Investor-state dispute settlement

Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) or investment court system (ICS) is a system through which investors can sue countries for discriminatory practices. ISDS is an instrument of public international law, and it contains a number of bilateral investment treaties, in certain international trade treaties, such as the USMCA. A version of it also appeared in the older NAFTA (chapter 11), and the CPTPP (through incorporation of TPP chapter 9) and CETA (sections 3 and 4) agreements. ISDS is also found in international investment agreements, such as the Energy Charter Treaty. If an investor from one country (the "home state") invests in another country (the "host state"), both of which have agreed to ISDS, and the host state violates the rights granted to the investor under the treaty, then that investor may bring the matter before an arbitral tribunal.

"ISDS" redirects here. For other uses, see ISDS (disambiguation).

While ISDS is often associated with international arbitration under the rules of ICSID (the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes of the World Bank), it often takes place under international arbitral tribunals governed by different rules or institutions, such as the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIA), or the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.

Foreign investment protection

Historical development

Under customary international law, an investor state can vindicate injury caused by the host state by exercising diplomatic protection, which may include retorsion and/or reprisals. In addition to diplomatic protection, states can and do establish ad hoc commissions and arbitral tribunals to adjudicate claims involving treatment of foreign nationals and their property by the host state ("state-state-dispute-settlement", SSDS), which can help avoid coercive resolutions. Notable examples of this practice are the Jay Treaty commissions, the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal and the American-Mexican Claims Commission.[1] However, these treaties were limited to the treatment of foreign investors during a past period of time, whereas modern ISDS allows investors to make claims against states in general and on a prospective basis.

Modern practice

Currently, the legal protection of Foreign Direct Investment under public international law is guaranteed by a network of more than 2,750 bilateral investment treaties (BITs), Multilateral Investment Treaties, most notably the Energy Charter Treaty and number of Free Trade Agreements such as NAFTA containing a chapter on investment protection. Most of these treaties were signed in the late 1980s and early 1990s before the current explosion of investor claims under the treaties began in the late 1990s.

The majority of the treaties provides foreign investors with substantive legal protection (including the right to "fair and equitable treatment", "full protection and security", "free transfer of means" and the right not to be directly or indirectly expropriated without full compensation) and access to ISDS for redress against host states for breaches of such protection. Some of these standards are framed in vague terms, given extensive discretion to arbitrators in their interpretation and application. The overall number of known cases reached over 500 in 2012. Of these, 244 were concluded, of which approximately 42% were decided in favor of the host state and approximately 31% in favor of the investor. Approximately 27% of the cases were settled out of court.[2]

Chapter 11 of NAFTA includes an Investor-State provision.

Notably, only foreign investors can sue states under investment treaties, because states are the parties to the treaty, and only states can be held liable to pay damages for breach of the treaty. States have no corresponding right to bring an original claim against a foreign investor under the treaties, again because investors are not parties to the treaty and therefore cannot be in breach of it. Thus, a decision in favor of the state means that the state has not been ordered to pay compensation, not that it received any compensation from the investor (although costs can be awarded against the investor). A state cannot "win" in ISDS in the manner of a foreign investor - a state which wishes to sue a foreign investor does so through its own domestic courts, without the need for a treaty.

ISDS cannot overturn local laws (unlike the World Trade Organization) which violate trade agreements,[3][4] but can grant monetary damages to investors adversely affected by such laws.[5] According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, ISDS requires specific treaty violations and does not allow corporations to sue solely for "lost profits".[6] However, violations may be difficult to foresee, and the threat of exorbitant fines may cause a chilling effect which halts regulation or legislation in the public interest (e.g. human health and environmental protection).[7] Critics also state that treaties are written so that any legislation causing lost profits is by definition a treaty violation, rendering the argument null that only treaty violations are subject to ISDS.[7]

NAFTA Chapter 11
Main article: North American Free Trade Agreement

A notable example of ISDS, which has been in existence for two decades now, is Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA Chapter 11 allows investors of one NAFTA party (Canada, United States or Mexico) to bring claims directly against the government of another NAFTA party before an international arbitral tribunal. Because NAFTA Article 1121 waives the 'local remedies' rule, investors are not required to exhaust local remedies before filing Chapter 11 claims. While this fact has been amply criticized in public, proponents of ISDS point out that speedy dispute resolution through ISDS is critical in modern economic environments and would be defeated by adding several steps of local remedies. On the other hand, there is no other situation in international law where a private party can sue a state without showing that the state's domestic courts are not independent or reliable. The removal of the customary duty to exhaust local remedies, where reasonably available, may have been a factor in the explosion of investment treaty claims since the late 1990s, although a more obvious explanation is the explosion in the number of bilateral free trade agreements since the breakdown of the multilateral WTO Doha round in the mid-2000s.

