Battle of Khanwa

The Battle of Khanwa was fought near the village of Khanwa, in Bharatpur District of Rajasthan, on March 16, 1527. It was fought between the invading forces of the first Mughal Emperor Babur and the Rajput forces led by Rana Sanga of Mewar, after the Battle of Panipat. The victory in the battle consolidated the new Mughal dynasty in India.[7]

Battle of Khanwa
Part of Expansion of the Mughal Empire
Mughal painting depicting the Rajput Army (Left) armed against Mughal Army (Right)
Date 16 March 1527 Location Khanwa, Rajasthan (near Fatehpur Sikri) 27°2′7″N 77°32′35″E Result Decisive Mughal victory[1] consolidation of Mughal power in Northern India Dissolution of the Rajput confederation
Belligerents
Mughal Empire	Rajput Confederation Lodi dynasty loyalists
Commanders and leaders
Babur Humayun Ustad Ali Quli Mustafa Rumi Chin Timur Khan Mir Mohib Ali Khalifa Mir Abdul Aziz Mir Muhammed Ali Khan Khusrau Shah Kokultash Kassim Husain Khan Muhammad Zaman Mirza Askari Mirza Hindal Mirza Sayyed Mehdi Khwaja Asad Malik Hast Raja Sanghar Ali Khan Silhadi (Switched sides)	Rana Sanga (WIA) Mahmud Lodi Hasan Khan Mewati † Maldeo Rathore Uday Singh of Vagad † Raimal Rathore of Idar Prithviraj Singh I[2] Ratan Singh of Merta † Manik Chand Chauhan † Chandrabhan Chauhan † Ratan Singh Chundawat † Raj Rana Ajja † Rao Ramdas † Gokaldas Parmar † Medini Rai Silhadi (Betrayed Rajput confederacy)
Strength
20,000 Turkic horsemen with an unknown number of foot musketeers, Swivel guns and Mortars.[3] Unknown number of Indian allies[4] 6,000 men under Silhadi (after defection)[5]	Unknown but considered to be double the amount of Mughals, the army consisted of Rajput horsemen with a contingent of Afghan horsemen and an unknown number of War Elephants[6]

Background

Until 1524, Babur's aim was to expand his rule to Punjab, primarily to fulfil the legacy of his ancestor Timur, since it used to be part of his empire.[8] Large parts of north India were under the rule of Ibrahim Lodi of the Lodi dynasty, but the empire was crumbling and there were many defectors. Babur had already raided Punjab in 1504 and 1518. In 1519 he tried to invade Punjab but had to return to Kabul due to complications there.[9] In 1523 he received invitations from Daulat Khan Lodi, Governor of Punjab and Ala-ud-Din, Ibrahim's uncle, to invade the Delhi Sultanate. Upon learning of Babur's invasion, the Rajput ruler of Mewar, Rana Sanga, sent an ambassador to Babur at Kabul, offering to join in Babur's attack on the Sultan. Sanga offered to attack Agra, while Babur would attack Delhi. Ibrahim Lodi was able to defeat Daulat Khan but was defeated in the First Battle of Panipat[9], where Babur annihilated the Lodi sultanate's army in the battle and killed the Sultan, while losing just a few hundred in the conflict.[10]

However, while Babur did attack Lodi and take over Delhi and Agra, Sanga made no move, apparently having changed his mind. Babur had resented this backsliding; in his autobiography, Babur accuses Rana Sanga of breaching their agreement. Historian Satish Chandra speculates that Sanga may have imagined a long, drawn-out struggle taking place between Babur and Lodi, following which he would be able to take control of the regions he coveted. Alternatively, writes Chandra, Sanga may have thought that in the event of a Mughal victory, Babur would withdraw from Delhi and Agra, like Timur, once he had seized the treasures of these cities. Once he realized that Babur intended to stay on in India, Sanga proceeded to build a grand coalition that would either force Babur out of India or confine him to Afghanistan. In early 1527, Babur started receiving reports of Sanga's advance towards Agra.[11]

Initial skirmishes

After the First Battle of Panipat, Babur had recognized that his primary threat came from two allied quarters: Rana Sanga and the Afghans ruling eastern India at the time. In a council that Babur called, it was decided that the Afghans represented the bigger threat, and consequently Humayun was sent at the head of an army to fight the Afghans in the east. However, upon hearing of Rana Sanga's advancement on Agra, Humayun was hastily recalled. Military detachments were then sent by Babur to conquer Dholpur, Gwaliar, and Bayana, strong forts forming the outer boundaries of Agra. The commanders of Dholpur and Gwalior surrendered their forts to Babur, accepting his generous terms. However, Nizam Khan, the commander of Bayana, opened negotiations with both Babur and Afghans. The force sent by Babur to Bayana was defeated and dispersed by Rana Sanga on 21st February 1527.[12] In his memoir, the Baburnama, Babur takes note of Rana Sanga's speedy advances which caused difficulties before his forces:[13]

..The foe swooped on our troops and put them to rout...

