Peace of Utrecht

The Peace of Utrecht is a series of peace treaties signed by the belligerents in the War of the Spanish Succession, in the Dutch city of Utrecht between April 1713 and February 1715.

"Treaty of Utrecht" redirects here. For other uses, see Treaty of Utrecht (disambiguation).

Peace of Utrecht
First edition of the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht between Great Britain and Spain in Spanish (left) and a later edition in Latin and English.
Context
Signed1713–15
LocationUtrecht, United Provinces
Signatories
Languages
Wikisource

Before Charles II of Spain died childless in 1700, he had named his grandnephew Philip of France as his successor in his last will. However, Philip was a French prince, grandson of Louis XIV of France and also in line for the French throne. The other major powers in Europe were not willing to tolerate the potential union of two such powerful states. Essentially, the treaties allowed Philip to take the Spanish throne in return for permanently renouncing his claim to the French throne, along with other necessary guarantees that would ensure that France and Spain should not merge, thus preserving the balance of power in Europe.

The treaties between several European states, including Spain, Great Britain, France, Portugal, Savoy and the Dutch Republic, helped end the war. The treaties were concluded between the representatives of Louis XIV of France and of his grandson Philip on one hand, and representatives of Anne of Great Britain, Victor Amadeus II of Sardinia, John V of Portugal and the United Provinces of the Netherlands on the other. Though the king of France ensured the Spanish crown for his dynasty, the treaties marked the end of French ambitions of hegemony in Europe expressed in the continuous wars of Louis XIV, and paved the way to the European system based on the balance of power.[1] British historian G. M. Trevelyan argues:

That Treaty, which ushered in the stable and characteristic period of Eighteenth-Century civilization, marked the end of danger to Europe from the old French monarchy, and it marked a change of no less significance to the world at large, — the maritime, commercial and financial supremacy of Great Britain.[2]

Another enduring result was the creation of the Spanish Bourbon Dynasty, still reigning over Spain up to the present while the original House of Bourbon has long since been dethroned in France.

Negotiations
Europe at the beginning of the War of the Spanish Succession

The War of the Spanish Succession was occasioned by the failure of the Habsburg king, Charles II of Spain, to produce an heir. Dispute followed the death of Charles II in 1700, and fourteen years of war were the result.

France and Great Britain had come to terms in October 1711, when the preliminaries of peace had been signed in London. The preliminaries were based on a tacit acceptance of the partition of Spain's European possessions. Following this, the Congress of Utrecht opened on 29 January 1712, with the British representatives being John Robinson, Bishop of Bristol, and Thomas Wentworth, Lord Strafford.[3] Reluctantly the United Provinces accepted the preliminaries and sent representatives, but Emperor Charles VI refused to do so until he was assured that the preliminaries were not binding. This assurance was given, and so in February the Imperial representatives made their appearance. As Philip was not yet recognized as its king, Spain did not at first send plenipotentiaries, but the Duke of Savoy sent one, and the Kingdom of Portugal was represented by Luís da Cunha. One of the first questions discussed was the nature of the guarantees to be given by France and Spain that their crowns would be kept separate, and little progress was made until 10 July 1712, when Philip signed a renunciation.[4]

With Great Britain, France and Spain having agreed to a "suspension of arms" (armistice) covering Spain on 19 August in Paris, the pace of negotiation quickened. The first treaty signed at Utrecht was the truce between France and Portugal on 7 November, followed by the truce between France and Savoy on 14 March 1714. That same day, Spain, Great Britain, France and the Empire agreed to the evacuation of Catalonia and an armistice in Italy. The main treaties of peace followed on 11 April 1713. These were five separate treaties between France and Great Britain, the Netherlands, Savoy, Prussia and Portugal. Spain under Philip V signed separate peace treaties with Savoy and Great Britain at Utrecht on 13 July. Negotiations at Utrecht dragged on into the next year, for the peace treaty between Spain and the Netherlands was only signed on 26 June 1714 and that between Spain and Portugal on 6 February 1715.[5]

Several other treaties came out of the congress of Utrecht. France signed treaties of commerce and navigation with Great Britain and the Netherlands (11 April 1713). Great Britain signed a like treaty with Spain (9 December 1713).[5]

Principal provisions
Western Europe in 1714, after the Treaties of Utrecht and Rastatt

The Peace confirmed the provisions contained in the will of Charles II of Spain by confirming the Bourbon candidate as Philip V of Spain. In return, Philip renounced the French throne, both for himself and his descendants, with reciprocal renunciations by French Bourbons to the Spanish throne, including Louis XIV's nephew Philippe of Orléans. These became increasingly important after a series of deaths between 1712 and 1714 left the five year old Louis XV as his great-grandfather's heir.[6]

Britain is usually seen as the main beneficiary, Utrecht marking the point at which it became the primary European commercial power.[7] In Article X, Spain ceded the ports of Gibraltar and Menorca, giving Britain a dominant position in the Western Mediterranean and a monopoly over the asiento or slave trade between Africa and Spanish America.

