Communist Party of Ukraine

The Communist Party of Ukraine (Ukrainian: Комуністична партія України, Komunistychna Partiya Ukrayiny, KPU) is a Ukrainian political party founded in 1993 as the successor to the Soviet-era Communist Party of Ukraine which was banned in 1991. The party played a major role in the parliamentary politics of post-Soviet Ukraine from its founding, but since the April 2015 Ukrainian decommunization law, the Ministry of Justice has legally prohibited the Communist Party from participating in elections.

Communist Party of Ukraine

Комуністична партія України
AbbreviationKPU
First SecretaryPetro Symonenko
Second SecretaryIgor Alekseyev
Founded19 June 1993 (1993-06-19)
Split fromSocialist Party of Ukraine
Preceded byCommunist Party of Ukraine (Soviet Union)
Merged intoNova Derzhava in 2015 (partly)
NewspaperKomunist (since 2000)[1]
Youth wingKomsomol of Ukraine
Membership (2012)115,000
IdeologyCommunism[2]
Marxism–Leninism[2]
Soviet nationalism
Left-wing populism[3]
Political positionFar-left
National affiliationLeft Opposition
Continental affiliationUnion of Communist Parties – Communist Party of the Soviet Union
International affiliationInternational Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties
Colors     Red
Website
kpu.life

Communist parties have a long history in Ukraine. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the party's predecessor Communist Party of Ukraine was banned in 1991, reforming into Socialist Party of Ukraine and other smaller parties. After being revived in 1993, the Communist Party was represented in the Ukrainian parliament from 1994 until the 2014 Ukrainian parliamentary election which resulted in national representation for Communists in Ukraine ending for the first time since 1918.[4][5] The Communist Party and its immediate predecessor emerged as the largest political force after each Ukrainian parliamentary election from 1990 until 2002 and until the aftermath of the Orange Revolution in 2004 the Communist Party was continuously the largest single party in the Ukrainian parliament.

In the aftermath of the 2013–2014 Euromaidan protests, the General Prosecutor of Ukraine and the Security Service of Ukraine have both filed charges against the party. The charges include supporting the 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia and "financing terrorism"[6] (i.e. providing support to separatists in Donbass), both acts of treason against the Ukrainian state. In particular, regional party cells in Donetsk Oblast created so called Communist Party of the Donetsk People's Republic. In May 2015, laws that ban communist and Nazi symbols came into effect in Ukraine.[7] Because of these laws, the Ukrainian Interior Ministry stripped the party of its right to participate in elections on 24 July 2015 and it stated it was continuing the court actions (that started in July 2014) to end the registration of Ukraine's communist parties.[8][9] On 16 December 2015, Kiev District Administrative Court validated the claim of the Ministry of Justice in full, banning the activities of the party in Ukraine.[10][11] On 28 December 2015, the party appealed, but on 25 January 2016, the Supreme Administrative Court denied the party in the consideration of the cassation. This resulted in the court's decision to ban the Communist Party not to come into force. However, the 2015 decommunization law contains a norm that allows the Ministry of Justice to prohibit the Communist Party from participating in elections. The Central Election Commission of Ukraine prohibited the candidacy of Petro Symonenko for the 2019 Ukrainian presidential election due to the fact that the statute, name and symbolism of his party did not comply with the 2015 decommunization laws.[12] Symonenko has led the Communist Party since 1993.[13]

History

The KPU formally considers itself the direct descendant of the Communist Party of Ukraine, a branch of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) which was founded on 5 July 1918, in Moscow.[14] The original communist party existed until 6 November 1991, when the CPSU and its branch in Ukraine were banned.[14] Between 1991 and 1993, several small communist organizations were created throughout Ukraine.[14] "Without clear legality", communists from all over Ukraine convened on 6 March 1993 for the All-Ukrainian Conference for Communists in an attempt to reestablish the KPU.[15] In reaction, the Verkhovna Rada legalized the establishment of communist parties two months later.[15] On 19 June 1993, the 1st Congress of the newly founded KPU was convened. Officially, it was designated as the 29th Congress to denote it as a direct successor to the Soviet KPU and it elected Petro Symonenko as First Secretary.[15]

In the 1994 presidential election, the KPU supported the candidacy of Oleksandr Moroz from the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU).[15] The relationship between the KPU and SPU was strong throughout the 1990s, with Moroz even speaking to the 22nd KPU Congress (held in 1999).[15] In the 1998 parliamentary election, the KPU won 121 seats, constituting 19.5% of the seats in the Verkhovna Rada.[15] The good result led the KPU to field their own candidate in the 1999 presidential election as they nominated party leader Symonenko.[15] Symonenko received 23.1 percent of the votes in the first round, trailing behind Leonid Kuchma who received 38,0 percent of the votes.[16] In the second round Symonenko received 38,8 percent, losing to Kuchma who received 57,7 percent of the vote.[16]

In 2000, two parties split from the party, namely the Communist Party of Ukraine (renewed) and the Communist Party of Workers and Peasants.[17]

The Constitutional Court of Ukraine recognized in 2001 that the ban on the Communist Party of Ukraine was in violation of the Constitution of Ukraine.[18]

