Pro-Beijing camp (Hong Kong)

Pro-Beijing camp, pro-establishment camp or pro-China camp refers to a political alignment in Hong Kong which generally supports the policies of the Beijing central government towards Hong Kong.[2] The term "pro-establishment camp" is regularly in use to label the broader segment of the Hong Kong political arena which has the closer relationship with the establishment, namely the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR).[3] It is also portrayed as the "Patriotic Front" by the pro-Beijing media and sometimes portrayed as "loyalists" by the rival pro-democracy camp.[4]

"Pro-Beijing camp" redirects here. For the political alignment in Macau, see pro-Beijing camp (Macau).

Pro-Beijing camp
LegCo PresidentAndrew Leung (BPA)
LegCo ConvenorMartin Liao
IdeologyMajority:
Chinese nationalism
Conservatism (HK)
Factions:
Chinese socialism
Economic liberalism[1]
Liberal conservatism
Social conservatism
ColoursRed and blue
(customary)
Legislative Council
42 / 70 (60%)
District Councils
89 / 479 (19%)
NPC (HK deputies)
36 / 36 (100%)
CPPCC (HK members)
124 / 124 (100%)
Pro-Beijing camp
Traditional Chinese親北京陣營
Simplified Chinese亲北京阵营
Pro-establishment camp
Chinese建制派
Pro-China camp
Traditional Chinese親中派
Simplified Chinese亲中派
Politics and government
of Hong Kong
Related topics
 Hong Kong portal

The pro-Beijing camp evolved from Hong Kong's pro-Communist faction, which was often called the "leftists", who have had a long history of following directions of the Communist Party of China (CPC) towards Hong Kong. It launched the 1967 leftist demonstrations against British colonial rule in Hong Kong and had a long rivalry with the pro-Kuomintang bloc. After the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed in 1984, affirming Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong from 1997, the traditional leftists realigned itself and unofficially formed a loose "United Front" with the conservative pro-business elites to counter the emergence of the pro-democracy camp in the 1990s and ensure a smooth transition of the Hong Kong sovereignty in Beijing's interest.

Since the handover in 1997, the pro-Beijing camp has become the major supporting force of the Hong Kong government and maintained control of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong (LegCo), with the advantages in the indirectly elected functional constituencies. Going into the 2010s, the pro-Beijing camp underwent a period of diversification in which different parties emerged and targeted different voters which resulted in steady increases of the support. With various positions on specific issues, the camp generally embraces the conservative values politically, socially and economically and Chinese nationalistic and patriotic sentiments. However, the unpopular SAR administrations and the opposition to the Beijing's policies toward Hong Kong have also caused the camp crushing defeats in 2003 and 2019.

Names

The term "pro-Beijing camp" refers to the political alignment which supports the policies of the Beijing, where the seat of the Government of the People's Republic of China is. Therefore, "pro-Beijing camp" is sometimes referred to as "pro-China camp". The label is sometimes confusing, since many in the pro-democracy camp, the main rival of the pro-Beijing camp, are also Chinese nationalists and pro-China but not in a political way, as they are mostly against the one party rule of the Communist Party of China (CPC). They are generally culturally pro-China and support democracy movements in China,[2] as well as the pro-Taiwan camp, which strongly support the Government of the Republic of China on Taiwan.

The faction in the pro-Beijing camp who was evolved from the "traditional leftists" was also called the "pro-Communists", while the business elites and professionals who were appointed by the colonial government before 1997 were called "pro-government camp". In the 1990s when the traditional leftists and business elites unofficially formed the loose "United Front" towards the handover in 1997, "pro-Beijing camp" has become a broader term for the whole segment. The term "pro-government camp" has also been used to describe the same segment which support the SAR government. During the unpopular administration of Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa, the hardcore pro-government parties, mainly the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB), were labelled "loyalists" by the pro-democracy camp. In recent years, a more neutral term "pro-establishment camp" is regularly in use, especially in Chinese media.