The importance placed by British negotiators on commercial interests was demonstrated by their demand for France to "level the fortifications of Dunkirk, block up the port and demolish the sluices that scour the harbour, [which] shall never be reconstructed".[8] This was because Dunkirk was the primary base for French privateers, as it was possible to reach the North Sea in a single tide and escape British patrols in the English Channel.[9] This ultimately proved unenforceable.

North America c. 1750; some French forts listed here were not built until thirty years after 1713.

Under Article XIII, Spain agreed to a British demand they preserve Catalan historical rights, in return for Catalan support for the Allies during the war. Spanish territories in Italy and Flanders were divided, with Savoy receiving Sicily and parts of the Duchy of Milan. The former Spanish Netherlands, the Kingdom of Naples, Sardinia, and the bulk of the Duchy of Milan went to Emperor Charles VI. In South America, Spain returned Colónia do Sacramento in modern Uruguay to Portugal and recognised Portuguese sovereignty over the lands between the Amazon and Oyapock rivers, now in Brazil.

In North America, France recognised British suzerainty over the Iroquois, and ceded Nova Scotia and its claims to Newfoundland and territories in Rupert's Land.[10] The French portion of Saint Kitts in the West Indies was also ceded in its entirety to Britain.[10] France retained its other pre-war North American possessions, including Cape Breton Island, where it built the Fortress of Louisbourg, then the most expensive military installation in North America.[11]

The successful French Rhineland campaign of 1713 finally induced Charles to sign the 1714 treaties of Rastatt and Baden, although terms were not agreed with Spain until the 1720 Treaty of The Hague.[12]

Responses to the treaties
North America in 1760, immediately before the Treaty of Paris. Note that New England was at this time depicted as bordering the St. Lawrence River, that the Province of New York occupied the geographic area of Upper Canada or Ontario, that Pennsylvania occupied much of the region to the south of Lake Erie and that Nova Scotia had not yet been divided by New Brunswick.

The treaty's territorial provisions did not go as far as the Whigs in Britain would have liked, considering that the French had made overtures for peace in 1706 and again in 1709. The Whigs considered themselves the heirs of the staunch anti-French policies of William III and the Duke of Marlborough. However, in the Parliament of 1710 the Tories had gained control of the House of Commons, and they wished for an end to Great Britain's participation in a European war. Queen Anne and her advisors had also come to agree.

The party in the administration of Robert Harley (created Earl of Oxford and Mortimer on 23 May 1711) and the Viscount Bolingbroke proved more flexible at the bargaining table and were characterised by the Whigs as "pro-French"; Oxford and Bolingbroke persuaded the Queen to create twelve new "Tory peers"[13] to ensure ratification of the treaty in the House of Lords. The opponents of the treaty tried to rally support under the slogan of No Peace Without Spain.

Although the fate of the Spanish Netherlands in particular was of interest to the United Provinces, Dutch influence on the outcome of the negotiations was fairly insignificant, even though the talks were held on their territory. The French negotiator Melchior de Polignac taunted the Dutch with the scathing remark de vous, chez vous, sans vous,[14] meaning that negotiations would be held "about you, around you, without you". The fact that Bolingbroke had secretly ordered the British commander, the Duke of Ormonde, to withdraw from the Allied forces before the Battle of Denain (informing the French but not the Allies), and the fact that they secretly arrived at separate peace with France was a fait accompli, made the objections of the Allies pointless.[15] In any case, the Dutch achieved their condominium in the Austrian Netherlands with the Austro-Dutch Barrier Treaty of 1715.[16]

Aftermath
Allegory of the Peace of Utrecht by Antoine Rivalz

The Treaty stipulated that "because of the great danger which threatened the liberty and safety of all Europe, from the too close conjunction of the kingdoms of Spain and France, ... one and the same person should never become King of both kingdoms".[17] Some historians argue this makes it a significant milestone in the evolution of the modern nation state and concept of a balance of power.[18]

First mentioned in 1701 by Charles Davenant in his Essays on the Balance of Power, it was widely publicised in Britain by author and Tory satirist Daniel Defoe in his 1709 article A Review of the Affairs of France. The idea was reflected in the wording of the treaties and resurfaced after the defeat of Napoleon in the 1815 Concert of Europe that dominated Europe in the 19th century.

