Wahhabism

Wahhabism (Arabic: الوهابية‎, al-Wahhābiyah) is an Islamic doctrine and religious movement founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab.[lower-alpha 1] It has been variously described as "ultraconservative", "far-right"[1] "austere",[2] "fundamentalist",[3] or "puritan(ical)";[4][5] as an Islamic "reform movement" to restore "pure monotheistic worship" (tawhid) by devotees;[6][7] and as a "deviant sectarian movement",[7] "vile sect"[8] and a distortion of Islam by its detractors.[2][9] The term Wahhabism is often used polemically and adherents commonly reject its use, preferring to be called Salafi or muwahhid,[10][11][12] claiming to emphasize the principle of tawhid[13] (the "uniqueness" and "unity" of God)[14] or monotheism, dismissing other Muslims as practising shirk (idolatry).[15] It follows the theology of Ibn Taymiyyah and the Hanbali school of jurisprudence,[6] although a small minority of Hanbali leaders renounced ibn Abd al-Wahhab's views due to Ottoman influence.[5]

Wahhabism is named after an eighteenth-century Islamic scholar, theologian, preacher and activist, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792).[6][16][17][18][19] He started a reform movement in the remote, sparsely populated region of Najd,[6][20] advocating a purging of such widespread Sunni practices as the veneration of saints and the visiting of their tombs and shrines, that were practiced all over the Islamic world, but which he considered idolatrous impurities and innovations in Islam (bid'ah).[6][14][21] Eventually he formed a pact with a local leader, Muhammad bin Saud, offering political obedience and promising that protection and propagation of the Wahhabi movement meant "power and glory" and rule of "lands and men".[22]

The alliance between followers of ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad bin Saud's successors (the House of Saud) proved to be a durable one. The House of Saud continued to maintain its politico-religious alliance with the Wahhabi sect through the waxing and waning of its own political fortunes over the next 150 years, through to its eventual proclamation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932, and then afterwards, on into modern times. Today Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab's teachings are the official, state-sponsored form of Sunni Islam[2][23] in Saudi Arabia.[24] With the help of funding from Saudi petroleum exports[25] (and other factors[26]), the movement underwent "explosive growth" beginning in the 1970s and now has worldwide influence.[2] The US State Department has estimated that over the past four decades concerns in Riyadh have directed at least $10bn (£6bn) to select charitable foundations toward the subversion of mainstream Sunni Islam by Wahhabism.[27] (As of 2017 changes to Saudi religious policy by Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman have led some to suggest that "Islamists throughout the world will have to follow suit or risk winding up on the wrong side of orthodoxy".[28])

The "boundaries" of Wahhabism have been called "difficult to pinpoint",[29] but in contemporary usage, the terms Wahhabi and Salafi are often used interchangeably, and they are considered to be movements with different roots that have merged since the 1960s.[30][31][32] However, Wahhabism has also been called "a particular orientation within Salafism",[33] or an ultra-conservative, Saudi brand of Salafism.[34][35] Estimates of the number of adherents to Wahhabism vary, with one source (Mehrdad Izady) giving a figure of fewer than 5 million Wahhabis in the Persian Gulf region (compared to 28.5 million Sunnis and 89 million Shia).[24][36]

The majority of Sunni and Shia Muslims worldwide disagree with the interpretation of Wahhabism, and many Muslims denounce them as a faction or a "vile sect".[8] Islamic scholars, including those from the Al-Azhar University, regularly denounce Wahhabism with terms such as "Satanic faith".[37] Wahhabism has been accused of being "a source of global terrorism",[38][39] inspiring the ideology of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),[40] and for causing disunity in Muslim communities by labelling Muslims who disagreed with the Wahhabi definition of monotheism as apostates[6][41] (takfir) and justifying their killing.[42][43][44] It has also been criticized for the destruction of historic shrines of saints, mausoleums, and other Muslim and non-Muslim buildings and artifacts.[45][46][47]

Definitions and etymology

Definitions

Some definitions or uses of the term Wahhabi Islam include:

• "a corpus of doctrines", and "a set of attitudes and behavior, derived from the teachings of a particularly severe religious reformist who lived in central Arabia in the mid-eighteenth century" (Gilles Kepel)[48]
• "pure Islam" (David Commins, paraphrasing supporters' definition),[9] that does not deviate from Sharia law in any way and should be called Islam and not Wahhabism. (King Salman bin Abdul Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia)[49]
• "a misguided creed that fosters intolerance, promotes simplistic theology, and restricts Islam's capacity for adaption to diverse and shifting circumstances" (David Commins, paraphrasing opponents' definition)[9]
• "a conservative reform movement ... the creed upon which the kingdom of Saudi Arabia was founded, and [which] has influenced Islamic movements worldwide" (Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim world)[50]
• "a sect dominant in Saudi Arabia and Qatar" with footholds in "India, Africa, and elsewhere", with a "steadfastly fundamentalist interpretation of Islam in the tradition of Ibn Hanbal" (Cyril Glasse)[13]
• an "eighteenth-century reformist/revivalist movement for sociomoral reconstruction of society", "founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab" (Oxford Dictionary of Islam).[51]
• originally a "literal revivification" of Islamic principles that ignored the spiritual side of Islam, that "rose on the wings of enthusiasm and longing and then sank down into the lowlands of pharisaic self-righteousness" after gaining power and losing its "longing and humility" (Muhammad Asad)[52]
• "a political trend" within Islam that "has been adopted for power-sharing purposes", but cannot be called a sect because "It has no special practices, nor special rites, and no special interpretation of religion that differ from the main body of Sunni Islam" (Abdallah Al Obeid, the former dean of the Islamic University of Medina and member of the Saudi Consultative Council)[29]
• "the true salafist movement". Starting out as a theological reform movement, it had "the goal of calling (da'wa) people to restore the 'real' meaning of tawhid (oneness of God or monotheism) and to disregard and deconstruct 'traditional' disciplines and practices that evolved in Islamic history such as theology and jurisprudence and the traditions of visiting tombs and shrines of venerated individuals." (Ahmad Moussalli)[53]
• a term used by opponents of Salafism in hopes of besmirching that movement by suggesting foreign influence and "conjuring up images of Saudi Arabia". The term is "most frequently used in countries where Salafis are a small minority" of the Muslim community but "have made recent inroads" in "converting" the local population to Salafism. (Quintan Wiktorowicz)[10]
• a blanket term used inaccurately to refer to "any Islamic movement that has an apparent tendency toward misogyny, militantism, extremism, or strict and literal interpretation of the Quran and hadith" (Natana J. DeLong-Bas)[54]

Etymology

According to Saudi writer Abdul Aziz Qassim and others, it was the Ottomans who "first labelled Abdul Wahhab's school of Islam in Saudi Arabia as Wahhabism". The British also adopted it and expanded its use in the Middle East.[55] The term Wahhabi should not be confused to Wahbi which is the dominant creed within Ibadism.[56]

Naming controversy: Wahhabis, Muwahhidun, and Salafis

Wahhabis do not like – or at least did not like – the term. Ibn Abd-Al-Wahhab was averse to the elevation of scholars and other individuals, including using a person's name to label an Islamic school.[10][42][57]

According to Robert Lacey "the Wahhabis have always disliked the name customarily given to them" and preferred to be called Muwahhidun (Unitarians).[58] Another preferred term was simply "Muslims" since their creed is "pure Islam".[59] However, critics complain these terms imply non-Wahhabis are not monotheists or Muslims.[59][60] Additionally, the terms Muwahhidun and Unitarians are associated with other sects, both extant and extinct.[61]

Other terms Wahhabis have been said to use and/or prefer include ahl al-hadith ("people of hadith"), Salafi Da'wa or al-da'wa ila al-tawhid[62] ("Salafi preaching" or "preaching of monotheism", for the school rather than the adherents) or Ahl ul-Sunna wal Jama'a ("people of the tradition of Muhammad and the consensus of the Ummah"),[33] Ahl al-Sunnah ("People of the Sunna"),[63] or "the reform or Salafi movement of the Sheikh" (the sheikh being ibn Abdul-Wahhab).[64] Early Salafis referred to themselves simply as "Muslims", believing the neighboring Ottoman Caliphate was al-dawlah al-kufriyya (a heretical nation) and its self-professed Muslim inhabitants actually non-Muslim.[41][65][66] The self-designation as "People of the Sunna" was important for Wahhabisms authencity, because during the Ottoman period only Sunnism was the legitimate doctrine.[67]

Many, such as writer Quinton Wiktorowicz, urge use of the term Salafi, maintaining that "one would be hard pressed to find individuals who refer to themselves as Wahhabis or organizations that use 'Wahhabi' in their title, or refer to their ideology in this manner (unless they are speaking to a Western audience that is unfamiliar with Islamic terminology, and even then usage is limited and often appears as 'Salafi/Wahhabi')".[10] A New York Times journalist writes that Saudis "abhor" the term Wahhabism, "feeling it sets them apart and contradicts the notion that Islam is a monolithic faith".[68] Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud for example has attacked the term as "a doctrine that doesn't exist here (Saudi Arabia)" and challenged users of the term to locate any "deviance of the form of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia from the teachings of the Quran and Prophetic Hadiths".[69][70] Ingrid Mattson argues that "'Wahhbism' is not a sect. It is a social movement that began 200 years ago to rid Islam of rigid cultural practices that had (been) acquired over the centuries."[71]

On the other hand, according to authors at Global Security and Library of Congress the term is now commonplace and used even by Wahhabi scholars in the Najd,[21][72] a region often called the "heartland" of Wahhabism.[73] Journalist Karen House calls 'Salafi' "a more politically correct term" for 'Wahhabi'.[74]

In any case, according to Lacey, none of the other terms have caught on, and so like the Christian Quakers, Wahhabis have "remained known by the name first assigned to them by their detractors".[58]

Wahhabis and Salafis

Many scholars and critics distinguish between Wahhabi and Salafi. According to American scholar Christopher M. Blanchard,[75] Wahhabism refers to "a conservative Islamic creed centered in and emanating from Saudi Arabia", while Salafiyya is "a more general puritanical Islamic movement that has developed independently at various times and in various places in the Islamic world".[42]

However, many call Wahhabism a more strict, Saudi form of Salafi.[76][77] Wahhabism is the Saudi version of Salafism, according to Mark Durie, who states Saudi leaders "are active and diligent" in using their considerable financial resources "in funding and promoting Salafism all around the world".[78] Ahmad Moussalli tends to agree Wahhabism is a subset of Salafism, saying "As a rule, all Wahhabis are salafists, but not all salafists are Wahhabis."[53]

Hamid Algar lists three "elements" Wahhabism and Salafism had in common.

1. above all disdain for all developments subsequent to al-Salaf al-Salih (the first two or three generations of Islam),
2. the rejection of Sufism, and
3. the abandonment of consistent adherence to one of the four or five Sunni Madhhabs (schools of fiqh).

And "two important and interrelated features" that distinguished Salafis from the Wahhabis:

1. a reliance on attempts at persuasion rather than coercion in order to rally other Muslims to their cause; and
2. an informed awareness of the political and socio-economic crises confronting the Muslim world.[79]

Hamid Algar and another critic, Khaled Abou El Fadl, argue Saudi oil-export funding "co-opted" the "symbolism and language of Salafism", during the 1960s and 70s, making them practically indistinguishable by the 1970s,[80] and now the two ideologies have "melded". Abou El Fadl believes Wahhabism rebranded itself as Salafism knowing it could not "spread in the modern Muslim world" as Wahhabism.[30]

History

The Wahhabi mission started as a revivalist movement in the remote, arid region of Najd. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, the Al Saud dynasty, and with it Wahhabism, spread to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. After the discovery of petroleum near the Persian Gulf in 1939, it had access to oil export revenues, revenue that grew to billions of dollars. This money – spent on books, media, schools, universities, mosques, scholarships, fellowships, lucrative jobs for journalists, academics and Islamic scholars – gave Wahhabism a "preeminent position of strength" in Islam around the world.[81]

In the country of Wahhabism's founding – and by far the largest and most powerful country where it is the state religion – Wahhabi ulama gained control over education, law, public morality and religious institutions in the 20th century, while permitting as a "trade-off" doctrinally objectionable actions such as the import of modern technology and communications, and dealings with non-Muslims, for the sake of the consolidation of the power of its political guardian, the Al Saud dynasty.[82]

However, in the last couple of decades of the twentieth century several crises worked to erode Wahhabi "credibility" in Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Muslim world – the November 1979 seizure of the Grand Mosque by militants; the deployment of US troops in Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq; and the 9/11 2001 al-Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington.[83]

In each case the Wahhabi establishment was called on to support the dynasty's efforts to suppress religious dissent – and in each case it did[83] – exposing its dependence on the Saudi dynasty and its often unpopular policies.[84][85]

In the West, the end of the Cold War and the anti-communist alliance with conservative, religious Saudi Arabia, and the 9/11 attacks created enormous distrust towards the kingdom and especially its official religion.[86]

Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab

The founder of Wahhabism, Mohammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, was born around 1702–03 in the small oasis town of 'Uyayna in the Najd region, in what is now central Saudi Arabia.[87] He studied in Basra,[88] in what is now Iraq, and possibly Mecca and Medina while there to perform Hajj, before returning to his home town of 'Uyayna in 1740. There he worked to spread the call (da'wa) for what he believed was a restoration of true monotheistic worship (Tawhid).[89]

The "pivotal idea" of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teaching was that people who called themselves Muslims but who participated in alleged innovations were not just misguided or committing a sin, but were "outside the pale of Islam altogether", as were Muslims who disagreed with his definition. [90]

This included not just lax, unlettered, nomadic Bedu, but also Shias and Sunnis such as the Ottomans.[91] Such infidels were not to be killed outright, but to be given a chance to repent first.[92] With the support of the ruler of the town – Uthman ibn Mu'ammar – he carried out some of his religious reforms in 'Uyayna, including the demolition of the tomb of Zayd ibn al-Khattab, one of the Sahaba (companions) of the prophet Muhammad, and the stoning to death of an adulterous woman. However, a more powerful chief (Sulaiman ibn Muhammad ibn Ghurayr) pressured Uthman ibn Mu'ammar to expel him from 'Uyayna.[93]

When Muhammad started preaching the manhaj of the Salaf-as-saliheen in the Ottoman controlled Hejaz, where veneration of saints and superstitions became prevalent, he was initially rejected and called "deviant". But, later his call to dawah became extremely popular. The fact based account is presented in the book "The Wahhabi Myth" by Haneef James Oliver.[94]

Alliance with the House of Saud

The First Saudi state 1744–1818

The ruler of a nearby town, Muhammad ibn Saud, invited ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab to join him, and in 1744 a pact was made between the two. [95] Ibn Saud would protect and propagate the doctrines of the Wahhabi mission, while ibn Abdul Wahhab "would support the ruler, supplying him with 'glory and power'". Whoever championed his message, ibn Abdul Wahhab promised, "will, by means of it, rule the lands and men". [22] Ibn Saud would abandon un-Sharia taxation of local harvests, and in return God might compensate him with booty from conquest and sharia compliant taxes that would exceed what he gave up.[96] The alliance between the Wahhabi mission and Al Saud family has "endured for more than two and half centuries", surviving defeat and collapse.[95][97] The two families have intermarried multiple times over the years and in today's Saudi Arabia, the minister of religion is always a member of the Al ash-Sheikh family, i.e., a descendant of Ibn Abdul Wahhab.[98]

According to most sources, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab declared jihad against neighboring tribes, whose practices of asking saints for their intercession, making pilgrimages to tombs and special mosques, he believed to be the work of idolaters/unbelievers.[43][60][92][99]

One academic disputes this. According to Natana DeLong-Bas, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was restrained in urging fighting with perceived unbelievers, preferring to preach and persuade rather than attack.[100] [101][102] It was only after the death of Muhammad bin Saud in 1765 that, according to DeLong-Bas, Muhammad bin Saud's son and successor, Abdulaziz bin Muhammad, used a "convert or die" approach to expand his domain,[103] and when Wahhabis adopted the takfir ideas of Ibn Taymiyya.[104]

However, various scholars, including Simon Ross Valentine, have strongly rejected such a view of Wahhab, arguing that "the image of Abd’al-Wahhab presented by DeLong-Bas is to be seen for what it is, namely a re-writing of history that flies in the face of historical fact".[105] Conquest expanded through the Arabian Peninsula until it conquered Mecca and Medina in the early 19th century.[106][107] It was at this time, according to DeLong-Bas, that Wahhabis embraced the ideas of Ibn Taymiyya, which allow self-professed Muslims who do not follow Islamic law to be declared non-Muslims – to justify their warring and conquering the Muslim Sharifs of Hijaz.[104]

One of their most noteworthy and controversial attacks was on Karbala in 1802. There, according to a Wahhabi chronicler 'Uthman b. 'Abdullah b. Bishr: "The Muslims" – as the Wahhabis referred to themselves, not feeling the need to distinguish themselves from other Muslims, since they did not believe them to be Muslims –

scaled the walls, entered the city ... and killed the majority of its people in the markets and in their homes. [They] destroyed the dome placed over the grave of al-Husayn [and took] whatever they found inside the dome and its surroundings ... the grille surrounding the tomb which was encrusted with emeralds, rubies, and other jewels ... different types of property, weapons, clothing, carpets, gold, silver, precious copies of the Qur'an.[108][109]

After this, the Wahhabis also massacred the male population and enslaved the women and children of the predominantly Sunni city of Ta'if in Hejaz in 1803.[110]

The Second Saudi state 1850

Saud bin Abdulaziz bin Muhammad bin Saud managed to establish his rule over southeastern Syria between 1803 and 1812. However, Egyptian forces acting under the Ottoman Empire and led by Ibrahim Pasha, were eventually successful in counterattacking in a campaign starting from 1811.[111] In 1818 they defeated Al-Saud, leveling the capital Diriyah, executing the Al-Saud emir and exiling the emirate's political and religious leadership,[97][112] and otherwise unsuccessfully attempted to stamp out not just the House of Saud but the Wahhabi mission as well.[113]

A second, smaller Saudi state (Emirate of Nejd) lasted from 1819 to 1891. Its borders being within Najd, Wahhabism was protected from further Ottoman or Egyptian campaigns by the Najd's isolation, lack of valuable resources, and that era's limited communication and transportation.[114]

By the 1880s, at least among townsmen if not Bedouin, Wahhabi strict monotheistic doctrine had become the native religious culture of the Najd.[115]

Abdulaziz Ibn Saud

Further information: History of Saudi Arabia

Ibn Saud, the first king of Saudi Arabia

In 1901, Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, a fifth generation descendant of Muhammad ibn Saud,[116] began a military campaign that led to the conquest of much of the Arabian peninsula and the founding of present-day Saudi Arabia, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.[117] The result that safeguarded the vision of Islam-based on the tenets of Islam as preached by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab was not bloodless, as 40,000 public executions and 350,000 amputations were carried out during its course, according to some estimates.[118][119][120][121]

Under the reign of Abdulaziz, "political considerations trumped religious idealism" favored by pious Wahhabis. His political and military success gave the Wahhabi ulama control over religious institutions with jurisdiction over considerable territory, and in later years Wahhabi ideas formed the basis of the rules and laws concerning social affairs, and shaped the kingdom's judicial and educational policies.[122] But protests from Wahhabi ulama were overridden when it came to consolidating power in Hijaz and al-Hasa, avoiding clashes with the great power of the region (Britain), adopting modern technology, establishing a simple governmental administrative framework, or signing an oil concession with the U.S. [123] The Wahhabi ulama also issued a fatwa affirming that "only the ruler could declare a jihad"[124] (a violation of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teaching, according to DeLong-Bas[101]),

As the realm of Wahhabism expanded under Ibn Saud into areas of Shiite (al-Hasa, conquered in 1913) and pluralistic Muslim tradition (Hejaz, conquered in 1924–25), Wahhabis pressed for forced conversion of Shia and an eradication of (what they saw as) idolatry. Ibn Saud sought "a more relaxed approach".[125]

In al-Hasa, efforts to stop the observance of Shia religious holidays and replace teaching and preaching duties of Shia clerics with Wahhabi, lasted only a year.[126]

In Mecca and Jeddah (in Hejaz) prohibition of tobacco, alcohol, playing cards and listening to music on the phonograph was looser than in Najd. Over the objections of Wahhabi ulama, Ibn Saud permitted both the driving of automobiles and the attendance of Shia at hajj.[127]

Enforcement of the commanding right and forbidding wrong, such as enforcing prayer observance and separation of the sexes, developed a prominent place during the second Saudi emirate, and in 1926 a formal committee for enforcement was founded in Mecca.[13][128] [129]

While Wahhabi warriors swore loyalty to monarchs of Al Saud, there was one major rebellion. King Abdulaziz put down rebelling Ikhwan – nomadic tribesmen turned Wahhabi warriors who opposed his "introducing such innovations as telephones, automobiles, and the telegraph" and his "sending his son to a country of unbelievers (Egypt)". [130] Britain had aided Abdulaziz, and when the Ikhwan attacked the British protectorates of Transjordan, Iraq and Kuwait, as a continuation of jihad to expand the Wahhabist realm, Abdulaziz struck, killing hundreds before the rebels surrendered in 1929.[131]

Connection with the outside

Before Abdulaziz, during most of the second half of the 19th century, there was a strong aversion in Wahhabi lands to mixing with "idolaters" (which included most of the Muslim world). Voluntary contact was considered by Wahhabi clerics to be at least a sin, and if one enjoyed the company of idolaters, and "approved of their religion", an act of unbelief.[132] Travel outside the pale of Najd to the Ottoman lands "was tightly controlled, if not prohibited altogether".[133]

Over the course of its history, however, Wahhabism has become more accommodating towards the outside world.[134] In the late 1800s, Wahhabis found Muslims with at least similar beliefs – first with Ahl-i Hadith in India,[135] and later with Islamic revivalists in Arab states (one being Mahmud Sahiri al-Alusi in Baghdad).[136] The revivalists and Wahhabis shared a common interest in Ibn Taymiyya's thought, the permissibility of ijtihad, and the need to purify worship practices of innovation.[137] In the 1920s, Rashid Rida, a pioneer Salafist whose periodical al-Manar was widely read in the Muslim world, published an "anthology of Wahhabi treatises", and a work praising the Ibn Saud as "the savior of the Haramayn [the two holy cities] and a practitioner of authentic Islamic rule".[138][139]

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia after unification in 1932

In a bid "to join the Muslim mainstream and to erase the reputation of extreme sectarianism associated with the Ikhwan", in 1926 Ibn Saud convened a Muslim congress of representatives of Muslim governments and popular associations.[140] By the early 1950s, the "pressures" on Ibn Saud of controlling the regions of Hejaz and al-Hasa – "outside the Wahhabi heartland" – and of "navigating the currents of regional politics" "punctured the seal" between the Wahhabi heartland and the "land of idolatry" outside.[141][142]