Investors may initiate an arbitration against the NAFTA Party under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL Rules") or under the Rules of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID Rules"). NAFTA Chapter 11 was the first instance of an ISDS provision receiving widespread public attention, especially in the United States in the wake of the Methanex case.[8]

TTIP

Resistance from the EU side to the US proposal to include an ISDS clause in the draft Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership treaty was such as to cause this element to be abandoned in September 2015. In its place, the European Commission proposed an investment court system (ICS).[9][10][11] Not long afterwards, ICS was declared illegal by the German Association of Magistrates,[12] though the Commission dismissed the magistrates' judgement as based on a misunderstanding.[13] For its part, the United States wants ISDS reinstated.[13]

According to a 2019 study, opposition to ISDS is the single most important factor motivating opposition to TTIP among Germans.[14]

Debates and criticism
If you wanted to convince the public that international trade agreements are a way to let multinational companies get rich at the expense of ordinary people, this is what you would do: give foreign firms a special right to apply to a secretive tribunal of highly paid corporate lawyers for compensation whenever a government passes a law to, say, discourage smoking, protect the environment or prevent a nuclear catastrophe. Yet that is precisely what thousands of trade and investment treaties over the past half century have done, through a process known as 'investor-state dispute settlement', or ISDS.[15]

—The Economist, October 2014

Regulatory capacity

Much debate and criticism[16][17] has arisen concerning the impact of ISDS on the capacity of governments to implement reforms and legislative programs related to public health, environmental protection, and human rights.[18]

Opponents argue that ISDS threatens Democracy and the Rule of Law[19], in part because investor state claims (or the threat of them) inhibit the ability of domestic governments to pass legislation addressing perfectly legitimate public concerns, such as health and environmental protection, labor rights or human rights.[20][21][22][23][24]

Proponents of ISDS argue that governments retain their regulatory ability if the agreements in question specify that regulations protecting health, the environment, labor rights, and human rights are allowed. The Office of the United States Trade Representative challenges the notion that ISDS challenges "the sovereign ability of governments impose any measure they wish to protect labor rights, the environment, or other issues of public welfare".[6] The International Bar Association (IBA) mirrors these sentiments, noting that "while investment treaties limit states’ ability to inflict arbitrary or discriminatory treatment, they do not limit (and, in fact, expressly safeguard) a state’s sovereign right to regulate in the public interest in a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory manner."[4] The White House notes that investment protections are a component of more than 3,000 trade agreements, the vast majority of which have some form of neutral arbitration.[25] The United States is party to at least 50 such agreements, has only faced 13 ISDS cases and never lost an ISDS case.[25]

In a February 2016 op-ed against the TPP, Senator Elizabeth Warren used the example of a French company suing Egypt because Egypt raised its minimum wage as an argument against the ISDS provisions of the TPP.[24] The editorial board of The Washington Post has, however, challenged this characterization of the case, noting that "Veolia of France, a waste management company, invoked ISDS to enforce a contract with the government of Alexandria, Egypt, that it says required compensation if costs increased; the company maintains that the wage increases triggered this provision. The case — which would result, at most, in a monetary award to Veolia, not the overthrow of the minimum wage — remains in litigation."[26]

According to the International Bar Association (IBA), states have won a higher percentage of ISDS cases than investors, and that around one-third of all cases end in settlement.[4] Claimant investors, when successful, recover on average less than half of the amounts claimed.[4] IBA notes that "only 8 per cent of ISDS proceedings are commenced by very large multinational corporations."[4] IBA challenges the notion that ISDS is biased against developing countries, noting that there is "no correlation between the success rates of claims against states and their income levels or development status."[4] IBA notes that ISDS is necessary even in countries with sophisticated domestic legal systems because those domestic courts rule according to domestic laws, not international law.[4] IBA notes that "increasingly, awards require the losing party to pay arbitration costs and legal fees to the winning party", which deters investors from initiating unmeritorious cases.[4]

A 2017 study found that the success rate of investors in investor-state disputes has sharply fallen over time because most legal challenges today seek compensation for regulation implemented by democracies, not expropriation by non-democracies.[27] The author of the study argues that the likely goal of investors is not to obtain compensation through ISDS, but to impose costs on governments contemplating regulations and therefore deter the regulatory ambitions of governments.[27]

Economic impact

The Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) claims that ISDS provisions are necessary, as they boost investment: "empirical evidence has shown that treaties including these provisions have a positive effect on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows between signatory countries.".[28] On the other hand, Hallward-Driemeier (2003) [29] analyzed the impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and, after conducting several tests with different dependent variables – absolute amount of FDI, the ratio of FDI to host country’s GDP and the share of host country’s FDI in total FDI outflows of a home country – concluded that BITs do not serve to attract additional FDI. Additionally, Emma Aisbett (2007) [30] found "no evidence for the claim that BITs signal a safe investment climate". Yackee[31] also concluded that "the apparently positive effect of BITs on FDI largely (and in some cases entirely) falls from significance", which is consistent with the empirical findings that "potential investors seem to have little awareness or appreciation of specific BITs".

