Media freedom in Russia

Media freedom in Russia concerns both the ability of directors of mass-media outlets to carry out independent policies and the ability of journalists to access sources of information and to work without outside pressure. Media of Russia include television and radio channels, periodicals, and Internet media, which according to the laws of the Russian Federation may be either state or private property.

2020 Press Freedom Index[1]

  Good situation

  Satisfactory situation

  Noticeable problems

  Difficult situation

  Very serious situation

  Not classified / No data

As of 2020 Russia ranked 149 out of 179 countries in the Press Freedom Index compiled by Reporters Without Borders. In the 2017 Freedom House Freedom of the Press report Russia scored 83 (100 being the worst), mostly because of new laws introduced in 2014 that further extended the state control over mass media.[2] Freedom House characterised the situation as even worse in Crimea where, after the 2014 annexation by Russia, both Russian jurisdiction and extrajudicial means are (according to Freedom House) routinely applied to limit freedom of expression.[3]

Multiple international organizations criticize various aspects of the contemporary press-freedom situation in Russia.[4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11] While much attention is paid to political influences, media expert William Dunkerley, a senior fellow at American University in Moscow, argues that the genesis of Russia's press-freedom woes lies in sectoral economic dysfunction.[12]

History

Main article: History of Russian journalism

Legislative framework

The Russian constitution provides for freedom of speech and press; however, government application of law, bureaucratic regulation, and politically motivated criminal investigations have forced the press to exercise self-censorship constraining its coverage of certain controversial issues, resulting in infringements of these rights.[4][5][13][14] According to Human Rights Watch, the Russian government exerts control over civil society through selective implementation of the law, restriction and censure.[8]

Commissioner for Human Rights (ombudsman)

Russia's ombudsman, named officially the Commissioner for Human Rights, is appointed for a certain term by the Parliament. The ombudsman cannot be dismissed before the end of his term, and is not subordinate to any body of power, including the president or the government. Russia's 83 administrative regions have the right to elect a local ombudsman whose authority is limited to that region. Less than half have done so.[15]

Russian Ombudsman Vladimir Lukin reported in 2006, that suggesting that freedom of speech is non-existent in Russia would be an exaggeration, the constitutional right for speech freedom is basically observed, as well as that there was no institutionalised censorship. Apparently for these very reasons journalists and publishers seldom appeal to the commissioner protesting restrictions of their right of seeking, receiving, transferring, publishing or distributing information. Yet disguised restrictions exist to a considerable degree, they are often put through the economic pressure on mass media by the authorities and loyal business. The so-called "self-censorship" which induces journalists to refrain from disseminating information which, in their opinion, may not please the authorities, is also widespread. So in many places the right to praise the authorities is ensured, while the opposite right is just formally declared.[16]

In 2008 annual report, Vladimir Lukin wrote that it is important to have the comprehensive legal interpretation of the terms that may limit the freedom of thought and word.[17] He spoke against the election legislation amendment that is "a practical prohibition" of contesting candidates' criticism, calling it obviously excessive. And Lukin was critical about the Law on combating extremist activities, noting that extremism and dissent must be strictly legally divided.[17]

Attacks and threats against journalists

Main article: List of journalists killed in Russia

The dangers to journalists in Russia have been well known since the early 1990s but concern at the number of unsolved killings soared after Anna Politkovskaya's murder in Moscow on 7 October 2006. While international monitors spoke of several dozen deaths, some sources within Russia talked of over two hundred fatalities.[18][19]

Remembrance Day of Journalists Killed in the Line of Duty in Russia is observed on 15 December every year.

Assaults on journalists

Since the early 1990s, a number of Russian reporters who have covered the situation in Chechnya, contentious stories on organized crime, state and administrative officials, and large businesses have been killed. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, since 1992, 50 journalists have been murdered for their professional activity in Russia (which made it the third deadliest country for journalists in the 1992–2006 period):[20] 30 journalists from 1993 to 2000, and 20 journalists since 2000.[21][22]

According to Glasnost Defence Foundation, there were 9 cases of suspicious deaths of journalists in 2006, as well as 59 assaults on journalists, and 12 attacks on editorial offices.[23] In 2005, the list of all cases included 7 deaths, 63 assaults, 12 attacks on editorial offices, 23 incidents of censorship, 42 criminal prosecutions, 11 illegal layoffs, 47 cases of detention by militsiya, 382 lawsuits, 233 cases of obstruction, 23 closings of editorial offices, 10 evictions, 28 confiscations of printed production, 23 cases of stopping broadcasting, 38 refusals to distribute or print production, 25 acts of intimidation, and 344 other violations of Russian journalist rights.[24]

On 7 October 2006, Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya, known for her criticisms of Russia's actions in Chechnya and the pro-Russia Chechen government, was shot in the lobby of her apartment building. The death of Politkovskaya triggered an outcry of criticism of Russia in the Western media, with accusations that, at best, Vladimir Putin has failed to protect the country's new independent media.[25][26]

International Press Institute reports selective use of regulations, politically motivated criminal investigations, journalist imprisonments, outlet shutdowns and aggressive harassments by security services.[4] According to the organization, Russia remains the most dangerous European country for journalists, with four killed in 2009.[27]

The Amnesty International reported in 2009, that "Human rights defenders, journalists and lawyers who spoke openly about human rights abuses faced threats and intimidation. The police appeared to be reluctant to investigate such threats and a climate of impunity for attacks on civil society activists prevailed." Amnesty International reported also a "climate of growing intolerance towards independent views". According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, Russia is a more dangerous place now than it was during the Cold War. Only Iraq and Algeria outrank it on the list of most life-threatening countries for the press.[28]

In October 2016, a group of Chechen journalists published an anonymous, dramatic appeal in The Guardian describing the intimidation and physical attacks they are experiencing under the Ramzan Kadyrov government and complete control the officials are enforcing over the media organisations in the republic.[29]

The Human Rights Committee of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is concerned about the contemporary situation in Russia.

at the alarming incidence of threats, violent assaults and murders of journalists and human rights defenders, which has created a climate of fear and a chilling effect on the media, including for those working in the North Caucasus, and regrets the lack of effective measures taken to protect the right to life and security of these persons.[11]

• In August 2014 the Pskov-based publisher Lev Shlosberg, member of the opposition Yabloko party, suffered a serious attack that left him unconscious. He claims the attack was related to his paper's investigations on the deployment of Russian soldiers from Pskov to Ukraine.[30]
• In August 2014 the investigative reporter Aleksandr Krutov was attacked and beaten in Saratov - the fourth time in his 20-years career in covering crime for a local publication.[30]
• In September 2014 a TV crew reporting on fraud was attacked in Novosibirsk. Their equipment was destroyed and the videographer was injured.[30]
• In December 2014 in Novosibirsk the editor in chief of taiga.info was beaten by two men in the website premises.[30]

On July 30, 2018, Orkhan Dzhemal (son of Geydar Dzhemal), was killed along with film director Alexander Rastorguev and cameraman Kirill Radchenko in the Central African Republic while filming a documentary about the activities of illegal Russian military formations in the CAR.[31]

• In June 2019, investigative journalist Ivan Golunov was arrested and allegedly beaten in custody[32]

Denial of entry and deportation of foreign journalists

• In February 2011, Guardian journalist Luke Harding, from Britain, was refused entry into Russia, contrary to OCSE regulations. He became the first foreign journalist to be expelled from Russia since the end of the Cold War. Some linked his expulsion with unflattering coverage of Russia, including speculation about Vladimir Putin's wealth. On 9 February Russia reversed the decision.[33]
• In July 2014, the Ukrainian journalist Yevgeniy Agarkov (1+1 TV) was arrested in Voronezh while reporting on the trial of a Ukrainian prisoner of war. He was charged with missing proper accreditation, and was convicted, deported and banned for five years.[30]
• In September 2014, a BBC team was attacked in Astrakhan while investigating the deaths of Russian soldiers in Ukraine - at the time still denied by the Kremlin. They had their equipment destroyed.[30]
• In 2015, an Australian journalist, Helen Womack, who spent over 30 years reporting from Russia was denied accreditation after listing on a nationalist-operated "list of enemies of Russia" website and forced to leave the country.[34]
• Also in 2015, following the documentary on Russian soldiers serving in war in Donbass, Simon Ostrovsky was denied accreditation to Russia.[35]
• Wacław Radziwinowicz was expelled in December 2015.[36]

Censorship and self-censorship

Article 29(5) of the Constitution of Russia states, "The freedom of the mass media shall be guaranteed. Censorship shall be prohibited."[37] The World Report 2009 by Human Rights Watch said that the Russian government controlled over civil society through selective implementation of the law, media restrictions and harassment of activists and human rights defenders.[38]

The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe in 2005 interview to Russian radio Ekho Moskvy said there was pressure on media from authorities in Russia's regions, and situation with the central media caused concerns, as many central TV media looked to lose former independence; his conclusion was that the most important task in Russia was to protect the victories of the 1991 law on mass media, and to let journalists work fully independently; yet he said that with all the difficulties the Russian media were free as a whole, and that he was interviewed in a direct broadcast without censorship spoke also about press freedom.[39]

According to 2005 research conducted by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (WCIOM),[40] the number of Russians who approve of censorship on TV has grown in a year from 63% to 82%; sociologists believe that Russians are not voting in favour of press freedom suppression, but rather for expulsion of ethically doubtful material such as scenes of violence and sex (57% for restricting of violence and sex depiction on TV, 30% for ban of fraudulent businesses ads; and 24% for products for sex ads, and 'criminal way of life propaganda' films).[41]