A major current in regional politics at that time was secular nationalism, which, with Gamal Abdul Nasser, was sweeping the Arab world. To combat it, Wahhabi missionary outreach worked closely with Saudi foreign policy initiatives. In May 1962, a conference in Mecca organized by Saudis discussed ways to combat secularism and socialism. In its wake, the World Muslim League was established.[143] To propagate Islam and "repel inimical trends and dogmas", the League opened branch offices around the globe.[144] It developed closer association between Wahhabis and leading Salafis, and made common cause with the Islamic revivalist Muslim Brotherhood, Ahl-i Hadith and the Jamaat-i Islami, combating Sufism and "innovative" popular religious practices[143] and rejecting the West and Western "ways which were so deleterious of Muslim piety and values".[145] Missionaries were sent to West Africa, where the League funded schools, distributed religious literature, and gave scholarships to attend Saudi religious universities. One result was the Izala Society which fought Sufism in Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon.[146]

An event that had a great effect on Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia[147] was the "infiltration of the transnationalist revival movement" in the form of thousands of pious, Islamist Arab Muslim Brotherhood refugees from Egypt following Nasser's clampdown on the Brotherhood[148] (and also from similar nationalist clampdowns in Iraq[149] and Syria[150]), to help staff the new school system of the (largely illiterate) Kingdom.[151]

The Brotherhood's Islamist ideology differed from the more conservative Wahhabism which preached loyal obedience to the king. The Brotherhood dealt in what one author (Robert Lacey) called "change-promoting concepts" like social justice and anticolonialism, and gave "a radical, but still apparently safe, religious twist" to the Wahhabi values Saudi students "had absorbed in childhood". With the Brotherhood's "hands-on, radical Islam", jihad became a "practical possibility today", not just part of history.[152]

The Brethren were ordered by the Saudi clergy and government not to attempt to proselytize or otherwise get involved in religious doctrinal matters within the Kingdom, but nonetheless "took control of Saudi Arabia's intellectual life" by publishing books and participating in discussion circles and salons held by princes.[153] In time they took leading roles in key governmental ministries,[154] and had influence on education curriculum.[155] An Islamic university in Medina created in 1961 to train – mostly non-Saudi – proselytizers to Wahhabism[156] became "a haven" for Muslim Brother refugees from Egypt.[157] The Brothers' ideas eventually spread throughout the kingdom and had great effect on Wahhabism – although observers differ as to whether this was by "undermining" it[147][158] or "blending" with it.[159][160]

Growth

In the 1950s and 60s within Saudi Arabia, the Wahhabi ulama maintained their hold on religious law courts, and presided over the creation of Islamic universities and a public school system which gave students "a heavy dose of religious instruction".[161] Outside of Saudi the Wahhabi ulama became "less combative" toward the rest of the Muslim world. In confronting the challenge of the West, Wahhabi doctrine "served well" for many Muslims as a "platform" and "gained converts beyond the peninsula".[161][162]

A number of reasons have been given for this success: the growth in popularity and strength of both Arab nationalism (although Wahhabis opposed any form of nationalism as an ideology, Saudis were Arabs, and their enemy the Ottoman caliphate was ethnically Turkish),[26] and Islamic reform (specifically reform by following the example of those first three generations of Muslims known as the Salaf);[26] the destruction of the Ottoman Empire which sponsored their most effective critics;[163] the destruction of another rival, the Khilafa in Hejaz, in 1925.[26]

Not least in importance was the money Saudi Arabia earned from exporting oil.[81]

Petroleum export era

See also: Petro-Islam

The pumping and export of oil from Saudi Arabia started during World War II, and its earnings helped fund religious activities in the 1950s and 60s. But it was the 1973 oil crisis and quadrupling in the price of oil that both increased the kingdom's wealth astronomically and enhanced its prestige by demonstrating its international power as a leader of OPEC. By 1980, Saudi Arabia was earning every three days the income from oil it had taken a year to earn before the embargo.[164] Tens of billions of US dollars of this money were spent on books, media, schools, scholarships for students (from primary to post-graduate), fellowships and subsidies to reward journalists, academics and Islamic scholars, the building of hundreds of Islamic centers and universities, and over one thousand schools and one thousand mosques.[165][166] [167] During this time, Wahhabism attained what Gilles Kepel called a "preeminent position of strength in the global expression of Islam".[81]

Afghanistan jihad

The "apex of cooperation" between Wahhabis and Muslim revivalist groups was the Afghan jihad.[168]

In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Shortly thereafter, Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, a Muslim Brother cleric with ties to Saudi religious institutions,[169] issued a fatwa[170] declaring defensive jihad in Afghanistan against the atheist Soviet Union, "fard ayn", a personal (or individual) obligation for all Muslims. The edict was supported by Saudi Arabia's Grand Mufti (highest religious scholar), Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz, among others.[171][172]

Between 1982 and 1992 an estimated 35,000 individual Muslim volunteers went to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets and their Afghan regime. Thousands more attended frontier schools teeming with former and future fighters. Somewhere between 12,000 and 25,000 of these volunteers came from Saudi Arabia.[173] Saudi Arabia and the other conservative Gulf monarchies also provided considerable financial support to the jihad – $600 million a year by 1982.[174]

By 1989, Soviet troops had withdrawn and within a few years the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul had collapsed.

This Saudi/Wahhabi religious triumph further stood out in the Muslim world because many Muslim-majority states (and the PLO) were allied with the Soviet Union and did not support the Afghan jihad.[175] But many jihad volunteers (most famously Osama bin Laden) returning home to Saudi Arabia and elsewhere were often radicalized by Islamic militants who were "much more extreme than their Saudi sponsors".[175]

"Erosion" of Wahhabism

Islamic Revolution in Iran

The February 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran challenged Saudi Wahhabism in a number of ways on a number of fronts. It was a revolution of Shia, not Sunni, and Wahhabism held that Shia were not truly Muslims. Nonetheless, its massive popularity in Iran and its overthrow of a pro-American secular monarchy generated enormous enthusiasm among pious Sunni, not just Shia Muslims around the world.[176] Its leader (Ruhollah Khomeini) preached that monarchy was against Islam and America was Islam's enemy, and called for the overthrow of al-Saud family. (In 1987 public address Khomeini declared that "these vile and ungodly Wahhabis are like daggers which have always pierced the heart of the Muslims from the back", and announced that Mecca was in the hands of "a band of heretics".[177])[178] All this spurred Saudi Arabia – a kingdom allied with America – to "redouble their efforts to counter Iran and spread Wahhabism around the world", and reversed any moves by Saudi leaders to distance itself from Wahhabism or "soften" its ideology.[179]

Grand Mosque seizure

In 1979, 400–500 Islamist insurgents, using smuggled weapons and supplies, took over the Grand mosque in Mecca, called for an overthrow of the monarchy, denounced the Wahhabi ulama as royal puppets, and announced the arrival of the Mahdi of "end time". The insurgents deviated from Wahhabi doctrine in significant details,[180] but were also associated with leading Wahhabi ulama (Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz knew the insurgent's leader, Juhayman al-Otaybi).[181] Their seizure of Islam's holiest site, the taking hostage of hundreds of hajj pilgrims, and the deaths of hundreds of militants, security forces and hostages caught in crossfire during the two-week-long retaking of the mosque, all shocked the Islamic world[182] and did not enhance the prestige of Al Saud as "custodians" of the mosque.

The incident also damaged the prestige of the Wahhabi establishment. Saudi leadership sought and received Wahhabi fatawa to approve the military removal of the insurgents and after that to execute them,[183] but Wahhabi clerics also fell under suspicion for involvement with the insurgents.[184] In part as a consequence, Sahwa clerics influenced by Brethren's ideas were given freer rein. Their ideology was also thought more likely to compete with the recent Islamic revolutionism/third-worldism of the Iranian Revolution.[184]

Although the insurgents were motivated by religious puritanism, the incident was not followed by a crackdown on other religious purists, but by giving greater power to the ulama and religious conservatives to more strictly enforce Islamic codes in myriad ways[185] – from the banning of women's images in the media to adding even more hours of Islamic studies in school and giving more power and money to the religious police to enforce conservative rules of behaviour.[186][187][188]

1990 Gulf War

In August 1990 Iraq invaded and annexed Kuwait. Concerned that Saddam Hussein might push south and seize its own oil fields, Saudis requested military support from the US and allowed tens of thousands of US troops to be based in the Kingdom to fight Iraq.[189] But what "amounted to seeking infidels' assistance against a Muslim power" was difficult to justify in terms of Wahhabi doctrine.[190][191]

Again Saudi authorities sought and received a fatwa from leading Wahhabi ulama supporting their action. The fatwa failed to persuade many conservative Muslims and ulama who strongly opposed US presence, including the Muslim Brotherhood-supported Sahwah "Awakening" movement that began pushing for political change in the kingdom.[192] Outside the kingdom, Islamist revival groups that had long received aid from Saudi and had ties with Wahhabis (Arab jihadists, Pakistani and Afghan Islamists) supported Iraq, not Saudi.[193]

During this time and later, many in the Wahhabi/Salafi movement (such as Osama bin Laden) not only no longer looked to the Saudi monarch as an emir of Islam, but supported his overthrow, focusing on jihad against the US and (what they believe are) other enemies of Islam.[194][195] (This movement is sometimes called neo-Wahhabi or neo-salafi.[53][196])

After 9/11

The 2001 9/11 attacks on Saudi's putative ally, the US, that killed almost 3,000 people and caused at least $10 billion in property and infrastructure damage,[197] were assumed by many, at least outside the kingdom, to be "an expression of Wahhabism" since the al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and most of the 9/11 hijackers were Saudi nationals.[198] A backlash in the formerly hospitable US against the kingdom focused on its official religion that came to be considered by some "a doctrine of terrorism and hate".[86]

Inside the kingdom, Crown Prince Abdullah addressed the country's religious, tribal, business and media leadership following the attacks in a series of televised gatherings calling for a strategy to correct what had gone wrong. According to Robert Lacey, the gatherings and later articles and replies by a top cleric, Abdullah Turki, and two top Al Saud princes, Prince Turki Al-Faisal and Prince Talal bin Abdul Aziz, served as an occasion to sort out who had the ultimate power in the kingdom: not the ulama, but rather the Al Saud dynasty. They declared that Muslim rulers were meant to exercise power, while religious scholars were meant to advise.[199]

In 2003–04, Saudi Arabia saw a wave of al-Qaeda-related suicide bombings, attacks on Non-Muslim foreigners (about 80% of those employed in the Saudi private sector are foreign workers[200] and constitute about 30% of the country's population[201]), and gun battles between Saudi security forces and militants. One reaction to the attacks was a trimming back of the Wahhabi establishment's domination of religion and society. "National Dialogues" were held that included "Shiites, Sufis, liberal reformers, and professional women".[202] In 2009, as part of what some called an effort to "take on the ulama and reform the clerical establishment", King Abdullah issued a decree that only "officially approved" religious scholars would be allowed to issue fatwas in Saudi Arabia. The king also expanded the Council of Senior Scholars (containing officially approved religious scholars) to include scholars from Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence other than the Hanbali madhab—Shafi'i, Hanafi and Maliki schools.[203]

Relations with the Muslim Brotherhood have deteriorated steadily. After 9/11, the then interior minister Prince Nayef blamed the Brotherhood for extremism in the kingdom,[204] and he declared it guilty of "betrayal of pledges and ingratitude" and "the source of all problems in the Islamic world", after it was elected to power in Egypt.[205] In March 2014 the Saudi government declared the Brotherhood a "terrorist organization".[189]

In April 2016, Saudi Arabia stripped its religious police, who enforce Islamic law on the society and are known as the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, from their power to follow, chase, stop, question, verify identification, or arrest any suspected persons when carrying out duties. They were told to report suspicious behaviour to regular police and anti-drug units, who would decide whether to take the matter further.[206][207]

Muhammad bin Salman

Bold reformist actions on religious policy taken by Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman (MbS) in 2017 have led some to question the future of Wahhabi conservatism. In an October 2017 interview with The Guardian newspaper, MbS stated

What happened in the last 30 years is not Saudi Arabia. What happened in the region in the last 30 years is not the Middle East. After the Iranian revolution in 1979, people wanted to copy this model in different countries, one of them is Saudi Arabia. We didn't know how to deal with it. And the problem spread all over the world. Now is the time to get rid of it.[208]

MbS has ruled in favor of allowing women to drive and enter sport stadiums, eventually reopening cinemas. According to Kamel Daoud, MbS is "above all ... putting pressure on the clergy and announcing the review and certification of the great canons of Muslim orthodoxy, including the hadiths, the collection of the Prophet Muhammad's sayings".[28]

MbS's pronouncements, as well as an international conference on Sunni Islam in Grozny (funded by the government of the United Arab Emirates) where "200 Muslim scholars from Egypt, Russia, Syria, Sudan, Jordan, and Europe reject[ed] Saudi Arabia's doctrine",[209] have been called a "frontal assault on Wahhabism" (as well as an assault on other conservative "interpretations of Islam, such as Salafism and Deobandism").[210][211]

Memoirs of Mr. Hempher

A widely circulated but discredited apocryphal description of the founding of Wahhabism[212][213] known as Memoirs of Mr. Hempher, The British Spy to the Middle East (other titles have been used)[214] alleges that a British agent named Hempher was responsible for the creation of Wahhabism. In the "memoir", Hempher corrupts Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, manipulating him[215] to preach his new interpretation of Islam for the purpose of sowing dissension and disunity among Muslims so that "We, the English people ... may live in welfare and luxury."[214]

Practices

As a religious revivalist movement that works to bring Muslims back from what it believes are foreign accretions that have corrupted Islam,[216] and believes that Islam is a complete way of life and so has prescriptions for all aspects of life, Wahhabism is quite strict in what it considers Islamic behavior. As a result, it has been described as the "strictest form of Sunni Islam".[217] On the other hand, critics argue, Wahhabism is not strict, but a distorted version of Islam and not based on traditional Shari'a law, nor is their practise typical or mired in the roots of Islam.[218][219] Unlike other schools of Sunnism, Wahhabis admonishes to ground Islamic principles solely on the Quran and Hadith,[220] rejecting much material derived within Islamic culture.

This does not mean however, that all adherents agree on what is required or forbidden, or that rules have not varied by area or changed over time. In Saudi Arabia the strict religious atmosphere of Wahhabi doctrine is visible in the conformity in dress, public deportment, and public prayer,[221] and makes its presence felt by the wide freedom of action of the "religious police", clerics in mosques, teachers in schools, and judges (who are religious legal scholars) in Saudi courts.[222]

Commanding right and forbidding wrong

Wahhabism is noted for its policy of "compelling its own followers and other Muslims strictly to observe the religious duties of Islam, such as the five prayers", and for "enforcement of public morals to a degree not found elsewhere".[223] Due to the main interest in purification of Islam, the teaching becomes very repressive to the followers.[224]

While other Muslims might urge abstention from alcohol, modest dress, and salat prayer, for Wahhabis prayer "that is punctual, ritually correct, and communally performed not only is urged but publicly required of men." Not only is wine forbidden, but so are "all intoxicating drinks and other stimulants, including tobacco." Not only is modest dress prescribed, but the type of clothing that should be worn, especially by women (a black abaya, covering all but the eyes and hands) is specified.[72]

Following the preaching and practice of ibn Abd al-Wahhab that coercion should be used to enforce following of sharia, an official committee has been empowered to "Command the Good and Forbid the Evil" (the so-called "religious police")[223][225] in Saudi Arabia – the one country founded with the help of Wahhabi warriors and whose scholars and pious citizens dominate many aspects of the Kingdom's life. Committee "field officers" enforce strict closing of shops at prayer time, segregation of the sexes, prohibition of the sale and consumption of alcohol, driving of motor vehicles by women, and other social restrictions.[226]

A large number of practices have been reported forbidden by Saudi Wahhabi officials, preachers or religious police. Practices that have been forbidden as Bid'a (innovation) or shirk (polytheism) and sometimes "punished by flogging" during Wahhabi history include performing or listening to music, dancing, fortune telling, amulets, television programs (unless religious), smoking, playing backgammon, chess, or cards, drawing human or animal figures, acting in a play or writing fiction (both are considered forms of lying), dissecting cadavers (even in criminal investigations and for the purposes of medical research), recorded music played over telephones on hold or the sending of flowers to friends or relatives who are in the hospital.[120][227][228][229][230][231] Common Muslim practices Wahhabis believe are contrary to Islam include listening to music in praise of Muhammad, praying to God while visiting tombs (including the tomb of Muhammad), celebrating mawlid (birthday of the Prophet),[232] the use of ornamentation on or in mosques, all of which is considered orthodoxy in the rest of the Islamic world.[233] The driving of motor vehicles by women is allowed in every country but Wahhabi-dominated Saudi Arabia[234] and dream interpretation, practiced by the famously strict Taliban, is discouraged by Wahhabis.[235]

Wahhabism emphasizes "Thaqafah Islamiyyah" or Islamic culture and the importance of avoiding non-Islamic cultural practices and non-Muslim friendship no matter how innocent these may appear,[236][237] on the grounds that the Sunna forbids imitating non-Muslims.[238] Foreign practices sometimes punished and sometimes simply condemned by Wahhabi preachers as unIslamic, include celebrating foreign days (such as Valentine's Day [239] or Mothers Day[236][238]) shaving, cutting or trimming of beards,[240] giving of flowers,[241] standing up in honor of someone, celebrating birthdays (including the Prophet's), keeping or petting dogs.[230] Wahhabi scholars have warned against taking non-Muslims as friends, smiling at or wishing them well on their holidays.[68]

Wahhabis are not in unanimous agreement on what is forbidden as sin. Some Wahhabi preachers or activists go further than the official Saudi Arabian Council of Senior Scholars in forbidding (what they believe to be) sin. Several wahhabis have declared football forbidden for a variety of reasons including it is a non-Muslim, foreign practice, because of the revealing uniforms and because of the foreign non-Muslim language used in matches.[242] [243] The Saudi Grand Mufti, on the other hand has declared football permissible (halal). [244]

Senior Wahhabi leaders in Saudi Arabia have determined that Islam forbids the traveling or working outside the home by a woman without their husband's permission – permission which may be revoked at any time – on the grounds that the different physiological structures and biological functions of the two sexes mean that each is assigned a distinctive role to play in the family.[245] As mentioned before, Wahhabism also forbids the driving of motor vehicles by women. Sexual intercourse out of wedlock may be punished with beheading,[246] although sex out of wedlock was permissible with a female slave until the practice of slavery was banned in 1962 (Prince Bandar bin Sultan was the product of "a brief encounter" between his father Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz – the Saudi defense minister for many years – and "his slave, a black servingwoman").[247][248]

Despite this strictness, senior Wahhabi scholars of Islam in the Saudi kingdom have made exceptions in ruling on what is haram. Foreign non-Muslim troops are forbidden in Arabia, except when the king needed them to confront Saddam Hussein in 1990; gender mixing of men and women is forbidden, and fraternization with non-Muslims is discouraged, but not at King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST). Movie theaters and driving by women are forbidden, except at the ARAMCO compound in eastern Saudi, populated by workers for the company that provides almost all the government's revenue. The exceptions made at KAUST are also in effect at ARAMCO.[249]

More general rules of what is permissible have changed over time. Abdulaziz Ibn Saud imposed Wahhabi doctrines and practices "in a progressively gentler form" as his early 20th-century conquests expanded his state into urban areas, especially the Hejab.[250] After vigorous debate Wahhabi religious authorities in Saudi Arabia allowed the use of paper money (in 1951), the abolition of slavery (in 1962), education of females (1964), and use of television (1965).[248] Music, the sound of which once might have led to summary execution, is now commonly heard on Saudi radios. [250] Minarets for mosques and use of funeral markers, which were once forbidden, are now allowed. Prayer attendance, which was once enforced by flogging, is no longer.[251]

Appearance

The uniformity of dress among men and women in Saudi Arabia (compared to other Muslim countries in the Middle East) has been called a "striking example of Wahhabism's outward influence on Saudi society", and an example of the Wahhabi belief that "outward appearances and expressions are directly connected to one's inward state."[233] The "long, white flowing thobe" worn by men of Saudi Arabia has been called the "Wahhabi national dress".[252] Red-and-white checkered or white head scarves known as Ghutrah are worn. In public women are required to wear a black abaya or other black clothing that covers every part of their body other than hands and eyes.

A "badge" of a particularly pious Salafi or Wahhabi man is a robe too short to cover the ankle, an untrimmed beard,[253] and no cord (Agal) to hold the head scarf in place.[254] The warriors of the Ikhwan Wahhabi religious militia wore a white turban in place of an agal.[255]

Wahhabiyya mission

Wahhabi mission, or Dawah Wahhabiyya, is the idea of spreading Wahhabism throughout the world. [256] Tens of billions of dollars have been spent by the Saudi government and charities on mosques, schools, education materials, scholarships, throughout the world to promote Islam and the Wahhabi interpretation of it. Tens of thousands of volunteers[173] and several billion dollars also went in support of the jihad against the atheist communist regime governing Afghanistan.[174]

Regions

Wahhabism originated in the Najd region, and its conservative practices have stronger support there than in regions in the kingdom to the east or west of it.[257][258][259] Glasse credits the softening of some Wahhabi doctrines and practices on the conquest of the Hejaz region "with its more cosmopolitan traditions and the traffic of pilgrims which the new rulers could not afford to alienate".[250]

The only other country "whose native population is Wahhabi and that adheres to the Wahhabi creed", is the small gulf monarchy of Qatar,[260][261] whose version of Wahhabism is notably less strict. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Qatar made significant changes in the 1990s. Women are now allowed to drive and travel independently; non-Muslims are permitted to consume alcohol and pork. The country sponsors a film festival, has "world-class art museums", hosts Al Jazeera news service, will hold the 2022 football World Cup, and has no religious force that polices public morality. Qataris attribute its different interpretation of Islam to the absence of an indigenous clerical class and autonomous bureaucracy (religious affairs authority, endowments, Grand Mufti), the fact that Qatari rulers do not derive their legitimacy from such a class.[261][262]

Views

Adherents to the Wahhabi movement identify as Sunni Muslims.[263] The primary Wahhabi doctrine is affirmation of the uniqueness and unity of God (Tawhid),[14][264] and opposition to shirk (violation of tawhid – "the one unforgivable sin", according to Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab).[265] They call for adherence to the beliefs and practices of the salaf (exemplary early Muslims). They strongly oppose what they consider to be heterodox doctrines, particularly those held by the vast majority of Sunnis and Shiites,[266] and practices such as the veneration of Prophets and saints in the Islamic tradition. They emphasize reliance on the literal meaning of the Quran and hadith, rejecting rationalistic theology (kalam). Wahhabism has been associated with the practice of takfir (labeling Muslims who disagree with their doctrines as apostates). Adherents of Wahhabism are favourable to derivation of new legal rulings (ijtihad) so long as it is true to the essence of the Quran, Sunnah and understanding of the salaf, and they do not regard this as bid'ah (innovation) .[267]

Theology

In theology Wahhabism is closely aligned with the Athari (literal) school, which represents the prevalent theological position of the Hanbali school of law.[268][269] Athari theology is characterized by reliance on the zahir (apparent or literal) meaning of the Quran and hadith, and opposition to the rational argumentation in matters of belief favored by Ash'ari and Maturidi theology.[270][271] However, Wahhabism diverges in some points of theology from other Athari movements.[272] These include a zealous tendency toward takfir, which bears a resemblance to the Kharijites.[272][273] Another distinctive feature is a strong opposition to mysticism.[272] Although it is typically attributed to the influence of Ibn Taymiyyah, Jeffry Halverson argues that Ibn Taymiyyah only opposed what he saw as Sufi excesses and never mysticism in itself, being himself a member of the Qadiriyyah Sufi order.[272] DeLong-Bas writes that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab did not denounce Sufism or Sufis as a group, but rather attacked specific practices which he saw as inconsistent with the Quran and hadith.[274]

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab considered some beliefs and practices of the Shia to violate the doctrine of monotheism.[275] According to DeLong-Bas, in his polemic against the "extremist Rafidah sect of Shiis", he criticized them for assigning greater authority to their current leaders than to Muhammad in interpreting the Quran and sharia, and for denying the validity of the consensus of the early Muslim community.[275] He also believed that the Shia doctrine of infallibility of the imams constituted associationism with God.[275]

David Commins describes the "pivotal idea" in Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teaching as being that "Muslims who disagreed with his definition of monotheism were not ... misguided Muslims, but outside the pale of Islam altogether." This put Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teaching at odds with that of most Muslims through history who believed that the "shahada" profession of faith ("There is no god but God, Muhammad is his messenger") made one a Muslim, and that shortcomings in that person's behavior and performance of other obligatory rituals rendered them "a sinner", but "not an unbeliever."

Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab did not accept that view. He argued that the criterion for one's standing as either a Muslim or an unbeliever was correct worship as an expression of belief in one God ... any act or statement that indicates devotion to a being other than God is to associate another creature with God's power, and that is tantamount to idolatry (shirk). Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab included in the category of such acts popular religious practices that made holy men into intercessors with God. That was the core of the controversy between him and his adversaries, including his own brother.[276]

In Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's major work, a small book called Kitab al-Tawhid, he states that worship in Islam is limited to conventional acts of worship such as the five daily prayers (salat); fasting for Ramadan (Sawm); Dua (supplication); Istia'dha (seeking protection or refuge); Ist'ana (seeking help), and Istigatha to Allah (seeking benefits and calling upon Allah alone). Worship beyond this – making du'a or tawassul – are acts of shirk and in violation of the tenets of Tawhid (monotheism).[277][278]

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's justification for considering the majority of Muslims of Arabia to be unbelievers, and for waging war on them, can be summed up as his belief that the original pagans the Prophet Muhammad fought "affirmed that God is the creator, the sustainer and the master of all affairs; they gave alms, they performed pilgrimage and they avoided forbidden things from fear of God". What made them pagans whose blood could be shed and wealth plundered was that "they sacrificed animals to other beings; they sought the help of other beings; they swore vows by other beings." Someone who does such things even if their lives are otherwise exemplary is not a Muslim but an unbeliever (as Ibn Abd al-Wahhab believed). Once such people have received the call to "true Islam", understood it and then rejected it, their blood and treasure are forfeit.[279][280]

This disagreement between Wahhabism and Sunni Orthodoxy (adherents of one of the four schools of jurisprudence) over the definition of worship and monotheism has remained much the same since 1740, according to David Commins,[276] although, according to Saudi writer and religious television show host Abdul Aziz Qassim, as of 2014, "there are changes happening within the [Wahhabi] doctrine and among its followers."[49]

According to another source, defining aspects of Wahhabism include a very literal interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah and a tendency to reinforce local practices of the Najd.[281]

Whether the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab included the need for social renewal and "plans for socio-religious reform of society" in the Arabian Peninsula, rather than simply a return to "ritual correctness and moral purity", is disputed.[282][283]

Jurisprudence (fiqh)

Of the four major sources in Sunni fiqh – the Quran, the Sunna, consensus (ijma), and analogical reasoning (qiyas) – Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's writings emphasized the Quran and Sunna. He used ijma only "in conjunction with its corroboration of the Quran and hadith"[284] (and giving preference to the ijma of Muhammad's companions rather than the ijma of legal specialists after his time), and qiyas only in cases of extreme necessity.[285] He rejected deference to past juridical opinion (taqlid) in favor of independent reasoning (ijtihad), and opposed using local customs.[286] He urged his followers to "return to the primary sources" of Islam in order "to determine how the Quran and Muhammad dealt with specific situations" without considering interpretations of previous Islamic scholarship,[287] when using ijtihad. According to Edward Mortimer, it was imitation of past judicial opinion in the face of clear contradictory evidence from hadith or Qur'anic text that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab condemned.[288] Natana DeLong-Bas writes that the Wahhabi tendency to consider failure to abide by Islamic law as equivalent to apostasy was based on the ideology of Ibn Taymiyya rather than Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's preaching and emerged after the latter's death.[289]

According to an expert on law in Saudi Arabia (Frank Vogel), Ibn Abd al-Wahhab himself "produced no unprecedented opinions". The "Wahhabis' bitter differences with other Muslims were not over fiqh rules at all, but over aqida, or theological positions".[290] Scholar David Cummings also states that early disputes with other Muslims did not center on fiqh, and that the belief that the distinctive character of Wahhabism stems from Hanbali legal thought is a "myth".[291]

Some scholars are ambivalent as to whether Wahhabis belong to the Hanbali legal school. The Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World maintains Wahhabis "rejected all jurisprudence that in their opinion did not adhere strictly to the letter of the Qur'an and the hadith".[292] Cyril Glasse's New Encyclopedia of Islam states that "strictly speaking", Wahhabis "do not see themselves as belonging to any school,"[293] and that in doing so they correspond to the ideal aimed at by Ibn Hanbal, and thus they can be said to be of his 'school'.[294] [295] According to DeLong-Bas, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab never directly claimed to be a Hanbali jurist, warned his followers about the dangers of adhering unquestionably to fiqh, and did not consider "the opinion of any law school to be binding."[296] He did, however, follow the Hanbali methodology of judging everything not explicitly forbidden to be permissible, avoiding the use of analogical reasoning, and taking public interest and justice into consideration.[296]

Loyalty and disassociation

According to various sources—scholars,[43][297][298][299][300][301] former Saudi students, [302] Arabic-speaking/reading teachers who have had access to Saudi text books, [303] and journalists[304] – Ibn 'Abd al Wahhab and his successors preach that theirs is the one true form of Islam. According to a doctrine known as al-wala' wa al-bara' (literally, "loyalty and disassociation"), Abd al-Wahhab argued that it was "imperative for Muslims not to befriend, ally themselves with, or imitate non-Muslims or heretical Muslims", and that this "enmity and hostility of Muslims toward non-Muslims and heretical had to be visible and unequivocal."[305][306] Even as late as 2003, entire pages in Saudi textbooks were devoted to explaining to undergraduates that all forms of Islam except Wahhabism were deviation,[303] although, according to one source (Hamid Algar) Wahhabis have "discreetly concealed" this view from other Muslims outside Saudi Arabia "over the years."[298][307]

In reply, the Saudi Arabian government "has strenuously denied the above allegations", including that "their government exports religious or cultural extremism or supports extremist religious education."[308]

Politics

According to ibn Abdal-Wahhab there are three objectives for Islamic government and society: "to believe in Allah, enjoin good behavior, and forbid wrongdoing." This doctrine has been sustained in missionary literature, sermons, fatwa rulings, and explications of religious doctrine by Wahhabis since the death of ibn Abdal-Wahhab.[72] Ibn Abd al-Wahhab saw a role for the imam, "responsible for religious matters", and the amir, "in charge of political and military issues".[309] (In Saudi history the imam has not been a religious preacher or scholar, but Muhammad ibn Saud[310] and subsequent Saudi rulers.[62][311])

He also taught that the Muslim ruler is owed unquestioned allegiance as a religious obligation from his people so long as he leads the community according to the laws of God. A Muslim must present a bayah, or oath of allegiance, to a Muslim ruler during his lifetime to ensure his redemption after death.[72][312] Any counsel given to a ruler from community leaders or ulama should be private, not through public acts such as petitions, demonstrations, etc. [313] [314] (This strict obedience can become problematic if a dynastic dispute arises and someone rebelling against the ruler succeeds and becomes the ruler, as happened in the late 19th century at the end of the second al-Saud state.[315] Is the successful rebel a ruler to be obeyed, or a usurper?[316])

While this gives the king wide power, respecting shari'a does impose limits, such as giving qadi (Islamic judges) independence. This means not interfering in their deliberations, but also not codifying laws, following precedents or establishing a uniform system of law courts – both of which violate the qadi's independence.[317]

Wahhabis have traditionally given their allegiance to the House of Saud, but a movement of "Salafi jihadis" has developed among those who believe Al Saud has abandoned the laws of God.[194][195] According to Zubair Qamar, while the "standard view" is that "Wahhabis are apolitical and do not oppose the State", there is another "strain" of Wahhabism that "found prominence among a group of Wahhabis after the fall of the second Saudi State in the 1800s", and post 9/11 is associated with Jordanian/Palestinian scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and "Wahhabi scholars of the 'Shu’aybi' school".[318]

Wahhabis share the belief of Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Islamic dominion over politics and government and the importance of dawah (proselytizing or preaching of Islam) not just towards non-Muslims but towards erroring Muslims. However Wahhabi preachers are conservative and do not deal with concepts such as social justice, anticolonialism, or economic equality, expounded upon by Islamist Muslims.[319] Ibn Abdul Wahhab's original pact promised whoever championed his message, 'will, by means of it, rule and lands and men.'"[22]

Population

One of the more detailed estimates of religious population in the Persian Gulf is by Mehrdad Izady who estimates, "using cultural and not confessional criteria", approximately 4.56 million Wahhabis in the Persian Gulf region, about 4 million from Saudi Arabia, (mostly the Najd), and the rest coming overwhelmingly from the Emirates and Qatar.[24] Most Sunni Qataris are Wahhabis (46.9% of all Qataris)[24] and 44.8% of Emiratis are Wahhabis,[24] 5.7% of Bahrainis are Wahhabis, and 2.2% of Kuwaitis are Wahhabis.[24]

Notable leaders

There has traditionally been a recognized head of the Wahhabi "religious estate", often a member of Al ash-Sheikh (a descendant of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab) or related to another religious head. For example, Abd al-Latif was the son of Abd al-Rahman ibn Hasan.

• Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792) was the founder of the Wahhabi movement.[320][321]
• Abd Allah ibn Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1752–1826) was the head of Wahhabism after his father retired from public life in 1773. After the fall of the first Saudi emirate, Abd Allah went into exile in Cairo where he died.[320]
• Sulayman ibn Abd Allah (1780–1818) was a grandson of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and author of an influential treatise that restricted travel to and residing in land of idolaters (i.e. land outside of the Wahhabi area).[320]
• Abd al-Rahman ibn Hasan (1780–1869) was head of the religious estate in the second Saudi emirate.[320]
• Abd al-Latif ibn Abd al-Rahman (1810–1876) Head of religious estate in 1860 and early 1870s.[320]
• Abd Allah ibn Abd al-Latif Al ash-Sheikh (1848–1921) was the head of religious estate during period of Rashidi rule and the early years of King Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud.[320]
• Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Al ash-Sheikh (1893–1969) was the head of Wahhabism in mid twentieth century. He has been said to have "dominated the Wahhabi religious estate and enjoyed unrivaled religious authority."[322]
• Ghaliyya al-Wahhabiyya was a female military leader who defended Mecca against recapture by Ottoman forces.

In more recent times, two Wahhabi clerics have risen to prominence with no relation to ibn Abd al-Wahhab.

• Abdul Aziz Bin Baz (1910–1999) has been called "the most prominent proponent" of Wahhabism during his time.[323]
• Muhammad ibn al-Uthaymeen (1925–2001) is another "giant". According to David Dean Commins, no one "has emerged" with the same "degree of authority in the Saudi religious establishment" since their deaths.[323]

International influence and propagation

Explanation for influence

Khaled Abou El Fadl attributed the appeal of Wahhabism to some Muslims as stemming from

• Arab nationalism, which followed the Wahhabi attack on the Ottoman Empire
• Reformism, which followed a return to Salaf (as-Salaf aṣ-Ṣāliḥ);
• Destruction of the Hejaz Khilafa in 1925;
• Control of Mecca and Medina, which gave Wahhabis great influence on Muslim culture and thinking;
• Oil, which after 1975 allowed Wahhabis to promote their interpretations of Islam using billions from oil export revenue.[324]

Scholar Gilles Kepel, agrees that the tripling in the price of oil in the mid-1970s and the progressive takeover of Saudi Aramco in the 1974–1980 period, provided the source of much influence of Wahhabism in the Islamic World.

... the financial clout of Saudi Arabia had been amply demonstrated during the oil embargo against the United States, following the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. This show of international power, along with the nation's astronomical increase in wealth, allowed Saudi Arabia's puritanical, conservative Wahhabite faction to attain a preeminent position of strength in the global expression of Islam. Saudi Arabia's impact on Muslims throughout the world was less visible than that of Khomeini]s Iran, but the effect was deeper and more enduring... it reorganized the religious landscape by promoting those associations and ulamas who followed its lead, and then, by injecting substantial amounts of money into Islamic interests of all sorts, it won over many more converts. Above all, the Saudis raised a new standard – the virtuous Islamic civilization – as foil for the corrupting influence of the West.[81]

Funding factor

Estimates of Saudi spending on religious causes abroad include "upward of $100 billion";[325] between $2 and 3 billion per year since 1975 (compared to the annual Soviet propaganda budget of $1 billion/year);[326] and "at least $87 billion" from 1987 to 2007.[327]

Its largesse funded an estimated "90% of the expenses of the entire faith", throughout the Muslim World, according to journalist Dawood al-Shirian.[328] It extended to young and old, from children's madrasas to high-level scholarship.[329] "Books, scholarships, fellowships, mosques" (for example, "more than 1,500 mosques were built from Saudi public funds over the last 50 years") were paid for.[330] It rewarded journalists and academics, who followed it and built satellite campuses around Egypt for Al Azhar, the oldest and most influential Islamic university.[166] Yahya Birt counts spending on "1,500 mosques, 210 Islamic centres and dozens of Muslim academies and schools".[326][331]

This financial aid has done much to overwhelm less strict local interpretations of Islam, according to observers like Dawood al-Shirian and Lee Kuan Yew,[328] and has caused the Saudi interpretation (sometimes called "petro-Islam"[332]) to be perceived as the correct interpretation—or the "gold standard" of Islam—in many Muslims' minds.[333][334]

Militant and political Islam

According to counter-terrorism scholar Thomas F. Lynch III, Sunni extremists perpetrated about 700 terror attacks killing roughly 7,000 people from 1981 to 2006.[335] What connection, if any, there is between Wahhabism and the Jihadi Salafis such as Al-Qaeda who carried out these attacks, is disputed.

Natana De Long-Bas, senior research assistant at the Prince Alwaleed Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University, argues:

The militant Islam of Osama bin Laden did not have its origins in the teachings of Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab and was not representative of Wahhabi Islam as it is practiced in contemporary Saudi Arabia, yet for the media it came to define Wahhabi Islam during the later years of bin Laden's lifetime. However "unrepresentative" bin Laden's global jihad was of Islam in general and Wahhabi Islam in particular, its prominence in headline news took Wahhabi Islam across the spectrum from revival and reform to global jihad.[336]

Noah Feldman distinguishes between what he calls the "deeply conservative" Wahhabis and what he calls the "followers of political Islam in the 1980s and 1990s," such as Egyptian Islamic Jihad and later Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. While Saudi Wahhabis were "the largest funders of local Muslim Brotherhood chapters and other hard-line Islamists" during this time, they opposed jihadi resistance to Muslim governments and assassination of Muslim leaders because of their belief that "the decision to wage jihad lay with the ruler, not the individual believer".[337]

Karen Armstrong states that Osama bin Laden, like most extremists, followed the ideology of Sayyid Qutb, not "Wahhabism".[338]

More recently the self-declared "Islamic State" in Iraq and Syria headed by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has been described as both more violent than al-Qaeda and more closely aligned with Wahhabism.

For their guiding principles, the leaders of the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, are open and clear about their almost exclusive commitment to the Wahhabi movement of Sunni Islam. The group circulates images of Wahhabi religious textbooks from Saudi Arabia in the schools it controls. Videos from the group's territory have shown Wahhabi texts plastered on the sides of an official missionary van.[339]

According to scholar Bernard Haykel, "for Al Qaeda, violence is a means to an ends; for ISIS, it is an end in itself." Wahhabism is the Islamic State's "closest religious cognate."[339]

Criticism and controversy

Criticism by other Muslims

Among the criticism, or comments made by critics, of the Wahhabi movement are:

• That it is not so much strict and uncompromising as aberrant,[340] going beyond the bounds of Islam in its restricted definition of tawhid (monotheism), and much too willing to commit takfir (declare non-Muslim and subject to execution) Muslims it found in violation of the doctrines of Wahhabism[341] (in the second Wahhabi-Saudi jihad/conquest of the Arabian peninsula, an estimated 400,000 were killed or wounded according to some estimates[118][119][120][121]);

• That bin Saud's agreement to wage jihad to spread Ibn Abdul Wahhab's teachings had more to do with traditional Najd practice of raiding – "instinctive fight for survival and appetite for lucre" – than with religion;[342]
• That it has no connection to other Islamic revival movements;[343]
• That unlike other revivalists, its founder Abd ul-Wahhab showed little scholarship – writing little and making even less commentary;[344]
• That its rejection of the "orthodox" belief in saints, which had become a cardinal doctrine in Sunni Islam very early on,[345][346][347] represents a departure from something which has been an "integral part of Islam ... for over a millennium."[348][349] In this connection, mainstream Sunni scholars also critique the Wahhabi citing of Ibn Taymiyyah as an authority when Ibn Taymiyyah himself adhered to the belief in the existence of saints;[350]
• That its contention towards visiting the tombs and shrines of prophets and saints and the seeking of their intercession, violate tauhid al-'ibada (directing all worship to God alone) has no basis in tradition, in consensus or in hadith, and that even if it did, it would not be grounds for excluding practitioners of ziyara and tawassul from Islam;[341]
• That its use of Ibn Hanbal, Ibn al-Qayyim, and even Ibn Taymiyyah's name to support its stance is inappropriate, as it is historically known that all three of these men revered many aspects of Sufism, save that the latter two critiqued certain practices among the Sufis of their time. Those who criticize this aspect of Wahhabism often refer to the group's use of Ibn Hanbal's name to be a particularly egregious error, arguing that the jurist's love for the relics of Muhammad, for the intercession of the Prophet, and for the Sufis of his time is well established in Islamic tradition;[351]
• That historically Wahhabis have had a suspicious willingness to ally itself with non-Muslim powers (specifically America and Britain), and in particular to ignore the encroachments into Muslim territory of a non-Muslim imperial power (the British) while waging jihad and weakening the Muslim Caliphate of the Ottomans[352][353]

Initial opposition

The first people to oppose Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab were his father, Abd al-Wahhab and his brother, Salman Ibn Abd al-Wahhab who was an Islamic scholar and qadi. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's brother wrote a book in refutation of his brother's new teachings, called: "The Final Word from the Qur'an, the Hadith, and the Sayings of the Scholars Concerning the School of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab", also known as: "Al-Sawa`iq al-Ilahiyya fi Madhhab al-Wahhabiyya" ("The Divine Thunderbolts Concerning the Wahhabi School").[354]

In "The Refutation of Wahhabism in Arabic Sources, 1745–1932",[354] Hamadi Redissi provides original references to the description of Wahhabis as a divisive sect (firqa) and outliers (Kharijites) in communications between Ottomans and Egyptian Khedive Muhammad Ali. Redissi details refutations of Wahhabis by scholars (muftis); among them Ahmed Barakat Tandatawin, who in 1743 describes Wahhabism as ignorance (Jahala).

Shi'a opposition

See also: Demolition of al-Baqi

Al-Baqi' mausoleum reportedly contained the bodies of Hasan ibn Ali (a grandson of Muhammad) and Fatimah (the daughter of Muhammad).

In 1801 and 1802, the Saudi Wahhabis under Abdul Aziz ibn Muhammad ibn Saud attacked and captured the Shia cities of Karbala and Najaf in Iraq and destroyed the tombs of Husayn ibn Ali, who is the grandson of Muhammad, and Ali (Ali bin Abu Talib), the son-in-law of Muhammad (see: Saudi sponsorship mentioned previously). In 1803 and 1804 the Saudis captured Mecca and Madinah and demolished various tombs of Ahl al-Bayt and Sahabah, ancient monuments, ruins according to Wahhabis, they "removed a number of what were seen as sources or possible gateways to polytheism or shirk" – such as the tomb of Fatimah, the daughter of Muhammad. In 1998 the Saudis bulldozed and poured petroleum over the grave of Aminah bint Wahb, the mother of Muhammad, causing resentment throughout the Muslim World.[355][356][357]

Shi'a Muslims complain that Wahhabis and their teachings are a driving force behind sectarian violence and anti-Shia targeted killings in many countries such as Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bahrain, Yemen. Worldwide, Saudis run sponsored mosques and Islamic schools teaching the Wahhabi version of Sunni Islam that labels Shia Muslims, Sufis, Christians, Jews and others as either apostates or infidels, thus paving a way for armed jihad against them by any means necessary till their death or submission to the Wahhabi doctrine. Wahhabis consider Shi'ites to be the archenemies of Islam.[358][359]

Sunni opposition

Ajyad Fortress of The Ottoman Empire in Makkah Al-Mukkaramah

Abraj Al-Bait Towers, Mecca, Saudi Arabia.