In February 2014, the party came out in firm opposition to the Euromaidan (pro-Ukrainian EU integration and anti-President Viktor Yanukovych protests) violence and identified the movement as a "coup" to overthrow the elected government and replace it with a pro-NATO regime and in an open plea from the First Secretary called for all communist and left-wing movements around the world to condemn the events as such.[19] However, the party did vote in favour of the impeachment of Yanukovych.[20]

After Yanukovych's ouster, several legislators have talked about the possibility of outlawing the KPU due to its alleged cooperation with pro-Russian separatists.[21] On 6 May, the party was outraged when its parliamentary representatives were expelled from the parliamentary session hall.[22] A week later, Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov threatened to ban the KPU for alleged involvement in the ongoing pro-Russian unrest in the east of the country.[23] On 8 July, the Ministry of Justice asked Kiev's District Administrative Court to ban the activity of the party as a result of "a large amount of evidence regarding illegal activities and illegal actions on the part of the Communist Party" (according to Justice Minister Pavlo Petrenko).[24] The Party of the European Left and the European United Left–Nordic Green Left grouping in the European Parliament condemned the possible ban and declared their solidarity with the KPU.[25][26] Russia's State Duma denounced the ban too and believed it was "an attempt by the new Kiev authorities to force political and civil forces that do not agree with the path taken by the ultranationalist powers to shut up".[27] The KPU also received solidarity from the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT) in Britain.[28]

On 11 April, a scuffle started in the Verkhovna Rada between KPU leader Petro Symonenko and two MPs from All Ukrainian Union "Svoboda", forcing speaker Oleksandr Turchynov to suspend the session for fifteen minutes.[29]

On 1 July, six MPs left the Communist Party faction in parliament, reducing it to 23 members.[30][31] On 22 July, a vote supported by 232 MPs gave the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada (the speaker of Ukraine's parliament) the power to dissolve a faction that has lost some of its members compared to the number it had while it was formed during the first parliamentary session after the previous election, pending a signature from President Petro Poroshenko.[27][32][33] Later that day, Poroshenko signed this bill, giving effect to this new parliamentary regulation.[27] The next day, speaker and former Acting President Turchynov announced the party's impending dissolution and added to MPs: "We only have to tolerate this party for another day".[27] The party's faction in parliament was dissolved on 24 July by Turchynov.[32] That same day, it was announced that at the time 308 criminal proceedings against members of the party had been opened.[34] Communists were accused of openly supporting the annexation of Crimea by Russia, supporting the creation of self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic and Lugansk People's Republic and agitating for annexation of the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to Russia.[34] The party leadership at the time stated its support for Ukrainian territorial integrity and excluded separatist dissenters from its membership.[13]

On 4 September, the Kiev District Administrative Court indefinitely postponed the hearing about the ban of the party.[35]

The October 2014 parliamentary election further marginalized the party as it won no constituency seats and came 1,12% short of reaching the 5% election threshold.[4][5][36] Since prior to its independence, Ukraine was a constituent republic of the Communist Soviet Union and this meant that for the first time since 1918 Communists were not represented in Ukrainian national politics.[4]

In May 2015, laws that banned communist symbols (the so-called "decommunization laws") came into effect in Ukraine, meaning that the party could not use communist symbols or sing the Soviet national hymn or "The Internationale".[7] In a 24 July decree based on these laws, the Ukrainian Interior Ministry stripped the party of its right to participate in elections and stated that it was continuing the court actions (which started in July 2014) to end the registration of Ukraine's communist parties.[8]

On 30 September, the District Administrative Court in Kiev banned two smaller communist parties, the Communist Party of Workers and Peasants and the Communist Party of Ukraine (renewed).[37] However, the Communist Party was not banned because it had filed an appeal against the Justice Ministry's decree on its activity termination.[37]

The party decided to take part in the October 2015 local elections as part of the umbrella party Left Opposition.[38] According to the Interior Ministry, this was legal as long as the new party did not use communist symbols.[38] Other party members took part in this election as Nova Derzhava.[13] The political party Nova Derzhava was established in 2012.[39] On 1 August, it elected a new leader Oleh Melnyk.[39] Formally along with the Communist Party, it is also a member of the Left Opposition Association.[39]

In late 2015, 19 local party leaders from the party's South and East Ukraine organisations resigned from the central committee to protest against repression of internal dissent they blamed on Symonenko.[13]

On 16 December, the District Administrative Court in Kiev satisfied the claim of the Ministry of Justice and banned the activities of the Communist Party.[10] This ban was criticised by John Dalhuisen of Amnesty International, who stated that the ban was "the same style of draconian measures used to stifle dissent” as used by the Soviet Union.[11] On 28 December 2015, the party appealed. On 25 January 2016, the Supreme Administrative Court of Ukraine denied the party in the consideration of the cassation of the (16 December 2015) ban.[40] The court suspended the appeal for the time being until the Constitutional Court determines the legitimacy of the law on decommunization.[41] This resulted in the court's decision to ban the Communist Party did not come into force. Nevertheless, the party appealed its ban at the European Court of Human Rights.[13] The April 2015 decommunization law does contains a norm that allows the Ministry of Justice to prohibit the Communist Party from participating in elections. The attempts to ban the party never did forbid individual members of the party to take part in elections as an independent candidate.[42]

In January 2017, the National Agency for Prevention of Corruption stated that since the Communist Party is not officially banned, it must report on its property and finances. Hence, the party still sends in its required financial reports and is still listed on the website of the Ministry of Justice and on the website of the Department of State Registration and Notary.[43] Due to the decommunization laws, the party changed its logo and the name that is since being written in a shortened version. In the summer of 2018, the parties website was closed by the police "due to the demonstration of communist symbols". According to party leader Symonenko, the reason for the website closure was a photo on the website of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine Volodymyr Shcherbytsky.