He also notes the experience of his gentry:

..either out of fear or to scare others..,..,..and others from Bayana, praised and extolled the valour and ferocity of Rajput troops.[13]

In one of the earliest western scholarly account[14] of the Mughal rulers, 'A History of India Under the Two First Sovereigns of the House of Taimur Baber and Humayun', William Erskine, a 19th-century Scottish historian, quotes:[13][15]

They (Mughals) had some sharp encounters with the Rajputs, ... found that they had now to contend with a foe more formidable than the Afghans or any of the natives of India to whom they had yet been opposed. The Rajputs, ... were ready to meet, face to face,... all times prepared to lay down their lives for their honour.

— William Erskine, "Rana Sanga", 'A History of India Under the Two First Sovereigns of the House of Taimur Baber and Humayun' P. 464

Rajput-Afghan alliance against Babur

Rana Sanga had succeeded in building a formidable military alliance against Babur. He was joined by virtually all the leading Rajput kings from Rajasthan, including those from Harauti, Jalor, Sirohi, Dungarpur, and Dhundhar. Rao Ganga of Marwar did not join personally but sent a contingent on his behalf led by his son Maldev Rathore. Rao Medini Rai of Chanderi in Malwa also joined the alliance. Further, Mahmud Lodi, the younger son of Sikandar Lodi, whom the Afghans had proclaimed their new sultan also joined the alliance with a contingent of Afghan horsemen with him. Khanzada Hasan Khan Mewati, the ruler of Mewat, also joined the alliance with his men. Babur denounced the Afghans who joined the alliance against him as kafirs and murtads (those who had apostatized from Islam). Chandra also argues that the alliance weaved together by Sanga represented a Rajput-Afghan alliance with the proclaimed mission of expelling Babur and restoring the Lodi empire.[16]

Babur rallies his troops

According to Babur, Rana Sanga's army consisted of 200,000 soldiers. However, according to Alexander Kinloch, this is an exaggeration as the Rajput army did not exceed 40,000 men during the campaign in Gujarat.[17] Even if this figure is exaggerated, Chandra comments that it is indisputable that Sanga's army greatly outnumbered Babur's forces.[18] The greater numbers and reported courage of the Rajputs served to instil fear in Babur's army. An astrologer added to the general unease by his foolish predictions. To raise the flagging morale of his soldiers, Babur gave a religious colour to the battle against Hindus. Babur proceeded to renounce future consumption of wine, broke his drinking cups, poured out all the stores of liquor on the ground and promulgated a pledge of total abstinence.[16] In his autobiography, Babur writes that:

It was a really good plan, and it had a favourable propagandistic effect on friend and foe.[19]

Preparation

Babur knew that his army would have been swept by the Rajput charge if he tried to fight them in the open, he therefore planned a defensive strategy to form a fortified encampment where he would use his muskets and artillery to weaken his foes and then strike when their morale had shattered.[20] Babur had carefully inspected the site. Like in Panipat, he strengthened his front by procuring carts that were fastened by iron chains (not leather straps, as at Panipat) and reinforced by mantlets. Gaps between the carts were used for horsemen to charge at the opponent at an opportune time. To lengthen the line, ropes made of rawhide were placed over wheeled wooden tripods. The flanks were given protection by digging ditches. Foot-musketeers, falconets and mortars were placed behind the carts, from where they could fire and, if required, advance. The heavy Turkic horsemen stood behind them, two contingents of elite horsemen were kept in the reserve for the taulqama (flanking) tactic. Thus, a strong offensive-defensive formation had been prepared by Babur.[20]

The battle

Rana Sanga, fighting in a traditional manner, charged the Mughal ranks. His army was shot down in great numbers by the Mughal muskets, the noise of the muskets further caused fear amongst the horses and elephants of the Rajput army, causing them to trample their own men.[20] Rana Sanga finding it impossible to attack the Mughal centre, ordered his men to attack the Mughal flanks, the fighting continued on the two flanks for three hours, during which the Mughals fired at the Rajput ranks with muskets and arrows while the Rajputs could only retaliate in close quarters.[20] "Band after band of the Pagan troops followed each other to help their men, so we in our turn sent detachment after detachment to reinforce our fighters on that side". Babur did make attempts to use his famous taulqama or pincer movement, however his men were unable to complete it, twice they pushed the Rajputs back however due to the relentless attacks of the Rajput horsemen they were forced to retreat to their positions. At about this time Silhadi of Raisen deserted the Ranas army and went over to Baburs.[20] The betrayal of Silhadi forced the Rana to change his plans and issue new orders, during this time the Rana was shot by a bullet and fell unconscious, causing great confusion in the Rajput army and a lull in the fighting for a short period. Babur has written this event in his memoirs by saying "the accursed infidels remained confounded for one hour".[20] A Jhala chieftain called Ajja acted as the Rana and led the Rajput army, while the Rana was hidden by a circlement of his trusted men. Jhala Ajja proved to be a poor general, as he continued the attacks on the Mughal flanks while ignoring his weak centre.[9] The Rajputs continued their attacks but failed to break the Mughal flanks and their centre was unable to do anything against the fortified Mughal centre, Jadunath Sarkar has explained the struggle in the following words: "In the centre the Rajputs continued to fall without being able to retaliate in the least or advance to close grips. They were hoplessly outlclassed in weapon and their dense masses only increased their hopeless slaughter, as every bullet found its billet." Babur after noticing the weak Rajput centre ordered his men to take the offensive, the Mughal attack pushed the Rajputs back and forced the Rajput commanders to rush to the front, resulting in the death of many.[20] The Rajputs were now leaderless as most of their senior commanders were dead and their unconsious king had been moved out of the battle. The Rajputs made a desperate charge on the Mughal left and right flanks like before, "here their bravest were mown down and the battle ended in their irretrievable defeat".[20] The Rajputs and their allies had been defeated, dead bodies could be found as far as Bayana, Alwar and Mewat. The Mughals were too exhausted after the long fight to give chase and Babur himself gave up the idea of invading Mewar.[20]