For the individual signatories, Britain established naval superiority over its competitors, commercial access to Spanish America, and control of Menorca and Gibraltar; it retains the latter territory to this day. France accepted the Protestant succession, ensuring a smooth transition when Anne died in August 1714 and ended support for the Stuarts under the 1716 Anglo-French Treaty.[19] An often overlooked benefit was that while the war left all participants with unprecedented levels of government debt, only Britain successfully financed it.[20]

Ensuring the succession of Maria Theresa reduced Austria's gains from the war and ultimately led to the War of the Austrian Succession in 1740

Spain retained the majority of its Empire and recovered remarkably quickly; the recapture of Naples and Sicily in 1718 was only prevented by British naval power and a second attempt was successful in 1734. The 1707 Nueva Planta decrees abolished regional political structures in the kingdoms of Aragon, Valencia and Majorca, although Catalonia retained some of these rights until 1767.[21]

Despite failure in Spain, Austria secured its position in Italy and Hungary, allowing them to continue expansion into areas of South-East Europe previously held by the Ottoman Empire. Even after paying expenses associated with the Dutch Barrier, increased tax revenues from the Austrian Netherlands funded a significant upgrade of the Austrian military.[22] However, these gains were diminished by various factors, chiefly the disruption of the Pragmatic Sanction of 1713 caused by Charles disinheriting his nieces in favour of his daughter Maria Theresa.[23]

Attempts to ensure her succession involved Austria in wars of little strategic value, much of the fighting in the 1733–1735 War of the Polish Succession taking place in their maritime provinces in Italy. Austria had traditionally relied on naval support from the Dutch, whose own capability had been severely degraded; Britain prevented the loss of Sicily and Naples in 1718 but refused to do so again in 1734.[24] The dispute continued to loosen Habsburg control over the Empire; Bavaria, Hanover, Prussia and Saxony increasingly acted as independent powers and in 1742, Charles of Bavaria became the first non-Habsburg Emperor in over 300 years.[25]

The Dutch Republic ended the war effectively bankrupt, the Barrier Treaty that cost so much proving largely illusory.[26] The forts were quickly overrun in 1740, Britain's promise of military support against an aggressor proving to be far more effective.[27] The damage suffered by the Dutch merchant navy permanently affected their commercial and political strength and it was superseded by Britain as the pre-eminent European mercantile power.[28]

Louis XIV died on 1 September 1715 and on his deathbed is alleged to have said "I have loved war too well."[29] True or not, while the final settlement at Utrecht was far more favourable than the Allied offer of 1709, France gained little that had not already been achieved through diplomacy by February 1701. It remained strong but concern at their relative decline in military and economic terms compared to Britain was an underlying cause of the War of the Austrian Succession in 1740.[30]

gollark: That's not exactly right.
gollark: Well, a DMCA stopping them accessing github might actually work.
gollark: Or, well, not comparable, similar.
gollark: How is mildly irritating someone on the internet because they repeatedly do bad things with a very stretched claim about their rights (they can block me, even) comparable to threatening to take away people's livelihood for stupid reasons?
gollark: That reads like a concession extracted under threat of thing.