In February 2019, the Central Election Commission of Ukraine refused to register the candidacy of Symonenko for the 2019 Ukrainian presidential election due to the fact that the statute, name and symbolism of the Communist Party did not comply with the 2015 decommunization laws.

Unlawful activities and banning of the party

On 28 November 2006, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted the Law of Ukraine "About 1932–1933 Holodomor in Ukraine".[44] The first article of the document indicates "Holodomor is a genocide against the Ukrainian people".[44] The second article states that public denial of the crime is recognized as desecration of the memory of millions of victims, disparaging of Ukrainian people and is unlawful.[44] On 13 January 2010, the Kiev Appellate Court reviewed criminal case on the fact of committing a genocide (crime against humanity) and agree with the conclusions of the investigation that leadership of Bolshevik regime, including Joseph Stalin and others, had purposely created such living conditions designed to physically eliminate a part of Ukrainian national group.[45] The court found guilty Stalin and others in directly committing the crime.[45] Less than four months after the event, the Communist Party branch office in Zaporizhia Oblast established in Zaporizhia a monument of Stalin and triumphantly opened it involving press and the public on 5 May.[46] Such unprecedented decision led to the fact that during the opening of the monument from the heat fainted three people and one woman died.[46] During those tragic events that accompanied the opening of the monument, representatives of the Communist Party were hindering journalist activity and accompanying it with a foul language.[46]

No later than since 2006, the Communist Party office in Donetsk on regular basis provided material and logistical assistance to the separatist organization Donetsk Republic (banned in 2007) which with assistance of the Communist Party was spreading printed information materials of separatist orientation in authorship of the ideologist of Donetsk internationalism Dmitriy Kornilov[47] as well as by collecting signatures for "independence of Donbass" agitated for violation of territorial integrity of Ukraine through seceding several oblasts of Ukraine from Ukraine and uniting them into one quasi state formation based on Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia and Kherson "republics".[48] Even after the Donetsk Republic Party was banned for separatism on 6 November 2007 by the Donetsk district administrative court on the suit of the Chief Justice Administration of Donetsk Oblast based on materials of the Security Service of Ukraine,[49] the Donetsk branch of Communists did not cease to assists separatists with its tents and printing capabilities periodically conducting joint campaigns with them.[48]

Views of the party's ban legitimacy

According to a Kiev Polytechnic professor who published an article in The Guardian stating that after the 2014 Ukrainian revolution, the party came into conflict with the Ukrainian government due to prominent displays of support for ousted Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych during the Euromaidan protests and alleged involvement with the separatist movement in Eastern Ukraine as well as the party's pro-Russian government agenda.[13] However, the party did vote in favour of the impeachment of Yanukovych.[20] Two days after the Ukrainian parliament changed its regulations regarding the required size of parliamentary groups, the Communist Party faction was dissolved on 24 July 2014.[32]

According to political scientist Tadeusz A. Olszański, in the War in Donbass the party "effectively supports the separatist rebellion".[50]

Ideology

In its statute, the Communist Party claims that "on voluntary basis it unites citizens of Ukraine who are supporters of the Communist idea".[51] The party considers itself a successor of the Communist Party of Ukraine of the Soviet Union and calls itself a "battle detachment of RKP(b)VKP(b)KPSS".[51] The party claims that prohibition of that party in August 1991 was unlawful,[51] which was confirmed by the decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on 27 December 2001. The party sets itself in an opposition to any government and seeks a full restoration of the socialist state in the country without any particular association with any other political parties.[51]

Program

  • Political sphere: liquidation of presidency as an institution, strengthening of democratic measures of state and public life; electoral legislation reform ensuring a proper share of representation of workers, peasants, intelligentsia, women, youth in Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and local government; introduction of practice to recall deputies and judges who received vote of no confidence; election of judges of prime level; filling with real meaning and proper financial support regional and local government; introduction in the country a system of public control; creation of labor group councils vested with powers to monitor economic activity of businesses; suppression of corruption, organized crime, particularly in the upper echelon of power; elimination of benefits and privileges for officials; federalization of Ukraine; comprehensive development of Ukrainian language and culture, granting Russian language the status of state language; changing of Ukraine's state symbol, lyrics and music of the State anthem.
  • Economic policy: modernization and public control over economy, nationalization of strategic businesses; establishing a competitive state sector of economy, energy independence; reforms in Agro-Industrial Complex, Housing and Communal Services, etc.; prohibition of private property.
  • Social sphere: liquidation of poverty, social justice, system of progressive taxation and state price regulation, free medicine, secondary and tertiary education; full compensation of deposits in the Soviet Savings Bank.
  • Spiritual sphere: quality youth politics; preservation of historical and cultural heritage including Soviet; increased punishment for distribution of narcotics, human trafficking, prostitution, promotion of pornography, violence; combating immorality, vulgarity, cynicism, national chauvinism, xenophobia, falsification of history, fascism, neo-Nazism, anti-Communism, anti-Sovietism; banning of neo-Nazi organizations in Ukraine, criminal penalties for acts of fascism; freedom of worldview and expression of faith, secular state.
  • Foreign policy: non-aligned military status, independent foreign policy, active position on creation of a new European system of collective security, reform of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, review international agreements with WTO and IMF, membership and active position in the CIS, Customs Union and Eurasian Economic Community of the Russian Federation, Belarus and Kazakhstan.