Wahhabism has been vehemently criticized by many mainstream Sunni Muslims and continues to be condemned by many prominent traditional Sunni scholars for being a "heretical and violent" innovation within Sunni Islam.[8]

Egypt

Among traditional Sunni organizations worldwide that oppose the Wahhabi ideology is the Al-Azhar in Cairo, the faculty of which regularly denounces Wahhabism with terms such as "Satanic faith."[8] Regarding Wahhabism, the renowned Azharite Sunni scholar and intellectual Muhammad Abu Zahra said: "The Wahhabis exaggerated [and bowdlerized] Ibn Taymiyya's positions ... The Wahhabis did not restrain themselves to proselytism only, but resorted to warmongering against whoever disagreed with them on the grounds that they were fighting innovation (bid`a), and innovations are an evil that must be fought ... Whenever they were able to seize a town or city they would come to the tombs and turn them into ruins and destruction ... and they would destroy whatever mosques were with the tombs also ... Their brutality did not stop there but they also came to whatever graves were visible and destroyed them also. And when the ruler of the Hijaz regions caved in to them they destroyed all the graves of the Companions and razed them to the ground ... In fact, it has been noticed that the Ulama of the Wahhabis consider their own opinions correct and not possibly wrong, while they consider the opinions of others wrong and not possibly correct. More than that, they consider what others than themselves do in the way of erecting tombs and circumambulating them, as near to idolatry ... In this respect they are near the Khawarij who used to declare those who dissented with them apostate and fight them as we already mentioned."[360]

The Sunni conventional scholars for centuries rejected Ibn Taymiyah's ideas however Wahhabism has made this controversial scholar its central figure.[361]

In the 18th century, the Hanafi scholar Ibn Abidin declared the Wahhabi movement of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab to be a modern-day manifestation of the Kharijites.[362][363] Another important early rebuttal of Wahhabism came from the Sunni jurist Ibn Jirjis, who argued that supplicating the saints is permitted to "Whoever declares that there is no god but God and prays toward Mecca," for, according to him, supplicating the saints is not a form of worship but merely calling out to them, and that worship at graves is not idolatry unless the supplicant believes that buried saints have the power to determine the course of events. These arguments were specifically rejected as heretical by the Wahhabi leader at the time. [364]

Morocco

The influential Sunni jurist and son of the renowned Moroccan scholar Abdullah al-Ghumari, Abu'l-Fayd Ahmad, staunchly condemned Wahhabism and attacked it for straying away from classical tradition, stating: "And nothing has emerged ... to bring about earthquakes and discord in the religion like Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who was astray and led others astray. Hence he was the Devil's Horn foretold by the Messenger (upon him be blessings and peace), and he abstained from offering prayer for Najd because of him, and because of the dissensions which would flow from his demonic preaching."[365]

Kuwait

The prominent Kuwaiti Sunni Shafi'i jurist Yusuf ibn al-Sayyid Hashim al-Rifa`i (1932–1999) remained a severe critic of Wahhabism throughout his scholarly life, and penned a famous fifty-seven-point critique of the movement, titled Advice to the Scholars of Najd. He criticized the followers of the movement for causing discord among the Sunni community by their labeling all other Sunnis as "pagans," "innovators," and "deviants."[366]

Turkey

The Transnational Turkish Gülen movement disagrees with Wahhabism furthermore blames it directly for the rise of Islamophobia in the world.[367] The leader of the movement Fethullah Gülen denounces Arabs for conspiring against the Ottoman state as well as interpreting Islam strictly by their Arabian culture and Wahhabism.[368]

Indonesia

The largest Sunni organization in the world, Indonesia's Nahdlatul Ulama, opposes Wahhabism,[369] referring to as a fanatical and innovative movement within the tradition of Sunnism.[369] Subsequently, Nahdlatul Ulama promotes Islam Nusantara, as an alternative movement against the growing austerity, intolerance, radicalization and violence brought by Wahhabi movement within modern Indonesian society. Islam Nusantara was developed in Nusantara (Indonesian archipelago) at least since the 16th century, defined as an interpretation of Islam that takes into account local Indonesian customs in forming its fiqh.[370]

Malaysia

Malaysia's largest Islamic body, the National Fatwa Council, has described Wahhabism as being against Sunni teachings, Dr Abdul Shukor Husin, chairman of the National Fatwa Council, said Wahhabi followers were fond of declaring Muslims of other schools as apostates merely on the grounds that they did not conform to Wahhabi teachings.[371]

South Asia

Opposition against wahabbism started in South Asia in 19th century which was led by prominent Islamic scholers of the time most notable of them was Maulana Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi.By the late 19th century it was led by Maulana Ahmed Raza Khan, whose extensive written refutation of wahabbism along with active opposition of wahabbism by his disciples and other sunni Ulama(Islamic scholers) became a movement. The movement was letter known as Barelvi movement. South Asia's Barelvi movement rejects Wahhabi beliefs.[372] According to Barelvi scholars, Wahhabis preach violence as opposed to Barelvis who promote peace. In 2016 Barelvis banned Wahhabis from their mosques nationwide.[373] The founder of the movement Ahmed Raza Khan said Wahhabis aren't Muslims, and any Muslim who has difficulty understanding this, has also left Islam.[374]

Somalia

The Somalia based paramilitary group Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a actively battles Wahhabi militants to prevent imposition of Wahhabi ideology.[375]

Lebanon

The transnational Lebanon Al-Ahbash movement uses takfir against Wahhabi and Salafi leaders.[376][377] The head of Al-Ahbash, Abdullah al-Harari says Wahhabis offer anthropomorphic descriptions of God thereby imitate polytheists.[378]

United States

The Sufi Islamic Supreme Council of America founded by the Naqshbandi Sufi Shaykh Hisham Kabbani classify Wahhabism as being extremist and heretical based on Wahhabism's role as a terrorist ideology and labelling of other Muslims, especially Sufis as polytheists, a practice known as takfir.[379][380][381][382]

In general, mainstream Sunni Muslims condemn Wahhabism for being a major factor behind the rise of such groups as al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Boko Haram, while also inspiring movements such as the Taliban.[383][384][385]

2016 joint fatwa in Chechnya

Main article: 2016 international conference on Sunni Islam in Grozny

In late 2016, at a conference of over a hundred Sunni scholars in Chechnya, Al-Azhar's current dean, Ahmed el-Tayeb was said to have taken an uncompromising stand against Wahhabism and Islamic terrorism by defining orthodox Sunnism as "the Ash'arites and Muturidis (adherents of the theological systems of Imam Abu Mansur al-Maturidi and Imam Abul Hasan al-Ash'ari) ... followers of any of the four schools of thought (Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki or Hanbali) and ... also the followers of the Sufism of Imam Junaid al-Baghdadi in doctrines, manners and [spiritual] purification."[386] Having said that, Sheikh Ahmad al-Tayeb excluded the "Salafists" from the term of Ahluls Sunna (Sunnis) stating that Salafists – also known as Wahhabis – are not from among the Sunnis.[387]

Non-religious motivations

According to at least one critic, the 1744–1745 alliance between Ibn Abdul Wahhab and the tribal chief Muhammad bin Saud to wage jihad on neighboring allegedly false Muslims, was a "consecration" by Ibn Abdul Wahhab of bin Saud tribe's long-standing raids on neighboring oases by "renaming those raids jihad." Part of the Najd's "Hobbesian state of perpetual war pitted Bedouin tribes against one another for control of the scarce resources that could stave off starvation." And a case of substituting fath, "the 'opening' or conquest of a vast territory through religious zeal", for the "instinctive fight for survival and appetite for lucre." [342]

Wahhabism in the United States

A study conducted by the NGO Freedom House found Wahhabi publications in mosques in the United States. These publications included statements that Muslims should not only "always oppose" infidels "in every way", but "hate them for their religion . . . for Allah's sake", that democracy "is responsible for all the horrible wars ... [and] the number of wars it started in the 20th century alone is more than 130 wars", and that Shia and certain Sunni Muslims were infidels.[388][389]

A review of the study by the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated[390] Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU) complained that the study cited documents from only a few mosques, arguing that most mosques in the U.S. are not under Wahhabi influence.[391] ISPU comments on the study were not entirely negative:

American-Muslim leaders must thoroughly scrutinize this study. Despite its limitations, the study highlights an ugly undercurrent in modern Islamic discourse that American Muslims must openly confront. However, in the vigor to expose strains of extremism, we must not forget that open discussion is the best tool to debunk the extremist literature rather than a suppression of First Amendment rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.[391]

Concern has been expressed over the fact that U.S. university branches, like the Georgetown School of Foreign Service and the Northwestern school of Journalism, housed in the Wahhabi country of Qatar, are exposed to the extremist propaganda espoused by Wahhabist imams who preach at the Qatar Foundation's mosque in Education City. Education City, a large campus where U.S. and European universities reside, hosted a series of religious prayers and lectures as part of a month-long annual Ramadan program in 2015. The prayers and lectures were held at Education City's new lavish mosque in Doha. Education City also affords campus space to other American universities such as Texas A&M and Carnegie Mellon.

Among those who have attended Education City lectures is a Saudi preacher who described the Charlie Hebdo massacre in Paris as "the sequel to the comedy film of 9/11", and another cleric who wrote, "Jews and their helpers must be destroyed."[392] The mosque in Education City has hosted extremist Anti-Semitic Wahhabi preachers speaking against "Zionist aggressors" in their sermons, and calling upon Allah "to count them in number and kill them completely, do not spare a [single] one of them."[392] Qatar has reportedly sent Jewish professors back to America,[393] and students attending American universities in Qatar are reportedly required to dress in a manner respectful to Wahhabism.[394]

European expansion

There has been much concern, expressed in both American and European media and scholarship, over the fact that Wahhabi countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar have been financing mosques and buying up land all over Europe. Belgium, Ireland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy have all noted the growing influence that these Wahhabi countries have over territory and religion in Europe.[395]

The concern resonates at a local level in Europe as well. In 2016, the citizens of Brussels, Belgium overturned a 2015 decision to build a 600-person mosque next to the Qatari embassy. Fear largely emanates from the fact that Belgian citizens see the mosque as an opportunity for a Wahhabi country to exert control over Muslims in Europe, thus spreading the more extreme sect of Islam.[395]

Several articles have been written that list the Cork Islamic Cultural Center as an example of one of many properties throughout Europe, paid for by the Qatari government, in an effort to spread an extreme and intolerant form of Islam known as Wahhabism.

The Assalam Mosque is located in Nantes, France was also a source on some controversy. Construction on the mosque began in 2009 and was completed in 2012. It is the largest mosque in its region in France. The mosque is frequently listed among examples of Qatar's efforts to export Wahhabism, their extreme and often intolerant version of Islam, throughout Europe.[395][396]

Some of the initiatives of the Cultural Islamic Center Sesto San Giovanni in Italy, funded by Qatar Charity, have also raised concerns due to its ties to Wahhabbism. The Consortium Against Terrorist Finance (CATF) said that the mosque has a history of affiliation and cooperation with extremists and terrorists.[397] CATF notes that Qatar Charity "was named as a major financial conduit for al-Qaeda in judicial proceedings following the attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania", supported al-Qaeda operatives in Northern Mali, and was "heavily involved in Syria."[397]

Munich Forum for Islam (MFI), also known as the Center for Islam in Europe-Munich (ZIEM), was another controversial initiative largely financed by the Wahhabi Gulf country of Qatar.[395] In 2013 German activists filed a lawsuit in opposition to the construction of the mosque. These activists expressed fear that the Qatari government aimed to build Mosques all over Europe to spread Wahhabism. But the government quashed the lawsuit. In addition to this 2014 ruling, another court ordered an anti-mosque protester to pay a fine for defaming Islam when the protester claimed that Wahhabi Islam is incompatible with democracy.

The Islamic Cultural Center in Luxembourg was also funded by Qatar in what some note is an attempt by Qatar to spread Wahhabism in Europe.[398]

Destruction of Islam's early historical sites

Main article: Destruction of early Islamic heritage sites in Saudi Arabia

The Wahhabi teachings disapprove of "veneration of the historical sites associated with early Islam", on the grounds that "only God should be worshipped" and "that veneration of sites associated with mortals leads to idolatry".[399] However, critics point out that no Muslims venerate buildings or tombs as it is a shirk. Muslims visiting the resting places of Ahl al-Bayt or Sahabah still pray to Allah alone while remembering the Prophet's companions and family members. Many buildings associated with early Islam, including mazaar, mausoleums and other artifacts have been destroyed in Saudi Arabia by Wahhabis from the early 19th century through the present day.[45][46] This practice has proved controversial and has received considerable criticism from Sufi and Shia Muslims and in the non-Muslim world.

Ironically, despite Wahhabi destruction of many Islamic, non-Islamic, and historical sites associated with the first Muslims, the Prophet's family and his companions, and the strict prohibition of visiting such sites (including mosques), the Saudi government renovated the tomb of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab turning his birthplace into a major tourist attraction and an important place of visitation within the kingdom's modern borders.[400]

• 
  Ottoman return of Mecca 1813 after being ousted by Salafis.
• 
  Battle of Medina (1812), Ottoman Army regains Medina from Salafis.
• 
  Ottoman loyalists gather against the Arab Revolt.
• 
  Al-Baqi' before the demolition by king Ibn Saud in 1925.[401]
• 
  The grave of Aminah; it was destroyed in 1998 by the Saudi Arabian government.

See also

• Aqidah
• Decline and modernization of the Ottoman Empire
• Destruction of early Islamic heritage sites in Saudi Arabia
• Fitnat al-Wahhabiyya
• International propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism
• Islamic fundamentalism
• Islamic schools and branches
• Memoirs of Mr. Hempher, The British Spy to the Middle East
• Muslim World League
• Ottoman–Saudi War
• Petro-Islam
• Quran
• Schools of Islamic theology
• Sufi–Salafi relations
• Takfirism
• Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad
• Wahhabi War

References

Notes

1. 
    • WAHHABIYYA, a term used to denote (a) the doctrine and (b) the followers of Krishna. cAbd al-Wahhab. Brill Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed
    • Wahhābīyah An eighteenth-century religious revival (tajdīd) and reform (islāh) movement founded in Nejd in Saudi Arabia by the scholar and jurist Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (1702/3–1791/2). The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World
    • WAHHABIYAH An Islamic renewal group established by Muhammad ibn EAlllll abhi.. l-Wahhab (d. AH 1206/1792 CE), the Wahhabıyah continues to the present in the Arabian Peninsula. The term Wahhabı was originally used by opponents of the movement, who charged that it was a new form of Islam, but the name eventually gained wide acceptance. Encyclopedia of Religion 2nd ed (MacMillan) Infact the wahabbis and Saudi tribes were supported by British forces to establish their nation, during that time ottomans where dominating the region and that british spy workers found using this filthy elements like new so called Salafi reformers against the Ottamans would be the righteous way to gain for their mutual benefits, thia salafist were even attacked masjidul haram
    • Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad (1703–92) Founder of a revivalist and reformist religious movement centered in Najd in central Arabia and commonly referred to as the Wahhabiyya or Wahhabis, The Princeton Encyclopeidia of Islamic Political Thought
    • Wahhabis Eighteenth-century reformist/revivalist movement for sociomoral reconstruction of society. (The Oxford Dictionary of Islam)
    • MUWAHHIDUN The movement was started by a religious scholar from Najd (Saudi Arabia), Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792), schooled by ulama (Islamic clergy) in what is now Iraq, Iran, and the Hijaz (western Arabia). The Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa (2nd Edition) (MacMillan)
    • The Wahhabiyya is a conservative reform movement launched in eighteenth-century Arabia by Muhammad b.Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792).Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim world (MacMillan)
    • Wahhabism (Arabic: Wahhabiyya) Named after its founder, Muhammad ibn abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792), Wahhabism is the most important form of militant Islamic reformism to arise in the Arabian Peninsula. [...] It refers to a set of doctrines and practices and to a sectarian movement comprised of those who embrace them. Encyclopedia of Islam, InfoBase
    • Wahhabism. Wahhabism refers to a conservative interpretation of Islam founded as a revival and reform movement in eighteenth-century Arabia (Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern World)
    • Wahabism An Islamic movement which developed during the eighteenth century in central Arabia, providing a rigorous, puritanical interpretation of Sunni teaching. (A Dictionary of Contemporary World History (3 ed.), Oxford)
    • Wahhābī ISLAMIC MOVEMENT Wahhābī, also spelled Wahābī, any member of the Muslim reform movement founded by Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb in the 18th century in Najd, central Arabia, and adopted in 1744 by the Saʿūdī family. (Encyclopedia Britannica)
    • Wahhābīya An ultra-conservative, puritanical Muslim movement adhering to the Ḥanbalite law, although it regards itself as ghair muqallidīn, non-adherent to parties, but defending truth. (The Concise Oxford Dictionary of World Religions, Oxford)