According to journalist Maxim Kononenko, "People invent censorship for themselves, and what happens on some TV channels, some newspapers, happens not because Putin dials them and says: 'No, this mustn't go.' But because their bosses are fools."[42] However, political scientist Yevgenia Albats in interview with Eduard Steiner has disputed this assertion: "Today the directors of the television channels and the newspapers are invited every Thursday into the Kremlin office of the deputy head of administration, Vladislav Surkov to learn what news should be presented, and where. Journalists are bought with enormous salaries. In discussions they tell us then how horrible it is to work in the state television service."[43]

Since 2012, at the beginning of Vladimir Putin's third presidential term, numerous laws have been passed to make censorship and extensive surveillance easier. Such measures also led to self-censorship.[44] A 2016 report by PEN America shows that limitations of freedom of expression in today's Russia do not affect only journalism and media, but the overall cultural space. According to the report, a confluence of laws aimed at contrasting terrorism and religious hatred and protecting children have led to an environment in which is increasingly hard to distribute fiction, broadcast independent television and promote independent theatre and music productions.[45] In addition, the selectivity and, at times, arbitrariness of Roskomnadzor, the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media, create uncertainty for writers, authors, publishers and other media producers, which often results in self-censorship as a way to avoid uncertain rules and arbitrary enforcement.[46]

Also, according to the 2016 Freedom House's report on freedom of the press, government officials frequently use the country's politicized and corrupt court system to harass journalists and bloggers who expose abuses by authorities. In the Russian legal system the definition of extremism is broad and this make possible for officials to invoke it to silence critical voices. Enforcement of such legal provisions has encouraged self-censorship in the country.[47]

In 2019 Russia introduced new regulation commonly called "fake news law" which criminalizes publications containing "unreliable" information as well as opinions that show "disrespect for society, government, state symbols, the constitution and government institutions".[48] The law was criticized for vague wording allowing selective application e.g. against political opposition. In 2020 during the COVID-19 crisis Novaya Gazeta was fined 60'000 rubles for disputing the officially declared mortality statistics.[49]

Prosecution of "extremist" content

In summer 2012, the Russian State Duma considered Bill 89417-6 which would create a blacklist of Internet sites including child pornography, drug-related material, and extremist material; as well as making providers of telecom services liable for such breaches.[50] The bill was criticized as not being aimed at combating the causes of illegal content and its distribution through the internet, nor contribute to the effectiveness of law enforcement and prosecution of criminals, and its subjective criteria could allow Russian authorities to mass block internet resources with legal content.[50][51] In December 2013, a law criminalizing "calls for separatism" was proposed. Under the law, violators face a fine of up to 306,700 rubles ($9,500) or jail terms of up to five years for making public calls for action aimed against the country's territorial integrity.[5]

Since 2009, the practice of the law enforcement agencies (most notably FSB) was to abuse newly introduced anti-extremism laws to suppress freedom of speech, including corruption investigations.[52] Publications and activities classified as "extremist" included protests against the court rulings in Bolotnaya Square case ("calling for illegal action") and criticism of overspending of local governor ("insult of the authorities") or publishing a poem in support of Ukraine ("inciting hatred")[53] In 2015, the fines for "extremist" content were raised to a maximum of 1 million rubles ($16,069).[54]

• In June 2015, Alexandr Byvshev, the poet whose works were banned as "extremist" earlier, was also listed on the official "list of terrorists and extremists" maintained by the Federal Service for Financial Monitoring (Росфинмониторинг, Rosfinmonitoring) and a "spontaneous collective condemnation" campaign was started in his village described as Soviet-esque by independent media.[55][56]
• Litvinenko's book "Blowing Up Russia" was also listed as an "extremist publication" and banned in 2015.[57]
• In November 2015, just before the Holodomor anniversary in Ukraine, the articles of Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term genocide and used it to describe the Holodomor, were also added to the federal index of extremist materials in Russia.[58]
• In February 2016, police in Saint Petersburg confiscated a whole print run of a book by a Polish war-time author Jan Nowak-Jeziorański because of an allegedly "extremist content" (mentions of Nazi-Soviet collaboration during World War II).[59]
• In October 2018 customs office in Saint Petersburg stopped a single copy of book "Future is History: How Totalitarianism Reclaimed Russia" by Masha Gessen, ordered on Amazon by a lawyer Sergey Golubok. DHL requested a declaration from Golubok that "the book does not contain extremist content" prior to delivery, and a few days later customs office requested him to certify that the book "does not spread specific views". The book is not sold in Russia, but it's also not in the "register of extremist materials".[60][61]
• Coordinated measures are being applied to movies that do not follow Russia's currently preferred official version of historical events, including fiction and documentary movies. Preemptive "inspections" by the prosecutor general office, Ministry of Culture and other official organs, as well as not issuing a required "screening license" was used to harass directors and block widespread shows of films such as The Death of Stalin, "Holiday" (rus. Праздник) by Andrey Krassovski,[62] Child 44, Ordered to forget.[63]
• Doctors and medical personnel from Abinsk complaining about lack of overtime payments related to the COVID-19 crisis were accused of "carrying out extremist activities" by police.[64]

References to the annexation of Crimea

After Russia took control of Crimea, the Russian parliament passed a law making it a criminal offense to question Russia's territorial integrity within what the government considers its borders.[65] A man named Andrei Bubayev was jailed for two years for reposting a picture of a toothpaste tube with the words "squeeze Russia out of yourself" and an article under the headline "Crimea is Ukraine" by a controversial blogger, who is in jail now, calling for military aggression against Russia.[66]

The Russian-language edition of the popular bestseller 21 Lessons for the 21st Century by Yuval Noah Harari published in 2019 had references to the annexation of Crimea and Putin removed or replaced on the topic of fake news, with some other references to them changed. The author said that he gave permission to the changes. He said that he has allowed changes in other translations as certain examples "could deter those audiences or spur censorship on the part of certain regimes".[67]

Law Against Rehabilitation of Nazism

A number of people were fined after the 2014 law against the "rehabilitation of Nazism" which includes criminalising what is deemed to be false information about the Soviet Union that is intentionally spread. Putin and other officials have talked about the need to counter the "rewriting of history", opposing interpretations that differ to official narratives.[68]

Main article: Law Against Rehabilitation of Nazism

Internet censorship and surveillance

Main articles: Internet censorship in Russia and Mass surveillance in Russia

Russia was found to engage in selective Internet filtering in the political and social areas; no evidence of filtering was found in the conflict/security and Internet tools areas by the OpenNet Initiative in December 2010.[69] Russia was on Reporters Without Borders list of countries under surveillance from 2010 to 2013[70] and was moved to the Internet Enemies list in 2014.[71] On 31 March 2013, The New York Times reported that Russia was beginning 'Selectively Blocking [the] Internet'.[72]

• Russia's System of Operational-Investigatory Measures (SORM) requires telecommunications operators to install hardware provided by the Federal Security Service (FSB). It allow the agency to unilaterally monitor users' communications metadata and content, including phone calls, email traffic and web browsing activity.[73] Metadata can be obtained without a warrant.[73] In 2014, the system was expanded to include social media platforms, and the Ministry of Communications ordered companies to install new equipment with Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) capability.[73] In 2015, the European Court for Human Rights found Russia's SORM surveillance legislation and practice in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Zakharov v. Russia).
• The Russian internet blacklist law (2012) faced criticism by major websites and NGOs on it launch.[74] At the time of introduction the list was described as a means for the protection of children from harmful content; particularly content which glorifies drug usage, advocates suicide or describes suicide methods, or contain child pornography.[74] In 2013 the blacklist law was amended with a clause to block content "suspected in extremism". It was expanded to include actions such as "calling for illegal meetings", "inciting hatred" and any other actions "violating the established order".[75][76][77] During the 2014 Crimea Crisis, Roskomnadzor blocked a number of websites criticising Russian policy in Ukraine, including pages of Alexei Navalny, Garri Kasparov and Grani.ru.[78] In July 2014, the online extremism law was used to prevent a march for Siberian autonomy.[30] In subsequent years, it has been used to block caricatures of Vladimir Putin[79] and LGBTQ content.[80]
• The "Bloggers law" (2014), an amendment to existing anti-terrorism legislation, requires all web services to store the user data of Russian citizens on servers within the country. Sites which do not comply with this requirement may be added to the blacklist.[81][82] Since August 2014, the law requires operators of free Wi-Fi hotspots (e.g. in restaurants, libraries, cafes etc.) to collect personal details of all users and identify them using passports.[83]
• The "Yarovaya law" (2016) requires telecom operators to store recordings of phone conversations, text messages and users' internet traffic for up to 6 months, as well as metadata for up to 3 years. This data as well as "all other information necessary" is available to authorities on request and without a court order.[84]

Social media platforms came under increased pressure in 2014. In April the founder of Vkontakte, Pavel Durov, announced he'd resign and leave the country due to FSB intimidation, after he refused to hand over the account data of Ukrainian activists. In September 2014 Vkontakte was taken over by mail.ru, owned by Kremlin-friendly businessman Alisher Usmanov.[30]