Soviet legacy

The KPU was established as "the inheritor of the ideas and traditions of the KPU, as it existed until its banning in August 1991".[52] In general, the party has laid weight on nostalgia for the Soviet Union to gain votes.[52] In contrast to many parts of the former Soviet Union where leftist conservatives have tried to win votes by promoting local nationalism, the KPU supports a form of Soviet nationalism,[52] considering the establishment of an independent Ukraine as illegal.[53] The party has remained loyal to the legacy of the Soviet Union.[54] In 1998, to celebrate the would-be 80th anniversary of the Soviet Union it published Historical Thesis, a text which painted a rosy picture of the former state.[54] The Soviet Union is barely criticized and controversial events such as the Great Purge and Holodomor are not mentioned in the party press.[54] There are some who are favorable to Joseph Stalin's legacy, giving the impression that things "only began to go wrong with [Nikita] Khrushchev's 'adventurism'".[54] Despite all this, when the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) is criticized at all, the favored line is that the party and state lost their belief in key Leninist principles.[54] Vladimir Lenin, the founder of the Soviet Union, "is still considered sacrosanct" by the party and official pronouncements talk of the "Leninist Communist Party of Ukraine" and more precisely that the KPU continues "speaking in the words of Lenin".[54]

Symonenko has criticized the label of conservative on the KPU, stating that the party is not willing to abandon its own history.[54] He has referred to the dissolution of the Soviet Union as "the tragic events of the recent past".[54] Further, the KPU believes the Soviet Union "was criminally destroyed".[54] The party believes that Ukraine has been living off the legacy of the Soviet Union since its independence.[54] However, certain concessions to the present have been made and at the 2nd KPU Congress it was stated that "it would be utopian to try and revive a socio-economic system of different relations, which existed in different conditions, under different principles and different organizations of production and distribution, different social-class structures of society, a different level of consciousness".[55]

Marxism

The party adheres and believes in the Marxian concepts of class struggle and historical materialism.[55] Their ongoing belief in historical materialism cements their views that the socialist mode of production will still be the society of the future.[55] It could be said that the party believed stronger than ever in the possibility of a socialist future since the "careerists", symbolized by Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk, were gone.[55]

The KPU believes that since the West has developed into a post-industrial society, capitalism through globalization was actively "de-modernizing" Ukraine.[55] This was in their favor since de-modernization would lead to the reestablishment of a dominant proletarian class.[55] As Vasyl Tereshchuk, a former party theoretician expelled in 2005, noted: "People are surviving on what they accumulated in the years of Soviet power: that is, they are not yet a classic proletariat as they still have much to lose (a flat, a car, a dacha, etc.). But their full proletarianization will come sooner or later".[55] Secondly, the dissolution of the Soviet Union directly led to the reestablishment of class antagonism in society.[55] This antagonism led to the exploitation of the proletariat by "a comprador bourgeoisie [...] behind which stands world imperialism headed by the USA".[55] According to Symonenko, on this basis there was no chance for a social democratic movement ever to develop in Ukraine.[55] The "softening of class antagonism in the West" which had led to the establishment of social democratic parties "was only possible because the local working class, as part of the 'golden billion', lived 'as parasites on the labour of the countries of the world periphery' to which Ukraine was rapidly being consigned. Ukraine could not expect any 'lessening of class antagonism, only the reverse".[56] Symonenko appreciates the economical aid and partnership with China and calls to use Communist Party of China as the example, giving the country back to the working people, and "build our country into a strong country like China".[57][58]

Views on nationalism

At least in the beginning, the party is best described as Soviet nationalist (nationalist in the sense that they are nostalgic for the Soviet Union).[59] As Yurii Solomatin, a member of parliament, noted in 2000, "we are Soviet communists; we are Soviet people; we are Soviet patriots".[59] The party continues speaking about the existence of a "Soviet people" and "Soviet homeland" and at the beginning no concessions were given to local Ukrainian nationalism.[59] There has been no talk of establishing a national communism unique to Ukraine and the 1st KPU Congress even criticized the notion of establishing a unique "Ukrainian communism".[59] Instead, the KPU has opted promoting Ukraine as a "bi-cultural state".[59] At the 1st KPU Congress, Symonenko told the delegates that "'the interests, rights and specific traits of one nation above those of other nations and nationalities', and in which 'the Ukrainian language' should not be 'over'-privileged, but left alone to enjoy 'its natural development, purged of the imposed language of the diaspora. The Russian language, as the native language of half the population of Ukraine, [should be given] the status of a state language alongside Ukrainian".[60] Their views on nationalism is highly nostalgic. When the Union of Communist Parties – Communist Party of the Soviet Union (UCP–CPSU), a loose organization of post-Soviet parties was formed, it was met with open arms.[60] However, when the Communist Party of the Russian Federation proposed in 1995 to transform the organization into a modern-day Comintern, the KPU opposed because of their Soviet nationalist views.[61]