Citations

1. Mark Juergensmeyer; Wade Clark Roof, eds. (2011). "Wahhabis". Encyclopedia of Global Religion. SAGE Publications. p. 1369. ISBN 9781452266565.
2. "Analysis Wahhabism". PBS Frontline. Retrieved 13 May 2014. For more than two centuries, Wahhabism has been Saudi Arabia's dominant creed. It is an austere form of Sunni Islam that insists on a literal interpretation of the Quran. Wahhabis believe that all those who don't practice their form of Islam are heathens and enemies. Critics say that Wahhabism's rigidity has led it to misinterpret and distort Islam, pointing to extremists such as Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. Wahhabism's explosive growth began in the 1970s when Saudi charities started funding Wahhabi schools (madrassas) and mosques from Islamabad to Culver City, California.
3. Schwartz, Steven. "Saudi Arabia and the Rise of the Wahhabi Threat". meforum. Retrieved 24 June 2014.
4. Kampeas, Ron. "Fundamentalist Wahhabism Comes to U.S." Belief.net, Associate Press. Retrieved 27 February 2014.
5. "Wahhabi". Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Retrieved 12 December 2010.
6. Haykel 2013, p. 231.
7. Commins, David (2006). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B. Tauris. p. vi. ISBN 9781845110802. wahhabism.
8. Valentine, Simon (9 January 2015). Force and Fanaticism. Oxford University Press. pp. 16–17. ISBN 9781849046152. Retrieved 24 July 2016. The majority of mainstream Sunni and Shia Muslims worldwide would strongly disagree with the interpretation of Wahhabism outlined above. Rather than see Wahhabism as a reform movement, many Muslims would reject it in the strongest terms as firqa, a new faction, a vile sect.
9. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. viv. While Wahhabism claims to represent Islam in its purest form, other Muslims consider it a misguided creed that fosters intolerance, promotes simplistic theology, and restricts Islam's capacity for adaption to diverse and shifting circumstances.
10. Wiktorowicz, Quintan. "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement" in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 29 (2006): p. 235, footnote.
11. DeLong-Bas, Natana J. (2004). Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (First ed.). Oxford University Press, USA. pp. 123–24. ISBN 0-19-516991-3. Wahhabism has become [...] a blanket term for any Islamic movement that has an apparent tendency toward misogyny, militantism, extremism, or strict and literal interpretation of the Quran and hadith
12. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. ix. Thus, the mission's devotees contend that 'Wahhabism' is a misnomer for their efforts to revive correct Islamic belief and practice. Instead of the Wahhabi label, they prefer either Salafi, one who follows the ways of the first Muslim ancestors (salaf), or muwahhid, one who professes God's unity.
13. see also: Glasse, Cyril, The New Encyclopedia of Islam, Rowman & Littlefield, (2001), pp. 469–72
14. Esposito 2003, p. 333 harvnb error: multiple targets (3×): CITEREFEsposito2003 (help)
15. V. G. Julie Rajan Al Qaeda's Global Crisis: The Islamic State, Takfir and the Genocide of Muslims Routledge 2015 ISBN 978-1-317-64538-2 page 76
16. Brown 2009, p. 245.
17. Delong-Bas 2004, pp. 41-42.
18. Laoust, H. (2012) [1993]. "Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb". In Bearman, P. J.; Bianquis, Th.; Bosworth, C. E.; van Donzel, E. J.; Heinrichs, W. P. (eds.). Encyclopaedia of Islam (2nd ed.). Leiden: Brill Publishers. doi:10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_3033. ISBN 978-90-04-16121-4.
19. Michael Sells, Professor of History and Literature of Islam and Comparative Literature at the Divinity School of the University of Chicago (22 December 2016). "Wahhabist Ideology: What It Is And Why It's A Problem". The Huffington Post. New York. Retrieved 10 June 2020.
20. Commins, David (2006). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 7. ISBN 9780857731357. The Wahhabi religious reform movement arose in Najd, the vast, thinly populated heart of Central Arabia.
21. "Wahhabi". GlobalSecurity.org. 27 April 2005. Archived from the original on 7 May 2005. Retrieved 10 May 2008.
22. Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom: Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia. Viking. pp. 10–11. the two ... concluded a pact. Ibn Saud would protect and propagate the stern doctrines of the Wahhabi mission, which made the Koran the basis of government. In return, Abdul Wahhab would support the ruler, supplying him with 'glory and power'. Whoever championed his message, he promised, 'will, by means of it, rule and lands and men'.
23. Glasse, Cyril (2001). The New Encyclopedia of Islam. AltaMira Press. p. 469. A sect dominant in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, at the beginning of the 19th century it gained footholds in India, Africa, and elsewhere.
24. Izady, Mehrdad (2014) [1999]. "Demography of Religion in the Gulf". Mehrdad Izady.
25. Kepel, Gilles (2002). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. I.B.Tauris. p. 61. ISBN 9781845112578. ... the financial clout of Saudi Arabia [that] had been amply demonstrated during the oil embargo against the United States, following the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. This show of international power, along with the nation's astronomical increase in wealth, allowed Saudi Arabia's puritanical, conservative Wahhabite faction to attain a preeminent position of strength in the global expression of Islam.
26. Abou El Fadl, Khaled (2005), The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists, Harper San Francisco, pp. 70–2.
27. "What is Wahhabism? The reactionary branch of Islam said to be 'the main source of global terrorism'". The Telegraph. Retrieved 16 December 2016.
28. DAOUD, KAMEL (16 November 2017). "If Saudi Arabia Reforms, What Happens to Islamists Elsewhere?". New York Times. Retrieved 16 November 2017.
29. Ibrahim, Youssef Michel (11 August 2002). "The Mideast Threat That's Hard to Define". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 4 September 2014. Retrieved 21 August 2014.
30. Dillon, Michael R. (September 2009). "Wahabism: Is it a Factor in the Spread of Global Terrorism?" (PDF). Naval Post-Graduate School. pp. 3–4. Retrieved 2 April 2014. Hamid Algar ... emphasizes the strong influence of the Saudi petrodollar in the propagation of Wahhabism, but also attributes the political situation of the Arab world at the time as a contributing factor that led to the co-opting of Salafism ... Khaled Abou El Fadl ... expresses the opinion that Wahhabism would not have been able to spread in the modern Muslim world ... it would have to be spread under the banner of Salafism. This attachment of Wahhabism to Salafism was needed as Salafism was a much more 'credible paradigm in Islam'; making it an ideal medium for Wahhabism ... The co-opting of Salafism by Wahhabism was not completed until the 1970s when the Wahhabis stripped away some of their extreme intolerance and co-opted the symbolism and language of Salafism; making them practically indistinguishable.
31. Stephane Lacroix, Al-Albani's Revolutionary Approach to Hadith. Leiden University's ISIM Review, Spring 2008, No. 21.
32. (Salafism has been termed a hybridation between the teachings of Ibn Abdul-Wahhab and others which have taken place since the 1960s) Stephane Lacroix, Al-Albani's Revolutionary Approach to Hadith. Leiden University's ISIM Review, Spring 2008, No. 21.
33. GlobalSecurity.org Salafi Islam
34. "Washington Post, For Conservative Muslims, Goal of Isolation a Challenge". Retrieved 13 November 2014.
35. John L. Esposito (13 July 2011). What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam. Oxford University Press. p. 54. ISBN 9780199794133.
36. Other sources give far lower numbers of Shia though they do not estimate the number of Wahhabi
    (15% of KSA is Shia. sources: Saudi Arabia's Shia press for rights| bbc|by Anees al-Qudaihi | 24 March 2009; and Council on Foreign Relations| Author: Lionel Beehner| 16 June 2006; Vali Nasr, Shia Revival, (2006) p. 236)
37. Valentine, Simon (9 January 2015). Force and Fanaticisim. Oxford. p. 17. ISBN 9781849046169. Retrieved 25 October 2017.Offline, ulema, such as those at the prestigious Al-Azhar University in Cairo (the Oxford University of the Sunni Muslim World) similarly, regularly denounce wahhabism as 'a satanic faith which has led to division, debate, dishonesty and mistrust of muslims'.
38. Haider, Murtaza (22 July 2013). "European Parliament identifies Wahabi and Salafi roots of global terrorism". Dawn.com. Retrieved 3 August 2014.
39. "Terrorism: Growing Wahhabi Influence in the United States" (PDF). US GPO. 26 June 2003. Journalists and experts, as well as spokespeople of the world, have said that Wahhabism is the source of the overwhelming majority of terrorist atrocities in today's world, from Morocco to Indonesia, via Israel, Saudi Arabia, Chechnya. Jon Kyl, US Senator for Arizona
40. Partick Cockburn, The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution. Verso 2014. p. 6
41. Commins, David (2006). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (PDF). I.B.Tauris. p. vi. [T]he pivotal idea in Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teaching determines whether one is a Muslim or an infidel. In his opinion, Muslims who disagreed with his definition of monotheism were not heretics, that is to say, misguided Muslims, but outside the pale of Islam altogether
42. Blanchard, Christopher M. "The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya" (PDF). Updated January 24, 2008. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved 12 March 2014.
43. Glasse, Cyril (2001). The New Encyclopedia of Islam. AltaMira Press. p. 470. Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab branded all who disagreed with him as heretics and apostates, thereby justifying the use of force in imposing his doctrine, and political suzerainty with it, on neighboring tribes. It allowed him to declare holy war (jihad), otherwise legally impossible, against other Muslims. To this end, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab also taught the use of firearms in place of the sword and the lance, the traditional weapons of the desert.
44. Mouzahem, Haytham (20 April 2013). "Saudi Wahhabi Sheikh Calls on Iraq's Jihadists to Kill Shiites". Al-Monitor. al-monitor. Archived from the original on 24 August 2014. Retrieved 18 August 2014.
45. Rabasa, Angel; Benard, Cheryl (2004). "The Middle East: Cradle of the Muslim World". The Muslim World After 9/11. Rand Corporation. p. 103, note 60. ISBN 0-8330-3712-9.
46. Howden, Daniel (6 August 2005). "The destruction of Mecca: Saudi hardliners are wiping out their own heritage". The Independent. Retrieved 21 December 2009.
47. Finn, Helena Kane (8 October 2002). "Cultural Terrorism and Wahhabi Islam". Council on Foreign Relations. Archived from the original on 4 September 2014. Retrieved 5 August 2014. It is the undisputed case that the Taliban justification for this travesty [the destruction of the Buddha statues at Bamiyan] can be traced to the Wahhabi indoctrination program prevalent in the Afghan refugee camps and Saudi-funded Islamic schools (madrasas) in Pakistan that produced the Taliban ... In Saudi Arabia itself, the destruction has focused on the architectural heritage of Islam's two holiest cities, Mecca and Medina, where Wahhabi religious foundations, with state support, have systematically demolished centuries-old mosques and mausolea, as well as hundreds of traditional Hijazi mansions and palaces.
48. Kepel, Gilles (2004). The War for Muslim Minds. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. p. 157.
49. Mahdi, Wael (18 March 2010). "There is no such thing as Wahabism, Saudi prince says". The National. Abu Dhabi Media. Retrieved 12 June 2014.
50. Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World. MacMillan Reference. 2004. p. 727.
51. Esposito, John L., ed. (15 May 2003). "(entry for Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab)". The Oxford Dictionary of Islam. Oxford University Press. p. 123. ISBN 9780199757268.
52. Muhammad Asad, The Road to Mecca, ISBN 978-0930452797
53. Moussalli, Ahmad (January 2009). "Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who Is The Enemy?" (PDF). Conflicts Forum Monograph. Retrieved 8 June 2014.
54. DeLong-Bas, Natana J. (2004). Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (First ed.). Oxford University Press, USA. pp. 123–24. ISBN 0-19-516991-3.
55. In the US the term "Wahhabi" was used in the 1950s to refer to "puritan Muslims", according to Life magazine. "The King of Arabia". Life. 31 May 1943. p. 72. ISSN 0024-3019. Retrieved 22 June 2013.
56. Hoffman, Valerie (2012). The Essentials of Ibadi Islam. p. 19.
57. Bederka, Alan. "Wahhabism and Boko Haram" (PDF). Student Center for African Research and Resolutions. Archived from the original (PDF) on 27 July 2014. Retrieved 4 August 2014. Calling them Wahhabis implies that they learned ideas from a man – Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab – instead of the Qur'an and Sunnah the, two great sources of Islam.
58. Lacey, Robert (1981). The Kingdom. New York and London: Harcourt Brace Javonoich. p. 56.
59. Abou El Fadl, Khaled (2005). The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. Harper San Francisco. p. 57. ... the Wahhabis used to label themselves al-Muslimun (the Muslims) or al-Muwahidun (the monotheists), intimating that those who did not accept their creed were neither Muslims nor monotheists
60. Algar, Hamid (2002). Wahhabism: A Critical Essay. Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International. pp. 1–2. Wahhabis themselves prefer the titles al-Muwahhidun or Ahl al-Tauhid, 'the asserters of the divine unity.' But precisely this self-awarded title springs from a desire to lay exclusive claim to the principle of tawhid that is a foundation of Islam itself; it implies a dismissal of all other Muslims as tainted by shirk. There is no reason to acquiesce in this assumption of a monopoly, and because the movement in question was ultimately the work of one man, Muhammad b. abdal-Wahhab it is reasonable as well as conventional to speak of 'Wahhabism' and Wahhabis.
61. Glasse, Cyril (2001). The New Encyclopedia of Islam. AltaMira Press. p. 469. Adherents ... prefer to call themselves Muhwahhidun (Unitarians). However, this name is not often used, as [it] is associated with other completely different sects extant and defunct.
62. Gold, Dore (2003). Hatred's Kingdom (First ed.). Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing. p. 21.
63. Mark Durie (6 June 2013). "Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood: What is the difference?". Middle East Forum. Salafis themselves do not like being called Wahhabis, because to them it smacks of idolatry to name their movement after a recent leader. Instead they prefer to call themselves Ahl al-Sunnah "People of the Sunna".
64. According to author Abdul Aziz Qassim (source: Mahdi, Wael (18 March 2010). "There is no such thing as Wahabism, Saudi prince says". The National. Abu Dhabi Media. Retrieved 12 June 2014.)
65. Abou el Fadl, Khalid (2005). The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. Harper San Francisco. p. 57. ... the Wahhabis used to label themselves al-Muslimun (the Muslims) or al-Muwahidun (the monotheists), intimating that those who did not accept their creed were neither Muslims nor monotheists.
66. Wahhabism: Oxford Bibliographies Online Research Guide. Oxford University Press. 2010. p. 3. ISBN 9780199804344.
67. Bernard Haykel, Thomas Hegghammer, Stéphane Lacroix Saudi Arabia in Transition Cambridge University Press 2015 ISBN 978-1-107-00629-4 page 153
68. MacFarquhar, Neil (12 July 2002). "A Few Saudis Defy a Rigid Islam to Debate Their Own Intolerance". New York Times. Retrieved 4 May 2014. Wahhabi-inspired xenophobia dominates religious discussion in a way not found elsewhere in the Islamic world.
    Bookshops in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, for example, sell a 1,265-page souvenir tome that is a kind of "greatest hits" of fatwas on modern life. It is strewn with rulings on shunning non-Muslims: don't smile at them, don't wish them well on their holidays, don't address them as "friend."
    A fatwa from Sheik Muhammad bin Othaimeen, whose funeral last year attracted hundreds of thousands of mourners, tackles whether good Muslims can live in infidel lands. The faithful who must live abroad should "harbor enmity and hatred for the infidels and refrain from taking them as friends," it reads in part.
69. "There is no such thing as Wahabism, Saudi prince says". Retrieved 13 November 2014.
70. "Saudi Prince Salman: The Term 'Wahhabi' Was Coined by Saudi Arabia's Enemies". Archived from the original on 4 August 2016. Retrieved 13 November 2014.
71. Mattson, Ingrid (18 October 2001). "Ingrid Mattson: What is Islam? CNN Interview". Retrieved 23 October 2015.
72. "Saudi Arabia. Wahhabi Theology". December 1992. Library of Congress Country Studies. Retrieved 17 March 2014.
73. Riedel, Bruce O. (2011). "Saudi Arabia, Elephant in the Living Room". The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East. Brookings Institution Press. p. 160. ISBN 978-0815722274.
74. House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia : Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 150. ISBN 978-0307473288.
75. "Christopher M. Blanchard, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division", Congressional Research Service.
76. Murphy, Caryle (5 September 2006). "For Conservative Muslims, Goal of Isolation a Challenge". Washington Post. The kind of Islam practiced at Dar-us-Salaam, known as Salafism, once had a significant foothold among area Muslims, in large part because of an aggressive missionary effort by the government of Saudi Arabia. Salafism and its strict Saudi version, known as Wahhabism, struck a chord with many Muslim immigrants who took a dim view of the United States' sexually saturated pop culture and who were ambivalent about participating in a secular political system.
77. Lewis, Bernard (27 April 2006). "Islam and the West: A Conversation with Bernard Lewis (transcript)". pewforum.org. Pew. Retrieved 5 August 2014. There are others, the so-called Salafia. It's run along parallel lines to the Wahhabis, but they are less violent and less extreme – still violent and extreme but less so than the Wahhabis.
78. Mark Durie (6 June 2013). "Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood: What is the difference?". Middle East Forum. What is called Wahhabism – the official religious ideology of the Saudi state – is a form of Salafism. Strictly speaking, 'Wahhabism' is not a movement, but a label used mainly by non-Muslims to refer to Saudi Salafism, referencing the name of an influential 18th-century Salafi teacher, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab ... The continuing impact of Salafi dogma in Saudi Arabia means that Saudi leaders are active and diligent in funding and promoting Salafism all around the world. If there is a mosque receiving Saudi funding in your city today, in every likelihood it is a Salafi mosque. Saudi money has also leveraged Salafi teachings through TV stations, websites and publications.
79. Algar, Hamid (2002). Wahhabism: A Critical Essay. Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International. p. 47.
80. Abou El Fadl, Khaled (2005). The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. p. 75.
81. Kepel, Gilles (2003). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. I.B. Tauris. pp. 61–62. ISBN 9781845112578.
82. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 208. Much of Wahhabism's 20th-century experience has been the story of trade-offs for the sake of consolidating the position of its political guardian. The ulama gained control over education, law, public morality and religious institutions. In return, they only mildly objected to the import of modern technology and communications and did not hamper Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud's dealings with the British, non-Saudi Arabs and Americans.
83. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 156. The gradual erosion of Wahhabi credibility has been punctuated by three major crises ... [November 1979 seizure of Grand Mosque; [2] Iraq invasion of Kuwait; [3] 9/11]
84. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 156. [Wahhabi clerics] dependence on the Saudi government disposed leading Wahhabi clerics to support its policies. As political discontent in the kingdom intensified, the Wahhabi establishment found itself in the awkward position of defending and unpopular dynasty.
85. Kepel, Gilles (2004). The War for Muslim Minds. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. pp. 179. the ulama occupy center stage in times of crisis and turn the situation to their own advantage. But the 1980s iteration of this tradition, the religious leaders called upon by the royal family to reestablish moral order were not Wahhabite clerics but were rather sahwa militants
86. Long, David E (2005). "Saudi Arabia [review of Wahhabi Islam by Natana DeLong-Bas]". Middle East Journal. 59 (2): 316–19. JSTOR 4330135.
87. DeLong-Bas, Natana J. (1 January 2007). Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. I.B.Tauris. p. 17. ISBN 9781845113223.
88. DeLong-Bas, Natana J. (1 January 2007). Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. I.B.Tauris. p. 22. ISBN 9781845113223.
89. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. ix.
90. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. pp. xix, x. Muslims sharply disagree on this question of definition because the pivotal idea in Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teaching determines whether one is a Muslim or an infidel. In his opinion, Muslims who disagreed with his definition of monotheism were not heretics, that is to say, misguided Muslims, but outside the pale of Islam altogether ...
    "Most Muslims throughout history have accepted the position that declaring this profession of faith [the shahada] makes one a Muslim. One might or might not regularly perform the other obligatory rituals ... but ... any shortcomings would render one a sinner, not an unbeliever.
    Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab did not accept that view. He argued that the criterion for one's standing as either a Muslim or an unbeliever was correct worship as an expression of belief in one God ... any act or statement that indicates devotion to a being other than God is to associate another creature with God's power, and that is tantamount to idolatry (shirk). Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab included in the category of such acts popular religious practices that made holy men into intercessors with God. That was the core of the controversy between him and his adversaries, including his own brother.
91. Abou El Fadl, Khaled (2005). The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. Harper San Francisco. p. 51. Abd al-Wahhab described the Ottoman caliphate as al-dawlah al-kufriyya (a heretical nation) and claimed that supporting or allying oneself with the Ottomans was as grievous a sin as supporting or allying oneself with Christians or Jews.
92. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 24. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab ... insisted that invoking and making vows to holy men indeed constituted major idolatry and that it was proper to deem as infidels anyone who failed to view such practices as idolatry ... He then stated that if one admits that these practices are major idolatry, then fighting is a duty as part of the prophetic mission to destroy idols. Thus, the idolater who call upon a saint for help must repent, If he does so, his repentance is accepted. If not, he is to be killed. [source: Ibn Ghannam, Hussien, Tarikh najd. (Cairo 1961) p. 438] ... In the end, the debate ... was not settled by stronger argument but by force majeure through Saudi conquest, carried out in the name of holy war, or jihad.
93. Asthana, N. C.; Nirmal, Anjali (25 July 2009). Urban Terrorism: Myths and Realities. Pointer Publishers. ISBN 9788171325986 – via Google Books.
94. Oliver, Haneef James (2002). The Wahhabi Myth: Dispelling Prevalent Fallacies and the Fictitious Link with Bin Laden. Trafford Publishing. ISBN 978-1-55395-397-5.
95. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 18. In 1744, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab arrived in al-Dir'iyya ... This was the origin of the pact between religious mission and political power that has endured for more than two and half centuries, a pact that has survived traumatic defeats and episodes of complete collapse.
96. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 18. Muhammad ibn Saud declared his readiness to back the mission against unbelief and idolatry but insisted ... two conditions ... Second, that Sheikh Muhammad approve of Ibn Saud's taxation of al-Dir'iyya's harvests. The reformer ... replied that God might compensate the amir with booty and legitimate taxes greater than the taxes on harvests.
97. English, Jeanette M. (2011). "14". Infidel behind the paradoxical veil. 1 (first ed.). AuthorHouse™. p. 260. ISBN 978-1-4567-2810-6. LCCN 2011900551. Retrieved 11 April 2012. In the last years of the 18th century, Ibn Saud attempted to seize control of Arabia and its outer lying regions and his heirs spent the next 150 years in this pursuit. This was done at the expense of the overlords of the Ottoman Empire. Eventually, the house of Al Saud met with defeat at the hands of the Ottoman and Egyptian armies, resulting in the burning of Diriyah.
98. Ibrahim, Youssef Michel (11 August 2002). "The Mideast Threat That's Hard to Define". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 4 September 2014. Retrieved 21 August 2014. The Saudi minister of religion is always a member of the Al Sheikh family, descendants of Ibn Abdul Wahab. Moreover links between Ibn Abdul Wahab and the house of Saud have been sealed with multiple marriages.
99. "Saudi Arabia. Wahhabi Theology". December 1992. Library of Congress Country Studies. Retrieved 17 March 2014. Muhammad ibn Saud turned his capital, Ad Diriyah, into a center for the study of religion under the guidance of Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab and sent missionaries to teach the reformed religion throughout the peninsula, the gulf, and into Syria and Mesopotamia. Together they began a jihad against the backsliding Muslims of the peninsula. Under the banner of religion and preaching the unity of God and obedience to the just Muslim ruler, the Al Saud by 1803 had expanded their dominion across the peninsula from Mecca to Bahrain, installing teachers, schools, and the apparatus of state power. So successful was the alliance between the Al ash Shaykh and the Al Saud that even after the Ottoman sultan had crushed Wahhabi political authority and had destroyed the Wahhabi capital of Ad Diriyah in 1818, the reformed religion remained firmly planted in the settled districts of southern Najd and of Jabal Shammar in the north. It would become the unifying ideology in the peninsula when the Al Saud rose to power again in the next century.
100. At various times Ibn Abd al-Wahhab either waged not jihad but only qital (fighting) against unbelievers ... DeLong-Bas, Natana J. (2004). Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (First ed.). New York: Oxford University Press, USA. p. 203. ISBN 0-19-516991-3.
101. ... did not give his blessing to Ibn Saud's campaign of conquest,DeLong-Bas, Natana J. (2004). Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (First ed.). New York: Oxford University Press, USA. p. 35. ISBN 0-19-516991-3. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab promised not to interfere with Muhammad Ibn Saud's state consolidation, and Muhammad Ibn Saud promised to uphold Ibn Abd al Wahhab's religious teachings ...
     [But] there is a marked difference between noninterference in military activities and active support and religious legitimation for them ... Rather than actively supporting or promoting this conquest, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab merely 'acceded' to it, hoping that Ibn Saud would get his fill of conquest and then focus on more important matter – those pertaining to religious reform. In fact, as evidence of the lack of religious support this military conquest enjoyed, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab left Ibn Saud's company altogether during this campaign, devoting himself instead to spiritual matters and prayer
102. DeLong-Bas also maintains that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab waged jihad only in defense against aggressive opponents: DeLong-Bas, Natana J. (2004). Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (First ed.). New York: Oxford University Press, USA. p. 38. ISBN 0-19-516991-3. Opponents of the Wahhabi movement claimed religious justification for their military actions by accusing the Wahhabis of ignorance, sorcery and lies ... It was only at this point – when the Wahhabi community was threatened – that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab finally authorized a jihad as holy war to defend the Wahhabis. However, even this defensive jihad remained limited in scope, as fighting was permitted only against those who had either attacked or insulted his followers directly.
103. DeLong-Bas, Natana J. (2004). Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (First ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. p. 245. ISBN 0-19-516991-3.
104. DeLong-Bas, Natana J. (2004). Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (First ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 247–50. ISBN 0-19-516991-3.
105. Simon Ross Valentine (2015). Force and Fanaticism: Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia and Beyond (First ed.). London: C. Hurst & Co. p. 49. ISBN 978-1849044646.
106. "Saudi Arabia. Wahhabi Theology". December 1992. Library of Congress Country Studies. Retrieved 17 March 2014. Muhammad ibn Saud turned his capital, Ad Diriyah, into a center for the study of religion under the guidance of Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab and sent missionaries to teach the reformed religion throughout the peninsula, the gulf, and into Syria and Mesopotamia. Together they began a jihad against the backsliding Muslims of the peninsula. Under the banner of religion and preaching the unity of God and obedience to the just Muslim ruler, the Al Saud by 1803 had expanded their dominion across the peninsula from Mecca to Bahrain, installing teachers, schools, and the apparatus of state power. So successful was the alliance between the Al ash Shaykh and the Al Saud that even after the Ottoman sultan had crushed Wahhabi political authority and had destroyed the Wahhabi capital of Ad Diriyah in 1818, the reformed religion remained firmly planted in the settled districts of southern Najd and of Jabal Shammar in the north. It would become the unifying ideology in the peninsula when the Al Saud rose to power again in the next century.
107. Olivier Roy, Antoine Sfeir, ed. (2007). Columbia World Dictionary of Islamism. Columbia University Press. pp. 399–400. The history of the Al Sa'ud dynasty is, therefore, one of political expansion based on the Wahhabi doctrine. After the conclusion of the pact of 1744, Muhammad Ibn Sa'ud, who at the time ruled only the Najd village of Dir'iya, embarked on the conquest of neighboring settlements, destroying idols and obliging his new subjects to submit to Wahhabi Islam.
108. "Wahhabism – A Critical Essay". 11 February 2005. Archived from the original on 11 February 2005.CS1 maint: BOT: original-url status unknown (link)
109. Khatab, Sayed (2011). Understanding Islamic Fundamentalism: The Theological and Ideological Basis of Al-Qa'ida's Political Tactics. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9789774164996. Retrieved 8 September 2016.
110. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 31. ISBN 9780857731357. ... al-Jabarti reported the 1803 masacre at Ta'if, where Wahhabi forces slaughtered the men and enslaved the women and children.
111. Kamal S. Salibi (25 December 1998). The Modern History of Jordan. I.B.Tauris. p. 31. ISBN 9781860643316. Retrieved 8 June 2016.
112. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 38. Ibrahim's ruthless prosecution of the war, al-Dir'iyya's leveling and the exile of the emirate's political and religious leadership gave the same impression to a sojourning European as it did to Arabian Bedouins and townsmen: The Saudi emirate and the Wahahbi mission had been crushed once and for all.
113. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 41.
114. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 69. Wahhabism retained hegemony over Najd's religious life because of the political shelter provided by Saudi power. In turn, the Saudi realm could maintain its independence vis-a-vis Istanbul because of physical and technological factors: Its geographical isolation, its lack of valuable resources, the limits of nineteenth-century communications, transportation and military technologies made conquest and pacification too costly for both Cairo and Istanbul. These outside powers decided to leave the Saudis alone so long as they did not revive the first amirate's impulse for expansion through jihad and refrained from attacking Hijaz, Iraq and Syria.
115. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 69. Outside of al-Qasim, the Rashidis left Wahhabi ulama in place a qadis throughout Najd, including the amirate's capital Ha'il. By the 1880s, generations of Najdi townsmen had lived in a Wahhabi milieu. The strict monotheistic doctrine had been naturalized as the native religious culture.
116. Lacey, The Kingdom, 1981, p.525
117. "Imam Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, Ibn Saud information resource". Archived from the original on 3 March 2012. Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab sought the protection of Muhammad bin Saud, in Ad-Dariyah, the home of the House of Saud... ... they had interests in common, pre-eminently a desire to see all the Arabs of the Peninsula brought back to Islam in its simplest and purest form. In 1744, they therefore took an oath that they would work together to achieve this end.
118. bin Zini Dahlan, Ahmad (1997). futuhat al-Islamiyya ba'd Mudiy al-Futuhat al-Nabawiyya. Beirut: Dar Sidir. pp. 2:234–45.
119. Algar, Hamid (2002). Wahhabism: a Critical Essay. Islamic Publications International. p. 42.
120. Van der Meulen, D. (15 October 2000). The Wells of Ibn Sa'ud. Routledge. pp. 62–113. ISBN 978-0710306760.
121. Simons, Geoff (1998). Saudi Arabia: the Shape of Client Feudalism. Palgrave, UK; MacMillan, US. pp. 151–73.
122. Blanchard, Christopher M. "The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya" (PDF). Updated January 24, 2008. Congressional Research Service. pp. 2–3. Retrieved 4 May 2014. Since the foundation of the modern kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932, there has been a close relationship between the Saudi ruling family and the Wahhabi religious establishment.3 Wahhabi-trained Bedouin warriors known as the Ikhwan were integral to the Al Saud family's military campaign to reconquer and unify the Arabian peninsula from 1912 until an Ikhwan rebellion was put down by force in 1930. Thereafter, Wahhabi clerics were integrated into the new kingdom's religious and political establishment, and Wahhabi ideas formed the basis of the rules and laws adopted to govern social affairs in Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism also shaped the kingdom's judicial and educational policies. Saudi schoolbooks historically have denounced teachings that do not conform to Wahhabist beliefs, an issue that remains controversial within Saudi Arabia and among outside observers.
123. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. pp. 102–3. What we do know is that Ibn Saud hewed to the dynastic tradition of supporting Wahhabi ulama and giving them control over religious institutions. At the same time, he tempered Wahhabi zeal when he felt that it clashed with the demands of consolidating power in Hijaz and al-Hasa or the constraints of firmer international boundaries maintained by the era's dominant power in the region, Great Britain. Simply put, political considerations trumped religious idealism. The same principle governed Ibn Saud's approach to adopting modern technology, building a rudimentary administrative framework and signing the oil concession with the Americans.
124. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 88.
125. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (PDF). I.B.Tauris. p. 77. The Ikhwan pressed for strict adherence to Wahhabi norms, but Ibn Saud was willing to take a more relaxed approach to matters like smoking tobacco and worship at shrines
126. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. pp. 76–7. Wahhabi ulama ordered the demolition of several Shiite mosques and took over teaching and preaching duties at the remaining mosques in order to convert the population ... some Shiites emigrated to Bahrain and Iraq ... The intensive phase of Wahhabi coercion lasted about one year. When ibn Saud decided to curb the Ikhwan, he permitted the shiites to drive away Wahhabi preachers.
127. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 78. Ibn Saud designated local dignitaries in Mecca and Jeddah to enforce loosely the Wahhabi prohibition of tobacco, alcohol, playing cards and the phonograph. The outcome of this approach was the preservation of a more relaxed atmosphere in Hijaz than in Najd. Standards would stiffen when Ibn Saud arrived for the pilgrimage with a retinue of Wahhabi ulama and then slacken with his departure ...[Ibn Saud] even pioneered the use of automobiles to transport pilgrims from Jeddah to Mecca over the objections of Wahhabi ulama who considered them a prohibited innovation. In another sign of Ibn Saud's willingness to disregard Wahhabi sensibilities, he allowed Shiites to perform the pilgrimage.
128. Cook, Michael (2001). Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought. Cambridge University Press.
129. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 95. [the first] documented instance of a formal committee to enforces the duty dates to 1926, [when the official Saudi newspaper in Mecca published the news of its establishment]
130. "The First Ikhwan Rebellion 1927–1928. Wars of the World". Globe University. Retrieved 29 April 2014. They attacked Ibn Sa'ud for introducing such innovations as telephones, automobiles, and the telegraph and for sending his son to a country of unbelievers (Egypt). Despite Ibn Sa'ud's attempts to mollify the Ikhwan by submitting their accusations to the religious scholars ('ulama'), they provoked an international incident by destroying an Iraqi force that had violated a neutral zone established by Great Britain and Ibn Sa'ud between Iraq and Arabia (1927–28); the British bombed Najd in retaliation.
131. "University of Central Arkansas, Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf Region".
132. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. pp. 47–9. Ibn Atiq considered the first category, those who willingly fall in with the idolaters to be infidels ... Those in the second category are not infidels but sinners because they stay with idolaters for the sake of wealth or preserving family ties; ... it is a sin, however, to remain in their land even if in one's heart one hates the idolaters ... Those in the third category are free of any blame. They openly practise religion or are compelled to reside among idolaters ... For the rest of the nineteenth century strict enforcement of this aversion to mixing with idolaters – and in Wahhabi terms, most Muslims fell into that category – would remain the norm of in Wahhabi discourse.
133. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 130.
134. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 130.
135. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 144. Ahl-i Hadith scholars and Wahhabis agreed that Sufis and Shiites were not true believers. The movement also shared with the Wahhabis that desire to revive the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya and a tendency to express intolerance toward other Muslims (Ahl-i Hadith preachers compared Delhi's Muslims to idolaters).
136. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 134. Alusi began a campaign against ritual innovations in Sufi orders like music, dance and veneration of saints' tombs
137. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 133.
138. Algar, Hamid (2002). Wahhabism: A Critical Essay. Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International. p. 46. Rashid Rida (d. 1935) ... After a visit to the newly conquered Hijaz, he published a work praising the Saudi ruler as the savior of the Haramayn and a practitioner of authentic Islamic rule and, two years later, an anthology of Wahhabi treatises. [why?] ... the aftermath of World War One saw both the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate and the failure of Sharif Husay to gain either a pan-Arab kingdom or acceptance by Muslim as a candidate for a revived caliphate. It is, then perhaps, not surprising that persons of salafi tendency ... casting around in desperation for a hero, should have begun to view Ibn Sa'ud with favor and to express sympathy for Wahhabism.
139. However, Rida had some liberal religious ideas and after his death his works were banned in Saudi Arabia.Abou El Fadl, Khaled (2005). The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. Harper San Francisco. p. 92. Rida's liberal ideas and writings were fundamentally inconsistent with Wahhabism, and this is why after Rida's death, the Wahhabis regularly condemned and maligned Rida. … the Saudis banned the writings of Rida, successfully preventing the republication of his work even in Egypt, and generally speaking made his books very difficult to locate
140. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 138.
141. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 103. By the early 1950s, Saudi Arabia was by no means a modern state ... Nevertheless, the twin pressures of controlling regions outside the Wahhabi heartland and navigating the currents of regional politics led him to take steps that punctured the seal between the internal land of belief and the outside land of idolatry.
142. see also Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 155.
143. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. pp. 151–52. in the 1950s and 1960s, two dramatic shift in Arab regional and Saudi domestic politics brought Islam to the fore as an element in the kingdom's international relations ...[1] the polarization of Arab politics between revolutionary (republican, nationalist) regimes and conservative monarchies and, [2] in the domestic realm, the assimilation of political ideologies sweeping nearby Arab lands.
144. Algar, Hamid (2002). Wahhabism: A Critical Essay. Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International. p. 49. It was in the bosom of this organization, intended to eclipse all other supranational Islamic organizations, that a closer association between leading Salafis and Wahhabis came into being. Its constituent council, which met for the first time in December 1962, was headed by the then chief mufti of Saudi Arabia, Muhammad b. Ibrahim Al al-Shaykh, a lineal descendant of Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab, and the presidency remains to this day vested in the Saudi chief mufti. Included among its eight other members were important representatives of the Salafi tendency: Sa'id Ramadan, son-in-law of Hasan al-Banna ... Maulana Abu l-A'la Maududi ... Maulanda Abu 'l-Hasan Nadvi (d. 2000) of India. In accordance with statute, the head of the league's secretariat has always been a Saudi citizen, the first to occupy the post being Muhammad Surur al-Sabban.
145. Robinson, Francis (November 2006). "review of The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia". Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society. 16 (3): 320–22. doi:10.1017/s1356186306286474. JSTOR 25188657. Then, the book [The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia] widens its focus to embrace the world beyond Arabia and to demonstrate how the Wahhabis and Islamic revivalists in the world beyond, members of the Muslim Brotherhood and supporters of the Ahl-i Hadith and the Jamaat-i Island, found common cause in their rejection of the West and its ways which were so deleterious of Muslim piety and values.
146. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 153. The League also sent missionaries to West Africa, where it funded schools, distributed religious literature and gave scholarships to attend Saudi religious universities. These efforts bore fruit in Nigeria's Muslim northern region with the creation of a movement (the Izala Society) dedicated to wiping out ritual innovations. Essential texts for members of the Izala Society are Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab's treatise of God's unity and commentaries by his grandsons.
147. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (PDF). I.B.Tauris. p. 5. The decision to offer asylum to Muslim Brothers fleeing persecution at the hands of secular Arab regimes was part of an effort to consolidate the bastion of Islam against atheist currents. No one could have foreseen that the Muslim Brothers would successfully spread their ideas in the kingdom and erode Wahhabism's hegemony.
148. "In Depth Profile: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood". Al Jazeera. 6 February 2011. ... targets of state repression. When Gamal Abdel Nasser took over Egypt in 1952, the Muslim Brotherhood is said to have welcomed the coup, but this budding relationship did not last. An attempted assassination on Nasser in 1954, blamed by the authorities on elements of the Brotherhood, saw the movement face a crackdown that led to the imprisonment of Qutb and other members. In 1956, the organisation was repressed and banned and Qutb was executed in 1966. However, it continued to grow, albeit underground.
149. Godlas, Alan. "The Muslim Brotherhood in 'Iraq Until 1991". University of Georgia. Retrieved 12 June 2014.
150. Kepel, Gilles (2004). The War for Muslim Minds. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. p. 156. In the melting pot of Arabia during the 1960s, local clerics trained in the Wahhabite tradition joined with activists and militants affiliated with the Muslim Brothers who had been exiled from the neighboring countries of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq – then allies of Moscow.
151. House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia: Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 144. In the 1960s, when Faisal became king, he championed the creation of public schools across the kingdom for boys—and also girls. The largely illiterate nation had few qualified teachers, so the government dispatched emissaries abroad, mostly to Egypt and Jordan, to recruit teachers with substantive skills who also were devout Muslims. A hallmark of King Faisal's reign was an effort to create an Islamic alliance in the Middle East to counter the Arab nationalism of Egypt's president, Gamel Abdel Nasser. When Nasser, a nationalist strongman and sworn enemy of Saudi Arabia, turned on his country's conservative Muslim Brotherhood, King Faisal welcomed those religious conservatives into Saudi Arabia as scholars and teachers, reinforcing the fundamentalist hold on the young Ministry of Education, founded in 1954 under his predecessor and half-brother, King Saud.
152. Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom : Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia. Viking. pp. 56–57. The ambitions of the Muslim Brotherhood were similar to those of the Salafis and also of the dawah wahhabiya (Wahhabi mission) – to reestablish the order of Allah and to bring about the perfect Islamic states. But the rhetoric of the Brotherhood dealt in change-promoting concepts like social justice, anticolonialism, and the equal distribution of wealth. Politically they were prepared to challenge the establishment in a style that was unthinkable to mainstream Wahhabis, who were reflexively deferential to their rulers, and enablers, the House of Saud. It was heady stuff for the young students of Jeddah, taking the Wahhabi values they had absorbed in childhood and giving them a radical, but still apparently safe, religious twist. They had learned of jihad at school as an instantly romantic concept – part of history. Now they were hearing of its practical possibility today, and they could even make personal contact with jihad in the barrel-chested shape of Abdullah Azzam, who gave lectures in both Jeddah and Mecca in the early 1980s. The Saudi government had welcomed ideologues like Azzam and Mohammed, the surviving Qutub, to the Kingdom as pious reinforcement against the atheistic, Marxist-tinged thinking of their Middle Eastern neighborhood. But in the process they were exposing young Saudi hearts and minds to a still more potent virus – hands-on, radical Islam.
153. Kepel, Gilles (2006). The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West. Belknap Press. pp. 173–74. Within the kingdom itself, the Muslim Brothers obeyed the prohibition on proselytizing to Saudi subjects [but] ... contributed to discussion circles and frequented the salons held by princes ... Methodically but without fanfare, the Brothers took control of Saudi Arabia's intellectual life, publishing books that extended their influence among educators and generally making themselves politically useful while obeying the orders that kept them away from the pulpits.
154. House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia: Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 156. Stephane Lacroix, a Saudi expert at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris, sums up the battle over education in Saudi Arabia: 'The education system is so controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood, it will take 20 years to change – if at all. Islamists see education as their base so they won't compromise on this.' [source: telephone interview by author Karen House]
155. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 201. The content analysis reveals both Wahhabi doctrine and Muslim Brothers themes. In fact, the Muslim Brother imprint on this sample of Saudi schoolbooks is striking. Apparently members of the organization secured positions in the Ministry of Education, which they used to propagate their ideas.
156. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 112. A new Islamic university in Medina was created to train proselytizers and its regulations called for 75% of its students to come from abroad.
157. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 164.
158. Commins, David (2006). The WahhaThe Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabiabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 185. ISBN 9781845110802. Retrieved 23 October 2015. David Commins, in The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia ... believes that 'the ideology of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda is not Wahhabi. It is instead a part of contemporary jihadist tendency that evolved from the teachings of Sayyid Qutb… in other words; Al-Qaeda belongs to an offshoot of twenty-first century Muslim revivalist ideology, not Wahhabism.' ... agrees with DeLong-Bas's conclusions that Al-Qaeda's ideology evolved with the introduction of Salafi ideas from Sayyid Qutb and other Muslim Brotherhood members.
159. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (PDF). I.B.Tauris. p. 172. the pronouncements and actions [of Juhayman, the leader of the 1979 Grand Mosque seizure] indicated that a combustible mix of Wahhabi and modern Islamic revivalism was brewing in the niches of Saudi mosques. Exactly how and when these elements combined has not yet been established beyond the common knowledge that Saudi Arabia opened its doors to members of the Muslim Brothers fleeing repression by secular regimes in Egypt and Syrian in the later 1950s and 1960s They spread their ideas by occupying influential positions in educational institutions and circulating their literature.
160. Kepel, Gilles (2004). The War for Muslim Minds. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. pp. 157. In the melting pot of Arabia during the 1960s, local clerics trained in the Wahhabite tradition joined with activists and militants affiliated with the Muslim Brothers who had been exiled from the neighboring countries of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq – then allies of Moscow. This blend of traditionalists and modern Islamist militants served the kingdom's interests well at first, because it countered the threat of a 'progressive', pro-Soviet Islam – the brand preached at Al Azhar University in Egypt during the Nasser regime. But eventually this volatile mixture would explode in the Saudis' hands.
161. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. pp. 155–56. "In the 1950s and 60s ... within Saudi Arabia, official religious institutions under Wahhabi control multiplied at the same time that ulama maintained their hold on religious law courts, presided over the creation of Islamic universities and ensured that children in public schools received a heavy dose of religious instruction.
162. Vogel, Frank E, Islamic Law and Legal Systems: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Leiden, 2000), p. 80
163. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 154.
164. Lacey, Robert (1981). The Kingdom : Arabia and the House of Sa'ud. Harcourt Brace Javonovich. p. back cover.
165. Kepel, Jihad, 2003, p. 72
166. Murphy, Caryle, Passion for Islam : Shaping the Modern Middle East: the Egyptian Experience, Simon and Schuster, 2002 p. 32
167. House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia: Its People, Past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 234. A former US Treasury Department official is quoted by Washington Post reporter David Ottaway in a 2004 article [Ottaway, David The King's Messenger New York: Walker, 2008, p. 185] as estimating that the late king [Fadh] spent 'north of $75 billion' in his efforts to spread Wahhabi Islam. According to Ottaway, the king boasted on his personal Web site that he established 200 Islamic colleges, 210 Islamic centers, 1500 mosques, and 2000 schools for Muslim children in non-Islamic nations. The late king also launched a publishing center in Medina that by 2000 had distributed 138 million copies of the Koran worldwide.
168. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 176.
169. Azzam was a lecturer at King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah and active in the Muslim World League
170. Defense of the Muslim Lands, the First Obligation after Faith
171. Kepel, Gilles, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, 2003, p. 145–47
172. Aboul‐Enein, Youssef. "The Late Sheikh Abdullah Azzam's Books" (PDF). dtic.mil. Combating Terrorism Center. Retrieved 5 June 2014.
173. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 174.
174. Kepel, Gilles, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam by Gilles Kepel, p. 143