• In 2004, Russia pressured Lithuania and in 2006 Sweden into shutting down the Kavkaz Center website, a site that supports creation of a Sharia state in North Caucasus and hosts videos on terrorist attacks on Russian forces in North Caucasus.[85][86]
• Magomed Yevloyev, editor of Ingushetia.org, a vocal critic of the region's administration, was murdered in August 2008.[87]
• At the background of December 2008 demonstrations in Vladivostok,[88] it was reported by Kontury news website that FSB officers addressed moderators of the ru_auto Internet community with a request to remove stories about the Vladivostok protests. The major reason, as reported by a moderator of the resource, was that a number of repeating posts with the information about protests worsened some sort of statistics on people's attitudes. The moderator in question requested bloggers to publish only unique posts about protest actions.[89]
• In December 2009, Internet provider Yota with over 100,000 subscribers[90] has blocked access to some Russian opposition Internet resources for its Moscow-based subscribers for a few days. The block occurred after the chief prosecutor of St. Petersburg recommended the company to block access to extremist resources. At the time, the only Internet resource listed as extremist by the Ministry of Justice of Russia was the site of Caucasian separatists Kavkaz Center. Since the evening of 6 December 2009, Yota opened access to all previously blocked resources, save for Kavkaz Center.[91][92]
• On 5 April 2013, it was confirmed by a spokesperson for the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media that Wikipedia had been blacklisted over the article 'Cannabis Smoking' on Russian Wikipedia.[93][94]
• On 7 August 2013, the Central District Court of the city of Tver, located 100 miles (roughly 160 km) northwest of Moscow, ruled that the official website of Jehovah's Witnesses should be banned throughout the Russian Federation. On 22 January 2014 the Regional Court of Tver ruled in favor of Jehovah's Witnesses and reversed the earlier ruling by the lower court. The Regional Court conducted a new trial, which concluded that the decision of the Central District Court was unjustified, since there was no legal reason to ban the site.[95]

"Extremist materials"

The Ministry of Justice maintains a list of "extremist materials" which are illegal to share.[96]

In 2017 an image of Putin as a "gay clown" was added as item 4071,[97] as a result of a 2016 legal case against social media activist A. V. Tsvetkov.[96]

Judicial prosecution of journalists and media outlets

Prosecutors in Russia have the custom of charging individuals – including journalists, bloggers, and whistle-blowers – with trumped-up criminal offenses including defamation, extremism, and other common criminal charges, as part of an effort to deter and limit their activities.[30]

• In a three-year court case beginning in 2008, Chernovik, Dagestan's largest independent newspaper, saw its editor-in-chief Nadira Isayeva and several reporters prosecuted on charges of "inciting hatred toward law enforcement officials" following criticism of the Federal Security Service's counterinsurgency tactics.[98] Reporters Without Borders, Committee to Protect Journalists,[99] and ARTICLE 19 all protested the charges,[100] and Isayeva was ultimately acquitted. She described the case as "a test for the institution of press freedom" in Dagestan.[101]

• In November 2013 Rostov-na-Donu investigative journalist and blogger Sergey Reznik (often reporting on corruption and abuses by politicians) was sentenced to 1.5 years in jail on various charges, including insult to a governmental official. The jail term was upheld in appeal in April 2014. A new defamation case was open against him in July 2014.[30]
• In January 2014 Aksana Panova, former chief editor of the Ura.ru website in Yekaterinburg, was given a two-year suspended sentence - including a ban on journalist activities - after being tried for extortion. She rejected all charges, claiming to be targeted in retribution for critical coverage of local officials.[30]
• In September 2015 the Siberian journalist and blogger Dmitriy Shipilov was arrested after he had interviewed the organisers of a march for Siberian autonomy. The official reason included failure to serve a three-month sentence for "insulting a public official". Shipilov claims the detention is politically motivated.[30]
• In October 2014 Rostov-na-Donu journalist Aleksandr Tolmachev was convicted to 9 years of hard labor on extortion charges, after having already spent three years in pre-trial detention.[30]

Judicial harassment of the blogger and politician Aleksey Navalny continued in 2014. Navalny was fined $8,400 in April for defaming a Moscow city councillor on Twitter. In December he was sentenced to three and a half years (with suspended sentence) together with his brother Oleg Navalny upon fraud charges. Roskomnadzor warned four media that reported on the sentence and relied a video of Navalny calling for demonstration, accusing them of inciting extremism.[30]

Government ownership and control of media outlets

The government has been using direct ownership, or ownership by large private companies with government links, to control or influence major national media and regional media outlets, especially television. There were reports of self-censorship in the television and print media, particularly on issues critical of the government.[5][102][103]

As to a 2016 Mediastandart Foundation survey, most of the Russian journalists feel that they are not free and independent, and believe that media owners undermine the independence of journalists.[104] According to Alexey Kudrin, Russia's former Minister of Finance and current head of the Civil Initiative Committee, "in the regions, the number of independent media is progressively declining. The same happens on the federal level—major corporations and state institutions exercise influence on the media."[104]

In the 15 years after 1990 most of the Russian print media underwent a change of ownership. Many of them disappeared, others changed owners repeatedly.[105] After the new Law on Mass Media was adopted in 1991, the first stage of privatization of the media market followed.[106] The term "oligarchs", including "media oligarchs", started to be used specifically in Russia indicating powerful businessmen close to political power. The latter, made them the "chosen ones" in the redistribution of the country's wealth after the Soviet Union's dissolution.[107] Since the election of Vladimir Putin in 1999, only oligarchs loyal to the government are able to maintain their control on strategic sectors of Russian economy and politic such as the information one.[107]

Over 5 years between 2011 and 2016 the government forced changes of ownership over 12 significant newsrooms with all-country reach, all of them previously associated with honest and independent reporting. RBC, Forbes, Russian Media Group, TV2, Russkaya Planeta, REN TV, Grani.ru, Lenta.ru, Rain TV, RIA Novosti, Gazeta.ru and Kommersant were suppressed or taken over using different techniques - some of the, with government owned shares were completely disbanded and their resources passed to newly created bodies under control of state-approved managers (e.g. RIA Novosti), while Rain TV was forcibly removed from TV channels and only allowed to continue business as an Internet-only station.[108]

All but one national TV channel are fully or partially owned by the state. The last channel – NTV – is owned by Gazprom, in which the state has a controlling stake. The situation in the radio market is similar. Major information channels are somehow controlled by the state.[105]

As of 2009, the Russian government owns 60% of newspapers, and in whole or in part, all national television stations.[103][109]

In 2008, the BBC has stated in recent years, that companies with close links to the Government, state-owned Gazprom among them, have bought several of the most influential papers.[110]

As to the IREX association Media Sustainability Index, in smaller cities, private independent media are often the only sources of local news, because local municipal newspapers publish only official information.[104]

Russian antimonopoly regulation is still evolving, with many uncertainties and compliance challenges remaining. Many of the key provisions of the Competition Law are unclear and open to interpretation. For this reason, they require further interpretation by Russian courts.[111]

Moreover, governmental control over media is in addition exercised through the distribution of state subsidies and advertising revenues.[104]

Government control over the broadcast media

Observers have noted the loss of the independence of national television stations.[112][113][114] As stated by the BBC, two out of the three main federal channels Channel One and Russia TV are controlled by the government, since they are completely or partially owned by the Rosimuschestvo (the Federal Agency for State Property Management). Instead, state-controlled energy giant Gazprom owns NTV.[115]

Russia TV (Rossiya) covers 98.5% of the country's territory and is state- owned. Channel One (Pervyj Kanal) covers 98.8% of Russia's territory and has a shared state and private ownership (51% state- 49% private).[105] However, most of the private shareholders include National Media Group (controlled by the structures of Yuri Kovalchuk, Chairman of the Board of Rossiya Bank, one of the largest banks in Russia, and Vladimir Putin’s personal friend; and Roman Abramovich, owner of Chelsea football club and Putin’s ally). NTV covers 84% of the national territory.[105]

According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, "All three major television networks are now in the hands of Kremlin loyalists."[116] Indeed, while Rossiya TV (Channel Russia) was state-owned since its foundation in 1991, major shareholders of ORT and NTV (Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky, respectively) sold their stocks to the government and Gazprom in 2000-2001. Moreover, TV6, a media outlet owned by Berezovsky, was closed in 2002 using a legal loophole. In 2003 TVS channel which was formed mainly of former NTV and TV6 was closed due to financial problems.[117][106]

Along with that, plenty of media outlets actively develop now while state participation in them is minimal.[118] There are private Russian TV networks with the broadcast cover reaching the majority of the Russia's population: REN TV (known for the daily analytical talk show with Tigran Keosayan, analytical news program "Week" with Marianna Maksimovskaya), TV Center ( known for "Postscriptum" with Aleksey Pushkov, "Moment of Truth" with Andrey Karaulov), Petersburg - Channel 5.

