Debt-trap diplomacy

Debt-trap diplomacy describes diplomacy based on debt carried out in the bilateral relations between countries with an often alleged negative intent.[1][2] The creditor country intentionally extends excessive credit to a debtor country with the alleged intention of extracting economic or political concessions from the debtor country when it becomes unable to honor its debt.[3] The conditions of the loans are often not made public,[4] and the borrowed money commonly pays contractors from the creditor country. Although the term has been applied to the lending practices of many countries and the International Monetary Fund,[5][6] it is currently most commonly associated with the People's Republic of China.[7] Recent bilateral agreements as part of China's Belt and Road Initiative have furthered this association, especially as to commodity-backed loans to developing nations.[8][9][10]

Description

The term was created by Brahma Chellaney to describe allegedly predatory Chinese lending practices where poor countries overwhelmed by unsustainable loans would be forced to cede control of strategic assets to Beijing.[11] First used in 2017, within 12 months the term had quickly spread through the media, intelligence circles, and western governments.[12] It has since expanded to include other parts of the world.[13] and was further defined and expanded upon in the context of Chinese geostrategic interests in a 2018 Harvard University report.[3][14]

International reaction

Criticism of China

Studies of economic experts in the practices of China found that the patterns of China's bank lending purposefully trap governments to gain strategic opportunities for China.[15] Chellaney calls this "clearly part of China's geostrategic vision".[16]

China's overseas development policy has been called debt-trap diplomacy because once indebted economies fail to service their loans, they are said to be pressured to support China's geostrategic interests.[17] Some commentators, for instance, maintain that China is buttressing repressive regimes in a neocolonialist manner through high-interest loans, intending to coerce these countries once they default to align with China on key strategic and military issues.[18][19] China has been accused of requiring secret negotiations and non-competitive pricing on projects where contracts must go to Chinese state-owned or linked companies that charge significantly higher prices than would be charged on the open market, and bidding must be closed.[18]

Western,[20][21] Indian[22], and African[23][24] media have criticized the secretive loan terms as well as their high interest-rates. For example, a 2006 loan to Tonga sought to rebuild infrastructure.[25] From 2013 to 2014, the country suffered a debt crisis when the Ex-Im Bank of China, to whom the loans are owed, did not forgive them.[26] The loans claimed 44 percent of Tonga's GDP.[26] Western analysts have suggested China's practices may hide hegemonic intentions and challenges to states' sovereignty.[27][28] China has also been accused of imposing unfair trade and financial deals when cash-strapped countries are unable to resist Beijing's money.[29]

Most importantly, the loans were allowed to interfere with the country's economy, and China gained a strategic advantage in Africa and elsewhere.[30] Jonathan Hillman, director of the Reconnecting Asia project for the Center for Strategic and International Studies states "If it can carry goods, it can carry troops."[15]

Criticism of the term

A SAIS-CARI report from August 2018 found that "Chinese loans are not currently a major contributor to debt distress in Africa. Yet many countries have borrowed heavily from China and others. Any new FOCAC loan pledges will likely take the growing debt burden of African countries into account."[31] A 2019 peer-reviewed Johns Hopkins research paper by Deborah Brautigam found that "the evidence so far, including the Sri Lankan case, shows that the drumbeat of alarm about Chinese banks' funding of infrastructure across the BRI and beyond is overblown."[32][33]

The Rhodium Group has stated that China's leverage in debt renegotiation is often exaggerated and was realistically limited in power and that the findings of their study frequently instead showed an outcome in favor of the borrower, not the supposedly predatory Chinese lender.[34][35] A May 2019 article in the Sydney Morning Herald said that the term was being questioned by new research; an analysis of 40 Chinese debt renegotiations by the Rhodium Group found that "asset seizures are a very rare occurrence" and, instead, debt write-off was the most common outcome.[36] The article also reported the views of Australian National University senior lecturer Darren Lim who referring to the Rhodium Group study, explained that much of the leverage shifts to the borrower after the loan has been given, and not to the lender. Lim said that "the debt-trap diplomacy" claim was never credible and despite that, had been pushed by the Trump Administration.[36]

A report by the Lowy Institute said that China had not engaged in deliberate "debt-trap diplomacy" in the Pacific that can justify the accusations of debt-trap diplomacy, at least from reviewing current evidence, and stated that China has not been the primary driver behind rising debt risks in the Pacific although warned the sheer scale of its lending, and the institutional weakness within Pacific states would pose clear risks for small states to be overwhelmed by debt.[37][38]

Other critics include Chinese state-owned tabloid Global Times[39] and Rwandan President Paul Kagame.[40]