In recent years, their commitment to Soviet nationalism has been partially replaced with a vaguer East Slavic nationalism.[62] Wishing not to reestablish a union with Russia "'as a protectorate of the Russian bourgeoisie", "the Ukrainian Communists have rediscovered the natural link from Soviet to East Slavic or Eurasian nationalism in the supposed common 'economic civilization' and proclivity for collective labour of all the East Slavic peoples".[62] As noted in the party journal Communist, the "'Soviet man [...] did not emerge from nothing before him stood the courageous Slavic-Rusich, the labour-loving Ukrainian peasant, the self-sacrificing Cossack".[62] At the 4th KPU Congress, the party conceded that Ukraine would not join any particular union as long as it weakened the country's sovereignty.[63]

Because of these views, Symonenko has been referred to as a Ukrainophobe.[64] Symonenko made controversy in 2007 when he accused the Ukrainian nationalist figure Roman Shukhevych of collaborationism with the Nazi Germany, for which the Pechersk District Court of Kiev city declared Symonenko's statement as false and obligated Symonenko publicly to disprove the "myth" and pay all court fees.[65] However, these views are commonplace amongst Western historians, linking Shukhevych to the Nachtigall Battalion.[66]

In 2007 and 2012, the electorate of the party was estimated to be very loyal to the party.[67]

Presidential elections

Presidency of Ukraine
Election year Candidate First round Second round
No. of
overall votes
% of
overall vote
No. of
overall votes
% of
overall vote
1994 Oleksandr Moroz (endorsed by the CPU) 3,466,541 13.3
1999 Petro Symonenko 5,849,077 23.1 10,665,420 38.8
2004 Petro Symonenko 1,396,135 5.0
2010 Petro Symonenko 872,877 3.5
2014 Petro Symonenko 272,723 1.5
2019 Petro Symonenko Registration denied

In 1994, the party was part of the Coalition of Left Parties that supported the Socialist Party candidate Oleksandr Moroz.

In the 2014 Ukrainian presidential election, Symonenko initially again ran as a candidate of his party, but he withdrew from the race on 16 May.[68] The Central Election Commission was unable to remove from the ballot his name because he withdrew from the race after the deadline of 1 May 2014.[69] In the election, he still received 1.51% of the vote.[70]

The Central Election Commission prohibited the candidacy of Symonenko for the 2019 Ukrainian presidential election due to the fact that the statute, name and symbolism of his party, the Communist Party did not comply with 2015 decommunization laws.[12]

Parliamentary elections

In the parliamentary election on 29 March 1998, the party gained 24.65%[71] of the vote and 123 seats, becoming the largest party in Parliament.

The first ten members on the party list were Petro Symonenko (MP), Omelian Parubok (MP), Anatoliy Nalyvaiko (tunneler of the Karl Marks Mine (Yenakieve)), Borys Oliynyk (MP), Valeria Zaklunna-Myronenko (actress of the Lesya Ukrainka Theater (Kiev)), Adam Martynyuk (the 2nd secretary of the Central Committee of CPU), Anatoliy Draholyuntsev (mechanic-electrician at Luhanskteplovoz), Vasyl Sirenko (Koretsky Institute of State and Law (NANU), unaffiliated), Borys Molchanov (tool craftsman at Dniproshyna) and Anatoliy Strohov (pensioner).

At the parliamentary election on 30 March 2002, the party won 19.98%[71] of the popular vote and 66 out of 450 seats in the Verkhovna Rada. The first ten members on the party list were Petro Symonenko (MP), Omelian Parubok (MP), Ivan Herasymov (Head of the Veterans of Ukraine Organization, unaffiliated), Borys Oliynyk (MP), Valeria Zaklunna-Myronenko (MP), Adam Martynyuk (MP), Stanislav Hurenko (MP), Oleksandr Tkachenko (MP), Anatoliy Nalyvaiko (MP) and Oleh Blokhin (MP, unaffiliated).

Since then, the party lost much support, particularly after the Orange Revolution. In the 2006 parliamentary election, the party won 3.66% and 21 seats.[71] The first ten members on the party list were Petro Symonenko (MP), Adam Martynyuk (MP), Ivan Herasymov (MP), Kateryna Samoilyk (MP), Omelian Parubok (MP), Valeria Zaklunna-Myronenko (MP), Oleksandr Holub (MP), Valentyn Matvyeyev (MP), Oleksandr Tkachenko (MP) and Petro Tsybenko (MP).