Ideology
See also: Conservatism in Hong Kong

The pro-Beijing camp members are united by the political ideology of being closer to Beijing government, as much out of conviction as of pragmatism, but vary on other issues within the context of Hong Kong. Some pro-Beijing factions, including the "traditional leftists" who evolved from their Marxist-Leninist and Maoist conviction in the 1960s and 70s often hold a strong sentiment of patriotism and Chinese nationalism. They have had a years-long tradition of following the orders of the Communist Party of China (CPC), many of whom were also alleged underground members of the Communist Party.

Amongst pragmatists, especially among the pro-business elites and tycoons who have been absorbed into Beijing's "United Front", have enjoyed political power and privileges, as well as economic interests, from the present political system and their close ties with the Beijing authorities. Some moderates also hope that in conceding on those issues on which China will not compromise, preserving as much as possible in the way of personal liberties and local autonomy can be achieved.[5]

The rhetoric of the pro-Beijing camp is mostly concerned with patriotism, social stability and economic prosperity. The pro-Beijing camp generally supports universal suffrage in Hong Kong under Beijing's framework, although the most conservative faction opposes increased democratic development in Hong Kong with the introduction of universal suffrage and see in it the creation of instability.[6]

History

Pro-Communist leftists
See also: Socialism in Hong Kong

The pro-Beijing camp evolved from the pro-Communist faction in Hong Kong which existed since the establishment of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The 1922 Seamen's strike, led by the Chinese Seamen's Union and the 1925–26 Canton–Hong Kong strike, led by various left-wing labour unions, were the two major Communist-related labour movements in the British colony of Hong Kong. During the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong, the Communist East River guerillas were active in the Pearl River Delta.[7]

The Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions (FTU), an umbrella trade union for the local left-wing unions, was founded in April 1948. After the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, the local Communists remained in their semi-underground status. In the early post-war days, the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions, the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce and the Hong Kong Chinese Reform Association became the three pillars of the local pro-Communist organs, following the orders of the New China News Agency, the de facto Communist China's representative in Hong Kong.[8] Their rivals were the pro-Nationalist faction, who pledged allegiance to the Nationalist government on Taiwan. The FTU took a leading role in the Hong Kong 1967 Leftist Riots, which inspired by the Cultural Revolution in the Mainland, aimed at overthrowing the British colonial rule in Hong Kong. The leftists lost their prestige after the riots for a period of time as the general public was against the violence attributed to the leftists, although the presence of the pro-Beijing Maoist elements remained strong in the universities and colleges throughout the 1970s, in which many of the pro-Communist university and college graduates became the backbones of the pro-Beijing camp today.[9][10]

Transition period

After the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984, the pro-Communist organisations became active again, of which many of them were appointed to various positions relating to the transition of the sovereignty of Hong Kong. The Beijing government also appointed many Hong Kong tycoons and professionals to sit on the Hong Kong Basic Law Consultative Committee (BLCC) and the Hong Kong Basic Law Drafting Committee (BLDC) as the means of forming a united front. To ensure the post-1997 political system would be dominated by business and professional interests, the Business and Professional Group of the Basic Law Consultative Committee was formed in April 1986 to propose a conservative, less democratic proposal of Group of 89 for electing the Chief Executive and Legislative Council, in contrast to the more progressive proposal of the pro-democracy activists.[11] Several new political parties, including the New Hong Kong Alliance (NHKA) founded in 1989 by Lo Tak-shing from the conservative wing and the Business and Professionals Federation of Hong Kong (BPF) founded in 1990 by Vincent Lo from the mainstream wing, evolved from the group.[12] The Liberal Democratic Federation of Hong Kong (LDF) consisted of the pro-government elected officeholders in which Maria Tam was the key person was also formed in 1990 in preparation for the first direct elections to the Legislative Council in 1991.[13]

The Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 sparked pro-democracy sentiments in Hong Kong. The newly formed democratic party, the United Democrats of Hong Kong, enjoyed landslide victories in the District Boards election, Urban and Regional Council election and Legislative Council election in 1991. To counter the pro-democracy influence in the legislature, the British-appointed unofficial members of the Legislative Council launched the Co-operative Resources Centre (CRC) in 1991 which transformed into the pro-business conservative Liberal Party in 1993, becoming the arch rival of the United Democrats. In 1992, the traditional leftists also formed the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB) under the direction of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office.[14] In 1994, a group of businessmen and professionals founded the Hong Kong Progressive Alliance (HKPA) under the direction of the New China News Agency.[15]