The impact of FDI on the GDP of developing economies is, itself, a matter of research. While some research (Olofsdotter, 1998; Reisen and Soto, 2001) finds a positive impact on developing countries, other authors (Mencinger, 2003; Carkovic and Levine, 2005; Johnson, 2006; Türkcan, Duman, and Yetkiner, 2008; Herzer, 2012) find a negative impact, and some (De Mello, 1999) find the data to be inconclusive. A fourth conclusion was proposed by others (Alfaro et al., 2004; Li and Liu, 2005; Batten and Vo, 2009): FDI may have a positive or negative impact on the GDP of developing economies depending on the existence of adequate policies to "filter" speculative or predatory investment. Thus, opponents of ISDS warn that these systems may harm the government's ability to filter FDI more favorable to development, and therefore harm GDP[32]. The Cato institute warns[33] that the creation of a two-tier justice system, by which foreign investors are subject to a set of rules different from domestic investors, apart from being contrary to the principle of the Rule of Law, is itself a market distortion prone to inefficiencies that are bound to harm GDP.

Finally, opponents of ISDS also argue[34] that these systems increase inequalities, harm public services, threaten labor and consumer protections, threaten financial stability and the environment, all of which have perilous economic consequences.

Conflicts of Interests

PIIE challenges the claim that ISDS "arbitrators lack integrity", noting that arbitrators take an oath of impartiality and both sides of a case choose arbitrators.[3]

Opponents of ISDS argue that, although the system lacks safeguards regarding individual abuse[35], the most important problem is systemic.[36] Opponents of ISDS note that arbitrators are paid on a case-by-case basis, and therefore they are personally benefited with an increase in claims. Because governments may not use the ISDS system to sue investors, if arbitrators have any bias toward companies of investors, they will encourage further claims and be personally benefited by that increase. The vague terms of most BITs ease this kind of "drift" on the interpretation of treaties by arbitrators[37]. This drift, fueled by the conflict of interest in the core of the system (that need not assume any lack of integrity on a personal level on the arbitrators side, but solely the cognitive difficulty in overcoming a bias when one's personal interest is at stake) may help explain the explosive growth on the number of known ISDS cases in the last few decades.[38]

Transparency

Opponents of ISDS argue that arbitrations are sometimes carried out in secret by trade lawyers who do not enjoy the typical safeguards of judicial independence and procedural fairness, who earn income only if a case is brought and proceeds, and who are not accountable to the public or required to take into account broader constitutional and international law human rights norms.[39] The Peterson Institute for International Economics agrees "that secrecy has gone too far" in many ISDS cases, but notes that agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership did ensure greater transparency in ISDS.[3] Proponents of ISDS point out that confidentiality is a standard feature of all arbitration and one that enables a constructive, de-politicized and fact-oriented atmosphere of dispute resolution. On the other hand, such traditional confidentiality is limited to disputes that affect the parties in question and not the broader public. Also, most ICSID awards, although confidential, are de facto published by consent of the parties. However, many awards under other arbitration rules are not public and, in the case of investor-arbitration at the International Chamber of Commerce, there is a requirement for blanket confidentiality for all aspects of a case.

It is further pointed out that judges are not elected in most countries outside the US, so that "public accountability of judges" may not be considered a standard of public international law. In any event, they say, the qualification of ISDS arbitrators matches or exceeds the qualification of most court judges. In response, critics make the point that any judge, whether domestic or international, who is part of a legal system not shown to be systematically biased or unreliable, has a greater claim to independence than an arbitrator because they are insulated from conflicts of interest that arise when arbitrators work on the side as lawyers, and is assigned cases in an objective manner rather than by the discretion of a disputing party or an executive official. Arbitrators are appointed by both parties at dispute, so such conflicts of interest may arise on both sides.

While ISDS has traditionally been confidential as any other arbitration, the general trend in the last decade has been to allow for more openness and transparency. On the other hand, there is still widespread confidentiality in the system.

Under Art. 29 of the U.S. Model-BIT of 2004, all documents pertaining to ISDS have to be made public and amicus curiae briefs are allowed. However, no investment treaty allows other parties who have an interest in the dispute, other than the claimant investor and respondent government, to obtain standing in the adjudicative process.