In the parliamentary election on 30 September 2007, the party won 5.39%[71] of the popular vote and 27 out of 450 seats. The first ten members on the party list were Petro Symonenko (MP), Yevhen Volynets (tunneler of the Vasily Chapayev Mine (Shakhtarsk)), Maryna Perestenko (Head of the Mars farm (Simferopol Raion)), Ivan Herasymov (MP), Yuriy Haidayev (Minister of Healthcare, unaffiliated), Adam Martynyuk (1st deputy Chairman of parliament), Valeriy Bevz (Deputy Minister of Emergencies), Oleksandr Tkachenko (MP), Oleksandr Holub (MP) and Ihor Aleksyeyev (MP). The party participated in the 2010 presidential election as part of the Election bloc of left and central left political forces.[72]

In the 2010 local elections, the party scored between 5% and 12% of the votes in all Ukrainian Oblasts, except in Western Ukraine and Kiev Oblast, where they almost had no voters.[73]

In the 2012 Ukrainian parliamentary election, the party won 13.18% of the national votes and no constituencies (it had competed in 220 of the 225 constituencies)[74] and thus 32 seats.[75] The party did win about one and a half million more votes compared with the results of the previous election.[76] Independent candidate Oksana Kaletnyk joined the Communist parliamentary faction on 12 December 2012.[77] Importance of Kaletnyk joining the Communists was due to parliamentary regulations on obtaining its own parliamentary factions which required to have at least one deputy who came to parliament by winning a constituency.[78] Oleh Tyahnybok tried to challenge the creation of Communist faction, but on 30 January 2013 the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine declined his petition.[79] Kaletnyk left the faction (at her own request) on 29 May 2014.[80] The first ten members on the party list were Petro Symonenko (MP), Petro Tsybenko (MP), Iryna Spirina (Head of Psychiatric Department (Dnipropetrovsk Medical Academy)), Spiridon Kilinkarov (MP), Oleksandr Prysyazhnyuk (unemployed), Ihor Aleksyeyev (MP), Ihor Kalyetnik (Head of the State Customs Service of Ukraine), Adam Martynyuk (1st deputy Chairman of parliament), Valentyn Matvyeyev (MP) and Yevhen Marmazov (MP).

The first ten members on the party list for the 2014 Ukrainian parliamentary election are Petro Symonenko (MP), Adam Martynyuk (MP), Kateryna Samoylyk (senior), Vasyl Sirenko (Koretsky Institute of State and Law, non-partisan), Petro Tsybenko (MP), Ihor Aleksyeyev (MP), Serhiy Hordiyenko (MP), Yevhen Marmazov (MP), Spiridon Kilinkarov (MP) and Serhiy Khrapov (unemployed).

In June 2019 the Central Election refused party members to register for the July 2019 Ukrainian parliamentary election.

Verkhovna Rada
Year
Party-list
Constituency/total
Overall seats won
Seat change
Government
Popular vote
%
Seats/total
1994 3,683,332 13.6% 86/450
86 / 450
86 Government
1998 6,550,353 25.4% 84/225 27/225
121 / 450
35 Minority support
2002 5,178,074 20.8% 59/225 7/225
66 / 450
55 Opposition
2006 929,591 3.7% 21/450 N/A
21 / 450
45 Coalition government
2007 1,257,291 5.4% 27/450 N/A
27 / 450
6 Opposition
2012 2,687,246 13.2% 32/225 –/225
32 / 450
5 Minority support
2014 608,756 3.87% –/225 –/198
0 / 450
32 Extra-parliamentary
2019 Registration denied -/225 -/198
0 / 450
Extra-parliamentary

