings of scripture whenever necessary. Justice ʿAbd al-Jabbar (935-1025) said in his Sharh al-Usul al-Khamsa (The Explication of the Five Principles):

إن الكلام متى لم يمكن حمله على ظاهره و حقيقته، و هناك مجازان أحدهما أقرب و الآخر أبعد، فإن الواجب حمله على المجاز الأقرب دون الأبعد، لأن المجاز الأبعد من الأقرب كالمجاز مع الحقيقة، و كما لا يجوز فى خطاب الله تعالى أن يحمل على المجاز مع إمكان حمله على الحقيقة، فكذلك لا يحمل على المجاز الأبعد و هناك ما هو أقرب منه

(When a text cannot be interpreted according to its truth and apparent meaning, and when (in this case) two metaphoric interpretations are possible, one being proximal and the other being distal; then, in this case, we are obligated to interpret the text according to the proximal metaphoric interpretation and not the distal, for (the relationship between) the distal to the proximal is like unto (the relationship between) the metaphor to the truth, and in the same way that it is not permissible, when dealing with the word of God, to prefer a metaphoric interpretation when a discernment of the truth is possible, it is also not permissible to prefer the distal interpretation over the proximal interpretation)

The hermeneutic methodology proceeds as follows: if the literal meaning of an ayah (verse) is consistent with the rest of scripture, the main themes of the Qur'an, the basic tenets of the Islamic creed, and the well-known facts, then interpretation, in the sense of moving away from the literal meaning, is not justified. If a contradiction results from adopting the literal meaning, such as a literal understanding of the "hand" of God that contravenes his transcendence and the Qur'anic mention of his categorical difference from all other things, then an interpretation is warranted. In the above quote, Justice 'Abd al-Jabbar emphatically mentioned that if there are two possible interpretations, both capable of resolving the apparent contradiction created by literal understanding of a verse, then the interpretation closer to the literal meaning should take precedence, for the relationship between the interpretations, close and distant, becomes the same as the literal understanding and the interpretation.

Note: Sharh al-Usul al-Khamsah may be a paraphrase or supercommentary made by Abd al-Jabbar's student Mankdim .[54]

The first obligation

Muʿtazilis believed that the first obligation on humans, specifically adults in full possession of their mental faculties, is to use their intellectual power to ascertain the existence of God, and to become knowledgeable of his attributes. One must wonder about the whole existence, that is, about why something exists rather than nothing. If one comes to know that there is a being who caused this universe to exist, not reliant on anything else and absolutely free from any type of need, then one realizes that this being is all-wise and morally perfect. If this being is all-wise, then his very act of creation cannot be haphazard or in vain. One must then be motivated to ascertain what this being wants from humans, for one may harm oneself by simply ignoring the whole mystery of existence and, consequently, the plan of the Creator. This paradigm is known in Islamic theology as wujub al-nazar, i.e., the obligation to use one's speculative reasoning to attain ontological truths. About the "first duty," ʿAbd al-Jabbar said it is "speculative reasoning (al-nazar) which leads to knowledge of God, because he is not known by the way of necessity (daruratan) nor by the senses (bi l-mushahada). Thus, he must be known by reflection and speculation."[55]

The difference between Muʿtazilis and other Muslim theologians is that Muʿtazilis consider al-nazar an obligation even if one does not encounter a fellow human being claiming to be a messenger from the Creator, and even if one does not have access to any alleged God-inspired or God-revealed scripture. On the other hand, the obligation of nazar to other Muslim theologians materializes upon encountering prophets or scripture.

Reason and revelation
Averroes insisted that all natural phenomena followed laws that God created.[56] [57][58]

The Muʿtazilis had a nuanced theory regarding reason, Divine revelation, and the relationship between them. They celebrated power of reason and human intellectual power. To them, it is the human intellect that guides a human to know God, his attributes, and the very basics of morality. Once this foundational knowledge is attained and one ascertains the truth of Islam and the Divine origins of the Qur'an, the intellect then interacts with scripture such that both reason and revelation come together to be the main source of guidance and knowledge for Muslims. Harun Nasution in the Muʿtazila and Rational Philosophy, translated in Martin (1997), commented on Muʿtazili extensive use of rationality in the development of their religious views saying: "It is not surprising that opponents of the Muʿtazila often charge the Muʿtazila with the view that humanity does not need revelation, that everything can be known through reason, that there is a conflict between reason and revelation, that they cling to reason and put revelation aside, and even that the Muʿtazila do not believe in revelation. But is it true that the Muʿtazila are of the opinion that everything can be known through reason and therefore that revelation is unnecessary? The writings of the Muʿtazila give exactly the opposite portrait. In their opinion, human reason is not sufficiently powerful to know everything and for this reason humans need revelation in order to reach conclusions concerning what is good and what is bad for them."[59]