Liberal opposition TV-Channel RTVi owned by Vladimir Gusinsky is not broadcast in Russia, but available in that country through networks of cable and satellite television, MMDS and IPTV networks.[119] A former editor of a program on that channel, Vladimir Kara-Murza, believes it is the merit of the RTVi that the possibility of a third presidential term of Vladimir Putin was prevented, and that the "backdoor political technologists" were made to "abide to the Constitution, albeit with the Successor operation".[120]

On 29 January 2014, the largest Russian TV providers, after key politicians expressed their discontent, disconnected Dozhd channel in response to a survey on its website and in live "Dilettants" discussing program. The survey asked if Leningrad should have been surrendered to the invading Nazi army in order to save hundreds of thousands of lives.[121]

Top state television channels frequently apply self-censorship, avoiding any controversial topics that might impact the public image of the authorities. For example, massive truck drivers protests across the country were never even mentioned in the First Channel in spite of wide coverage in local and independent media and requests of the viewers.[122]

The situation in the radio market is similar. Major information channels are in one way or another controlled by the state.[105] Only four Russian radios broadcast political talk shows: Mayak, Radio Rossii, Vesti FM, and Ekho Moskvy. Mayak, Vesti FM and Radio Rossii are state-owned (Rosimushchestvo), while Ekho Moskvy is owned by the state-controlled Gazprom Media.[106] A complete list of the audiovisual services in Russia can be found in the MAVISE Database, made by the European Audiovisual Observatory. Such list includes the ownership of TV channels and on-demand services.[123]

Government control over print media

Kommersant-Vlast, Expert, and the New Times are weeklies that provide serious analysis of the current political issues . However, they are owned by oligarchs who openly support the government. Kommersant-Vlast is produced by Kommersant Publishing House that is owned by Alisher Usmanov. Expert is a part of Expert Media Holding that is owned by Oleg Deripaska’s Basic Element and a Russian state corporation—Vnesheconombank.[106]

Government control over web-sites

Most popular websites, if they are not internationally owned such as Google and Facebook, are state-owned or owned by a couple of influential businessmen such as Alexander Mamut and Alisher Usmanov.[124]

Foreign media owners

A law signed in 2014 provided to limit foreign ownership stakes in any Russian media assets to 20% by early 2017.[125] As a consequence, in 2015, the German Springer Publishing House sold the Russian edition of Forbes, and Finland’s Sanoma sold its stakes in the business newspaper Vedomosti and the English-language publication, The Moscow Times. Russian media executives bought the stakes in both transactions. The Moscow Times subsequently switched from daily to weekly publication, and its chief editor resigned due to conflicts with the new owner. The new publisher of Forbes said that the magazine would carry fewer stories on politics and focus on business and economics.[126][127]

"Black lists" controversy

As reported by Clifford J. Levy in a 2008 New York Times article, all Vladimir Putin's opponents are being made to vanish from Russian television. They are blacklisted and not allowed to appear in television shows. In one example, a presentation critical of Putin's policies has been digitally erased.[128] This is the case of Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky, two powerful Russian oligarchs in the 1990s. Berezovsky had invested in the former public broadcaster ORT’s first channel while Gusinsky, created Russia’s first independent TV station, NTV. After Putin’s power takeover, the media owned by Berezovsky and Gusinsky were the first victims of this "purge." Tax controls, raids by armed men, searches and arrests forced their bosses to flee the country and to sell their media outlets.[107]

To counter these claims, the news outlet of the Young Guard of United Russia has argued that that at least 35-40% of participants of NTV-aired talk show "At a barrier" hosted by Vladimir Solovyov during the last two years represented the liberal opposition (including Novodvorskaya, Ivanenko, Nemtsov, Hakamada); from January to May 2008, overt adversaries of Vladimir Putin participated in 9 of 16 episodes of the talk show.[129]

REN-TV and Channel 5 news ban controversy

On 16 October 2009, Kommersant newspaper reported that the owner of private television channels REN TV and Channel 5 had made changes to the managing structures of the channels. Referring to an anonymous source, Kommersant stated that as the result these channels would cease to broadcast independent news; instead, since 2010 they would receive the news from the state channel RT (known as Russia Today until 2009). As Kommersant wrote, "the Channel 5 and REN-TV are the only Russian TV channels today whose editorial policy is different than state news. Only through these channeles opposition politicians are aired, as well as other events adversed by authorities are reported." However, the head of a REN-TV analytical news program Week Marianna Maksimovskaya was quoted by Kommersant as saying she held optimistic about the new executive director of REN-TV and sure that its editorial policy would not be altered.[113][130]

On 19 October 2009, press secretary of REN-TV channel Nazarov asserted that REN-TV and Channel 5 will receive from the RT network "exclusively technological support", and the state channel will impose no influence on the informational part of the news.[131]

On 22 October 2009, Alexander Orjonikize, a former head of REN-TV, and now CEO of National Media Group that owns TV channels in question, said that while the possibility of partnership in order to produce more saturated and interesting news is discussed, "it's important to note that whatever business strategy would be chosen in that direction, editorial policy regarding news and its informational contents will not be altered."[132]

Channel 5 employs 1,700 people in Saint Petersburg. Its sales in 2009 accounted for US$20 million, while the expenditures exceeded 100 million. On 19 October 2009, employees of the TV channel published an open letter to the top Russian politicians, concerned over a possibility of mass dismissals.[133] On 23 October 2009, CEO of NMG-TV Vladimir Khanumyan in an interview promised no mass dismissals will take place; he also commented that "Information about Russia Today is generally some misunderstanding. I don't even understand how could it be used in our project. It's the TV channel which makes programs for the abroad audience in English and Arab languages. How does that relate to Channel 5?"[134]

RBC

In 2016 leadership and top journalists of RBC media holding left the company following an investigation launched by the authorities into an alleged "fraud", which was widely associated with the non-mainstream coverage of political affairs and the government, including the latest Panama Papers publications on the wealth of Vladimir Putin.[135] One journalist described the situation as "having a strong resemblance to the takeover of NTV in the early 2000s".[136][137][138]

Official stance towards the issues of state dominance

In 2000, prior to the presidential election, Kommersant published a long document titled "The Reform of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation", allegedly leaked from the election committee of Vladimir Putin.[139] The programme proposed a number of changes to government information policy, including strict centralization of mass media and suppression of criticism from both media as well as from opposition in Duma.

"The Directorate, setting a goal for itself, needs to act more effectively and actively than the opposition, must be harsher in its work and claims than the opposition, it must use sharper and more crushing facts. There should be no weakness or liberalism, there is no time left for this. For every claim directed against the Leadership of the country or its policy, the Presidential Press Center of the Administration must immediately answer. Operational information about the intentions of opposition forces to conduct political events comes to the Directorate. The Directorate implements all preemptive actions before the action to be conducted by the opposition, but in a beneficial “light” for the Presidential side".

The document also offered a number of case studies and examples on how journalists or members of Duma exposing cases of corruption or suspicious purchases (e.g. foreign property) by members of the administration should be silenced with "preventive political actions", involving release of compromising personal details about the whistleblowers, journalists and protesters or organizing "spontaneous" counter-pickets in support of the administration.[140] These methods were also applied to foreign journalists reporting from Russia and included ostensible surveillance, tapping of apartments and threats to relatives.[141]

In 2006, President of Russia Vladimir Putin commented that in the period of 1990s freedom of press in Russia "was indeed under threat, not from the former state ideology that once held a monopoly on expression, but from the dictates of oligarchic capital".[142] When asked about media freedom in 2006 interview with NBC TV channel, Putin replied: "We have more than 3,500 television and radio companies here in Russia and state participation in them is decreasing with every passing year. As for print media, there are more than 40,000 publications and we could not control them all even if we wanted to."[143]

In May 2008, the International Federation of Journalists welcomed signs of a "fresh start" in relations between the authorities and independent media in Russia.[144]

In November 2008, state of the nation address President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev acknowledged problems with the Russian media:[145]

"[A]s was the case 20 years ago, the bureaucracy still does not trust free citizens and free activity. This logic pushes it into dangerous conclusions and acts. The bureaucracy from time to time casts fear over the business world, pressuring it to keep in line and not to take what they consider wrong action, takes control of this or that media outlet, trying to stop it from saying what they consider the wrong thing, meddles in the electoral process, preventing the election of what they consider the wrong person, and puts pressure on the courts, stopping them from handing down what they consider the wrong verdict."[145]

The policies adopted in that address answered that criticism the following way:

"Ninth, parliamentary parties should have clear guarantees that their work will be covered by the state media.

Tenth, freedom of speech should be backed up by technological innovation. Experience shows that it is practically of no use to persuade the bureaucrats to "leave the media in peace". Instead of persuading, we should work more actively to expand the free internet and digital television space. No bureaucrat can obstruct discussion on the internet or censor thousands of channels at once."[145]

In May 2009, a Federal Law "On Guarantees of Equality of Parliamentary Parties in Covering their Activities by the National State-Owned TV and Radio Channels" was adopted.[146]

In his 2009 State of the Nation Address Dmitry Medvedev recommended all regions of the Russian Federation to pass laws on guarantees of equal media coverage of activity of parties represented in regional parliaments.[147]

In 2007, a report by professor of politics Nicolai N. Petro asserted that foreign companies owned shares in over half of all Russian broadcasting companies and not the state. According to him, the Russian state's share in the newspaper and journal market is estimated to be less than 10%, while its share in electronic media is even smaller.[118]

Russian head of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs Konstantin Kosachev said in a 2005 interview that there were no differences between freedom of speech in Russia and Western countries in regards to the printed media: "there is an enormous amount of newspapers which write any sort of stuff." Speaking of electronic media, he acknowledged that they were mainly under the control of the authorities, but added that that's not a specifically Russian phenomenon.[148]

According to the BBC, the Russian newspaper market offers its consumers a more diverse range of views than those same consumers can sample on the country's leading television channels.[110]

According to Vedomosti newspaper, in 2009 Rupert Murdoch's corporation failed to sell its three popular Russian radio stations because it didn't manage to find buyers for them.[149]