Africa
Chinese loans to Africa[41]
Year Billions of US$
2005
2
2006
5
2007
6
2008
4
2009
6
2010
7
2011
10
2012
13
2013
18
2014
15
2015
13
2016
30

China is a major stakeholder in the economies of many African countries with a significant influence on many aspects of the continent's affairs.[42] Recently, African countries have rapidly increased their borrowing from China.[42] According to research conducted as part of the Jubilee Debt Campaign in October 2018,[43] African countries owed China US$10 billion in 2010 increasing to over $30 billion by 2016.[43] China's lending to African countries is part of a large-scale overseas investment boom forming part of its quest to secure access to raw materials and become an economic superpower.[44]

The five countries in Africa with the largest current Chinese debt, are Angola ($25 billion), Ethiopia ($13.5 billion), Zambia ($7.4 billion), the Republic of Congo ($7.3 billion), and North Sudan ($6.4 billion).[45]

Infrastructure

Several infrastructure projects funded by Chinese loans are thought to have had a positive impact on the economies of many African countries via much-needed developments in infrastructure.[46] Infrastructure improved with these loans includes roads, railways, and ports.[46] Improved infrastructure favors internal trade, healthcare, and education systems.[46] One such example of infrastructure development is the Merowe Dam Project in Sudan to produce hydroelectric power.[46]

In the 2015 and 2017 records of the World Bank, several African countries have large debts not only with China but also with other creditor nations.[47] Interest rates of about 55% in the private sector prompted many African countries to go to China for loans, which charges around 17%.[47] The debts of African countries to China paid for the investment in sectors needing critical development and growth and not just consumption.[48] China in exchange demands payment in the form of jobs, and natural resources.[48] In economic theory and practice, any country can borrow from another country to finance its economic development.[48]  However, it is not always easy to find someone who will lend them money. The global competition to be the best country to invest money in is in fact, can be a sign of a country's financial strength, which is why many African countries do not consider the loans a debt-trap.[48]

Economic risks

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a multi-billion-dollar expansion project of China, to expand its power through lending to countries to spur their economic growth.[49] BRI is also sometimes called the "Chinese Marshall Plan". The BRI project was launched in 2013 by paramount leader Xi Jinping to improve the infrastructure of countries in Europe, Africa, and Asia in exchange for global trade opportunities and economic advantage.[49] The plan consists of spearheading and investing in 60 projects around the world.[50] The initial expected costs of the BRI exceed $1tn, and actual costs are even higher.[50] The risks involved in borrowing countries are unexpectedly high. In recent news, many countries in the BRI project have started rethinking the perils of the projects and the fact that most have repayment issues.[50] Jonathan Hillman, director of the Reconnecting Asia Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington believes that there is more to these projects than just mere financial strategy: "It's also a vehicle for China to write new rules, establish institutions that reflect Chinese interests, and reshape 'soft' infrastructure."[50]

The negative effects of Chinese loans to African economies include fear of losing local companies to those Chinese with strong buying powers.[49] Debt from China has also promoted illicit trade among China and African countries.[50] Such imports are cheap because of China's cheap labor and are thus preferred for locally manufactured goods. Examples of cheap imports from China include clothes and electronics. Trade between African countries and China has also affected ties between African countries and other continents, especially Europe and North America. According to Brautigam, Chinese loans are prone to misuse and have promoted the levels of corruption and fight for power in African countries.[49]

Over four-fifths of China's investments are spent on infrastructure projects in underdeveloped and developing countries.[50] Forecasts of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) show that the economic growth rate of China will fall to around 6.2%, which is around 0.4% less than 2018's 6.6%.[51] One reason for the decline is the increasing number of trade disputes between China and the US. Another is the sudden increase in debt in the past decade, which was used for infrastructure programs.[50]

Kenya
Further information: China–Kenya relations

Between 2006 and 2017, Kenya took out loans of at least $9.8 billion (Sh1043.77 billion) from China.[52] Chinese debt accounts for 72% of overall foreign debt.[53]
China lent Kenya extensive funds to build highways and the standard gauge railway between Mombasa and Nairobi[54][55] totaling over US$6.5 billion as of 2020.[3] In late December 2018, Kenya reportedly came close to default on Chinese loans to develop its largest and most lucrative port, the Port of Mombasa. A default could have forced Kenya to relinquish control of the port to China.[56][57] Kenyan media has debated whether Chinese loans are worth the risk, drawing analogies with § Sri Lanka, and some commentators have said that these loans could jeopardize Kenyan sovereignty.[54][58]