175. Kepel, Gilles (2002). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam by. Harvard University Press. p. 139. The summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference at Taif, Saudi Arabia, in January 1981, which had reached a consensus on the idea of launching a jihad for the liberation of Jerusalem and Palestine, refused to do the same for Afghanistan. Instead, it confined itself to calling on all Islamic states to cooperate with the UN secretary general in bringing an end to a situation that was 'prejudicial to the Afghan people.'
176. Kramer, Martin S. (June 1996), "Fundamentalist Islam at Large: The Drive for Power", Middle East Quarterly, pp. 37–49, archived from the original on 26 December 2010
177. Kramer, Martin S. (30 September 1996), "Khomeini's Messengers in Mecca", Arab Awakening and Islamic Revival, Transaction Publishers, ISBN 978-1560002727
178. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 171. Tehran's efforts to export the revolution through leaflets, radio broadcasts and tape cassettes castigating Al Saud for corruption and hypocrisy found a receptive audience in the Eastern Province. On 28 November, Saudi Shia summoned the courage to break the taboo on public religious expression by holding processions to celebrate the Shia holy day of Ashura [...]
     "on 1 February, the one-year anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini's return to Iran, violent demonstrations again erupted. Crowds attacked banks and vehicles and hoisted placards with Khomeini's picture. The government responded to the February protests with a mix of coercion and co-optation. On the one hand, leading Shiite activists were arrested. On the other, a high official from the Interior Ministry met with Shiite representatives and acknowledged that Riyadh had neglected the region's development needs. [...] extend the electricity network [...] more schools and hospitals and improve sewage disposal.
179. Shane, Scott (25 August 2016). "Saudis and Extremism: 'Both the Arsonists and the Firefighters'". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 24 June 2017.
180. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 63. It is important to emphasize, however, that the 1979 rebels were not literally a reincarnation of the Ikhwan and to underscore three distinct features of the former: They were millenarians, they rejected the monarchy and they condemned the wahhabi ulama.
181. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 163.
182. Benjamin, The Age of Sacred Terror (2002) p. 90
183. Salame, Ghassan, "Islam and politics in Saudi Arabia", Arab Studies Quarterly, v.ix n. 3 (1987), p.321
184. Kepel, Gilles (2004). The War for Muslim Minds. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. pp. 179. in keeping with a pattern dating back to the alliance between the royal family and tribal clerics, in which the ulama occupy center stage in times of crisis and turn the situation to their own advantage. But the 1980s iteration of this tradition, the religious leaders called upon by the royal family to reestablish moral order were not Wahhabite clerics but were rather sahwa militants whose belief system was a hybrid of Salafism and Qutbist thought and whose allegiances lay outside the Saudi kingdom.
185. Wright, Sacred Rage, (2001), p. 155
186. Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom : Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia. Viking. pp. 49–52.
187. Glasse, Cyril, The New Encyclopedia of Islam, Rowman & Littlefield, (2001), pp. 469–72
188. Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom : Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia. Viking. p. 48. 'Those old men actually believed that the Mosque disaster was God's punishment to us because we were publishing women's photographs in the newspapers,' says a princess, one of Khaled's nieces. 'The worrying thing is that the king [Khaled] probably believed that as well.' ... Khaled had come to agree with the sheikhs. Foreign influences and bida'a were the problem. The solution to the religious upheaval was simple – more religion.
189. Lacroix, Stéphane. "Saudi Arabia's Muslim Brotherhood predicament". Washington Post. Retrieved 20 March 2014.
190. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 176. ... Iraq's 2 August 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Saddam Hussein's annexation of the oil-rich amirate alarmed Riyadh and Washington, in large measure because his intentions were unclear: Did he intend to push south to seize the oil fields in Saudi Arabia's Eastern province.
191. DeLong-Bas, Natana J. (2004). Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (First ed.). USA: Oxford University Press. p. 269. ISBN 0-19-516991-3. For the Muslim Saudi monarchy to invite non-Muslim American troops to fight against Muslim Iraqi soldiers was a serious violation of Islamic law. An alliance between Muslims and non-Muslims to fight Muslims was also specifically forbidden by the teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab
192. McCants, William (17 March 2014). "Islamist Outlaws". Foreign Affairs. Retrieved 19 April 2014.
193. Kepel, Gilles (2002). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. I.B.Tauris. pp. 150, 218, 225–6.
194. Husain, Ed (2007). The Islamist: Why I joined Radical Islam in Britain, what I saw inside and why I left. Penguin Books. p. 246. In contemporary Wahhabism there are two broad factions. One is publicly supportive of the House of Saud, and will endorse any policy decision reached by the Saudi government and provide scriptural justification for it. The second believe that the House of Saud should be forcibly removed and the wahhabi clerics should take charge. Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda are from the second school.
195. Kepel, Gilles (2002). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. p. 220. According to the militants, there were, however, two kinds of salafist, as they defined them. The sheikists had replaced the adoration of Allah with the idolatry of the oil sheiks of the Arabian peninsula, with the Al Saud family at their head. Their theorist was Abdelaziz bin Baz... the archetypal court ulama (ulama al-balat)... They had to be striven against and eliminated. Confronted by the sheikist traitors, the jihadist-salafists had a similarly supercilious respect for the sacred texts in their most literal form, but they combined it with an absolute commitment to jihad, whose number-one target had to be America, perceived as the greatest enemy of the faith. The dissident Saudi preachers Hawali and Auda were held in high esteem by this school
196. Dillon, Michael R. "WAHHABISM: IS IT A FACTOR IN THE SPREAD OF GLOBAL TERRORISM?" (PDF). September 2009. Naval Post-Graduate School. pp. 27–38. Retrieved 2 April 2014.
197. "How much did the September 11 terrorist attack cost America?". 2004. Institute for the Analysis of Global Security. Retrieved 30 April 2014.
198. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 172.
199. Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom: Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia. Viking. pp. 234–36. A few days later another article appeared delivering the same verdict. Prince Talal bin Abdul Aziz ... ranked high in the brotherly pecking order ... The sheikhs and ulama had very valuable advice to offer, wrote the prince, but it was no more than that—advice. They should not consider that they were among 'those who govern'. Dr. Turki's bid for a direct role in Saudi government was firmly slapped down, and the reverend doctor did not argue back.
200. Coy, Peter (16 July 2014). "Online Education Targets Saudi Arabia's Labor Problem, Starting With Women". Bloomberg Businessweek. Retrieved 26 September 2014. Saudi citizens account for two-thirds of employment in the high-paying, comfortable public sector, but only one-fifth of employment in the more dynamic private sector, according to the International Monetary Fund (PDF).
201. "Census shows Kingdom's population at more than 27 million". Saudi Gazette. 24 November 2010. Archived from the original on 6 October 2014.
202. Commins, David (2006). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 6. In 2003–2004, Saudi cities were the scene of a wave of suicide bombings, killings of westerners and gun battles between Saudi security forces and militants ... members of Al Saud decided it might be time to trim Wahhabism's domination by holding a series of National Dialogues that included Shiites, Sufis, liberal reformers, and professional women. At present, the indications are not good for true believers in Wahhabi doctrine. But as its history demonstrates, the doctrine has survived crises before.
203. Christopher Boucek (27 October 2010). "Saudi Fatwa Restrictions and the State-Clerical Relationship". Carnegie Endowment.
204. Rubin, Elizabeth (7 March 2004). "The Jihadi Who Kept Asking Why". New York Times. Retrieved 22 July 2014. When Saudi intellectuals began worrying aloud that Saudi mosques and schools were fostering hatred of non-Wahhabists among young men, the religious establishment – which ensures that the kingdom follows a strictly puritanical interpretation of Islamic law – reacted with righteous anger, as if its social authority were under threat. Prince Nayef defended the religious establishment and blamed instead a foreign import – the Muslim Brotherhood, the radical Islamic political organization founded in Egypt in the 1920s – for the kingdom's problems. For years, Saudi Arabia sheltered and embraced the Brotherhood activists, and now, Prince Nayef told the press, the Brotherhood had turned against the Saudis and were destroying the Arab world.
205. Mintz, John; Farah, Douglas (10 September 2004). "In Search of Friends Among The Foes U.S. Hopes to Work With Diverse Group". The Washington Post. Retrieved 28 November 2012.
206. "Saudi Arabia's religious police ordered to be 'gentle'". BBC. 13 April 2016. Retrieved 8 November 2016.
207. "Saudi Arabia strips religious police of arrest powers". CNN. CNN. 14 April 2016. Retrieved 8 November 2016.
208. Chulov, Martin. "I will return Saudi Arabia to moderate Islam, says crown prince". The Guardian. Retrieved 16 November 2017.
209. Cervellera, Bernardo (9 June 2016). "Conference in Grozny: Wahhabism exclusion from the Sunni community provokes Riyadh's wrath". AsiaNews.it. Retrieved 16 November 2017.
210. Dorsey, James M. (28 October 2017). "Crown Prince Mohammed's Vow To Moderate Saudi Islam: Easier Said Than Done". HuffPost. Bloomberg. Retrieved 16 November 2017.
211. 25–27 August 2016 Islamic conference in Grozny Archived 17 November 2017 at the Wayback Machine
212. Bernard Haykel (27 May 2008). "Middle East Strategy at Harvard, Anti-Wahhabism: a footnote". John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University. Retrieved 13 November 2014.
213. George Packer (17 May 2004). "Caught in the Crossfire: Will moderate Iraqis embrace democracy or Islamist radicalism?". The New Yorker.
214. Confessions of a British Spy and British Enmity Against Islam (PDF) (8 ed.), Waqf Ikhlas Publications, 2001, archived from the original (PDF) on 9 May 2015
215. Daniel Pipes (January 1996). "The Saga of "Hempher", Purported British Spy". Daniel Pipes. Retrieved 13 November 2014.
216. Lewis, Bernard, The Middle East, p. 333
217. "Ramadan in Saudi Arabia". The Economist. 11 June 2016. Retrieved 11 June 2016.
218. Paul Marshall Radical Islam's Rules: The Worldwide Spread of Extreme Shari'a Law Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2005 ISBN 978-1-461-68690-3 page 19
219. Paulo Casaca, Siegfried O. Wolf Terrorism Revisited: Islamism, Political Violence and State-Sponsorship Springer 2017 ISBN 978-3-319-55690-1 page 159
220. Mark A. Caudill Twilight in the Kingdom: Understanding the Saudis Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006 ISBN 9780275992521 p. 132
221. "Saudi Arabia. Wahhabi Theology". December 1992. Library of Congress Country Studies. Retrieved 17 March 2014. Wahhabi influence in Saudi Arabia, however, remained tangible in the physical conformity in dress, in public deportment, and in public prayer. Most significantly, the Wahhabi Legacy was manifest in the social ethos that presumed government responsibility for the collective moral ordering of society, from the behavior of individuals, to institutions, to businesses, to the government itself.
222. Bradley, John R. (2005). Saudi Arabia Exposed. Macmillan. p. 10. ... religious police, which is feared and reviled both because of its wide reach and because its members are drawn from the lower classes. Their resentment of the rich, combined with their freedom of action, results in a dangerous combination and adds to the hardline religious social atmosphere sanctioned by Wahhabi doctrine, which is spread by clerics in the mosques and teachers in the schools, and which guides the verdicts handed down by Wahhabi 'justice' in the courts.
223. Glasse, Cyril (2001). The New Encyclopedia of Islam. AltaMira Press. p. 470. Wahhabism is noted for its policy of compelling its own followers and other Muslims strictly to observe the religious duties of Islam, such as the five prayers, under pain of flogging at one time, and for enforcement of public morals to a degree not found elsewhere.
224. Saudi schools promoting hatred and violence on non-believers — BBC.co.uk
225. Kepel, Gilles (2004). The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West. Harvard University Press. p. 158. ISBN 9780674015753. Ibn Taymiyya and Abdul Wahhab counseled the strictest possible application of sharia in the most minuscule aspects of daily life and the use of coercion on subjects who did not conform to dogma. As Wahhabism began to exert its influence, a religious militia, the mutawaa – bearded men armed with cudgels (and today, riding in shiny SUVs) – was organized in Saudi Arabia to close down shops and office at prayer times five times a day.
226. Saudi Arabia's religious police 'contains extremists'| 4 February 2014|
227. Abou El Fadl, Khaled (2005). The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. Harper San Francisco. p. 67. Wahhabis regularly flogged the residents of territories under their control for listening to music, shaving their beards, wearing silk or gold (this applied to men only), smoking, playing backgammon, chess, or cards, or failing to observe strict rules of sex segregation; and they destroyed all the shrines and most of the Muslim historical monuments found in Arabia.
228. Simons, Geoff (1998). Saudi Arabia: The Shape of a Client Feudalism. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 152–59.
229. Kostiner, Joseph (1993). The Making of Saudi Arabia, 1916–1936: From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State. Oxford University Press. p. 119. ISBN 978-0195074406.
230. (from The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists, by Khaled Abou El Fadl, Harper San Francisco, 2005, p. 160)
231. Tripp, Harvey; Peter North (2003). Culture Shock! Saudi Arabia. Graphic Arts Center Publishing Company. p. 131.
232. Battram, Robert A. (22 July 2010). Canada in Crisis (2): An Agenda for Survival of the Nation. Trafford. pp. 415–16. ISBN 9781426933936.
233. Sharp, Arthur G. "What's a Wahhabi?". net places. Archived from the original on 21 March 2014. Retrieved 20 March 2014.
234. Anderson, Shelly (2013). Falling Off the Edge of the World. Lulu. p. 137. ISBN 9781304059833.
235. Roy, Olivier (2004). Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. Columbia University Press. p. 239. ISBN 9780231134996. The Taliban, despite their similarity to Wahhabis, never destroyed the graves of pirs (holy men) and emphasised dreams as a means of revelation, which is not a Wahhabi trait.
236. Husain, The Islamist, 2007, p. 250
237. Afshin Shahi (4 December 2013). The Politics of Truth Management in Saudi Arabia. ISBN 9781134653195. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab condemned many traditions, practices and beliefs that were an integral part of the religious and cultural consciousness of the Muslim community.
238. "A special day for mothers: Difference of opinion". Saudi Gazette. Archived from the original on 12 March 2014. [hadith] 'Whoever imitates or resembles a nation, he is considered among them.'
239. "Many celebrate Valentine's Day in secret" Archived 12 March 2014 at the Wayback Machine Saudi Gazette.
240. A Saudi Woman Is Threatened After Tweeting About Beards|newyorker.com |19 February 2014 |Katherine Zoepf
241. Eltahawy, Mona (1 July 2004). "The Wahhabi war against 'infidels' and flowers". Islam Daily. Archived from the original on 26 July 2014. Retrieved 22 March 2014. ... a Saudi friend forwarded me a copy of a fatwa, or religious ruling, issued by senior clerics. The fatwa banned the giving of flowers when visiting the sick in the hospital. The ruling observed: "It is not the habit of Muslims to offer flowers to the sick in hospital. This is a custom imported from the land of the infidels by those whose faith is weak. Therefore it is not permitted to deal with flowers in this way, whether to sell them, buy them or offer them as gifts."
242. [Mansour al-Nogaidan, a young preacher in the Sahwah (awakening) movement] Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom : Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia. Viking. p. 122. ... he continued his crusade against what he saw as the hypocrisy of the Wahhabi establishment. A year later, in 1989, he issued a fatwa condemning the World Youth Soccer Cup, which was being held in Saudi Arabia. Soccer was haram (forbidden), in his view, like many sports ...
243. [the leader of "The Salafi Group That Commands Right and Forbids Wrong" (Juhayman Al-Otaybi)] Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom : Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia. Viking. p. 12. Everywhere Juhayman looked he could detect bidaa – dangerous and regrettable innovations. The Salafi Group That Commands Right and Forbids Wrong was originally intended to focus on moral improvement, not on political grievances or reform. But religion is politics and vice versa ... immoral of the government to permit soccer matches...
244. House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia: Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 50. ... one Saudi sheikh issued a fatwa condemning soccer because the Koran, he insisted, forbids Muslim to imitate Christians or Jews. Therefore, using words like foul or penalty kick is forbidden. The country's grand mufti, Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah al Ashaikh, rejected that fatwa and called on the religious police to track down and prosecute its author.
245. Brooks, Geraldine (1995). Nine Parts of Desire. Doubleday. p. 161. [from the religious editor of the Saudi Gazette circa 1986–1995] There are legal and moral rights that become consequential on marriage. Because of their different physiological structures and biological functions, each sex is assigned a role to play in the family ... it is the husband who is supposed to provide for the family. If he cannot gain enough to support the family ... both ... may work for gain. However:
     1. he husband has the right to terminate a wife's working whenever he deems it necessary;
     2. He has the right to object to any job if he feels that it would expose his wife to any harm, seduction or humiliation;
     3. The wife has the right to discontinue working whenever she pleases.
246. Death of a Princess, Lacey, The Kingdom, chapter 48
247. Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom : Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia. Viking. p. 75.
248. Max Rodenbeck (21 October 2004). "Unloved in Arabia". New York Review of Books. 51 (16).
249. House, Karen Elliott, On Saudi Arabia : Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future, Knopf, 2012, p. 9
250. Glasse, Cyril (2001). The New Encyclopedia of Islam. AltaMira Press. p. 470. Wahhabi doctrines and practices were imposed by the conquests although in a progressively gentler form as more urban areas passed into Saudi control. This was particularly true of the Hejaz, with its more cosmopolitan traditions and the traffic of pilgrims which the new rulers could not afford to alienate. Thus, although the sound of a trumpet calling reveille in Mecca when it was newly conquered was enough to cause riot among the Wahhabi soldiers – music was forbidden – such that only energetic intervention on the part of the young Prince Faysal, later King, prevented a massacre, today music flows freely over the radio and television.
251. Glassé, Cyril (January 2003). The New Encyclopedia of Islam. AltaMira. p. 471. ISBN 9780759101906. The sign of changing times in Saudi Arabia is that the exigencies of the modern world and pragmatism have opened the door to accepting the legal precedents of the other schools. The Wahhabis consider, or previously considered, many of the practices of the generations which succeeded the Companions as bid‘ah ... these included the building of minarets (today accepted) and the use of funeral markers.
252. Bradley, John R. (2005). Saudi Arabia Exposed: Inside a Kingdom in Crisis. macmillan. p. 5. ISBN 9781403970770. Retrieved 20 August 2014.
253. Lacey (2009). Inside the Kingdom, Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia. Viking. p. 12. Luxuriant beards were and are the most famous badge of Salafi conviction, based on a traditional belief, which some scholars dispute, that the Prophet never trimmed his beard ... The other badge is a shortened thobe, because the Prophet did not let his clothes brush the ground.
254. Ambah, Faiza Saleh (22 June 2007). "An Unprecedented Uproar Over Saudi Religious Police". Washington Post Foreign Service. Retrieved 26 September 2014.
255. Rutter, Eldon (September 1998). "The Holy Cities of Arabia". In Michael Wolfe (ed.). One Thousand Roads to Mecca: Ten Centuries of Travelers Writing about the ... Grove Press. p. 344. ISBN 9780802135995.
256. Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom: Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia. Viking. p. 56. The ambitions of the Muslim Brotherhood were similar to those of the Salfis and also of the dawah wahhabiya (Wahhabi mission) – to reestablish the order of Allah and to bring about the perfect Islamic states.
257. at least one scholar (David Commins), sometimes refers to Wahhabism as the "Najdi reform movement" (p. 41), "Najdi movement" (pp. 141, 146), "Najdi doctrine" (pp. 152, 200–01), and "Najdi mission" (p. 204) in his book (Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 41. Official Egyptian correspondence expressed sectarian hostility to the Najdi reform movement),
     Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 141. Nevertheless, significant differences separate the Najdi movement from the modern revivalist agenda because the former stemmed from Muhammad ibn Ad al-wahhab's distinctive views on doctrine, where as the Muslim Brothers were a reaction against European domination and cultural invasion.,
     Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 152. The Wahhabi leadership of the World Muslim League made it an instrument for exporting the Najdi doctrine.
258. House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia: Its People, Past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 235. The Eastern Province (home to the oil reserves and to the perennially ill-used and unhappy Shiite minority) and the Hejaz (site of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina with their more open, international outlook) both resent the overwhelming dominance of religious conservatives from the Najd, home of the Al Saud, at all levels of national governance.
259. Bradley, John R. (2005). Saudi Arabia Exposed. Macmillan. p. 58. ... Asir, and the tribal population in that region, like the liberals of the Hijaz and the Shiites of the Eastern Province, have always been reluctant partners in the Saudi state. As with the merchants of the Hijaz and al-Jouf, the tribes of Asir have never fully embraced Wahhabi doctrine. Periodic local rebellions, and a low-level struggle to keep alive a regional identity, are both testimony to that ...
260. 2014 population estimate of 2 million, compared to 30 million for Saudi Arabia.
261. Dorsey., James M. "Wahhabism vs. Wahhabism: Qatar Challenges Saudi Arabia". 2013-09-08. Middle East Online. Retrieved 28 April 2014. Qatar, the only other country whose native population is Wahhabi and that adheres to the Wahhabi creed.
262. Cole, Juan (2009). Engaging the Muslim World. Macmillan. p. 110. ISBN 9780230620575.
263. Wahhabism: Understanding the Roots and Role Models of Islamic Extremism, by Zubair Qamar, condensed and edited by ASFA staff
264. "Allah". Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Retrieved 28 May 2008.
265. DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 2004: 62
266. Kabir, Nahid Afrose (1 January 2013). Young American Muslims: Dynamics of Identity. Edinburgh University Press. p. 44. ISBN 9780748669936. Both Wahhabism and Salafism are very much opposed by the vast majority of Sunnis and also by Shiites
267. Halverson, Jeffry R. (2010). Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam: The Muslim Brotherhood, Ash'arism, and Political Sunnism. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 71. ISBN 9780230106581. Abdul-Wahhab was a proponent of Ijtihad, as were the leading reformers of the Salafi movement in Egypt.
268. Halverson, Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam, 2010: 49 (Quote: "Wahhabism then is justifably characterized as a distinct sectarian movement with its own idiosyncrasies that diverge from other Athari movements. But it nevertheless remains thoroughly Athari in nature.")
269. Halverson, Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam, 2010: 34 (Quote: "The Atharis are often erroneously (but understandably) subsumed under the Hanbalite school of law (madhhab) [...] The Hanbalite madhhab [...] largely maintained the traditionalist or Athari position")
270. Halverson, Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam, 2010: 36 (Quote: For the Atharis, the "clear" (i.e., zahir, apparent, or literal) meaning of the Qur'an and especially the prophetic traditions (ahadith) have sole authority in matters of belief, as well as law, and to engage in rational disputation (jadal), even if one arrives at the truth, is absolutely forbidden.)
271. Spevack, Aaron (2014). The Archetypal Sunni Scholar: Law, Theology, and Mysticism in the Synthesis of Al-Bajuri. State University of New York Press. p. 44. Those who opted out of affiliation with the Ash'aris and Maturidis are often referred to as merely a group of Hanbalis [...] or Atharis, who relied on transmitted as opposed to rationally deduced sources. Their school is generally associated with an insistence on avoiding the use of rational argumentation in matters of belief, and a reliance solely on transmitted content (Qur'an and Hadith).
272. Halverson, Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam, 2010: 48–49
273. John L. Esposito, Emad El-Din Shahin, ed. (2013). "Islam and power in Saudi Arabia". The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 412–13. ISBN 9780195395891.
274. DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 2004: 84
275. DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 2004: 84-7
276. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. x. Most Muslims throughout history have accepted the position that declaring this profession of faith [the shahada] makes one a Muslim. One might or might not regularly perform the other obligatory rituals ... but ... any shortcomings would render one a sinner, not an unbeliever.
     Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab did not accept that view. He argued that the criterion for one's standing as either a Muslim or an unbeliever was correct worship as an expression of belief in one God. ... any act or statement that indicates devotion to a being other than God is to associate another creature with God's power, and that is tantamount to idolatry (shirk). Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab included in the category of such acts popular religious practices that made holy men into intercessors with God. That was the core of the controversy between him and his adversaries, including his own brother.
     One of the peculiar features of the debate between Wahhabis and their adversaries is its apparently static nature ... the main points in the debate [have] stay[ed] the same [since 1740].
277. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Kitab al-Tawhid
278. DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 2004: 69
279. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 25.
280. Ibn Ghannam, Hussien (2009). Tarikh najd. Cairo. pp. 467–71, 477.
281. "Wahhabi Theology". Saudi Arabia, Library of Congress Country Studies. Library of Congress. December 1992. The Wahhabi movement in Najd was unique in two respects: first, the ulama of Najd interpreted the Quran and sunna very literally and often with a view toward reinforcing parochial Najdi practices;
282. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. pp. 142–43. It is common for writers on Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab to assert that he sought a social renewal of Arabia, but that characterization is never given specific substance, unless one considers ritual correctness and moral purity to constitute such renewal. The problem with such generalizations is they encourage facile comparisons with modern revivalist movements, when in fact Najd's eighteenth-century reformer would have found key elements in Hasan al-Banna's writings utterly alien.
283. Esposito, John L., ed. (15 May 2003). "(entry for Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab)". The Oxford Dictionary of Islam. Oxford University Press. p. 123. ISBN 9780199757268. plans for socio-religious reform of society were based on the key doctrine of tawhid
284. DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 2004: 97
285. DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 2004: 96
286. DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 2004: 100
287. DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 2004: 107-8
288. Mortimer, Edward, Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam, Vintage Books, 1982, p. 61
289. DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 2004: 247–50
290. Vogel, Frank E (2000). Islamic Law and Legal Systems: Studies of Saudi Arabia. Leiden. p. 76. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab produced no unprecedented opinions and Saudi authorities today regard him not as a mujtahid in fiqh [independent thinker in jurisprudence], but rather in da'wa or religious reawakening ... the Wahhabis' bitter differences with other Muslims were not over fiqh rules at all, but over aqida, or theological positions.
291. Commins 2006, p. 12 harvnb error: multiple targets (6×): CITEREFCommins2006 (help) According to Commins, Kitab al-Tawhid "has nothing to say on Islamic law, which guides Muslims' everyday lives. This is a crucial point. One of the myths about Wahhabism is that its distinctive character stems from its affiliation with the supposedly 'conservative' or 'strict' Hanbali legal school. If that were the case, how could we explain the fact that the earliest opposition to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab came from other Hanbali scholars? Or that a tradition of anti-Wahhabi Hanbalism persisted into the nineteenth century? As an expert on law in Saudi Arabia notes, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab produced no unprecedented opinions and Saudi authorities today regard him not as a mujtahid in fiqh [independent thinker in jurisprudence], but rather in da'wa or religious reawakening… The Wahhabis' bitter differences with other Muslims were not over fiqh [jurisprudence] rules at all, but over aqida, or theological positions."
292. Richard C. Martin, ed. (2004). Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World. MacMillan Reference. p. 728. Among the innovations condemned by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was the centuries-long heritage of jurisprudence (fiqh) that coalesced into four Sunni schools of law and many schools of Shi'ism. The Wahhabiyya considered themselves the true Sunnis and acknowledged their affinity to the Hanbali legal tradition. Yet they rejected all jurisprudence that in their opinion did not adhere strictly to the letter of the Qur'an and the hadith, even that of Ibn Hambal and his students.
293. Glasse, Cyril (2001). The New Encyclopedia of Islam. AltaMira Press. pp. 469, 470. The Wahhabis are often said to 'belong' to the Hanbali School of Law (madhhab), but strictly speaking, like the Ahl al-Hadith ... they are ghayr muqallidun ('non-adherents'), and do not see themselves as belonging to any school, any more than the first Muslim generations did.
294. Glasse, Cyril, The New Encyclopedia of Islam Altamira, 2001, p. 407
295. see also Mortimer, Edward, Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam, Vintage Books, 1982, p. 61
296. DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 2004: 112–3
297. Moussalli, Ahmad (30 January 2009). Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who Is The Enemy? (PDF). A Conflicts Forum Monograph. p. 3. ... the Wahhabis – who claim to be the champion of Sunni Islam – perceive the Sunnis as having been wrong for over ten centuries and have been living a state of pre-Islamic paganism (jahiliyya [literally, ignorance]) since they moved away from the way of al-salaf. They even accused the majority of orthodox Sunni Muslims who were living under the Ottoman caliphate and the caliphate itself of reprehensible innovation (bid‘ah) and unbelief (kufr) because they had been living under a political system that is unknown to al-salaf.
298. Algar, Hamid (2002). Wahhabism: A Critical Essay. Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International. p. 20. In 1159/1746, the Wahhabi-Saudi state made a formal proclamation of jihad all who did not share their understanding of tauhid, for they counted as non-believers, guilty of shirk and apostasy. It is significant that whenever the term 'Muslims' occurs in Uthman b. Abdullah b Bishr's chronicle, 'Unwan al-Majd fi Tarikh Najd, it refers exclusively to the Wahhabis. But the Wahhabi dismissal of all Muslims other than themselves as non-believers is of more than historical significance. Discreetly concealed over the years because of a variety of factors –above all the desire of the Saudi regime to portray itself as a protector of Muslim interests, despite abundant evidence to the contrary – this attitude of monopolistic rejection continues to inform the attitudes to Muslims held by contemporary Wahhabis and those under their influence, even when not fully articulated." (p.20)
299. Ruthven, Malise (1984). Islam in the World. Penguin. p. 282. Ibn 'Abd al Wahhab's fundamentalism ... led to an Khariji-style division of the world into 'us' against 'them', identifying all who failed to conform to Wahhabi tenets as 'infidels' liable to attack ...
300. Dillon, Michael R. (September 2009). "Wahhabism: Is it a Factor in the Spread of Global Terrorism?" (PDF). NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL. p. 13. Archived from the original (PDF) on 18 April 2014. The intertwining of Saudi political/military power and Wahhabi religious power strengthened this legitimacy, as Wahhabism (or Wahhabiyyah) claims to represent the only orthopraxy Islam.
301. Abu Khalil, The Battle for Saudi Arabia: Royalty, Fundamentalism, and Global Power, 50
302. "analyses wahhabism". PBS Frontline. Wahhabi Muslims believe that their sect is the real true form of Islam, and that pretty much any other kind of way of practicing Islam is wrong." [according to Ahmed Ali, 'a Shi'a Muslim who grew up in Saudi Arabia']
303. Husain, Ed (2007). The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside and Why I Left. Penguin. p. 250. My Saudi students gave me some of their core texts from university classes. They complained that regardless of their subject of study, they were compelled to study 'Thaqafah Islamiyyah' (Islamic Culture) ... These books were published in 2003 (after a Saudi promise in a post-9/11 world to alter their textbooks) and were used in classrooms across the country in 2005. I read these texts very closely: entire pages were devoted to explaining to undergraduates that all forms of Islam except Wahhabism were deviation. There were prolonged denunciations of nationalism, communism, the West, free mixing of the sexes, observing birthdays, even Mother's Day
304. Khalid, Ahmad Ali (20 July 2011). "Petro-Islam' is a nightmare scenario". Wisdom Blow. Retrieved 1 April 2014. Saudi textbooks are filled with references to hate; the Islamic Studies curriculum in the country is simply barbaric. I've experienced first-hand being taught by an Islamic Studies teacher in one of the most prominent private schools in Riyadh, about the dangers of having non-Muslims as friends and about the evil conspiracies hatched by Christians, Jews and Shias.
305. Abou El Fadl, Khaled (2005). The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. Harper San Francisco. pp. 49, 50. Significantly, Abd al-Wahhab also insisted that it was a sign of spiritual weakness for Muslims to care for or be interested in non-Muslim beliefs or practices. Pursuant to a doctrine known as al-wala' wa al-bara' (literally, the doctrine of loyalty and disassociation), Abd al-Wahhab argued that it was imperative for Muslims not to befriend, ally themselves with, or imitate non-Muslims or heretical Muslims. Furthermore, this enmity and hostility of Muslims toward non-Muslims and heretical had to be visible and unequivocal. For example, it was forbidden for a Muslim to be the first to greet a non-Muslim, and even if a Muslim returned a greeting, a Muslim should never wish a non-Muslim peace.
306. (source conflates Wahhabism and Islam) Bukay, David (Summer 2013). "Islam's Hatred of the Non-Muslim". Middle East Quarterly: 11–20. Retrieved 27 June 2015.
307. see also Amb. Curtin Winsor, PhD (22 October 2007). "Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism and the Spread of Sunni Theofascism". Global Politician. Archived from the original on 27 April 2014.
308. Christopher M. Blanchard (24 January 2008). "The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya" (PDF). Congressional Research Service. p. CRS-5. The Saudi Arabian government has strenuously denied the above allegations. Saudi officials continue to assert that Islam is tolerant and peaceful, and they have denied allegations that their government exports religious or cultural extremism or supports extremist religious education. In response to allegations of teaching intolerance, the Saudi government has embarked on a campaign of educational reforms designed to remove divisive material from curricula and improve teacher performance, although the outcome of these reforms remains to be seen. Confrontation with religious figures over problematic remarks and activities poses political challenges for the Saudi government, because some key Wahhabi clerics support Saudi government efforts to de-legitimize terrorism inside the kingdom and have sponsored or participated in efforts to religiously re-educate former Saudi combatants.
309. DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 2004: 34–5
310. (note the first four Saudi monarchs have the title Imam) "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: History. Rulers of the first Saudi state". info.gov.sa. Government of Saudi Arabia. Archived from the original on 19 December 2012. Retrieved 20 August 2014.
311. Vogel, Frank E, Islamic Law and Legal Systems: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Leiden, 2000), p. 207
312. House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia : Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 27. Not only is the Saudi monarch effectively the religious primate, but the puritanical Wahhabi sect of Islam that he represents instructs Muslims to be obedient and submissive to their ruler, however imperfect, in pursuit of a perfect life in paradise. Only if a ruler directly countermands the comhandments of Allah should devout Muslims even consider disobeying. 'O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. [surah 4:59]'
313. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 180. Ibn Baz submitted a memorandum to apologize for the Letter of Demands' tone and for publishing it at all rather than adhering to the customary Wahhabi principle that counsel to a ruler should be private.
314. Abir, Mordechai (1993). Saudi Arabia: Government, Society and the Gulf Crisis. London. pp. 191–94.
315. Struggle between designated heir Abdullah and his half brother Saud
316. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 62. For the Wahhabi ulama, however, the succession struggle raises an unprecedented and knotty issue: namely, which candidate to support. Part of the problem lay in the ulama's tendency to accord allegiance to the ruler, regardless of how he came to power, as long as he declared support for Wahhabism. But some ulama insisted on a strict juridical view that branded a rebel against the legitimate ruler (imam) as a usurper
317. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 115. Since believers owe the ruler obedience, he is free to organize government as he sees fit as long as he does not cross that line. While this appears to grant unlimited powers to the ruler, the proviso for respecting shari'a limits is significant, since it includes, in Wahhabi doctrine, respect for the independence of qadis in matters within their jurisdiction. Hence, the ruler may not interfere in their deliberations. Building on this limitation on a ruler's power, the ulama have preserved their autonomy in the legal sphere by refusing to participate in the codification of law and the formation of a uniform system of law courts ... In matters before religious courts, Vogel found a striking degree of independence wielded by qadis because their mandate is not to follow precedent or implement a uniform code, but to discern the divine ruling in a particular incident.
318. "Wahhabism: Understanding the Roots and Role Models of Islamic Fanaticism and Terror". AGAINST "ISLAMIC" TERRORISM & ISLAMOPHOBIA.
319. Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom: Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia. Viking. p. 56. The ambitions of the Muslim Brotherhood were similar to those of the Salafis and also of the dawah wahhabiya (Wahhabi mission) – to reestablish the order of Allah and to bring about the perfect Islamic states. But the rhetoric of the Brotherhood dealt in change-promoting concepts like social justice, anticolonialism, and the equal distribution of wealth. Politically they were prepared to challenge the establishment in a style that was unthinkable to mainstream Wahhabis, who were reflexively defferential to their rulers, and enablers, the House of Saud.
320. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 210.
321. Khaled Abou El Fadl (2002), The Place of Tolerance in Islam, p. 8. Beacon Press. ISBN 0807002291.
322. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 111.
323. Caryle Murphy (15 July 2010). "A Kingdom Divided". GlobalPost. Archived from the original on 5 May 2014. Retrieved 6 May 2014. First, there is the void created by the 1999 death of the elder Bin Baz and that of another senior scholar, Muhammad Salih al Uthaymin, two years later. Both were regarded as giants in conservative Salafi Islam and are still revered by its adherents. Since their passing, no one "has emerged with that degree of authority in the Saudi religious establishment," said David Dean Commins, history professor at Dickinson College and author of "The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia."
324. Abou El Fadl, Khaled, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists, Harper San Francisco, 2005, pp. 70–72.
325. documentary The Qur'an aired in the UK, The Qur'an review in The Independent
326. Yahya Birt, an academic who is director of The City Circle, a networking body of young British Muslim professionals, quoted in Wahhabism: A deadly scripture| Paul Vallely 1 November 2007
327. Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism and the Spread of Sunni Theofascism Archived 3 May 2016 at the Wayback Machine| By Ambassador Curtin Winsor, PhD
328. Dawood al-Shirian, 'What Is Saudi Arabia Going to Do?' Al-Hayat, 19 May 2003
329. Abou al Fadl, Khaled, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists, HarperSanFrancisco, 2005, pp. 48–64
330. Kepel, p. 72
331. Coolsaet, Rik. "Cycles of Revolutionary Terrorism, Chapter 7". In Rik Coolsaet (ed.). Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and American. Ashgate Publishing Ltd. The proliferation of brochures, free qurans and new Islamic centres in Malaga, Madrid, Milat, Mantes-la-Jolie, Edinburgh, Brussels, Lisbon, Zagreb, Washington, Chicago, and Toronto; the financing of Islamic Studies chairs in American universities; the growth of Internet sites: all of these elements have facilitated access to Wahhabi teachings and the promotion of Wahhabism as the sole legitimate guardian of Islamic thought.
332. Kepel 2002, pp. 69–75 harvnb error: multiple targets (5×): CITEREFKepel2002 (help)
333. "Radical Islam in Central Asia". Retrieved 13 November 2014.
334. Kuan Yew Lee; Ali Wyne (2012). Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master's Insights on China, the United States, and . MIT Press. ISBN 9780262019125. But over the last 30-odd years, since the oil crisis and the petrodollars became a major factor in the Muslim world, the extremists have been proselytizing, building mosques, religious schools where they teach Wahhabism ... sending out preachers, and having conferences. Globalizing, networking. And slowly they have convinced the Southeast Asian Muslims, and indeed Muslims throughout the world, that the gold standard is Saudi Arabia, that that is the real good Muslim.
335. Lynch III, Thomas F. (29 December 2008). "Sunni and Shi'a Terrorism Differences that Matter" (PDF). gsmcneal.com. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. pp. 24–40. Retrieved 22 October 2014.
336. Natana J. Delong-Bas, "Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad", (Oxford University Press: 2004), p. 279
337. After Jihad: American and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy by Noah Feldman, New York : Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003, p. 47
338. Armstrong, Karen. The label of Catholic terror was never used about the IRA. guardian.co.uk
339. Kirkpatrick, David D. (24 September 2014). "ISIS' Harsh Brand of Islam Is Rooted in Austere Saudi Creed". new york times. Retrieved 26 September 2014.
340. Algar, Hamid (2002). Wahhabism: A Critical Essay. Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International. pp. back cover. Wahhabism, a peculiar interpretation of Islamic doctrine and practice that first arose in mid-eighteenth century Arabia, is sometimes regarded as simply an extreme or uncompromising form of Sunni Islam. This is incorrect, for at the very outset the movement was stigmatized as aberrant by the leading Sunni scholars of the day, because it rejected many of the traditional beliefs and practices of Sunni Islam and declared permissible warfare against all Muslims that disputed Wahhabi teachings.
341. Algar, Hamid (2002). Wahhabism: A Critical Essay. Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International. pp. 33–34. [Algar lists all these things that involve intercession in prayer, that Wahhabi believe violate the principle of tauhid al-'ibada (directing all worship to God alone)]. all the allegedly deviant practices just listed can, however, be vindicated with reference not only to tradition and consensus but also hadith, as has been explained by those numerous scholars, Sunni and Shi'i alike, who have addressed the phenomenon of Wahhabism. Even if that were not the case, and the belief that ziyara or tawassul is valid and beneficial were to be false, there is no logical reason for condemning the belief as entailing exclusion from Islam.
342. Kepel, Gilles (2004). The War for Muslim Minds. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. p. 159. the alliance concluded in 1744–1745 between Abdul Wahhab and the tribal chief Muhammad bin Saud, who ruled over the oasis of Diriyya ... in the Nejd, the peninsula's central desert province. (In Arabic, najd is any area where water disappears into the sand.) A Hobbesian state of perpetual war pitted Bedouin bribes against one another for control of the scarce resources that could stave off starvation. In exchange for Bin Saud's adherence to the strict dogma of Ibn Taymiyya, Abdul Wahhab offered to consecrate the Saudi tribe's raids on neighboring oases by renaming those raids jihad – holy war to promote, by the sword, Islam's triumph over unbelief. In place of the instinctive fight for survival and appetite for lucre, Abdul Wahhab substituted fath, the 'opening' or conquest of a vast territory through religious zeal.
343. Algar, Hamid (2002). Wahhabism: A Critical Essay. Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International. pp. 4–5. A related error is to think of Wahhabism as having been from the time of its origin a reform movement that found a widespread and sympathetic echo in the Muslim world, or that it conformed to a general pattern of 'renewal' (tajdid) then underway in the Middle East, in South Asia, in Africa and elsewhere. All those movements were largely different in their nature from Wahhabism, which must be regarded within the specific context of its own time as an exception, an aberration, or at best an anomaly.
344. Algar, Hamid (2002). Wahhabism: A Critical Essay. Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International. pp. 14–15, 17. in the introduction to his translation to Kitab al-Tauhid, he [Islmail Raji al-Faruqi] had it almost right when, in the introduction to his translation to Kitab al-Tauhid, he described the book as having 'the appearance of a student's notes.' It would have been closer to the mark to say that this and many other writings of Abdal-Wahhav were the notes of a student ... what might charitably be termed the scholarly output of ... abdal-Wahhab ... All of his works are extremely slight, in terms of both content and bulk." Algar goes on to suggest that the works have been padded with lists of "further issues" and expansion by their editors/translators to make up for their slightness ... It is true that some fairly thick volumes have been published in Saudi Arabia as the collected works of ... Abd al-Wahhab ... but they are mostly a little more than collections of notes and arrangements of hadith according to certain subjects." "Volumes one, two, and four of this set" ... contain no elucidation or commentary from ... Abd al-Wahhab ... Every major figure to inaugurate a significant movement of renewal in Islamic history has been a prolific and influential writer, two examples ... Uthman dan Fodio and ... Dihlawi."... Abda al-Wahhab "is not remotely comparable to either.
345. Christopher Taylor, In the Vicinity of the Righteous (Leiden: Brill, 1999), pp. 5–6
346. See John Renard, Friends of God: Islamic Images of Piety, Commitment, and Servanthood (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008); Idem., Tales of God Friends: Islamic Hagiography in Translation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009)
347. Jonathan A.C. Brown, "Faithful Dissenters: Sunni Skepticism about the Miracles of Saints," Journal of Sufi Studies 1 (2012), p. 123
348. Juan Eduardo Campo, Encyclopedia of Islam (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2009), p. 600
349. See Gibril F. Haddad, Al-Albani and Friends: A Concise Guide to the Salafi Movement (AQSA Publications, 2004), et passim
350. Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Mukhtasar al-Fatawa al-Masriyya, 1980, p. 603: "The miracles of saints are absolutely true and correct, by the acceptance of all Muslim scholars. And the Qur'an has pointed to it in different places, and the sayings of the Prophet have mentioned it, and whoever denies the miraculous power of saints are only people who are innovators and their followers."
351. See Gibril F. Haddad, Al-Albani and Friends: A Concise Guide to the Salafi Movement (AQSA Publications, 2004).
352. Schwartz, Stephen (2002). The Two Faces of Islam. Doubleday. p. 79. During this period [of Wahhab jihad against the Ottoman Empire] Britain acquired a client in southeast Arabia: Oman, a state with sovereignty over Zanzibar in African and parts of the Iranian and neighboring coasts. Britain also expanded its influence northward into the area now known as the United Arab Emirates. In the other direction, the British subjugated Aden, on the southern Yemen coast in 1839. Yet remarkably enough, Wahhabi violence was almost never turned against the encroachments of this aggressive Christian power; the fanatics seemed concerned only with destroying the Ottomans. For this reason, anti-Wahhabi Muslim writers have repeatedly denounced them as a tool of the British ..." (p.79)
353. Algar, Hamid (2002). Wahhabism: A Critical Essay. Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International. pp. 38–9. The first contact was made in 1865, and British subsidies started to flow into the coffers of the Saudi family, in ever growing quantity as World War One grew closer. The relationship fully matured during that war. In 1915, the British signed with the Saudi ruler of the day, Abd al-Aziz b. Sa'ud (Ibn Sa'ud); one of those contracts with their underlings that were euphemistically known as "treaties of friendship and cooperation". Money was, of course, the principal lubricant of friendship and cooperation, and by 1917 the Saudi ruler was receiving 5000 pounds a month ... the British also graciously saw fit to confer a knighthood on the champion of Wahhabism ... in 1935, Abd al-Aziz b. Sa'ud was made a Knight of the Order of the Bath."
354. Al-Rasheed, Madawi (2008). Kingdom without borders: Saudi political, religious and media frontiers. ISBN 9780231700689. Retrieved 17 September 2012.
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356. Nibras Kazimi, A Paladin Gears Up for War, The New York Sun, 1 November 2007
357. John R Bradley, Saudi's Shi'ites walk tightrope, Asia Times, 17 March 2005
358. Jan-Erik Lane; Hamadi Redissi; Riyāḍ Ṣaydāwī (2009). Religion and Politics: Islam and Muslim Civilization (illustrated ed.). Ashgate Publishing. p. 253. ISBN 9780754674184.
359. Mohammad Javad Zarif (13 September 2016). "Mohammad Javad Zarif: Let Us Rid the World of Wahhabism". New York Times.
360. Muhammad Abu Zahra, Tarikh al-Madhahib al-Islamiyya, pp. 235–38
361. Robinson, Chase (3 April 2017). Islamic Civilization in Thirty Lives: The First 1,000 Years. University of California. ISBN 9780520966277. Retrieved 7 January 2018.
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364. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 59. Abd al-Latif, who would become the next supreme religious leader ... enumerated the harmful views that Ibn Jirjis openly espoused in Unayza: Supplicating the dead is not a form of worship but merely calling out to them, so it is permitted. Worship at graves is not idolatry unless the supplicant believes that buried saints have the power to determine the course of events. Whoever declares that there is no god but God and prays toward Mecca is a believer.
365. Abu'l-Fayd Ahmad ibn Abi Abdallah al-Siddiq al-Ghimmari, Ihya al-Maqbur, pp. 59–60
366. al-Sayyid Yusuf al-Rifa`i and al-Sayyid al-Habib 'Alawi al-Haddad, Advice to Our Brothers the Scholars of Najd, trans. and notes by G.F. Haddad, lxxxvi p. + 393 p.
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Bibliography