Coverage of the Ukraine crisis

Main article: Media portrayal of the Ukrainian crisis

The Russian military intervention in Ukraine and the occupation of Crimea, in 2014, led to a reinforcement of propaganda and disinformation from state-owned media outlets, including by altered or misidentified images, stories that were distorted[150] or invented from scratch. According to the war reporter Arkadiy Babchenko, Russian mass media played a significant role in actually starting the war in Donbass stating that "this is the first war in history started exclusively by Goebbels-like propaganda".[151][152]

Independent coverage of war-related issues led to official pressures on media outlets. Lenta.ru was warned by Roskomnadzor in March 2014 after publishing an interview with a member of Right Sector; the following day the owner replaced the editor with a pro-governmental one, and 40 employees resigned in protest. In October 2014, Ekho Moskvy was warned by Roskomnadzor after airing first-hand testimonies of the fighting in eastern Ukraine, allegedly "justifying war crimes".[30]

In March 2016 Sergey Shoygu when speaking at a Russian media prize ceremony described information in general as "yet another weapon, yet another unit of the Armed Forces. These weapons can be used for good or bad".[153]

Political pressure on independent media

According to the World Press Freedom Review 2008 by International Press Institute, the pressure on Russian independent media outlets and their employees increased considerably in 2007. The government use variety of methods to control of broadcasters, to sideline critical journalists, and to intimidate them into self-censorship.[4]

According to International Press Institute, even bolder publications have to curtail their coverage to avoid problems with the authorities.[4]

Selective use of bureaucratic regulations were employed to inhibit media outlets, vague laws were passed to restrict independent activities, politically motivated criminal investigations against critics were used, independent journalists were imprisoned on trumped-up charges and their media outlets were closed, controlling interests in independent news outlets were purchased, aggressive harassment of journalists by security services took place and the failure to bring justice in the murders of journalists and in other violent attacks against the press prevailed.

In 2016, the PEN association concluded that using a combination of methods including taking control over large media companies and TV channels and selective and flexible usage of newly introduced laws, the government has acquired practical control over what is published in mass-media in Russia:[154]

Although the press has not given in without a struggle and some key independent outlets, reporters, and editors continue to speak and publish, state television and a limited selection of other “loyal” outlets dominate today’s Russian media landscape. With the mainstream press increasingly toeing the Kremlin line, government restrictions have expanded to encroach upon other cultural spaces and modes of expression, including social activism, literature, art, and theater.

While there are provisions in the Russian Constitution that guarantee freedom of speech and specifically forbid censorship, the practical execution of numerous legal acts and dependence of courts results in practically unlimited control of the government over what is published and where. The laws in question are the anti-extremism laws, law on protection of children from harmful information, law on insult to religious believers, foreign agents law and undesirable organisations law. An important role in the censorship system is played by Roskomnadzor (Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecom, Information Technologies and Mass Communications), an institution that- according to PEN- "has reawakened people’s internal editors — the voice in your head that consciously or unconsciously makes you question what you are writing or publishing: does this cross the line? Will this get me in trouble?"[154]

According to an expert, the expulsion of competitive political actors from media ownership has gradually led to the depoliticisation of media content. Depoliticization of media content, however, led to its patriotisation as well.[103]

On 25 November 2017, Putin signed into law new measures allowing authorities to list foreign media outlets as "foreign agents", comparing it to the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act requirement that forces Russia Today to register as a Russian foreign agent in the U.S. The law allows Moscow to force foreign media to brand their own news provided to Russians as the work of "foreign agents".[155]

Selective use of regulations and criminal investigations

As stated by IPI, the Russian Government use selectively politicized regulations and bureaucratic harassment to inhibit media outlets.[4][28] Main legal tools used here are anti-extremism laws (described above) and foreign agents law.

In 2008, Amnesty International criticized the run-up to parliamentary and presidential elections as "a clampdown on the freedoms of assembly and expression", stating that "the authorities have violently dispersed some opposition demonstrations, while pro-government events have gone ahead without interference."[10]

In 2015, PolitPress initiated a database of various forms of repression applied to journalists and activists in Russia, counting overall 302 of those subject to various forms of repression, including 17 journalists.[156] Memorial has published a list of political prisoners in Russia, that also includes journalists.[157]

Access to information and open data

Russia's Law on Providing Access to Information on the Activities of State Bodies and Bodies of Local Self-Government, was enacted by the lower house of the legislature (State Duma) on 21 January 2009.[158] The law positively guarantees the rights of Russian citizens to request and receive information, outlines a procedure for such requests, and determines government responsibility for providing such information. Such adoption was welcomed by the Human Rights Committee of United Nations in 2009.[159]

However, even if the right to information is also legally guaranteed in Russia by the first Article of the Russian Law on Mass Media (27 December 1991) and by Article 29 of the 1993 Constitution, the realm of information is characterized by secrecy rather than openness.[160][161] The Law on Mass Media assigns a direct right to receive information only to mass media, while Russian citizens have the right to receive reliable information on the state activities and representants via the mass media (Art. 38.1). State officials, in turn, are obliged to inform the media about their activities: on demand, but also actively.[162]

According to the Global Right to Information Rating (GRIR), the Russian legal framework (including jurisprudence) does not recognise a fundamental right of access to information.[163] The GRIR appointed score 1 to Russia, where 6 is the maximum possible score with regard to the right to access information. However, when considered together with the scope and the requesting procedures provided by the Russian Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the GRIR assigned Russia a total score of 98, out of the maximum score of 150.[163] The Penal Code (Art. 144) fixes high penalties for unlawful refusal of information and for hindering the professional activity of journalists.[162] The right to access public information is particularly undermined by the legal exception valid for refusing the information's disclosure, namely the category of "confidential information" (commercial, state, or military secrets) is open to wide interpretations.[162][164] The Law "on state secrets" was adopted on 21 July 1993 (amended in October 1997). In addition to a list of categories of information that could be classified as state secrets, the President of Russia can elaborate and approve such list through the publication of a public decree.[162]

Svetlana Mironyuk commented to Vasily Gatov that Russian media since the early 2000s is divided into three groups: outsiders, our guys, and in-betweeners.[165]

• "Outsiders." Vedomosti, Kommersant, Forbes, Novaya Gazeta, Lenta.ru (until March 2014), Dozhd, The Moscow Times, and others. These have a more Western media approach to covering events. These media sources are outside the official Kremlin viewpoint.[165]
• "Our guys." Komsomolskaya Pravda, Russia-24, VGTRK, and the Aram Gabrelyanov media family — Zhizn, Lifenews.ru and Izvestia. This group can access exclusive interviews of Kremlin officials but the Kremlin expects certain "services" in return. To keep this group inline, it is up to several central figures such as Alexei Gromov and Mikhail Lesin, who began the task, and later they were joined by first Vladislav Surkov, and then his replacement Vyacheslav Volodin. To replace the Kremlin handlers, special yellow telephones, which are "media hotlines" to the Kremlin, have been installed on the "Our guys" editors desks since the mid-2000s.[165]
• "In-betweeners." the commercial radio station Ekho Moskvy (majority owned by Gazprom-Media) and the Interfax news agency may not always have access to Kremlin authorities, but occasionally can have a story.[165]

In 2015, the FSB (Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation), the principal security agency of Russia, proposed a new regulation that will restrict access to public property registers, that were previously frequently used by whistle-blowers to expose multimillion-dollar mansions belonging to public officials who could not afford them from their official salary.[166] The regulation was proposed shortly after the media exposed an undeclared mansion belonging to FSB vice-director Sergey Smirnov using the public registers.[167][168] In the same year, a group of deputies proposed a new law that would penalize "anti-Russian" or "anti-patriotic" statements. The law was criticized as unconstitutional and vague due to lack of definition of what these terms would really mean.[169]

Another regulation enacted in 2015 is based on the European right to be forgotten concept, but without any of the safeguards for the public interest and freedom of speech. According to some experts, the regulation's scope is to silence publications about specific corrupted politicians, even if the accusations were true and confirmed in courts.[170] Public land registers were also anonymized to hide names of property owners after they were frequently used by watchdogs to question unexplainable wealth of public officers.[171]

In 2015, the non-profit association RosOtvet, launched an online service to facilitate requests for information to authorities.[172]

Open data and proactive disclosure

Beyond the duty to disclose public information upon request, public authorities in Russia have an affirmative obligation to publish information (i.e. proactive disclosure). Such information consists in:[164]

• Full and brief official names of the government body, postal address, email for requests/messages from citizens, reference phone numbers - usually published and actualized information on powers and competence;
• Information on head officials (full names, other information - upon agreement);
• Official symbols;
• Approved forms (templates) for applications and other documents acceptable for review by the government body;
• Information on services provided by the government body in the field of licensing works performed abroad and using information containing state secret;
• Procedure for entering state service in the government body;
• Procedure for submission and review of applications from individuals and organizations Procedure, address, and schedule for reception of individuals and organizations;
• Name of the government body's structure department in charge of reception, contact data (email, reference phones).

Proactive disclosure of information by public bodies is provided by a series of laws, many of them aimed at contrasting corruption.[173] One of them is the Russian Federation Federal Law "On providing access to information on the activities of state bodies and local governments", adopted by the State Duma on 21 January 2009.[158]

The Russian legislation provides several ways for government bodies to publish their open data: it can be done through the federal Open Data Portal (data.gov.ru),[174] dedicating a section on a government body's own official website or on a special open data portal, regional or municipal.