Ministerial appointments

Splinter parties

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See also

Notes

    References

    1. Official website. Komunist newspaper.
    2. Nordsieck, Wolfram (2014). "Ukraine". Parties and Elections in Europe. Archived from the original on 12 June 2018. Retrieved 6 September 2018.
    3. "Populism in Ukraine in a Comparative European Context (in English)" (PDF). Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 57, no. 6, pp. 3-18. November–December 2010. Retrieved 29 November 2013.
    4. Ukrainian Communist leader Symonenko not planning to leave country, Interfax-Ukraine (29 October 2014)
      Ukraine’s Elections Mark a Historic Break With Russia and Its Soviet Past, Time magazine (October 27, 2014)
    5. General official results of Rada election, Interfax-Ukraine (11 November 2014)
      Central Election Commission announces official results of Rada election on party tickets, Interfax-Ukraine (11 November 2014)
    6. "Ukraine Communists deny financing terrorism, accuse Security Service chief of lying". Kyiv Post. Retrieved 26 August 2014.
    7. "Ukraine bans Soviet symbols and criminalises sympathy for communism". The Guardian. May 21, 2015. Retrieved June 30, 2015.
    8. Ukraine's Justice Ministry outlaws Communists from elections, Kyiv Post (24 July 2015).
    9. Justice Ministry bans three communist parties from taking part in election process as they violate Ukrainian law - minister, Interfax-Ukraine (24 July 2015)
    10. Court rules complete ban of Communist Party of Ukraine
    11. Ukraine bans Communist party for 'promoting separatism'
    12. (in Ukrainian) The CEC refused to register nearly fifty presidential candidates, Ukrayinska Pravda (8 February 2019)
    13. (in Ukrainian) European Court began reviewing complaints about the ban of the Communist Party, Ukrayinska Pravda, (30 December 2016)
      Kiev has a nasty case of anti-communist hysteri
      Ukraine court bans Communist Party, Daily News and Analysis (17 Dec 2015)
    14. Bozoki & Ishiyama 2002, p. 401.
    15. Bozoki & Ishiyama 2002, p. 402.
    16. Bozoki & Ishiyama 2002, pp. 403–404.
    17. Ukraine Bars Communists From Elections, Radio Free Europe (24 July 2015)
    18. "гøåííÿ Êîñòèòóö³éíîãî Ñóäó Óêðà¿íè ó ñïðàâ³ çà... - â³ä 27.12.2001 ¹ 20-ðï/2001 (Ñòîð³íêà 1 ç 2)". Retrieved 16 February 2015.
    19. "Обращение_к_иностранным_партиям_2_(eng.).pdf". Google Docs. Retrieved 16 February 2015.
    20. Parliamentary vote on the draft resolution on the withdrawal of President of Ukraine to fulfill constitutional powers (number 4193) - as a basis and as a whole Archived March 12, 2014, at the Wayback Machine, Verkhovna Rada
    21. "Turchynov asks Justice Ministry to ban Communist Party of Ukraine". Interfax-Ukraine. Retrieved 16 February 2015.
    22. "Ukrainian Communists outraged by Rada majority's decision to expel faction from session hall". Kyiv Post. 6 May 2014. Retrieved 7 May 2014.
    23. "Turchynov Calls Justice Ministry Apply Court For Prohibition Of Communist Party If Their Collaboration With Separatists Proved". Ukrainian News. 13 May 2014. Archived from the original on 26 July 2014. Retrieved 14 May 2014.
    24. Justice Ministry launches process to ban Communist Party of Ukraine, Interfax-Ukraine (8 July 2014)
    25. "Ukraine: No more war, no more fascism". Archived from the original on 26 July 2014. Retrieved 16 February 2015.
    26. "Ukrainian democracy under threat as interim government moves to ban Communist party". Archived from the original on 28 July 2014. Retrieved 16 February 2015.
    27. Communist Party Ousted From Ukraine Parliament, The Moscow Times (23 July 2014)
    28. "RMT union denounces Western support for Kiev – supports antifascist resistance - Solidarity with the Antifascist Resistance in Ukraine". Solidarity with the Antifascist Resistance in Ukraine. 2014-09-10. Retrieved 16 February 2015.
    29. Andre Fomine, Ukraine's Opposition leader Petro Simonenko roughed up by Svoboda ultranationalists, retrieved 2018-12-17
    30. Six MPs leave Communist Party faction in Ukraine's parliament, Interfax-Ukraine (1 July 2014)
    31. (in Ukrainian) Dynamics in the fraction of the in the Communist Party of Ukraine in the VII convocation, Verkhovna Rada
    32. Turchynov dissolves Ukrainian Communist Party faction in parliament, Interfax-Ukraine (24 July 2014)
    33. "22.07.2014 Верховная Рада проголосовала за запрет Компартии Украины". YouTube. 22 July 2014. Retrieved 16 February 2015.
    34. (in Ukrainian) Against the Communists opened 308 criminal proceedings, Ukrayinska Pravda (24 July 2014)
    35. SBU chief: Communist Party ban important for national security, Interfax-Ukraine (10 November 2014)
    36. (in Ukrainian) Communist Party of Ukraine goes to elections to Parliament, the electoral list headed Symonenko, Interfax-Ukraine (29 August 2014)
    37. (in Ukrainian) The court banned the two Communist parties, Ukrayinska Pravda (1 October 2015)
      Kyiv’s Court terminates two Communist parties, Ukrinform (1 October 2015)
    38. (in Russian) The communists go to the polls in the "Left Opposition" - the leader of the Communist Party, RIA Novosti Ukraine (13 August 2015)
    39. Symonenko invented how to squeeze into the local elections (Симоненко придумал, как протиснуться на местные выборы). Ukrayinska Pravda. 25 September 2015
    40. Ban of Communist Party final: Ukraine’s Supreme Administrative Court, UNIAN (25.01.2016)
    41. (in Ukrainian) From Frank to Kiwis: who are the Ukrainian socialists, Hromadske.TV (May 1, 2018)
    42. (in Ukrainian) Довибори до ВР: У Дніпрі 51 кандидат, є представник КПУ (By-election to the Verkhovna Rada: in Dnipro 51, a candidate is a representative of the Communist Party), Ukrayinska Pravda, 19 June 2016.