See also

References
  1. R.R. Palmer, A History of the Modern World 2nd ed. 1961, p. 234.
  2. G.M. Trevelyan, A shortened history of England (1942) p 363.
  3. The staunch Tory Strafford was hauled before a committee of Parliament for his part in the treaty, which the Whigs considered not advantageous enough.
  4. James Falkner (2015). The War of the Spanish Succession 1701-1714. Pen and Sword. p. 205.
  5. Randall Lesaffer, "The Peace of Utrecht and the Balance of Power", Oxford Public International Law.
  6. Somerset, Anne (2012). Queen Anne: The Politics of Passion. Harper Press. p. 470. ISBN 978-0007203765.
  7. Pincus, Steven. "Rethinking Mercantilism: Political Economy, The British Empire and the Atlantic World in the 17th and 18th Centuries" (PDF). Warwick University: 7–8. Retrieved 10 May 2018.
  8. Moore, John Robert (1950). "Defoe, Steele, and the Demolition of Dunkirk". Huntington Library Quarterly. 13 (3): 279. doi:10.2307/3816138.
  9. Bromley, J. S. (1987). Corsairs and Navies, 1600–1760. Continnuum-3PL. p. 233. ISBN 978-0907628774.
  10. George Chalmers, Great Britain (24 January 1790). "A Collection of Treaties Between Great Britain and Other Powers". Printed for J. Stockdale – via Internet Archive.
  11. Royle, Trevor (2016). Culloden; Scotland's Last Battle and the Forging of the British Empire. Little, Brown. p. 148. ISBN 978-1408704011.
  12. "Treaties of Utrecht – European history". Encyclopedia Britannica.
  13. The twelve peers consisted of two who were summoned in their father's baronies, Lords Compton (Northampton) and Bruce (Ailesbury), and ten recruits, namely Lords Hay (Kinnoull), Mountjoy, Burton (Paget), Mansell, Middleton, Trevor, Lansdowne, Masham, Foley, and Bathurst. David Backhouse, "Tory Tergiversation In The House of Lords, 1714–1760" Archived 28 June 2006 at the Wayback Machine.
  14. Szabo, I. (1857). The State Policy of Modern Europe from the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century to the Present Time. Vol. I, Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans and Roberts, p. 166
  15. Churchill, W. (2002). Marlborough: His Life and Times, University of Chicago Press, ISBN 0-226-10636-5, pp. 954–955
  16. Israel, J. I. (1995), The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477–1806, Oxford University Press,ISBN 0-19-873072-1 hardback, ISBN 0-19-820734-4 paperback, p. 978
  17. Article II, Peace and Friendship Treaty of Utrecht.
  18. Lesaffer, Randall. "The peace of Utrecht and the balance of power". OUP Blog. Retrieved 5 May 2018.
  19. Szechi, Daniel (1994). The Jacobites: Britain and Europe, 1688-1788 (First ed.). Manchester University Press. pp. 93–95. ISBN 978-0719037740.
  20. Carlos, Ann; Neal, Larry; Wandschneider, Kirsten (2006). "The Origins of National Debt: The Financing and Re-financing of the War of the Spanish Succession" (PDF). International Economic History Association: 2. Retrieved 6 September 2018.
  21. Vives Vi, Jaime (1969). An Economic History of Spain. Princeton University Press. p. 591. ISBN 978-0691051659.
  22. Falkner, James (2015). The War of the Spanish Succession (Kindle ed.). 4173–4181: Pen and Sword Military. ASIN B0189PTWZG.CS1 maint: location (link)
  23. Kann, Robert A (1974). A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526–1918 (1980 ed.). University of California Press. pp. 88–89. ISBN 978-0520042063.
  24. Anderson, M. S. (1995). The War of Austrian Succession 1740–1748. Routledge. pp. 10–11. ISBN 978-0582059504.
  25. Lindsay, J. O. (1957). The New Cambridge Modern History. Volume 7: The Old Regime, 1713–1763. Cambridge University Press; New edition. p. 420. ISBN 978-0521045452.
  26. Kubben, Raymond (2011). Regeneration and Hegemony: Franco-Batavian Relations in the Revolutionary Era 1795–1803. Martinus Nijhoff. p. 148. ISBN 978-9004185586.
  27. Ward, Adolphus William (1922). The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, Volume 2 (2011 ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 57. ISBN 978-1108040136.
  28. Elliott, John (2014). Dadson, Trevor (ed.). The Road to Utrecht in Britain, Spain and the Treaty of Utrecht 1713–2013. Routledge. p. 8. ISBN 978-1909662223.
  29. Colville, Alfred (1935). Studies in Anglo-French History During the Eighteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (2018 ed.). Forgotten Books. p. 149. ISBN 978-1528022392.
  30. Lynn, John (1999). The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667–1714. Modern Wars In Perspective. Longman. pp. 361–362. ISBN 978-0582056299.

Bibliography
  • Bruin, Renger and Cornelis Haven, eds. Performances of Peace: Utrecht 1713 (2015).
  • Churchill, Winston (2002). Marlborough: His Life and Times, Bk. 2, vols. iii & iv. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 0-226-10635-7 online abridged edition
  • Gregory, Desmond: Minorca, the Illusory Prize: A History of the British Occupations of Minorca Between 1708 and 1802 (Associated University Press, 1990)
  • Lesaffer, Randall. "The peace of Utrecht and the balance of power", Oxford Historical Treaties 10 Nov 1914 online
  • Lynn, John A (1999). The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667–1714. Longman. ISBN 0-582-05629-2
  • Mowat, Robert Balmain. History of European diplomacy, 1451–1789 (1928) pp 141–54; online pp 165–82.
  • Sichel, Walter. Bolingbroke And His Times, 2 vols. (1901–02) Vol. 1 The Reign of Queen Anne
  • Stanhope, Philip: History of England, Comprising the Reign of Queen Anne until the Peace of Utrecht (London: 1870)
  • Trevelyan, G. M (1930–34). England Under Queen Anne. 3 volumes. Longmans, Green and co.
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