In 2016, the association Infometer[175][176] has audited open data of 166 websites belonging to administrations of the largest Russian cities, those populated over 100,000. This study revealed that most cities' administrations do not publish open data:

• most of those publishing open data do it at their own resources that is not always the best solution;
• quite few city administrations approve normative acts regarding open data;
• the very few city administrations work with the community of open data software developers.[177]

73 out of the 166 cities under survey do publish open data. They observe the requirements on open data publication for 47.9%.[178]

Infometer, from July to October 2014, made an audit of compliance of various level courts' official websites with the Federal Law "On Providing Access to Information on the Activities of Courts in the Russian Federation" No. 262-FZ from 22 Dec 2008. The experts focused on the openness of information on Russian general jurisdiction courts' activities, focusing on online publication of templates for documents used for filing applications to courts.[179] The results showed that, with regard to the Supreme Court of Russia, information is available at 24.1%. Referring to Regional Court, out of the 85 examined their openness level appears to be 42.4%. Finally, with regard to First Instance courts, their openness was 31%.[179]

With regard to open data, as to 2015 the Infometer association calculated that 69 Russian regions publish open data and for 36.6% at average regions observe requirements for open data publication. Most of these open data are published in the governmental field.[176]

See also

• Human rights in Russia
• List of journalists killed in Russia
• Mat (Russian profanity) § Legal issues
• Media of Russia
• Political repression of cyber-dissidents § Russia
• Russian Internet blacklist
• Telecommunications in Russia