The Muʿtazili position on the roles of reason and revelation is well captured by what Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari (d. 324 AH/935 AD), the eponym of the Ashʿari school of theology, attributed to the Mu'tazili scholar Ibrahim an-Nazzam (d. 231 AH/845 AD) (1969):

كل معصية كان يجوز أن يأمر الله سبحانه بها فهي قبيحة للنهي، وكل معصية كان لا يجوز أن يبيحها الله سبحانه فهي قبيحة لنفسها كالجهل به والاعتقاد بخلافه، وكذلك كل ما جاز أن لا يأمر الله سبحانه فهو حسن للأمر به وكل ما لم يجز إلا أن يأمر به فهو حسن لنفسه

No sin may be ordered by God as it is wrong and forbidden, and no sin shall be permitted by God, as they are wrong by themselves. To know about it and believe otherwise, and all that God commands is good for the ordered and all that it is not permissible except to order it is good for himself

In the above formulation, a problem emerged, which is rendering something obligatory on the Divine being — something that seems to directly conflict with Divine omnipotence. The Muʿtazili argument is predicated on absolute Divine power and self-sufficiency, however. Replying to a hypothetical question as to why God does not do that which is ethically wrong (la yaf`alu al-qabih), 'Abd al-Jabbar replied:[60] Because he knows the immorality of all unethical acts and that he is self-sufficient without them...For one of us who knows the immorality of injustice and lying, if he knows that he is self-sufficient without them and has no need of them, it would be impossible for him to choose them, insofar as he knows of their immorality and his sufficiency without them. Therefore, if God is sufficient without need of any unethical thing it necessarily follows that he would not choose the unethical based on his knowledge of its immorality. Thus every immoral thing that happens in the world must be a human act, for God transcends doing immoral acts. Indeed, God has distanced himself from that with his saying: "But Allah wills no injustice to his servants" (Qur'an 40:31), and his saying: "Verily Allah will not deal unjustly with humankind in anything" (Qur'an 10:44).

The thrust of ʿAbd al-Jabbar's argument is that acting immorally or unwisely stems from need and deficiency. One acts in a repugnant way when one does not know the ugliness of one's deeds, i.e., because of lack of knowledge, or when one knows but one has some need, material, psychological, or otherwise. Since God is absolutely self-sufficient (a result from the cosmological "proof" of his existence), all-knowing, and all-powerful, he is categorically free from any type of need and, consequently, he never does anything that is ridiculous, unwise, ugly, or evil.

The conflict between Muʿtazilis and Ashʿaris concerning this point was a matter of focus. Muʿtazilis focused on divine justice, whereas the Ashʿaris focused on divine omnipotence. Nevertheless, Divine self-restraint in Muʿtazili discourse is part of divine omnipotence, not a negation of it.

Validity of hadith

The Mu'tazilite "Ahl al-Kalam" argued that the prophetic example of Muhammad in his capacity as a messenger "is found in following the Quran alone", rather than oral Hadith.[61][62]

The early Mu'tazilis viewed the transmission of the oral Hadith as not sufficiently reliable.[63] The Hadith, according to them, was mere guesswork, conjecture, and bidah (innovation), while the Quran was complete and perfect, and did not require the Hadith or any other book to supplement or complement it.[64] For example, during the Abassid dynasty, the poet, theologian, and jurist, Ibrahim an-Nazzam founded a madhhab called the Nazzamiyya that rejected the authority of Hadiths.[65] His famous student, Al-Jahiz, was also critical of those who followed oral Hadiths, referring to his Hadithist opponents as al-nabita ("the contemptible").[66]

According to Racha El Omari, early Mutazilites believed that hadith were susceptible to "abuse as a polemical ideological tool"; that the matn (content) of the hadith -- not just the isnad -- ought to be scrutinized for doctrine and clarity; that for hadith to be valid they ought to be mutawatir, i.e. supported by tawātur or many isnād (chains of oral transmitters), each beginning with a different Companion.[67][68]

In writing about mutawatir (multi-isnād Hadith) and ahad (single-isnad hadith, i.e. almost all hadith) and their importance from the legal theoretician's point of view, Wael Hallaq notes the medieval scholar Al-Nawawi (1233–1277) argued that any non-mutawatir hadith is only probable and can not reach the level of certainty that a mutawatir hadith can. However, these mutawir were extremely scarce. Scholars like Ibn al-Salah (d. 1245 CE), al-Ansari (d. 1707 CE), and Ibn ‘Abd al-Shakur (d. 1810 CE) found "no more than eight or nine" hadiths that fell into the mutawatir category.[69]