Under the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership, the tribunals shall, subject to the consent of the disputing parties, conduct hearings open to the public. The tribunal will make available to the public documents relating to the dispute such as the notice of intent, the notice of arbitration, pleadings, memorials, minutes or transcripts of the hearings of the tribunal, where available; orders, awards and decisions of the tribunal. In addition, third parties can and increasingly do participate in investor-state arbitration by submitting amicus curiae petitions.[40]

The World Bank's International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) is required by ICSID Administrative and Financial Regulation 22 to make public, information on the registration of all requests for arbitration and to indicate in due course the date and method of the termination of each proceeding. It also publishes the vast majority of awards with the consent of the parties. If the parties do not consent, ICSID publishes excerpts showing the tribunal's reasoning.[41] The ICSID website has published awards for most completed arbitrations,[42] and decisions in investor-state arbitrations outside of ICSID are also publicly available online.

On 1 April 2014, the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration entered into force.[43] Article 3 foresees a general duty to publish all documents pertaining to an ISDS-procedure under UNCITRAL Rules, where the treaty establishing the ISDS-mechanism has been concluded after 1 April 2014 or where the parties so consent, subject to certain overwhelming confidentiality interests listed in Article 7. Original proposals to make all UNCITRAL arbitration under investment treaties public were not adopted after opposition by some states and by representatives of the arbitration industry who participated in the UNCITRAL working group negotiations as state representatives.

On 17 March 2015, the United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration ('Mauritius Convention') was opened for signatures in Port Louis, Mauritius.[44] The Mauritius Convention will render the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor State Arbitration also applicable to disputes arising out of investment treaties that were concluded prior to 1 April 2014 if both parties to the investment treaty are also party to the Mauritius Convention.[45] The Convention has not yet entered into force since the three required ratifications have not yet been submitted.[46] 10 States have signed the Mauritius Convention so far.[46]

Tribunals

Investment disputes can be initiated by corporations and natural persons and in almost all cases, investment tribunals are composed of three arbitrators (unless otherwise agreed by the parties). As in most arbitrations, one is appointed by the investor, one by the state, and the third is usually chosen by agreement between the parties or their appointed arbitrators or selected by the appointing authority, depending on the procedural rules applicable to the dispute. If the parties do not agree who to appoint, this power is assigned to executive officials usually at the World Bank, the International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, or a private chamber of commerce.

Other individuals cannot initiate a claim against a state under an investment treaty. Also, no individual or state can initiate a claim against a foreign investor under an investment treaty. This has led to criticisms that investor-state arbitration is not balanced and that it favours the "haves" over the "have nots" by giving foreign investors, especially major companies, access to a special tribunal outside any court. While the arbitration process itself does not provide explicitly privileged access for larger investors over individuals or SMEs, the costs of ISDS, as in any court or arbitration system, tend to be off-putting for smaller claimants.

Examples

According to a 2011 paper, "In terms of wins and losses, [the] U.S. has never lost a case as the respondent country. U.S. investors have won 15 cases, lost 22 cases and settled 14 cases. In terms of performance with respect to developing countries, U.S. investors have won 14 cases and lost 17."[47]

Cases lost by government
S.D. Myers v. Canada
Between 1995 and 1997 the Canadian government banned the export of toxic PCB waste, in order to comply with its obligations under the Basel Convention, of which the United States is not a party. Waste treatment company S.D. Myers then sued the Canadian government under NAFTA Chapter 11 for $20 million in damages. The claim was upheld by a NAFTA Tribunal in 2000.[48][49]
Occidental v. Ecuador
In October 2012, an ICSID tribunal awarded a judgment of $1.8 billion for Occidental Petroleum against the government of Ecuador.[50] Additionally, Ecuador had to pay $589 million in backdated compound interest and half of the costs of the tribunal, making its total penalty around $2.4 billion.[50] The South American country annulled a contract with the oil firm on the grounds that it violated a clause that the company would not sell its rights to another firm without permission. The tribunal agreed the violation took place but judged that the annulment was not fair and equitable treatment to the company.[50]
Ethyl Corporation v. Canada
In April 1997 the Canadian parliament banned the import and transport of MMT, a gasoline additive, over concerns that it poses a significant public health risk. Ethyl Corporation, the additive's manufacturer, sued the Canadian Government under NAFTA Chapter 11 for $251 million, to cover losses resulting from the "expropriation" of both its MMT production plant and its "good reputation".[51]
A similar challenge was launched by three Canadian provinces, under the Agreement on Internal Trade, and was upheld by a Canadian dispute settlement panel.[52] Consequently, the Canadian government repealed the ban and paid Ethyl Corporation $15 million as compensation.[53]
Dow AgroSciences v. Canada
On 25 August 2008, Dow AgroSciences LLC, a U.S. corporation, served a Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, for losses allegedly caused by a Quebec ban on the sale and certain uses of lawn pesticides containing the active ingredient 2,4-D.[54] The tribunal issued a consent award as the parties to the dispute reached a settlement.[55]