• Delong-Bas, Natana J. (2004). Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-516991-3. Retrieved 1 June 2020.
• Brown, Daniel W. (2009). "The Wahhābī Movement". A New Introduction to Islam. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 245–247. ISBN 978-1-4051-5807-7. Retrieved 1 June 2020.
• Commins, David (2015). "From Wahhabi to Salafi". In Haykel, Bernard; Hegghammer, Thomas; Lacroix, Stéphane (eds.). Saudi Arabia in Transition: Insights on Social, Political, Economic and Religious Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 151–166. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139047586.011. ISBN 978-1-107-00629-4. Retrieved 15 June 2020.
• Haykel, Bernard (2013). "Ibn ‛Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad (1703-92)". In Böwering, Gerhard; Crone, Patricia; Kadi, Wadad; Mirza, Mahan; Stewart, Devin J.; Zaman, Muhammad Qasim (eds.). The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. pp. 231–232. ISBN 978-0-691-13484-0. Retrieved 15 June 2020.
• Moosa, Ebrahim (2015). What Is a Madrasa?. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press. ISBN 978-1-4696-2013-8. Retrieved 1 June 2020.
• White, Jonathan R. (2017). "Militant Scholars and Strategists". Terrorism and Homeland Security (9th ed.). Boston: Cengage Learning. pp. 252–253. ISBN 978-1-305-63377-3. LCCN 2015951183. Retrieved 1 June 2020.