The large-scale democratisation initiated by then Governor Chris Patten resulted in the deterioration of Sino-British relations and led to the emergence of an "unholy alliance" of pro-Beijing businesspeople and leftist loyalists versus the pro-democratic popular alliance.[16] The Liberal Party led by Allen Lee launched a campaign attempting to defeat Patten's proposal which was backed by Beijing despite its eventual failure. Despite this, in the broadened franchise, the pro-Beijing camp was again defeated by the pro-democracy camp in the 1995 Legislative Council election. The Beijing government argued that the electoral reform introduced by Patten had violated the Joint Declaration, and thus they would scrap the reforms upon resumption of sovereignty. In preparation, a parallel legislature, the Provisional Legislative Council, was set up in 1996 under the control of pro-Beijing camp, and it introduced as the Legislative Council upon the founding of the new SAR government in 1997.

Early post-handover years

Since 1997, the pro-Beijing camp has never lost a majority in LegCo, controlling LegCo through a collaboration of the pro-Beijing groups with their support within the functional constituencies. In 2002, Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa formed a governing alliance with the DAB and Liberal Party, the two largest pro-Beijing parties in the legislature, by inviting the two chairmen, Jasper Tsang and James Tien, to the Executive Council.[17] On 1 July 2003, a peaceful crowd of more than 500,000 protested against the introduction of controversial legislation under Article 23 of the Basic Law.[18] James Tien, chairman of the Liberal Party and member of the Executive Council, forced the government to delay the second reading of the bill. The stance of the DAB on Article 23 and their blind support for the Tung Chee-hwa's administration were strongly criticised and led to their losses in the District Council election.[19]

In 2005, veteran civil servant Donald Tsang succeeded the unpopular Tung Chee-hwa stepped down as Chief Executive in Beijing's direction. The pro-government camp supported the Tsang government, even though some traditional leftists questioned Tsang's background in the colonial civil service. After the setbacks in 2003, the pro-Beijing camp won back seats lost in 2003 in the 2007 District Council election, in which the DAB became the largest victor.[20] The DAB enjoyed another victory in 2011 District Council election.[21] In the Hong Kong legislative election, 2012, the pro-Beijing camp won more than half of the geographical constituency seats respectively in Hong Kong Island, Kowloon West and New Territories West, narrowing the number of seats held in the geographical constituencies between pro-Beijing and pro-democrats to 17 seats and 18 seats respectively. The pro-Beijing camp retained control of the Legislative Council and the DAB remained the largest party with 13 seats in total.[22]

Since the late 2000s, the pro-Beijing camp has expanded its spectrum of support from pro-business elites and traditional leftists to those from a broader background. The former Secretary for Security Regina Ip, who was in charge of introducing the Basic Law Article 23 stood in the Hong Kong Island by-election in 2007 against the former Chief Secretary Anson Chan supported by the pro-democrats. Despite her defeat, she was able to be elected in the 2008 Legislative Council election, and formed the middle class and professional oriented New People's Party in 2011.[23] Some pro-Beijing legal professionals who ran as independents, such as Priscilla Leung, Paul Tse and Junius Ho were elected to the Legislative Council in recent elections, which were seen receiving support from the Liaison Office, which was viewed growing influence in Hong Kong's domestic affairs. On the other hand, the FTU, which operated as the sister organisation of the DAB, began to run under its own banner, taking a more pro-labour and pro-grassroots stance as compared to the DAB's big-tent position.

2012 Chief Executive election and aftermath

Two pro-Beijing candidates ran for the Chief Executive election in 2012, with the Chief Secretary Henry Tang and the Convenor of the Executive Council, Leung Chun-ying using scandals, dirty tactics and smears on each other. Leung eventually won the election with the support of the Liaison Office, despite the fierce competition deeply divided the pro-Beijing camp into Tang camp and Leung camp. After the election, Beijing called for a reconciliation of the two camps.