Cases won by government
Apotex v. the United States
Under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, Apotex Inc., a Canadian pharmaceuticals corporation, has alleged that U.S. courts committed errors in interpreting federal law, and that such errors were in violation of NAFTA Article 1102 (national treatment) and Article 1105 (minimum standard of treatment under international law). Apotex also alleged that the challenged U.S. court decision in favor of the Pfizer drug company expropriated Apotex’s investments in generic versions of the antidepressant Zoloft under NAFTA Article 1110 as was manifestly unjust.[56]
Apotex relied on the doctrine that a manifestly unjust domestic legal decision breaches international law and can be viewed as a substantive denial of justice.[57] Apotex has also brought a similar claim involving U.S. regulatory provisions concerning an abbreviated new drug development application for Pravastatin and patents allegedly held by Bristol Myers Squibb.[56] Apotex has two claims involving different generic products. On 14 June 2013, the Tribunal issued an Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, dismissing all of the claims and ordering Apotex to pay the United States' legal fees and arbitral expenses.[58]
Chemtura Corporation v. Canada
Chemtura Corporation, a United States agricultural pesticide products manufacturer, alleged that the Canadian government's Pest Management Regulatory Agency (PMRA) wrongfully terminated its pesticide business in lindane-based products, which are used on canola, rapeseed, mustard seed and cole crops to control flea beetle infestations, and on cereal crops to control wireworm. Chemtura alleged NAFTA violations of Article 1105 (on minimum standards of treatment) and Article 1110 (on expropriation). All claims were dismissed by the Tribunal, given that the measure did not amount to a substantial deprivation of the Claimant's investment and was taken legitimately and without bad faith.[59]
Philip Morris v. Uruguay
The Philip Morris v. Uruguay case (Spanish: es:Caso Philip Morris contra Uruguay) started on 19 February 2010, when the multinational tobacco company Philip Morris International filed a complaint against Uruguay seeking $25 million in damages.[60] The company complained that Uruguay's anti-smoking legislation devalued its cigarette trademarks and investments in the country and based its lawsuit on the bilateral investment treaty between Switzerland and Uruguay. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), a part of the World Bank decided it had jurisdiction on 2 July 2013,[61] and three years later ruled in favor of Uruguay, ordering Philip Morris to pay Uruguay $7 million, in addition to all court costs.[62]

Dismissed cases
KT Asia Investment Group v. Kazakhstan
The claimant (company incorporated in Holland) was a shell company owned by Kazakh national (Mr. Ablyazov). It owned shares in BTA Bank, which the claimant alleged were nationalized by the respondent (Kazakhstan). The state position was that as owned by a Kazakh national the claimant was not eligible for investment protection under the Dutch-Kazakh BIT. This argument was dismissed by the Arbitrage. The Kazakh state then alleged that it didn’t nationalize the bank, but it bailed it out (wiping out the shares’ value in the process). The latter was due to the embezzlement of depositors’ trust (and funds) by Mr. Ablyazov. Investigating the matter the Arbitrage reached the conclusion that the investment doesn’t meet the Salini test, thus it is not protected under the BIT. As a result the Arbitrage decided it has no jurisdiction to decide the dispute.[63]

Prospects for ISDS

After ISDS claims by investors sharply increased starting in the late 1990s, ISDS came under greater public attention and criticism. This was true for the NAFTA claims against the United States in the late 1990s, for Germany in the wake of the Vattenfall claims in the late 2000s and also for Australia in 2011, when confronted with the Philip Morris claim.[64]

In 2011, the Australian government announced that it would discontinue the practice of seeking inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement provisions in trade agreements with developing countries. It stated that it:

"...supports the principle of national treatment — that foreign and domestic businesses are treated equally under the law. However, the Government does not support provisions that would confer greater legal rights on foreign businesses than those available to domestic businesses. Nor will the Government support provisions that would constrain the ability of Australian governments to make laws on social, environmental and economic matters in circumstances where those laws do not discriminate between domestic and foreign businesses. The Government has not and will not accept provisions that limit its capacity to put health warnings or plain packaging requirements on tobacco products or its ability to continue the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme... In the past, Australian Governments have sought the inclusion of investor-state dispute resolution procedures in trade agreements with developing countries at the behest of Australian businesses. The Gillard Government will discontinue this practice. If Australian businesses are concerned about sovereign risk in Australian trading partner countries, they will need to make their own assessments about whether they want to commit to investing in those countries... Foreign businesses investing in Australia will be entitled to the same legal protections as domestic businesses but the Gillard Government will not confer greater rights on foreign businesses through investor-state dispute resolution provisions."[65]