Further reading

• Burckhardt, John Lewis, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahábys, H. Colburn and R. Bentley, 1830.
• Valentine, S. R., "Force & Fanaticism: Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia and Beyond", Hurst & Co, London, 2015, ISBN 978-1849044646.
• Imran N. Hosein (1996). 'The Caliphate, the Hejaz and the Saudi-Wahhabi Nation-State'. New York: Masjid Darul Qur'an.
• Algar, Hamid, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay, Islamic Publications International, ISBN 1-889999-13-X.
• Holden, David and Johns, Richard, The House of Saud, Pan, 1982, ISBN 0-330-26834-1.
• Al-Rasheed, Madawi, A History of Saudi Arabia, Cambridge University Press, 2002, ISBN 0-521-64412-7.
• De Gaury, Gerald and Stark, Freya, Arabia Phoenix, Kegan Paul International Limited, ISBN 0-7103-0677-6, ISBN 978-0-7103-0677-7.
• Oliver, Haneef James, The 'Wahhabi' Myth: Dispelling Prevalent Fallacies and the Fictitious Link with Bin Laden, T.R.O.I.D. Publications, February 2004, ISBN 0-9689058-5-4.
• Quist, B. Wayne and Drake, David F., Winning the War on Terror: A Triumph of American Values, iUniverse, 2005, ISBN 0-595-67272-8.
• Malik, S. K. (1986). The Quranic Concept of War (PDF). Himalayan Books. ISBN 81-7002-020-4.
• Swarup, Ram (1982). Understanding Islam through Hadis. Voice of Dharma. ISBN 0-682-49948-X.
• Trifkovic, Serge (2006). Defeating Jihad. Regina Orthodox Press, USA. ISBN 1-928653-26-X.
• Phillips, Melanie (2006). Londonistan: How Britain is Creating a Terror State Within. Encounter books. ISBN 1-59403-144-4.

• Commins, David Dean (2006). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (PDF). I.B. Tauris. ISBN 1-84885-014-X.
• Esposito, John (2003). The Oxford Dictionary of Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-512558-4.
• Kepel, Gilles (2002). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. trans. Anthony F. Roberts (1st English ed.). Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-00877-4.
• Vernochet, Jean-Michel (2013). Les Egarés: Wahhabisme est-il un contre Islam ? (4th French ed.). Alfortville-F: Sigest. ISBN 978-2-917329-62-7.
• Saint-Prot, Charles. Islam. L'avenir de la tradition entre révolution et occidentalisation (Islam. The Future of Tradition between Revolution and Westernization). Paris: Le Rocher, 2008.
• Saudi Clerics and Shia Islam, by Raihan Ismail, Oxford University Press, 2016. ISBN 978-0-19-023331-0

External links

• Wheeler Thatcher, Griffithes (1911). "Wahhābis" . Encyclopædia Britannica. 28 (11th ed.). p. 245.
• "Wahhabism." - Oxford Bibliographies Online
• Islam for Today - What Is a Salafi And Is Their Approach Valid?
• Spero News – Bosnia: Muslims upset by Wahhabi leaders
• BBC Analysis: Inside Wahhabi Islam
• Saudi Publications on Hate Ideology
• Booknotes interview with Stephen Schwartz on The Two Faces of Islam: The House of Sa'ud from Tradition to Terror, 2 February 2003