South Africa
Further information: China–South Africa relations

South Africa is estimated to owe the equivalent of 4% of its annual GDP to China.[59] The country has received multiple tranches of Chinese loans, some of which have raised concerns around their opaque conditions[60] and alleged links to corruption in South Africa. This includes a controversial US$2.5 billion loan from the Chinese Development Bank to state-owned South African electrical utility Eskom arranged during the Jacob Zuma government,[61] the conditions of which were not made public.[62] Another US$2.5 billion loan from a private Chinese company, Huarong Energy, to Eskom, was found by the Zondo Commission of Inquiry into state corruption to be improper[63] prompting Eskom chairperson Jabu Mabuza to publicly state that Eskom would not be repaying the loan due to irregularities and corruption involved in the issuing of the loan.[64]

An additional R370 billion (US$25.8 billion) loan from the China Development Bank during the presidency of Cyril Ramaphosa was given to promote a 2018 economic stimulus package. The South African government initially described the loan as a "gift"[65] whilst the details of the loan were not made public thereby causing significant public controversy.[66][67] The government justified the loan by stating that the interest rate was not exorbitant[68], and also that it could not be disclosed due to confidentiality clauses.[69] The loan was criticized by the opposition Democratic Alliance political party for possibly pushing the country into a "debt trap".[69][66]

Rest of Africa
  • Nigeria: US$3.1 billion of the country's total US$27.6 billion foreign debt is owned by China. Nigerian financial publication Nairametrics warned of falling into a Chinese debt trap given Nigeria's notable problems with corruption.[70]
  • Zambia: US$7.4 billion of the country's total US$8.7 billion of debt is owned by China, a large debt burden given the relatively small size of Zambia's economy.[71] In 2018, Zambian lawmakers debated whether Chinese loans characterized as reckless and difficult to repay, put Zambian sovereignty at risk.[72] The Zambian government was in talks with China about its total surrender of the state electricity company ZESCO as debt repayment since the country has defaulted on multiple Chinese loans for infrastructure projects.
  • Djibouti: Loans to develop a strategic port.[73] Chinese loans total 77% of the country's total debt.[71] Djibouti owes over 80 percent of its GDP to China and in 2017, became host to China's first overseas military base.[74]
  • Republic of the Congo: An estimated $2.5billion is owed to Chinese lenders. The exact number is unknown even to the Congolese government.[71]
  • Egypt: China is financing the country's new capital of New Cairo.[75] In an interview, Gen. Ahmed Zaki Abdeen, who heads the Egyptian state-owned enterprise overseeing the new capital, criticized American reluctance to invest in Egypt, saying: "Stop talking to us about human rights." "Come and do business with us. The Chinese are coming — they are seeking win-win situations. Welcome to the Chinese."[75]

In Latin America
See also: China–Latin America relations, China–Venezuela relations, and China–Ecuador relations

An article in CNBC said that Chinese investment in Latin America has been burgeoning and that the project has been heavily criticized amid allegations of debt-trap diplomacy and neo-colonialism.[76] These concerns have been pronounced especially in Venezuela and Ecuador.[77]

  • Argentina: Argentina has been denied access and oversight of a Chinese satellite tracking station on its territory.[74]
  • Ecuador: Ecuador has agreed to sell 80 to 90 percent of its crude oil to China through 2024 in exchange for US$6.5 billion in Chinese loans.[74]
  • Venezuela: An article published by Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy said that China's loans in Venezuela are not debt trap diplomacy nor "creditor imperialism", but simply "lose-lose" financial mistakes where both parties stand to lose.[13] An article in Quartz summarized the Carnegie article accordingly: "counter to the dominant narrative about Chinese debt ensnaring other countries, the country that needs to fear excessive and unsustainable Chinese lending the most is China."[78]

In Asia

Sri Lanka

Further information: China–Sri Lanka relations
Loans from China to build the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka have been cited as an example of debt-trap diplomacy, after Sri Lanka defaulted and subsequently gave a 99-year lease to China in place of payment.

Critics cite the example of a loan given to the Sri Lankan government by the Exim Bank of China to build the Magampura Mahinda Rajapaksa Port[79] and Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport as an example of debt-trap diplomacy. The state-owned Chinese firms China Harbour Engineering Company and Sinohydro Corporation were hired to build the Magampura Port for US$361 million which was 85% funded by China's state-owned Export-Import Bank at an annual interest rate of 6.3%.[80] Due to Sri Lanka's inability to service the debt on the port, it was leased to the Chinese state-owned China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited on a 99-year lease in 2017.[81] This caused concern in the United States, Japan,[28] and India that the port might be used as a Chinese naval base[82] to contain China's geopolitical rivals.