This statement is a reaction to Philip Morris' ISDS claim under UNCITRAL rules to challenge Australian tobacco Advertising Restrictions.[66] By 2013, Australia had not terminated any bilateral investment treaties allowing for ISDS. Even if it were to do so, most such treaties foresee post-termination-protection for many years after the termination has become effective. In any event, since the election of the conservative Coalition Government in 2013, the Government has entered into free trade agreements (such as the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement, Ch 9 section B) that include ISDS.[67]

An alternative way ahead may be the preservation of investor protection under public international law, including ISDS, but with more concern for transparency and the balancing of economic and non-economic interests.[68] As noted above, the European Commission proposed September 2015) an 'Investment Court System' to replace ISDS clauses (notably in the draft TTIP), with the scope for investor challenge much reduced and with 'highly skilled judges' rather than arbitrators used to determine cases.[69]

In this vein, Karel De Gucht, the EU commissioner in charge of negotiating International Investment Agreements declared on 18 December 2014 that future agreements shall become more transparent, shall "fully enshrine democratic prerogatives" and "explicitly state that legitimate government public policy decisions – on issues such as the balance between public and private provision of healthcare or "the European ban on chicken carcasses washed with chlorine" – cannot be over-ridden".[70] He announced to "crack down on companies using legal technicalities to build frivolous cases against governments", to "open up investment tribunals to public scrutiny – documents will be public and interested parties, including NGOs, will be able to make submissions". Also, he said, the EU "will eliminate any conflicts of interest – the arbitrators who decide on EU cases must be above suspicion". However, insisting equally on the advantages of such investment protection agreements, he states along that [they] "protect job-creating investment from discrimination and unfair treatment" and that "the task here is to find the right balance between preventing abuse and protecting investments".

Current controversies over ISDS appear driven by attempts to expand its scope to new countries and, especially, to relations between developed countries with mature court systems and democratic governments.

In 2014, several members of the United States House of Representatives expressed opposition to the inclusion of ISDS in the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the United States and the European Union.[71] In 2015, faced with opposition to ISDS in several European countries, the European Parliament adopted a resolution requiring any new dispute settlement scheme included in TTIP "must be replaced by a new public and transparent system of investment protection, in which private interests cannot undermine public policy and which is subject to public law".[72] (The Commission's 2015 proposal in response is noted above).

South Africa has stated it will withdraw from treaties with ISDS clauses, and India is also considering such a position. Indonesia plans to let treaties with ISDS clauses lapse when they need renewal. Brazil has refused any treaty with ISDS clauses.[64]

In 2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that "The arbitration clause in the Agreement between the Netherlands and Slovakia on the protection of investments is not compatible with EU law".[73] This ruling could imply that any similar arbitration tribunal considering corporate sovereignty cases would also be illegal under EU law.

The process of the UK leaving the EU (known as Brexit) may generate ISDS cases against the UK. For example non-EU financial firms, that based themselves in the City of London in the expectation of continued participation in the European Single Market and subsequently having suffered adverse consequences of the loss of such access under different arrangements, may have an actionable case against the UK Government.[74]

gollark: I mean, if they got them for free for some unfathomable reason, sure I guess?
gollark: > How is it wastefulMacBooks are very expensive and not particularly worth it.
gollark: How wasteful.
gollark: Or, well, the obvious alternative.
gollark: Maybe. On the one hand I at least like to think I'm vaguely better than average at actually paying attention to explanations for things and won't just immediately consign them to "outgroup → bad" or "not convention → bad". On the other hand probably most people think that since people are bad at comparing things. On the third hand, which I totally have, the alternative is to just assume people doing things are probably right, which seems wrong.