In late 2012, some pro-Leung advocacy groups with the allegations of Beijing's financial supports began to emerge such as Voice of Loving Hong Kong, Caring Hong Kong Power and Hong Kong Youth Care Association, which launched counter-protests against the pan-democrats. The Leung Chun-ying administration with its hardline stance on the growing movement for Hong Kong independence after the 2014 Umbrella Revolution was strongly criticised by the pro-democrats and some pro-Beijing moderates. James Tien, a keen supporter of Henry Tang in 2012 became a leading critic of Leung. He was stripped from his Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) office during the 2014 protests after he asked Leung to step down.[24] In the 2015 District Council and 2016 Legislative Council elections, the pro-democrats and localists scored better-than expected victories over the pro-Beijing camp. In December 2016, Leung Chun-ying announced he would not seek for re-election.[25]

The two top officials, Chief Secretary for Administration Carrie Lam and Financial Secretary John Tsang emerged as front runners in the 2017 Chief Executive election after Leung's announcement. Both resigned from their posts, while Lam's resignation was approved by the central government within days, Tsang's resignation was delayed for a month, which sparked the speculation that Tsang was not Beijing's favoured candidate. With the active lobbying by the Liaison Office, Lam received 580 nominations from the 1,194-member Election Committee, while Tsang struggled to get enough nominations from the pro-Beijing electors and had to rely on the pro-democracy camp. Lam went on to win the election with 777 votes, beating Tsang's 365 votes and retired judge Woo Kwok-hing's 21 votes.[26]

The pro-Beijing camp formed a united front in the 2018 Legislative Council by-election. It took two of the four vacancies left by the 2016 Legislative Council oath-taking controversy, by taking the Kowloon West geographical constituency and Architectural, Surveying, Planning and Landscape functional constituency from the pro-democrats and localists. Vincent Cheng of the DAB narrowly defeated Yiu Chung-yim who was disqualified from the Legislative Council in the oath-taking controversy, becoming the first pro-Beijing candidate to win in a single-member district election since the handover.[27]

Political parties
  • The Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB), is the largest pro-Beijing party founded by a group of traditional leftists in 1992 with sustainable grassroots support. The image of leftists has faded over time since its merger with the pro-business Hong Kong Progressive Alliance (HKPA) in 2005 and more young professionals take place in the party leadership.
  • Business and Professionals Alliance for Hong Kong (BPA), is the leading party for the pro-business sector in the Legislative Council. Formed by Economic Synergy, a breakaway group from the Liberal Party, and Professional Forum , a parliamentary group with functional constituency legislators, it was established in 2012 and has become the second-largest force in the legislature.
  • Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions (FTU), is the traditional leftist labour union which co-founded the DAB in 1992. It positions itself with a pro-labour and patriotic agenda and has been separated from the DAB and actively participated in elections under its own banner in recent years.
  • Liberal Party, is the pro-business party formed in 1993 by a group of legislators who had been appointed by the British Governor and functional constituency members. It has a large support from the business sector and adopts an economic liberal and liberal conservative ideology.
  • New People's Party, is a party founded by Regina Ip who caters at middle class and civil servant interests.
  • Federation of Hong Kong and Kowloon Labour Unions, is a small labour union which has a seat in the legislature through the Labour functional constituency.
  • New Century Forum, is a political group and think tank founded in 1999 which dedicates to middle class interests. The only representative of the group in the Legislative Council is convenor Ma Fung-kwok.
  • Professional Power, many candidates were not challenged by any parties or independent politicians from the pro-Beijing camp in 2019 Hong Kong local elections.[28] Prior to the polling day, there was a list widely circulated in LIHKG and Factcheck.io. The list claimed itself as a list of candidates endorsed by Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions. The list has included six candidates from the Professional Power.[29][30]

Advocacy groups

Following the election of CY Leung as Chief Executive of Hong Kong, public discontent manifested itself in the form of mass petitions, rallies and demonstrations, so much so that it seemed that a plurality of the Hong Kong public was anti-Leung. In late 2012 pro-Leung advocacy groups began to emerge such as Voice of Loving Hong Kong, Caring Hong Kong Power and Hong Kong Youth Care Association, the fact that all these groups feature the Chinese character for love in the names has led to these groups to be called the "love Hong Kong faction" (Chinese: 愛字派 literally "love character faction"). The word love in this context is taken from the lexicon of political debate in mainland China, were the slogan "Love China, Love the Party", is seen as the basis of patriotism, and the demand that any future Chief Executive of Hong Kong must "Love China, Love Hong Kong" (Chinese: 愛國愛港).