    43. (in Ukrainian) Life after death. Who and why woke the Party of Regions?, Glavcom (6 December 2017)
    44. Law of Ukraine. "About 1932-1933 Holodomor in Ukraine". Verkhovna Rada website.
    45. Resolution of the Kiev Appellate Court on the fact of committing a genocide in Ukraine in 1932-1933. Security Service of Ukraine website.
    46. Communists about the dead woman: She died of worthy death in front of Stalin (Коммунисты об умершей женщине: Она умерла достойной смертью, перед Сталиным). Korrespondent.net. 5 May 2010.
    47. Donetsk authorities openly support separatism and Slavic fascism (Власти Донецка открыто поддерживают сепаратизм и славяно-фашизм). Novosti Donbassa. 15 November 2006
    48. In Donetsk collecting signatures to secede from Ukraine (В ДОНЕЦКЕ СОБИРАЮТ ПОДПИСИ ЗА ОТДЕЛЕНИЕ ОТ УКРАИНЫ). Zadonbass.
    49. The banned Donetsk Republic claims that Yushchenko is preparing invasion of Kuban (Запрещённая "Донецкая республика" заявляет, что Ющенко готовит вторжение на Кубань). Newsru. 23 October 2009
    50. Olszański, Tadeusz A. (17 September 2014), Ukraine's political parties at the start of the election campaign, OSW—Centre for Eastern Studies
    51. Party program. Communist Party of Ukraine official website.
    52. Wilson 2002, p. 30.
    53. Wilson 2002, p. 29.
    54. Wilson 2002, p. 31.
    55. Wilson 2002, p. 32.
    56. Wilson 2002, pp. 32–33.
    57. 刘洋. "乌克兰共产党领袖称乌应以中国为榜样". Retrieved 16 February 2015.
    58. "彻底被震撼:乌克兰共产党领袖竟如此大赞中国!(图)". Archived from the original on 6 May 2015. Retrieved 16 February 2015.
    59. Wilson 2002, p. 33.
    60. Wilson 2002, p. 34.
    61. Wilson 2002, pp. 34–35.
    62. Wilson 2002, p. 35.
    63. Wilson 2002, p. 45.
    64. Lesiv, K; Yaschenko, A; Mishchenko, M (23 August 2011). "Експерти визначили найбільш активних українофобів часів Незалежності" [Experts defined the most active Ukrainophobes in times of the independence]. Ukrainian Independent Information Agency. Retrieved 22 February 2014.
    65. "Син Шухевича нагадав Литвину, що Симоненко має вибачитися за брехню про Гітлера" [Son of Shukhevych reminded Lytvyn that Symonenko has to apologize for the lie about Hitler]. Ukrayinska Pravda. 18 February 2011. Retrieved 12 February 2014.
    66. "Die Kollaboration in der Ukraine", Christoph Dieckmann, Babette Quinkert, Tatjana Tönsmeyer (eds.), Kooperation und Verbrechen. Formen der “Kollaboration“ im östlichen Europa 1939-1945 (Göttingen: Wallenstein, 2003), p. 176
      Ruth Wodak; John E. Richardson, eds. (2013). Analysing Fascist Discourse: European Fascism in Talk and Text (Volume 5 of Routledge critical studies in discourse ed.). Routledge. p. 235. ISBN 9780415899192.
      Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2008 Vol.1. US Government Printing Office. p. 1777. ISBN 9780160875151.
      Andrea Mammone; Emmanuel Godin; Brian Jenkins, eds. (2012). Mapping the Extreme Right in Contemporary Europe: From Local to Transnational. Routledge. pp. 189–201. ISBN 9781136330384.
      Payne, Steven (2013). Perpetrators, Accomplices and Victims. Routledge. p. 259. ISBN 9781317989974.
      Tottle, D (1987). Fraud, Famine and Fascism: The Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard. Progress. p. 103. ISBN 978-0919396517.
      Poliszczuk, Wiktor (1999). Bitter truth: the criminality of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) : the testimony of a Ukrainian. University of Michigan Press. p. 148. ISBN 9780969944492.
    67. Eight Reasons Why Ukraine’s Party of Regions Will Win the 2012 Elections by Taras Kuzio, The Jamestown Foundation (17 October 2012)
      UKRAINE: Yushchenko needs Tymoshenko as ally again Archived 2013-05-15 at the Wayback Machine by Taras Kuzio, Oxford Analytica (5 October 2007)
    68. Communist leader Symonenko withdraws his candidacy from presidential race, Kyiv Post (16 May 2014)
    69. (in Ukrainian) Simonenko left the ballot, Ukrayinska Pravda (17 May 2014)
    70. "Poroshenko wins presidential election with 54.7% of vote - CEC". Radio Ukraine International. 29 May 2014. Archived from the original on 2014-05-29.
      (in Russian) Results election of Ukrainian president, Телеграф (29 May 2014)
    71. (in Ukrainian) Комуністична партія України, Database DATA
    72. Bloc of left and center-left forces to nominate CPU Leader for Ukraine's president Archived 2012-03-14 at the Wayback Machine, Interfax-Ukraine (3 October 2009)
    73. (in Ukrainian) Results of the elections, preliminary data, on interactive maps by Ukrayinska Pravda (8 November 2010)
    74. (in Ukrainian) Candidates, RBC Ukraine
    75. (in Ukrainian) Proportional votes Archived October 30, 2012, at the Wayback Machine & Constituency seats Archived November 5, 2012, at the Wayback Machine, Central Election Commission of Ukraine
    76. After the parliamentary elections in Ukraine: a tough victory for the Party of Regions, Centre for Eastern Studies (7 November 2012)
    77. (in Ukrainian) Калетнік прийшла до комуністів, оскільки не хоче бути "інгредієнтом" Kaletnik came to the Communists because they do not want to be "ingredient", Ukrayinska Pravda (12 December 2012)
    78. Leshchenko, S. Political circus: "button-pressers" were caught on their habits. Ukrayinska Pravda. 22 November 2012
    79. The last revolution for Symonenko. Will the Communist Party survive strike in the back? Frankivchanyn. 23 May 2014
    80. Oksana Kaletnyk leaves Communist Party faction in parliament, Interfax-Ukraine (29 May 2014)

    Bibliography

    Articles and journal entries
    Books
    • Bozoki, Andras; Ishiyama, John T. (2002). The Communist Successor Parties of Central and Eastern Europe. M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 978-0765609861.
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