See also

References
  1. Newcombe, Andrew Paul; Paradell, Lluís (2009). Law and practice of investment treaties : standards of treatment. Austin [Tex.]: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business. ISBN 978-90-411-2351-0.
  2. "Recent Developments in Investor-State Disputes" (PDF). Unctad.org. Retrieved 19 November 2014.
  3. "Assessing the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Volume 1: Market Access and Sectoral Issues | PIIE". piie.com. Retrieved 22 July 2016.
  4. "Investor-state dispute settlement: the importance of an informed, fact-based debate". International Bar Association.
  5. Claire Provost and Matt Kennard (10 June 2015). "The obscure legal system that lets corporations sue countries". The Guardian. Retrieved 22 July 2016.
  6. "ISDS: Important Questions and Answers | United States Trade Representative". ustr.gov. Retrieved 20 July 2016.
  7. Sweetland, Edwards, Haley (2016). Shadow courts: the tribunals that rule global trade. Colombia Global Reports. pp. Chapter: Introduction. ISBN 9780997126402. OCLC 933590566.
  8. "Methanex Corp. v. United States of America". State.gov. Retrieved 19 November 2014.
  9. Nielsen, Nikolaj (16 September 2015). "EU proposes new trade court with US". EUobserver. Retrieved 23 February 2016.
  10. Greenpeace (11 February 2016). "From ISDS to ICS: A Leopard Can't Change Its Spots" (PDF). Greenpeace Position Paper. p. 1. Retrieved 23 February 2016.
  11. "Press corner". European Commission - European Commission. Retrieved 22 November 2019.
  12. Nielsen, Nikolaj (4 February 2016). "TTIP investor court illegal, say German judges". EUobserver. Retrieved 6 February 2016.
  13. Nielsen, Nikolaj (17 February 2016). "EU defends TTIP investor court after German backlash". EUobserver. Retrieved 23 February 2016.
  14. Hahm, Hyeonho; König, Thomas; Osnabrügge, Moritz; Frech, Elena (2019). "Who Settles Disputes? Treaty Design and Trade Attitudes Toward the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)". International Organization. 73 (4): 881–900. doi:10.1017/S0020818319000249. ISSN 0020-8183.
  15. "The arbitration game". economist.com. 14 October 2014. Retrieved 6 February 2016.
  16. M.Waibel et.al., The Backlash against Investment Arbitration - Perceptions and Reality, Wolters Kluwer: Austin et.al, 2010
  17. "ARTICLE: THE NAFTA CHAPTER 11 EXPROPRIATION DEBATE THROUGH THE EYES OF A PROPERTY THEORIST". Litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com. Retrieved 19 November 2014.
  18. Dupuy, P.M., Petersmann, E.U., Francioni, F., eds. (February 2010). "Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration", Oxford Scholarship Online. ISBN 978-0-19-957818-4 doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199578184.001.0001
  19. "Still not loving ISDS: 10 reasons to oppose investors' super-rights in EU trade deals | CEO". corporateeurope.org. Retrieved 9 March 2020.
  20. Stiglitz, Joseph; Hersh, Adam S. (5 October 2015), Opinion: The Trans-Pacific Partnership charade: TPP isn't about 'free' trade at all, MarketWatch, retrieved 28 October 2015
  21. Goodman, Amy; Stiglitz, Joseph (27 October 2015), Joseph Stiglitz: Under TPP, Polluters Could Sue U.S. for Setting Carbon Emissions Limits, retrieved 27 October 2015
  22. Why the TPP Is Too Flawed for a 'Yes' Vote in Congress J. Sachs, The Huffington Post, 11 November 2015
  23. The real danger in TPP L. Johnson, L. Sachs and J. Sachs, CNN, 19 February 2016
  24. Warren, Elizabeth (25 February 2015). "The Trans-Pacific Partnership clause everyone should oppose". The Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 1 August 2016.
  25. "Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Questions and Answers". 26 February 2015. Retrieved 22 July 2016.
  26. Board, Editorial (11 March 2015). "Don't buy the trade deal alarmism". The Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 1 August 2016.
  27. Pelc, Krzysztof J. (31 May 2017). "What Explains the Low Success Rate of Investor-State Disputes?". International Organization. 71 (3): 559–583. doi:10.1017/S0020818317000212. ISSN 0020-8183.
  28. "What Do the Data Say about the Relationship between Investor-State Dispute Settlement Provisions and FDI? | PIIE". piie.com. Retrieved 22 July 2016.
  29. Hallward-Driemeier (2003). "Do bilateral investment treaties attract foreign direct investment? Only a bit - and they could bite". World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series. WPS 3121: 1–37.
  30. Aisbett, Emma (2007). "Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: Correlation versus Causation". MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich. 2255: 1–47.
  31. Yackee, Jason W (2007). "Do Bits Really Work? Revisiting the Empirical Link between Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment". Univ. Of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper. 1054: 1–32. SSRN 1015083.
  32. "Corporate Attacks on Our Laws | Public Citizen". isdscorporateattacks.org/. Retrieved 9 March 2020.