Wāṣil ibn ʿAṭāʾ (700–748 CE, by many accounts a founder of the Mutazilite school of thought), held that there was evidence for the veracity of a report when it had four independent transmitters. His assumption was that there could be no agreement between all transmitters in fabricating a report. Wāṣil’s acceptance of tawātur seems to have been inspired by the juridical notion of witnesses as proof that an event did indeed take place. Hence, the existence of a certain number of witnesses precluded the possibility that they were able to agree on a lie, as opposed to the single report which was witnessed by one person only, its very name meaning the “report of one individual” (khabar al-wāḥid). Abū l-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf (d. 227/841) continued this verification of reports through tawātur, but proposed that the number of witnesses required for veracity be twenty, with the additional requirement that at least one of the transmitters be a believer.[68]

One Mu'tazilite who expressed the strongest statement of skepticism of any source of knowledge outside of reason and the Qurʾān was Ibrahim an-Nazzam (c. 775 – c. 845). For him, both the single and the mutawātir reports could not be trusted to yield knowledge. He recounted contradictory ḥadīth and examined their divergent content (matn) to show why they should be rejected: they relied on both faulty human memory and bias, neither of which could be trusted to transmit what is true. Al-Naẓẓām bolstered his strong refutation of the trustworthiness of ḥadīth within the larger claim that ḥadīth circulated and thrived to support polemical causes of various theological sects and jurists, and that no single transmitter could by himself be held above suspicion of altering the content of a single report. Al-Naẓẓām’s skepticism involved far more than excluding the possible verification of a report, be it single or mutawātir. His stance also excluded the trustworthiness of consensus, which proved pivotal to classical Muʿtazilite criteria devised for verifying the single report (see below). Indeed, his shunning of both consensus and tawātur earned him a special mention for the depth and extent of his skepticism, even among fellow Muʿtazilites.[70]

gollark: Just use a minifier™.
gollark: There are probably a bunch of other utilities which would be neat which I repeat a lot, I think often stuff for fiddling with table formats.
gollark: Including stuff like "read all of handle and then close it" (plus convenience stuff for fs.open/http.get), probably some of potatOS's random vaguely general-purpose stuff like compression, "safe" (de)serialization, map/reduce/filter/other stuff, randomly pick item from list, generate random bytestring, etc.
gollark: But also with other things.
gollark: Yes.