References

1. "2020 World Press Freedom Index". Reporters Without Borders. 2020.
2. "Russia". Freedom of the Press. Freedom House. 2015. Retrieved 5 May 2015.
3. "Harsh Laws and Violence Drive Global Decline". Freedom House. 2015. Retrieved 5 May 2015.
4. International Press Institute: Russia
5. Human Rights Reports: Russia; US BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR; 2013
6. "Europe no longer so exemplary, Russian tragedy deepens - Reporters Without Borders". Archived from the original on 14 February 2015. Retrieved 14 February 2015.
7. Reporters Without Borders: Indeks svabody pressy 2009 god Archived 4 November 2009 at the Wayback Machine, (in Russian).
8. "Human Rights Watch: World Report, Russia p. 393" (PDF). HRW.org. Retrieved 15 June 2017.
9. Amnesty International: Amnesty International Report 2009 - Russia Archived 5 August 2009 at the Wayback Machine
10. "Freedom curtailed in the Russian Federation - Amnesty International". 26 February 2008. Retrieved 14 February 2015.
11. "The October 2009 Concluding Observations of the United Nations Human Rights Committee". OHCHR.org. Retrieved 15 June 2017.
12. Medvedev's Media Affairs, William Dunkerley, Omnicom Press, 2011.
13. Shaun Walker (15 April 2015). "Hollywood's Child 44 pulled in Russia after falling foul of culture ministry". The Guardian. Retrieved 15 April 2015.
14. Index of Reporters without Borders Archived 22 October 2009 at the Wayback Machine, 2009
15. St. Petersburg Times: Controversial Ombudsman Mikhailov Dismissed Archived 1 March 2014 at the Wayback Machine, 23 October 2009.
16. Lukin, Vladimir (9 February 2007). "Report Of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation For the Year 2006". Official Website of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation. Archived from the original (DOC) on 5 March 2009.
17. 2008 Report of Russian Ombudsman Archived 7 October 2009 at the Wayback Machine (in Russian)
18. "Czar Putin". CNN. Transcripts.cnn.com. 9 December 2007. Retrieved 18 October 2014.
19. Azhgikhina, Nadezhda Ilinichna (7 November 2016). "10 Years on From the Murder of Russian Journalist Anna Politkovskaya, What Has Changed?". Newsweek. Retrieved 5 March 2018.
20. CPJ calls on Putin to take responsibility for Politkovskaya murder probe - Committee to Protect Journalists
21. "Attacks on the Press 2005: Russia", Committee to Protect Journalists, 16 February 2006.
22. "Motive Confirmed: Deaths of journalists where the CPJ is reasonably certain that the journalist was murdered in direct reprisal for his or her work; was killed in crossfire during combat situations; or was killed while carrying out a dangerous assignment such as coverage of a street protest", spreadsheet, Committee to Protect Journalists, 15 August 2009.
23. Конфликты, зафиксированные службой мониторинга ФЗГ на территории РФ в течение 2006 года Archived 27 September 2007 at the Wayback Machine
24. Конфликты, зафиксированные ФЗГ в течение 2005 года на территории РФ Archived 7 August 2007 at the Wayback Machine
25. Putin's Russia failed to protect this brave woman Archived 27 September 2007 at the Wayback Machine, Joan Smith.
26. Anna Politkovskaya, Prominent Russian Journalist, Putin Critic and Human Rights Activist, Murdered in Moscow Archived 14 November 2007 at the Wayback Machine, Democracy Now
27. International Press Institute: Europe Overview
28. "Anatomy of injustice", The Committee to Protect Journalists, September 2009.
29. "Chechen journalists, international journalists – Ramzan Kadyrov has silenced us all". The Guardian. 10 October 2016. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 14 October 2016.
30. Freedom House, [freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/russia Russia 2015 Press Freedom report]
31. "Russia in Africa: Inside a military training centre in CAR". www.aljazeera.com.
32. "Russian media's rare support for arrested reporter". 10 June 2019. Retrieved 10 June 2019.
33. Sabbagh, Dan (9 February 2011). "Russia U-turns over Guardian journalist's deportation". The Guardian.
34. Womack, Helen (18 June 2015). "Why I had to leave Russia, after three decades as a foreign correspondent there". Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 21 June 2015.
35. "Автору фильма о "селфи-солдатах" в Донбассе отказали в аккредитации в России" [The author of the film about "selfie soldiers" in the Donbass was denied accreditation in Russia] (in Russian). TV Rain. 22 June 2015. Retrieved 22 June 2015.
36. Imielski, Roman (18 December 2015). "Rosja wyrzuca korespondenta "GW". Radziwinowicz: Od dziś nie mogę z Moskwy napisać ani jednego tekstu" [Russia throws out the Gazeta Wyborcza correspondent. Radziwinowicz: From today I cannot report from Moscow]. Gazeta Wyborcza (in Polish). Agora.
37. Article 29 Archived 30 August 2013 at the Wayback Machine, Chapter 2: Rights and Freedoms of Man and Citizen, The Constitution of Russia, Kremlin Archive. Retrieved 14 September 2013.
38. "Human Rights Watch: World Report 2009: Russia" (PDF). HRW.org. Retrieved 15 June 2017.
39. Interview of Alvaro Gil-Robles to M. Ganapolsky, Echo of Moscow, 24 April 2005, (in Russian).
40. Russian Public Opinion Research Center (WCIOM), web site. Retrieved 14 September 2013.
41. Dembinskaia, Natalia (24 June 2005). 82% россиян выступают за цензуру на телевидении [82% of Russians approve of television censorship]. Russian Development Portal (in Russian). Archived from the original on 29 September 2007.
42. Interview with Maxim Kononenko Archived 6 December 2007 at the Wayback Machine, Эдуарду Коридорову, ТАСС-Прогноз, 15 July 2005, (in Russian). (English translation).
43. Steiner, Eduard (April 2007). "What should I be afraid of?". Magazine for Arts and Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe. Retrieved 26 April 2016.
44. "Reporters Without Borders: Russian laws 'lead to self-censorship'". Deutsche Welle. 29 January 2014. Retrieved 6 June 2017.
45. Rosenberg, Alyssa (9 February 2016). "How censorship works in Vladimir Putin's Russia". The Washington Post. Retrieved 6 June 2017.
46. "Discourse in danger: attacks on free expression in Putin's Russia" (PDF). PEN America Center. 25 January 2016. Retrieved 6 June 2017.
47. "Russia. Freedom of the Press 2016". freedomhouse.org. 2016. Retrieved 6 June 2017.
48. "Russia Criminalizes The Spread Of Online News Which 'Disrespects' The Government". NPR.org. Retrieved 19 June 2020.
49. "«Эхо Москвы» и главреда сайта радиостанции оштрафовали на 260 тысяч рублей по закону о фейках из-за интервью с политологом Соловьем". Новая газета - Novayagazeta.ru (in Russian). Retrieved 19 June 2020.
50. "Russian Lawmakers Set to Debate Internet Blacklist", RIA Novosti (Moscow), 6 July 2012.
51. President's Council for the Development of Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights, Statement by the Council in respect of the bill № 89417-6 "On Amendments to the Federal Law" On protection of children from information harmful to their health and development " - retrieved 9 July 2012
52. Paul Goble (29 March 2015). "FSB Increasingly Involved in Misuse of 'Anti-Extremism' Laws, SOVA Says". The Interpreter Magazine. Retrieved 1 April 2015.
53. "Examples of forbidden content". Zapretno.info. 2014. Archived from the original on 30 October 2014. Retrieved 29 October 2014.
54. "Putin Raises 'Extremism' Fines for Russian Media Tenfold". The Moscow Times. 4 May 2015. Retrieved 6 May 2015.
55. "Росфинмониторинг - Перечень террористов и экстремистов (действующие)". www.fedsfm.ru. Retrieved 10 June 2015.
56. Neef, Christian; Schepp, Matthias (22 April 2014). "The Propaganda War: Opposition Sings Kremlin Tune on Ukraine". Spiegel Online. Retrieved 10 June 2015.
57. "Грани.Ру: Книга "ФСБ взрывает Россию" включена в список экстремистских материалов". grani.ru. Retrieved 10 June 2015.
58. "Федеральный список экстремистских материалов дорос до п. 3152". SOVA Center for Information and Analysis. Retrieved 28 November 2015.
59. "Изъят тираж книги Яна Новака-Езёраньского". Retrieved 15 February 2016.
60. "Reinventing Soviet-Style Censorship in Russia – and Beyond?". Human Rights Watch. 21 November 2018. Retrieved 23 November 2018.
61. Inc., TV Rain. "Петербургская таможня не пропустила книгу Маши Гессен о тоталитаризме в России". Retrieved 21 November 2018.
62. "YouTube удалил фильм Алексея Красовского "Праздник"". TASS. Retrieved 20 January 2019.
63. Tokmasheva, Maria (30 January 2018). "Final cut: Movies that have been banned in Russia". www.rbth.com. Retrieved 20 January 2019.
64. Higgins, Andrew (25 May 2020). "Putin Speaks, Officials Shrug, and Doctors Are Caught in the Middle". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 26 May 2020.
65. "Trial Postponed For Crimean Journalist Charged With Separatism".
66. "Dozens in Russia imprisoned for social media likes, reposts". The Big Story. Archived from the original on 31 March 2017. Retrieved 10 June 2016.
67. "Post-post-truth". meduza.io. Retrieved 24 July 2019.
68. Bone, Harry (11 October 2016). "Putin backs WW2 myth in new Russian film". Retrieved 23 December 2019.
69. "ONI Country Profiles", Research section at the OpenNet Initiative web site, a collaborative partnership of the Citizen Lab at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto; the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University; and the SecDev Group, Ottawa
70. Internet Enemies Archived 23 March 2012 at the Wayback Machine, Reporters Without Borders (Paris), 12 March 2012
71. "Internet Enemies", Enemies of the Internet 2014: Entities at the heart of censorship and surveillance, Reporters Without Borders (Paris), 11 March 2014. Retrieved 24 June 2014.
72. "Russians Selectively Blocking Internet". The New York Times. 31 March 2013.
73. Maréchal, Nathalie (22 March 2017). "Networked Authoritarianism and the Geopolitics of Information: Understanding Russian Internet Policy". Media and Communication. 5 (1): 29. doi:10.17645/mac.v5i1.808. ISSN 2183-2439.
74. "Russia internet blacklist law takes effect". BBC. 31 October 2012. Retrieved 3 November 2012.
75. "Путин подписал закон о блокировке сайтов за экстремизм". Retrieved 23 August 2015.
76. Internet Restriction Bill Passes First Reading, The Moscow Times, 8 July 2012, retrieved 9 July 2012
77. "Law concerning the illegal websites register has come into force" Archived 5 November 2013 at the Wayback Machine, Lyudmila Ternovaya, Кызыл тан, 30 July 2012, accessed 7 August 2012
78. "Нас блокируют. Что делать?". Grani.ru. 2014.
79. Robins-Early, Nick (6 April 2017). "Russia Bans 'Extremist' Image Of Putin In Makeup". Retrieved 15 June 2017 – via Huff Post.
80. "Russia Blacklists LGBT Teen Online Support Group". The Moscow Times. 2 February 2015. Retrieved 5 July 2017.
81. "Facebook, Gmail, Skype face Russia ban under 'anti-terror' plan". CNET. 23 July 2014. Retrieved 24 July 2014.
82. "Russian MPs back law on internet data storage". BBC News. Retrieved 24 July 2014.
83. "Passport now required to use public Wi-Fi in Russia". RAPSI. 8 August 2014. Retrieved 22 September 2014.
84. "Russia: 'Big Brother' Law Harms Security, Rights". Human Rights Watch. 12 July 2016. Retrieved 2 July 2017.
85. "Lithuania shuts Chechen rebel site", BBC News, 18 September 2004
86. "Chechen rebel website reopens", BBC News, 8 October 2004
87. Kremlin critic shot in Ingushetia, BBC
88. Protests on Car Tariffs Erupt in Russia, The New York Times, 22 December 2008
89. http://kontury.info/news/2008-12-23-607
90. "Yota: subscriber growth", 18 August 2009
91. "Абоненты расследуют «фильтрацию» оппозиционных сайтов" Archived 28 September 2011 at the Wayback Machine ("Subscribers are investigating the 'filtering' of opposition websites"), Olga Ivanova, New Russia News Agency (NR2), 3 December 2009, (in Russian). (English translation)).
92. "Абоненты Yota несколько дней не имели доступа к оппозиционным сайтам" ("Yota blocked access to opposition sites for several days"), Lenta.Ru, 7 December 2009 (in Russian). (English translation).
93. "Russia May Block Wikipedia Access Over Narcotics Article". RIA Novosti. 6 May 2013.
94. "Russian media regulator confirms Wikipedia blacklisted". Russia Beyond The Headlines. Interfax. 5 April 2013.
95. "Russian Court Overturns Attempt to Ban Bible-Education Website-JW.org", Johovah's Witnesses, 21 January 2014. Retrieved 23 January 2014.
96. Robins-Early, Nick (6 April 2017). "Russia Bans 'Extremist' Image Of Putin In Makeup". Retrieved 15 June 2017 – via Huff Post.
97. http://minjust.ru/ru/node/243787 page 453, item 4071 "Плакат с изображением человека, похожего на президента РФ В.В. Путина, на лице которого макияж – накрашены ресницы и губы, что, по замыслу автора/авторов плаката, должно служить намеком на якобы нестандартную сексуальную ориентацию президента РФ. Текст под изображением (воспроизводится с сохранением особенностей орфографии и пунктуации, с сокрытием нецензурной лексики): «Избиратели Путина, как ... вроде бы их много, но среди моих знакомых их нет», размещенный 07 мая 2014 года в социальной сети «Вконтакте» на аккаунте http://vk.com/id161877484 с ник-неймом «Александр Цветков» (решение Центрального районного суда г. Твери от 11.05.2016);"
98. "Court acquits Dagestan's leading independent newspaper". Reporters Without Borders. 20 May 2011. Retrieved 26 May 2011.