  33. "Special Courts for Foreign Investors | Cato Institute". cato.org. Retrieved 9 March 2020.
  34. "Red Carpet Courts | CEO" (PDF). corporateeurope.org/. Retrieved 9 March 2020.
  35. "Profiting from injustice | TNI" (PDF). tni.org. Retrieved 9 March 2020.
  36. "Profiting from injustice | TNI" (PDF). tni.org. Retrieved 9 March 2020.
  37. "Profiting from injustice | TNI" (PDF). tni.org. Retrieved 9 March 2020.
  38. "Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator | UNCTAD". investmentpolicy.unctad.org/. Retrieved 9 March 2020.
  39. Van Harten, Gus. "OECD Document Discusses Investor State Dispute Settlement". Archived 4 January 2019 at the Wayback Machine Accessed: 7 July 2011.
  40. "ICSID, Arbitration Rules". Icsid.worldbank.org. Retrieved 10 April 2013.
  41. "International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID Cases". Icsid.worldbank.org. Retrieved 10 April 2013.
  42. "International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, View Decisions and Awards". Icsid.worldbank.org. Retrieved 10 April 2013.
  43. "UNCITRAL : Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration" (PDF). Uncitral.org. Retrieved 19 November 2014.
  44. "2014 - UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration". uncitral.org.
  45. "United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration" (PDF). Retrieved 22 November 2019.
  46. "Status". uncitral.org.
  47. Gallacher, Kevin P.; Shrestha, Elen (1 January 2011). "Investment Treaty Arbitration and Developing Countries: A Re-Appraisal". The Journal of World Investment & Trade. 12 (6): 919–928. doi:10.1163/221190011X00355. ISSN 2211-9000.
  48. "Canada's PCB Export Ban Could Cost Taxpayer Dear". Environment News Service. Retrieved 3 January 2016.
  49. "S.D. Myers Inc. v. Government of Canada". Global Affairs Canada. Retrieved 3 January 2016.
  50. Martin Khor (2012). "The emerging crisis of investment treaties". South Centre.
  51. "NAFTA & Environmental Laws: Ethyl Corp. v. Government of Canada". Global Policy Forum. Retrieved 3 January 2016.
  52. "Ethyl Corporation v. the Government of Canada". Global Affairs Canada. Retrieved 3 January 2016.
  53. "NAFTA's Chapter 11 Makes Canada Most-Sued Country Under Free Trade Tribunals". Huffington Post. Retrieved 3 January 2016.
  54. "Dow AgroSciences LLC v. Government of Canada", US Department of State. Accessed: 12 April 2010.
  55. "INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (ICSID) : IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION UNDER CHAPTER 11 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES" (PDF). International.gc.ca. Retrieved 19 November 2014.
  56. "Apotex Inc v USA", US Department of State. Accessed: 12 April 2010.
  57. McFadden, M. 1995. "Provincialism in US Courts", Cornell Law Review 81:31 at 32.
  58. "Apotex Inc. v. United States of America", US Department of State. Accessed: 18 April 2014
  59. "Chemtura Corp. v. Government of Canada", US Department of State. Accessed: 12 April 2010.
  60. Alfred-Maurice de Zayas (16 November 2015). "How can Philip Morris sue Uruguay over its tobacco laws?". The Guardian. Retrieved 22 October 2016.
  61. "Decision on Jurisdiction" (PDF). 4 July 2013. Retrieved 22 August 2014.
  62. "Phillip Morris loses tough-on-tobacco lawsuit in Uruguay". Reuters. 8 July 2016. Retrieved 9 July 2016.
  63. "International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes" (PDF). Retrieved 22 November 2019.
  64. "Investor-state dispute settlement - The arbitration game". The Economist. 11 October 2014. Retrieved 1 April 2015.
  65. "Trade Policy Statement", Australian Government. Accessed: 5 September 2014.
  66. "Tobacco plain packaging—investor-state arbitration". Ag.gov.au. Retrieved 19 November 2014.
  67. "China–Australia Free Trade Agreement". Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Retrieved 22 November 2019.
  68. "Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) : State of play and prospects for reform" (PDF). Europarl.europa.eu. Retrieved 19 November 2014.
  69. "Commission proposes new Investment Court System for TTIP and other EU trade and investment negotiations". The European Commission. 16 September 2015. Retrieved 25 April 2016.
  70. Karel De Gucht. "You're wrong, George Monbiot – there is nothing secret about this EU trade deal". the Guardian. Retrieved 19 November 2014.
  71. Drake, Celeste (18 December 2014). "Powerful Members of Congress Oppose Special 'Corporate Court' Rights for European Firms". AFL–CIO. Archived from the original on 21 December 2014. Retrieved 21 December 2014.
  72. "Euractiv: European Parliament backs TTIP, rejects ISDS". Retrieved 20 August 2015.
  73. Court of Justice of the European Union. "Judgment in Case C-284/16 - Slowakische Republik v Achmea BV" (PDF). Retrieved 9 March 2018.
  74. Glinavos, Ioannis (1 May 2018). "Brexit, the City and Options for ISDS". ICSID Review. 33 (2): 380–405. doi:10.1093/icsidreview/siy003. ISSN 0258-3690.
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.