These supposedly grassroots organisations present themselves as being a spontaneous reaction to the excesses of the pan-democracy camp, as Hong Kong's silent majority who wish for a prosperous, harmonious society and who reject the "social violence" of the pan-democrats. Describing themselves as apolitical and independent of outside powers, these groups use various tactics to counter the pan-democrats, including counter rallies and marches in opposition to pan-democrat ones, counter petitions, and making accusations of campaign fund fraud and irregularities against pan-democrat politicians to the Independent Commission Against Corruption.[31] They also make use of mass heckling at pan-democracy forums to silence debate.[32]

Outside commentators suspect that these groups are orchestrated by China's Liaison Office in Hong Kong pointing to a use of language that parrots Beijing's and an antipathy to Falun Gong which mirrors Beijing's own political line. Whether directly or not these organisations have received support from Beijing through the United Front Work Department, with employees of Chinese companies based in Hong Kong, being asked to sign petitions and attend rallies, and members of hometown societies being paid to do the same.[33]

During the 2014 Hong Kong protests, on mid-October 2014, the "love Hong Kong faction" took to wearing a blue ribbon as a counter to the protesters yellow one. It is alleged that it is the "love Hong Kong faction" that has organised counter protests and who attempted to charge through pan-democracy protesters in Causeway Bay.

During the 2019–20 Hong Kong protests, Safeguard Hong Kong Alliance and Politihk Social Strategic have organised protests either in support of the government's extradition bill or the Hong Kong Police.

Alleged Triad involvement

During the 2012 Chief Executive election campaign, Leung's campaign officers were seen attending a dinner in Lau Fau Shan with Kwok Wing-hung, nicknamed “Shanghai Boy”, an alleged former leader of the local triad Wo Shing Wo. The content of the meeting remained unknown to the public.[34]

In a town hall meeting on 11 August 2013 in Tin Shui Wai where Leung attended, some thugs-like Leung’s supporters allegedly provoked and beat up protesters. Leung Che-cheung, chairman of the New Territories Association of Societies (NTAS) and Legislative Council member of the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB) who hosted the town hall meeting invited a group of triad-related individuals to a dinner party and called in supporters to support Leung prior to the meeting. Tang Sui-man, also known as "Four Eyes Man", representative of the villagers from Wang Toi Shan Ho Lik Pui Tsuen, Tsang Shu-wo, also known as "Tall Man Wo", chairman of Ping Shan Heung Rural Committee and a number of powerful triad related individuals were called into action.

During the 2014 Hong Kong protests, the armed anti-Occupy protesters beat up Occupy protesters in the Mong Kok occupation site. The student protesters accused the government and the police of allowing gangs to attack them as there was no uniformed police in the scene during the event. Democratic Party legislator James To also accused that "the [Hong Kong] government has used organised, orchestrated forces and even triad gangs in [an] attempt to disperse citizens."[35]

During the 2019 Hong Kong protests, a mob of over 100 armed men dressed in white indiscriminately attacked civilians on the streets and passengers in the Yuen Long MTR station on 21 July[36][37] including the elderly, children,[38] black-clad protesters,[39] journalists and lawmakers.[40] At least 45 people were injured in the incident,[41] including a pregnant woman.[42] Pro-Beijing legislator Junius Ho was seen in various videos posted online greeting the white-clothed group of assailants, shaking their hands and calling the suspected gangsters "heroes", giving them thumbs-up and saying to them "thank you for your hard work." At least one of the white-clothed men who shook hands with Ho has been shown to have been inside Yuen Long Station during the attacks.[43][44]