See also

References
  1. "Mutazilah", Encyclopaedia Britannica.
  2. Ash'ariyya and Mu'tazila| muslimphilosophy.com | NEAL ROBINSON | 1998
  3. Abdullah Saeed. The Qur'an: an introduction. 2008, page 203
  4. Kadri, Sadakat (2012). Heaven on Earth: A Journey Through Shari'a Law from the Deserts of Ancient Arabia to the Streets of the Modern Muslim World. macmillan. p. 77. ISBN 9780099523277.
  5. Fakhry, Majid (1983). A History of Islamic Philosophy (second ed.). New York: Columbia University Press. p. 46. Almost all authorities agree that the speculation of the Muʿtazilah centeres around the two crucial concepts of divine justice and unity, of which they claim to be the exclusive, genuine exponents.
  6. Fakhry, Majid (1983). A History of Islamic Philosophy (second ed.). New York: Columbia University Press. p. 47. The early Muslim theologians had naturally been unanimous in denying that God could be unjust, but the problem of reconciling the justice of God and the glaring reality of evil in the world does not appear to have disturbed them particularly. And it was precisely this problem that became, from Wasil's time on the crucial issue with which the Muʿtazilah and their adversaries grappled.... [According to the Muʿtazila,] good and evil are not conventional or arbitrary concepts whose validity is rooted in the dictates of God, as the Traditionists and later the Ashʿarites held, but are rational categories which can be established through unaided reason
  7. Al-Shahrastani, al-Milal, p.31 f
  8. Al-Baghdadi, Usul al Din, pp.150f
  9. Al-Baghdadi, A.Q.,Usul al Din, Istanbul, 1928, pp.26f
  10. Al-Shahrastani, M.,al-Milal wa'l-Nihal, London, 1892, p.31
  11. al-Ash'ari, Maqalat, p.356
  12. Oussama Arabi. Studies in Modern Islamic Law and Jurisprudence. page 27–28
  13. Muhammad Qasim Zaman (1997). Religion and Politics Under the Early ?Abbasids: The Emergence of the Proto-Sunni Elite. BRILL. pp. 106–112. ISBN 978-90-04-10678-9.
  14. The North African "Institute for the Faith Brigades" denounced Bin Laden's "misguided errors" and accused Abu Hafs al Mawritani, a leading figure in Al-Qaeda's juridicial committee, of being a Muʿtazilite. B. Liam 'Strategist and doctrinarian jihadis' in: Fault Lines in Global Jihad: Organizational, Strategic, and Ideological Fissures, ed. Assaf Moghadam, Brian Fishman, Publisher Taylor & Francis, 2011, page 81, ISBN 1136710582, 9781136710582
  15. For example, Quran 18:16, 19:48 and 4:90). According to Sarah Siroumsa, "The verb i'tazala means "to withdraw", and in its most common use, as given in the dictionaries and attested in Hadith literature, it denotes some sort of abstinence from sexual activity, from worldly pleasures, or, more generally, from sin. Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-'Arab, s.v oy.':/ : wensirck, Concordance a indices de la tradition musulmatle, vol Iv, p. 11)7. 'Amr taught his followers to be "the party which abstains" (i.e., from evil: al-firqa al-muʿtazila), asceticism was their most striking characteristic. They were given the name "Mu'tazila" in reference to their pious asceticism, and they were content with this name," http://pluto.huji.ac.il/~stroums/files/MuTazila_Reconsidered.pdf
  16. Dhanani, Alnoor (1994). The physical theory of Kalām : atoms, space, and void in Basrian Muʻtazilī cosmology. Leiden: Brill. p. 7. ISBN 978-9004098312.
  17. Martin 1997, p. ?.
  18. Mutazilah at the Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Accessed 13 March 2014. Some of the Companions of Muhammad such as Sa`d ibn Abi Waqqas and Abdullah ibn Umar were neutral in the dispute between ʿAlī and his opponents (Muawiyah I). Encyclopaedia of Islam s.v. "Mu'tazila", Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands (1999): "It is an explanation of this kind which today, in particular as a result of the studies undertaken by Nallino ("Sull'origine del nome dei Mu'taziliti", in RSO, vii [1916]), is generally accepted: i'tizal would designate a position of neutrality in the face of opposing factions. Nallino drew support for the argument from the fact that at the time of the first civil war, some of the Companions ('Abd Allah b. 'Umar, Sa'd b. Abi Waqqas, etc.), who had chosen to side neither with ʿAli nor with his adversaries, were for that reason called muʿtazila. He even drew the conclusion that the theological Mu'tazilism of Wasil and his successors was merely a continuation of this initial political Mu'tazilism; in reality, there does not seem to have been the least connection between one and the other. But, in its principle, this explanation is probably valid."
  19. Walzer 1967.
  20. Craig 2000.
  21. Brown, Rethinking tradition in modern Islamic thought, 1996: p.15
  22. Brown, Rethinking tradition in modern Islamic thought, 1996: p.13-15
  23. J. SCHACHT, An Introduction to Islamic Law (1964), supra note 5, at 47
  24. Forte, David F. (1978). "Islamic Law; the impact of Joseph Schacht" (PDF). Loyola Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review. 1: 13. Retrieved 19 April 2018.