Following his victory, Babur ordered a tower of enemy skulls to be erected, a practice formulated by Timur against his adversaries, irrespective of their religious beliefs. According to Chandra, the objective of constructing a tower of skulls was not just to record a great victory, but also to terrorize opponents. Earlier, the same tactic had been used by Babur against the Afghans of Bajaur.[18]

Aftermath

The Battle of Khanwa demonstrated that Rajput bravery was not enough to counter Babur's superior generalship and organizational skills. Babur himself commented:

Swordsmen though some Hindustanis maybe, most of them are ignorant and unskilled in military move and stand, in soldierly counsel and procedure.

[21] Rana Sanga managed to evade capture and escape to Chittor, but the grand alliance he had built collapsed. Quoting Rushbrook Williams, Chandra writes:

The powerful confederacy which depended so largely for its unity upon the strength and reputation of Mewar, was shattered by a single defeat and ceased henceforth to be a dominant factor in the politics of Hindustan.

[18]

On 30 January 1528 Rana Sanga died in Chittor, apparently poisoned by his own chiefs, who held his plans of renewing the fight with Babur to be suicidal.[18]

It is suggested that had it not been for the cannon of Babur, Rana Sanga might have achieved victory. Pradeep Barua notes that Babur's cannon put an end to outdated trends in Indian warfare.[22]

See also

• Battles of Rajasthan
• First Battle of Panipat
• Battle of Ghaghra

References

1. An Advanced History of India, Dr K. K. Datta, p. 429.
2. Bhatnagar, V. S. (1974). Life and Times of Sawai Jai Singh, 1688–1743. Impex India. p. 6.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
3. Military history of india by Jadunath Sarkar pg.58 — "Cavalry was formed in divisions, 5,000 under Humayun, 3,000 under Mahdi Khwaja, 10,000 under Babur and 2,000 elite horsemen in reserve for Taulqama"
4. Military history of india by Jadunath Sarkar pg.59 — "The Indian allies of Babur were posted in his left wing"
5. Military history of india by Jadunath Sarkar pg.57 — "30,000 on paper, but probably not more than 6,000".
6. Military history of india by Jadunath Sarkar pg.56 — "Facing him was an enemy more than double his own number".
7. An Advanced History of India, Dr K.K.Datta, p. 429.
8. Eraly 2007, pp. 27–29.
9. A Comprehensive History of India: Comprehensive history of medieval India p107.
10. Chaurasia, Radhey Shyam (2002). History of medieval India : from 1000 A.D. to 1707 A.D. New Delhi: Atlantic Publ. pp. 89–90. ISBN 81-269-0123-3.
11. Chandra 2006, pp. 32–33.
12. Chandra 2006, p. 33.
13. (Emperor of Hindustan), Babur (1527) [1527 AD]. Babur Nama: Journal of Emperor Babur. Translated by Beveridge, Annette. Penguin Books India. p. 289. ISBN 978-0-14-400149-1. Check date values in: |year= / |date= mismatch (help)
14. Erskine, William (24 May 2012). A History of India Under the Two First Sovereigns of the House of Taimur, Báber and Humáyun. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-108-04620-6.
15. "A history of India under the two first sovereigns of the house of Taimur, Báber and Humáyun". INDIAN CULTURE. Retrieved 11 July 2020.
16. Chandra 2006, p. 34.
17. 8 Chaturkula Charitra, p. 25
18. Chandra 2006.
19. Babur, Emperor of Hindustan (2002). The Baburnama: Memoirs of Babur, Prince and Emperor. translated, edited and annotated by W. M. Thackston. Modern Library. ISBN 0-375-76137-3.
20. Military history of India by Jadunath Sarkar pg.56-61
21. Chandra 2006, p. 35.
22. Barua, Pradeep (2005). The State at War in South Asia. University of Nebraska Press. pp. 33–34. ISBN 978-0-80321-344-9.

Bibliography

• Chandra, Satish (2006). Medieval India: From Sultanat to the Mughals (1206–1526). 2. Har-Anand Publications.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
• Eraly, Abraham (2007), Emperors Of The Peacock Throne: The Saga of the Great Moghuls, Penguin Books Limited, ISBN 978-93-5118-093-7