Indonesia

In 2003, Suramadu Bridge was built by a consortium of Indonesian companies working with China Road and Bridge Corporation and the China Harbor Engineering Company. The total cost of the project, including connecting roads, has been estimated at US$445 million.

The coal-fired 990 MW Indramayu West Java 1 power plant was inaugurated in October 2011. Construction began in 2007 and was managed by a consortium of contractors: China National Machinery Industry Corporation, China National Electric Equipment Corporation, estimated cost: $870 million

In 2011, Sumatra coal railway, estimated cost US$1.5 billion

In 2015 Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail, estimated cost: around US$5.5 billion

In 2015 Central Kalimantan Puruk Cahu-Bangkuang coal railway, estimated US$3.3 billion

In April 2018, Indonesia and China signed five contracts worth $23.3 billion consisting of several infrastructure projects such as a hydropower plant development and a facility to convert coal into dimethyl ether, among other projects.

In March 2019 Indonesia and China will execute an investment plan worth US$91.1 billion for 28 national projects under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), according to the first meeting of the Joint Steering Committee for the Construction of Regional Comprehensive Economic Corridors for Cooperation between the countries in Bali.

Malaysia
Further information: China–Malaysia relations and 1Malaysia Development Berhad scandal

China financed $22 billion worth of projects in Malaysia during the leadership of former Prime Minister Najib Razak.[18] On 31 May 2014, then-Prime Minister Najib Razak made a state visit to China where he was welcomed by China's Premier Li Keqiang. China and Malaysia pledged to increase bilateral trade to US$160 billion by 2017. They also agreed to upgrade economic and financial co-operation, especially in the production of halal food, water processing, railway construction, and ports.[83]

After his inauguration in 2018, the then PM Mahathir Mohamad canceled projects worth approximately $2.795 billion with China Petroleum Pipeline Bureau for oil and gas pipelines, saying Malaysia would not be able to repay its obligations.[18] 90% of the cost of several of the pipelines in Borneo and from Malacca to Johor had been paid, but only 13% of the construction had been completed.[84] Mohamad further stated that some of the funding from the Exim Bank of China had been misappropriated as part of the 1MDB scandal.[84]

Mohamad and his Finance Minister Lim Guan Eng criticized the projects,[84] saying they were expensive, unnecessary, not useful, uncompetitive as open bidding was not allowed, secretive, conducted with no public oversight and favored Chinese state-owned firms and those affiliated with Najib's United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) party at inflated prices.[18] Locals in the city of Malacca also complained that the port was unneeded and the small company that was awarded the contract had ties to the previously-ruling UMNO political party.[18]

When confronted with the China's String of Pearls strategy in the Indian Ocean, and China's motives in Malaysia and the Strait of Malacca, Malaysian Deputy Minister of Defense Liew Chin Tong said:

"You look at a map and you can see the places where China is plotting ports and investments, from Myanmar to Pakistan to Sri Lanka, on toward Djibouti. What's crucial to all that? Our little Malaysia, and the Malacca Strait. I say publicly that we do not want to see warships in the Strait of Malacca or the South China Sea."[18]

However the loans and their terms were later renegotiated and Mahathir Mohamad pledged support for the BRI and became one of the key opening speakers of the BRI Summit in Beijing in 2019.[85][86]

Maldives

In December 2019, the Speaker of the Maldives' parliament, the People's Majlis and former President, Mohamed Nasheed said Maldives owed China $3.5 billion in loans which included $1.5 billion in government-to-government loans and the rest in private loans and sovereign guarantees. He said that the Chinese debt trap was not just an economic issue but also a human rights one and an issue of sovereignty and freedom of the island nation.[87][88]

Tajikistan

In 2011, Tajikistan had to cede about 1000 square kilometres of land to China in exchange for waiver of outstanding debt of hundreds of millions of dollars.[89]

Other examples

The Chinese have made loans to the Malaysian government of Najib Razak,[28] Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Tajikistan, the Maldives, Mongolia, and to build a national highway in Montenegro, as part of the Belt and Road Initiative.[73][90] It has also made US$19 billion worth of loans to Pakistan, as part of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and other projects.[73][91] A New York Times investigative report from December 2018 reported on emerging military dimensions of the investments, which it termed a debt-trap and stated are under poor governance and transparency.[92] China also made a US$115 million loan to Tonga to redevelop its infrastructure,[93] and US$2 billion in loans to Papua New Guinea totalling almost a quarter of its total debt.[93]

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See also

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