Electoral performance

Chief Executive elections
Election 1st Candidate Party Votes % 2nd Candidate Party Votes % 3rd Candidate Party Votes %
1996 Tung Chee-hwa Nonpartisan 320 80.40 Yang Ti-liang Nonpartisan 42 10.55 Peter Woo Nonpartisan 36 9.05
2002 Tung Chee-hwa Nonpartisan Uncontested
2005 Donald Tsang Nonpartisan Uncontested
2007 Donald Tsang Nonpartisan 649 84.07
2012 Leung Chun-ying Nonpartisan 689 66.81 Henry Tang Nonpartisan 285 27.14
2017 Carrie Lam Nonpartisan 777 65.62 John Tsang[45] Nonpartisan 365 31.38

Legislative Council elections
Election Number of
popular votes		 % of
popular votes		 GC
seats		 FC
seats		 EC
seats		 Total seats +/− Status
1998 449,668 30.38 5 25 10
40 / 60
 N/A Majority
2000 461,048 34.94 8 25 6
39 / 60
 0 Majority
2004 661,972 37.40 12 23
35 / 60
 4 Majority
2008 602,468 39.75 11 26
37 / 60
 3 Majority
2012 772,487 42.66 17 26
43 / 70
 6 Majority
2016 871,016 40.17 16 24
40 / 70
 3 Majority

District Council elections
Election Number of
popular votes		 % of
popular votes		 Total
elected seats		 +/-
1999 443,441 54.69
232 / 390
 22
2003 489,889 46.48
201 / 400
 28
2007 614,621 53.98
273 / 405
 61
2011 654,368 55.42
301 / 412
 23
2015 788,389 54.61
298 / 431
 6
2019 1,233,030 42.06
62 / 452
 242
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See also