99. "CPJ to honor brave international journalists". Committee to Protect Journalists. 2010. Archived from the original on 2 September 2012. Retrieved 26 May 2011.
100. "ARTICLE 19 is concerned about ongoing prosecution of independent newspaper staff in Dagestan". ARTICLE 19. 21 March 2010. Retrieved 26 May 2011.
101. "Dagestan court acquits Chernovik journalists". Committee to Protect Journalists. 19 March 2011. Retrieved 26 May 2011.
102. "Russia - Country report - Freedom of the Press - 2013". www.FreedomHouse.org. Retrieved 15 June 2017.
103. "Russia - Media Landscape - European Journalism Centre (EJC)". European Journalism Centre (EJC). Archived from the original on 20 March 2018. Retrieved 14 February 2015.
104. "IREX - Media Sustainability Index". rcmediafreedom.eu. International Research & Exchanges Board (IREX). 1 February 2017. Retrieved 11 May 2017.
105. Krasnoboka, Natalya (2017). "Media Landscapes- Russia". ejc.net. European Journalism Centre. Archived from the original on 20 March 2018. Retrieved 11 May 2017.
106. KHVOSTUNOVA, Olga (9 December 2013). "A complete guide to who controls the Russian news media". indexoncensorship.org. Index on Censorship. Retrieved 11 May 2017.
107. Levy, Alexandre (July 2016). "Media oligarchs go shopping" (PDF). rsf.org. Reporters Without Borders. Retrieved 11 May 2017.
108. "12 newsrooms in 5 years How the Russian authorities decimated a news industry — Meduza". Meduza. Retrieved 17 November 2018.
109. "Freedom of Press 2009" Archived 28 December 2010 at the Wayback Machine, Freedom House.
110. BBC: The press in Russia (16 May 2008)
111. Petrov, Valentin; Shevtsov, Petr (10 July 2014). "Russian Federation: Russian Antitrust Law: Important Considerations For Non-Russian Investors". mondaq.com. Mondaq. Retrieved 11 May 2017.
112. "Report by Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles on his Visits to the Russian Federation". Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights. 20 April 2005. Retrieved 16 March 2008.
113. "Dissenting voices to be silenced as liberal Russian TV channels come under state control", Guardian, 16 October 2009.
114. "Russia, Heroes and Henchmen, The Work of Journalist and the Media in Russian Regions" Archived 19 November 2011 at the Wayback Machine, Reporters Without Borders, September 2009.
115. Country profile: Russia, BBC News, 6 March 2012. Retrieved 13 September 2013.
116. "Who will be Russia's conscience?", Joel Simon, Newark Star-Ledger, 22 October 2006.
117. Financial Times: Russian media set for landmark deals Archived 26 December 2007 at the Wayback Machine, 8 January 2002
118. Russia as friend, not foe, By Nicolai N Petro.
119. Official site of RTVi Archived 16 July 2011 at the Wayback Machine
120. Near the broken air Archived 6 January 2010 at the Wayback Machine, by Novata Gazeta, 2008
121. Телеканал "Дождь" начали отключать в регионах, Синдеева назвала истинную причину таких решений [TV channel "Rain" has begun to be switched off in the regions; Sindeeva has named the true cause behind such decisions] (in Russian). NEWSru.com. 29 January 2014. Retrieved 26 April 2016.
122. ЗЗрители добились от Первого канала сюжета про дальнобойщиков. (Но получили не то) [Channel One viewers managed to push for a story about truckers. (But didn't get the right story)]. tvrain.ru (in Russian). Retrieved 26 April 2016.
123. "MAVISE Database on TV and on-demand audiovisual services in Europe". rcmediafreedom.eu. European Audiovisual Observatory. 1 September 2016. Retrieved 11 May 2017.
124. Vendil Pallin, Carolina (4 January 2016). "Internet control through ownership: the case of Russia". Post-Soviet Affairs. Post- Soviet Affairs. 33: 16–33. doi:10.1080/1060586X.2015.1121712.
125. Ibragimova, Galiya (24 September 2014). "New law further restricts foreign media investment". rbth.com. Russia Beyond the Headlines. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
126. "Freedom of the Press 2016- Russia". freedomhouse.org. Freedom House. 2016. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
127. Sinelschikova, Yekaterina (28 April 2015). "New Russian media ownership law: How will changes affect foreign players?". rbth.com. Russia Beyond the Headlines. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
128. It Isn’t Magic: Putin Opponents Vanish From TV The New York Times, 3 June 2008. Related discussion Archived 5 June 2008 at the Wayback Machine.
129. New York Times врет про "черные списки" на российском ТВ [New York Times is lying about Russian TV "black lists"]. Young Guard of United Russia (in Russian). 4 June 2008. Archived from the original on 16 December 2008.
130. REN-TV and Channel 5 will get different news, by Kommersant, 16 October 2008
131. REN-TV will retain its own news, by lenta.ru, 19 October 2009
132. CEO of NMG: editorial policy regarding news on Channel 5 and REN-TV won't be altered, by Lenizdat.Ru, 22 October 2009, (in Russian).
133. Employees of the Channel 5 threaten mass protests, (in Russian).
134. Interview of Vladimir Khanumyan, Business Peterburg, 23 October 2009.
135. "The dismantling of the independent news organization 'RBC': How Russia gained and today lost a great source of news — Meduza". Meduza. Retrieved 13 May 2016.
136. "Reuters назвало ставшую "последней каплей" статью РБК". slon.ru. Retrieved 13 May 2016.
137. "Three Top Editors Leave Russia's RBC Media Holding". RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. 13 May 2016. Retrieved 13 May 2016.
138. "Журналисты РБК объявили об уходе вслед за руководством". slon.ru. Retrieved 13 May 2016.
139. "Reform of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation". miamioh.edu. Miami University. May 2000. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
140. "The Reform of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation" (PDF). Kommersant. miamioh.edu. 18. 5 May 2000. Retrieved 26 April 2016.
141. "My starring role in Russian propaganda". StopFake.org. Retrieved 5 November 2015.
142. "Speech at Opening Ceremony of the 59th World Newspaper Congress (Moscow)" Archived 18 April 2007 at the Wayback Machine, Valadimir Putin, Kremlin archive, 5 June 2006. Retrieved 13 September 2013.
143. "Interview with NBC Channel" Archived 12 March 2007 at the Wayback Machine, 12 July 2006.
144. IFJ Welcomes "Fresh Start" in Russia as Medvedev Opens Door to Media Dialogue Archived 10 June 2011 at the Wayback Machine, May 2008, IFJ
145. Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation Archived 15 December 2013 at the Wayback Machine, Dmitry Medvedev, Kremlin archive, 5 November 2008. Retrieved 13 September 2013.
146. Text of the Federal Law "On Guarantees of Equality of Parliamentary Parties in Covering their Activities by the National State-Owned TV and Radio Channels" (in Russian)
147. "Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation" (full text) (in Russian), (digest) , November 2009
148. Interview of Konstantin Kosachev Archived 13 January 2006 at the Wayback Machine, 2005, (in Russian).
149. Murdoch didn't manage to find buyers for Russian radio stations, by Lenta.Ru, 2009 (in Russian).
150. "The propagandist's translation dictionary: How Russia's pro-Kremlin media 'translates' the news". Meduza.io. Retrieved 17 March 2016.
151. Babchenko, Arkadiy (15 April 2015). Аркадий Бабченко: "Если бы не российское телевидение, этой войны бы не было" [Arkadiy Babchenko, "If it were not for Russian TV, this war would not have occurred"] (in Russian). OpenRussia. Retrieved 24 April 2015.
152. Volkov, Denis (10 September 2015). "Supporting a War that isn't: Russian Public Opinion and the Ukraine Conflict". StopFake.org. Retrieved 12 September 2015.
153. "Сергей Шойгу наградил победителей конкурса "МЕДИА-АС"". Российская газета. Retrieved 17 March 2016.
154. "Discourse in Danger. Attacks on free expression in Putin's Russia" (PDF). PEN. 2016. Retrieved 15 February 2016.
155. "Russia's Putin signs 'foreign agents' media law". Reuters. 2017. Retrieved 25 November 2017.
156. "PolitPressing.org • политические преследования в России". PolitPressing.org. Retrieved 18 June 2015.
157. "List of Political Prisoners in the Russian Federation" (PDF). Norwegian Helsinki Committee. 1 June 2015. Archived from the original (PDF) on 5 March 2016. Retrieved 26 April 2016.
158. "Federal Law "On Providing Access to Information on the Activities of Government Bodies and Bodies of Local Self-Government", No. 8-FZ, February 9, 2009". legislationline.org. 9 February 2009. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
159. "CONSIDERATION OF REPORTS SUBMITTED BY STATES PARTIES UNDER ARTICLE 40 OF THE COVENANT. Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee" (PDF). www2.ohchr.org. UN Human Rights Committee. 30 October 2009. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
160. "CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS OF THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION". right2info.org. Right2INFO.org. 9 January 2012. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
161. "The Constitution of the Russian Federation". constitution.ru. 12 December 1993. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
162. De Smaele, Hedwig (7 November 2014). "Limited Access to Information as a Means of Censorship in Post-Communist Russia". Javnost - the Public. 11 (2): 65–81. doi:10.1080/13183222.2004.11008854. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
163. "Global Right to Information Rating- Russia". rti-rating.org. Access Info Europe, Centre for Law and Democracy. Archived from the original on 8 October 2016. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
164. "REGIONAL CONSULTATION ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION National Questionnaire European Consultation". right2info.org. Right2INFO.org. 21 September 2012. Archived from the original on 15 May 2018. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
165. Gatov, Vasily (11 March 2015). "How the Kremlin and the Media Ended Up in Bed Together". The Moscow Times. Retrieved 5 December 2017.
166. "Daching: How to Get Beaten Up in the Russian Countryside | News". Retrieved 10 July 2015.
167. "ФСБ предложила засекретить данные о владельцах недвижимости после громких разоблачений госслужащих". realty.newsru.com. Retrieved 10 July 2015.
168. ""Второго человека в ФСБ" обвинили в укрытии элитной недвижимости, которая может стоить его дохода за 10 лет". realty.newsru.com. Retrieved 10 July 2015.
169. "'Anti-Russian,' a Dangerously Unconstitutional Update of 'Anti-Soviet,' Reznik Says". The Interpreter Magazine. 27 July 2015.
170. "Legal Analysis: Russia's Right To Be Forgotten · Article 19". www.article19.org. Retrieved 5 November 2015.
171. "Знакомьтесь, сыновья генпрокурора - ЛСДУ3 и ЙФЯУ9". Алексей Навальный. Retrieved 10 June 2016.
172. РосОтвет. rosotvet.ru (in Russian). RosOtvet. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
173. "The regulatory and legal framework for the study of the openness of the highest regional executive bodies". translate.google.com. Infometer. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
174. "Open Data Portal- Russia". data.gov.ru. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
175. "Infometer". en.infometer.org/. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
176. "Infometer". od.infometer.org. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
177. "Russian Cities' Open Data: Audit Results – 2016". en.infometer.org. Infometer. Archived from the original on 9 November 2017. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
178. "Russian Cities' Open Data Map". en.infometer.org. Infometer. March 2016. Archived from the original on 9 November 2017. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
179. "Informational Openness of Russian Judicial Websites: General Jurisdiction Courts". en.infometer.org. Infometer. October 2014. Archived from the original on 9 November 2017. Retrieved 15 May 2017.

External links

• "Mass Media Defence Center". mmdc.ru. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
• "World Press Freedom Index 2017, Reporters Without Borders: Russia". rsf.org/. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
• "Faculty of Journalism, Lomonosov Moscow State University". journ.msu.ru. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
• "The Russia Media Fund". russianmediamarket.com. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
• Rosenholm, Arja; Nordenstreng, Kaarle; Trubina, Elena. "Russian Mass Media and Changing Values". rcmediafreedom.eu. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
• "Transparency International Russia". transparency.org.ru/. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
• Harassment Chronicles, an English-language resource run by the oppositional Other Russia (a coalition including Kasparov's United Civil Front)
• Freedom House 2010 Press Survey: Russia
• A guide to the troubled world of independent Russian media, The Calvert Journal, April 2014
• "НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ ДОКЛАД О ДОСТУПЕ К ИНФОРМАЦИИ О ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТИ ОРГАНОВ ВЛАСТИ В РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ (Access to Information: State Secrets and Human Rights)" (PDF). freedominfo.org. Institute for Information Freedom Development (IIFD). September 2008. Retrieved 15 May 2017.