  25. Musa, ibid, pp.36–37; taken from Abdur Rab, ibid, p. 199.
  26. Martin 1997.
  27. Nawas 1994.
  28. Nawas 1996.
  29. Cooperson 2005.
  30. Ess 2006.
  31. https://eujournal.org/index.php/esj/article/download/8399/8037
  32. Adamson, Peter. "Al-Kindi and Mu'tazila: Divine Attributes, Creation and Freedom." Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 1 (2003): 45-77.
  33. William Thomson, "The Moslem World", in William L. Langer (1948), ed., An Encyclopedia of World History, rev. edition, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, p.189.
  34. Siddiqi, Muhammad (1993). Hadith Literature. Oxford: The Islamic Texts Society. p. 47. ISBN 0-946621-38-1.
  35. William Thomson, "The Moslem World", in William L. Langer (1948), ed., An Encyclopedia of World History, rev. edition, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, p. 189.
  36. Byrd, Anthony Robert (27 November 2007). A Euro-American 'Ulama? Mu 'tazilism, (Post)Modernity, and Minority Islam. Retrieved 4 June 2020.
  37. H. Al-Rahim, Ahmed (January 2006). "Islam and Liberty". Journal of Democracy. 17 (1): 166–169.
  38. Kerr, Malcolm H. (2010). Hoiberg, Dale H. (ed.). 'Abduh Muhammad (15 ed.). Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica Inc. p. 20-21. ISBN 978-1-59339-837-8.
  39. Benzine, Rachid (2008). Les Nouveaux Penseurs de l'Islam. Albin Michel. ISBN 978-2-226-29040-3.
  40. Sonn, Tamara (1995). Esposito, John L. (ed.). "Rahman, Fazlur". The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  41. Esack, Farid (1999). On Being a Muslim: Finding a Religious Path in the World Today. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 1-85168-146-9.
  42. Martin, Richard C.; Woodward, Mark R.; Atmaja, Dwi S. (1997). Defenders of Reason in Islam: Mutazilism from Medieval School to Modern Symbol. Oxford: Oneworld. p. 164.
  43. Abu Zayd, Nasr (1998). Rationalism in Exegesis: A Study of the Problem of Metaphor in the Writing of the Mutazilites (4 ed.). Beirut and Casablanca.
  44. "Mutazilisme". mutazilisme.fr (in French). Retrieved 23 July 2018.
  45. Fakhry, Majid (1983). A History of Islamic Philosophy (second ed.). New York: Columbia University Press. p. 46. Thus according to a leading Mu'talite authority of the end of the ninth century, five basic tenets make up the strict Mu'tazilite creed: justice and unity, the inevitability of the threats and promises of God, the intermediary position, the injunction of right and the prohibition of wrong.
  46. Al-Khayyat, A.H., Kitab al-Intisar, Beirut, 1957, p.93
  47. Jackson 2005.
  48. Martin 1997, p. 92.
  49. Martin 1997, p. 58.
  50. Martin 1997, p. 93.
  51. Martin 1997, p. 65-6.
  52. Martin 1997, p. 82, 106.
  53. Abba, A. A. (2015). Abuja. Missing or empty |title= (help)
  54. Gimaret 1979.
  55. Martin 1997, p. 90.
  56. Kadri, Sadakat (2012). Heaven on Earth: A Journey Through Shari'a Law from the Deserts of Ancient Arabia ... macmillan. pp. 118–9. ISBN 9780099523277.
  57. For al-Ghazali's argument see The Incoherence of the Philosophers. Translated by Michael E. Marmura. 2nd ed, Provo Utah, 2000, pp.116-7.
  58. For Ibn Rushd's response, see Khalid, Muhammad A. ed. Medieval Islamic Philosophical Writings, Cambridge UK, 2005, p.162)
  59. Martin 1997, p. 187.
  60. Martin 1997, p. 96.
  61. Brown, Rethinking tradition in modern Islamic thought, 1996: p.15-16
  62. excerpted from Abdur Rab, ibid, pp. 199–200.
  63. Sabine Schmidtke, The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology, Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 264-265
  64. Azami, M. A., Studies in Hadith Methodology and Literature, Islamic Book Trust, Kuala Lumpur, 92; cited in Akbarally Meherally, Myths and Realities of Hadith – A Critical Study, (published by Mostmerciful.com Publishers), Burnaby, BC, Canada, 6; available at http://www.mostmerciful.com/Hadithbook-sectionone.htm Archived 2016-03-13 at the Wayback Machine; excerpted from Abdur Rab, ibid, p. 200.
  65. Abdul-Raof, Hussein (2012). Theological Approaches to Quranic Exegesis: A Practical Comparative-Contrastive Analysis. London: Routledge. pp. 33–34. ISBN 978-0-41544-958-8.
  66. Zaman, Muhammad Qasim (1997). Religion and Politics Under the Early 'Abbasids: The Emergence of the Proto-Sunni Elite. Leiden: E.J. Brill. p. 55. ISBN 978-9-00410-678-9.
  67. see: Ḍirār b. ʿAmr (d. 728/815) In his al-Taḥrīsh wa-l-irjāʾ
  68. Ghani, Usman (2015). "3. Concept of Sunna in Mu'tazilite Thought.". In Duderija, Adis (ed.). The Sunna and its Status in Islamic Law: The Search for a Sound Hadith. Springer. p. 65. Retrieved 29 March 2018.
  69. Hallaq, Wael (1999). "The Authenticity of Prophetic Ḥadîth: A Pseudo-Problem" (PDF). Studia Islamica. 89: 75–90. JSTOR 1596086. Retrieved 30 March 2018.
  70. Racha El-Omari, "Accommodation and Resistance: Classical Muʿtazilites on Ḥadīth" in Journal of Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 71, No. 2 (October 2012), pp. 234-235

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