References
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  2. Lee, Eliza Wing-Yee (2011). Gender and Change in Hong Kong: Globalization, Postcolonialism, and Chinese Patriarchy. UBC Press. p. 71.
  3. "为"反对派"正名之"疑惑篇"". Ta Kung Pao. 13 January 2014. Archived from the original on 2 February 2017. Retrieved 21 January 2017.
  4. Hackler, Darrene L. (2006). Crisis and Transformation in China's Hong Kong. M.E. Sharpe. p. 142.
  5. So, Alvin Y. (1999). Hong Kong's Embattled Democracy: A Societal Analysis. Johns Hopkins University Press. p. 137. OCLC 607440705.
  6. Davies, Stephen; Roberts, Elfed (1990). Political Dictionary for Hong Kong. Macmillan Publishers. pp. 181–2.
  7. Loh, Christine (2010). Underground Front: The Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong. Hong Kong University Press. pp. 48–52. OCLC 995322556.
  8. Irwin, Lewis G. (2003). The Policy Analyst's Handbook: Rational Problem Solving in a Political World. M.E. Sharpe. p. 69.
  9. Felber, Roland; Grigoriev, A.M.; Leutner, Mechthild; et al., eds. (2013). The Chinese Revolution in the 1920s: Between Triumph and Disaster. Routledge. pp. 213–5.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  10. Chiu, Stephen Wing Kai; Lui, Tai Lok (2000). The Dynamics of Social Movements in Hong Kong: Real and Financial Linkages and the Prospects for Currency Union. Hong Kong University Press. p. 215.
  11. Loh, Christine (2010). Underground Front: The Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong. Hong Kong University Press. pp. 160–164. OCLC 995322556.
  12. "Who is BPF?". The Business and Professionals Federation of Hong Kong. Archived from the original on 5 March 2016. Retrieved 29 May 2017.
  13. Chan, Ming K. (1997). The Challenge of Hong Kong's Reintegration with China: Modern Diasporic Femininity. Hong Kong University Press. p. 58.
  14. Cheng, Joseph Yu-shek; Brosseau, Maurice (1993). China Review 1993. Chinese University Press. p. 10.8.
  15. Loh, Christine (2010). Underground Front: The Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong. Hong Kong University Press. p. 305. OCLC 995322556.
  16. Chan, Ming K. (1997). The Challenge of the Reintegration with China. Hong Kong University Press. p. 51.
  17. Ash, Robert (2003). Hong Kong in Transition: One Country, Two Systems. Routledge. p. 4.
  18. South China Morning Post, 2 July 2003
  19. "【蘋話當年】2003年民建聯區選大敗 曾鈺成辭任主席". Apple Daily. 24 November 2014. Archived from the original on 5 July 2017. Retrieved 29 May 2017.
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  23. Yan, Cathy (8 January 2011). "Hong Kong's Ip Launches Political Party". Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 10 February 2020. Retrieved 17 January 2011. Joining Ms Ip as deputy chairmen are former Liberal Party member Michael Tien and Louis Shih, former chairman of the pro-democracy organization SynergyNet.
  24. James Tien faces CPPCC expulsion Archived 28 October 2014 at the Wayback Machine, RTHK, 28 October 2014
  25. Haas, Benjamin (9 December 2016). "Hong Kong's divisive leader to step down amid political crisis". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 24 January 2017. Retrieved 21 January 2017.
  26. "2017 Chief Executive Election Results". Electoral Affairs Commission. Archived from the original on 29 April 2018. Retrieved 29 April 2018.
  27. "Hong Kong democrats to rely on legal appeals after failing to win back Legco veto foothold". South China Morning Post. 12 March 2018. Archived from the original on 16 March 2018. Retrieved 17 March 2018.
  28. 評論編輯室 (30 October 2019). "【區選前瞻】西貢區山頭林立 「撞區」全因無大台？". 香港01 (in Chinese). Archived from the original on 9 December 2019. Retrieved 19 November 2019.
  29. "LIHKG". LIHKG 討論區. Archived from the original on 9 December 2019. Retrieved 19 November 2019.
  30. "區議會選舉候選人及區議員資料庫 - 選區事實處". hkfactcheck.io. Archived from the original on 9 December 2019. Retrieved 19 November 2019.
  31. "Group files donation complaint to ICAC". RTHK. 24 July 2014. Archived from the original on 17 December 2014. Retrieved 17 December 2014.
  32. "Hecklers disrupt democracy forum". RTHK. 7 April 2014. Archived from the original on 9 October 2014. Retrieved 6 October 2014.
  33. Torode, Greg; Pomfret, james; Lim, Benjamin (4 July 2014). "The battle for Hong Kong's soul". Taipei Times. Archived from the original on 14 October 2014. Retrieved 9 October 2014.
  34. "Who asked Mr Kwok to dinner?". South China Morning Post. 11 March 2012.
  35. "Hong Kong legislator says government using triads against protesters". The Guardian. 4 October 2014.
  36. "'Where were the police?' Hong Kong outcry after masked thugs launch attack". The Guardian. 22 July 2019. Retrieved 23 July 2019.
  37. "45 injured after mob attack at Hong Kong MTR station". Channel NewsAsia. 22 July 2019. Retrieved 23 July 2019.
  38. "How marauding gang dressed in white struck fear into Yuen Long". South China Morning Post. Hong Kong. 23 July 2019. Retrieved 23 July 2019.
  39. Leung, Christy; Ting, Victor (22 July 2019). "Police chief defends 'late' force response to mob violence in Yuen Long". South China Morning Post. Hong Kong. Retrieved 23 July 2019.
  40. Cheng, Kris (22 July 2019). "Chaos and bloodshed in Hong Kong district as hundreds of masked men assault protesters, journalists, residents". Hong Kong Free Press (HKFP). Retrieved 23 July 2019.
  41. At least 45 injured as rod-wielding mob dressed in white rampages through Yuen Long MTR station, beating screaming protesters – South China Morning Post
  42. 【元朗襲擊】白裙女懷孕不足3個月沒通知醫院　診所求醫證胎平安 (22:46). online "instant news". Ming Pao. Hong Kong: Media Chinese International. 23 July 2019. Retrieved 23 July 2019.
  43. 【無警時份】何君堯向元朗白衣人鼓掌豎拇指：你哋係我嘅英雄. "real time news" section. Apple Daily (in Chinese). Hong Kong: Next Digital. 21 July 2019. Retrieved 21 July 2019.
  44. Cheng, Kris (22 July 2019). "Chaos and bloodshed in Hong Kong district as hundreds of masked men assault protesters, journalists, residents". Hong Kong Free Press. Retrieved 21 July 2019.
  45. Note: Most of the nominees and support are pro-democrats.
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