Roger Myerson

Roger Bruce Myerson (born 1951) is an American economist and professor at the University of Chicago. He holds the title of the David L. Pearson Distinguished Service Professor of Global Conflict Studies at The Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts in the Harris School of Public Policy, the Griffin Department of Economics, and the College.[1] Previously, he held the title The Glen A. Lloyd Distinguished Service Professor of Economics.[2] In 2007, he was the winner of the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel with Leonid Hurwicz and Eric Maskin for "having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory."[3] He was elected a Member of the American Philosophical Society in 2019.[4]

Roger Myerson
Born (1951-03-29) March 29, 1951
NationalityUnited States
InstitutionUniversity of Chicago
Northwestern University
FieldGame theory
Alma materHarvard University (AB, SM, PhD)
Doctoral
advisor
Kenneth Arrow
Doctoral
students
Scott E. Page
ContributionsMechanism design
AwardsNobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences (2007)
Information at IDEAS / RePEc

Biography

Roger Myerson was born in 1951 in Boston. He attended Harvard University, where he received his A.B., summa cum laude, and S.M. in applied mathematics in 1973. He completed his Ph.D. in applied mathematics from Harvard University in 1976.[5] His doctorate thesis was A Theory of Cooperative Games.[6]

From 1976 to 2001, Myerson was a professor of economics at Northwestern University's Kellogg School of Management, where he conducted much of his Nobel-winning research.[7] From 1978 to 1979, he was Visiting Researcher at Bielefeld University. He was Visiting Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago from 1985–86 and from 2000–01. He became Professor of Economics at Chicago in 2001. Currently, he is the inaugural David L. Pearson Distinguished Service Professor of Global Conflict Studies at the University of Chicago.[8]

Awards and Honors

Bank of Sweden Nobel Memorial Prize

Myerson was one of the three winners of the 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, the other two being Leonid Hurwicz of the University of Minnesota, and Eric Maskin of the Institute for Advanced Study. He was awarded the prize for his contributions to mechanism design theory.[9]

Myerson made a path-breaking contribution to mechanism design theory when he discovered a fundamental connection between the allocation to be implemented and the monetary transfers needed to induce informed agents to reveal their information truthfully. Mechanism design theory allows for people to distinguish situations in which markets work well from those in which they do not. The theory has helped economists identify efficient trading mechanisms, regulation schemes, and voting procedures. Today, the theory plays a central role in many areas of economics and parts of political science.[9]

Memberships and Honors

Myerson is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the National Academy of Sciences, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the American Philosophical Society.[6] He is a Fellow of the Game Theory Society [10] and serves as an advisory board member on the International Journal of Game Theory.[11] Myerson holds an Honorary Doctorate from the University of Basel in 2002 [12] and received the Jean-Jacques Laffont Prize in 2009.[13]

Personal life

In 1980, Myerson married Regina (née Weber) and the couple had two children, Daniel and Rebecca.[14]

Publications

Game theory and mechanism design
  • Myerson, Roger B. (August 1977). "Graphs and Cooperation in Games" (PDF). Mathematics of Operations Research. 2 (3): 225–229. doi:10.1287/moor.2.3.225.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • Myerson, Roger B. (October 1977). "Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility" (PDF). Econometrica. 45 (7): 1631–1637. doi:10.2307/1913955. JSTOR 1913955.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • Myerson, R. B. (June 1978). "Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept" (PDF). International Journal of Game Theory. 7 (2): 73–80. doi:10.1007/BF01753236.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • Myerson, Roger B. (January 1979). "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem". Econometrica. 47 (1): 61–73. doi:10.2307/1912346. JSTOR 1912346.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • Myerson, Roger B. (February 1981). "Optimal Auction Design". Mathematics of Operations Research. 6 (1): 58–73. doi:10.1287/moor.6.1.58.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • Myerson, Roger B. (November 1983). "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal" (PDF). Econometrica. 51 (6): 1767–1797. doi:10.2307/1912116. JSTOR 1912116.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • Myerson, Roger B. (1984). "Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information". Econometrica. 52 (2): 461–487. doi:10.2307/1911499. JSTOR 1911499.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • "Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive Compatibility," in Hurwicz, Leonid; Schmeidler, David; Sonnenschein, Hugo, eds. (2005). Social goals and social organization : essays in memory of Elisha Pazner. Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 229–259. ISBN 9780521023955.

He wrote a general textbook on game theory in 1991, and has also written on the history of game theory, including his review of the origins and significance of noncooperative game theory.[15] He also served on the editorial board of the International Journal of Game Theory for ten years.

Myerson has worked on economic analysis of political institutions and written several major survey papers:

  • Myerson, Roger B. (Winter 1995). "Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct, and Performance". Journal of Economic Perspectives. 9 (1): 77–89. doi:10.1257/jep.9.1.77. JSTOR 2138356.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • "Economic Analysis of Political Institutions: An Introduction," Advances in Economic Theory and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, volume 1, edited by D. Kreps and K. Wallis (Cambridge University Press, 1997), pages 46–65.
  • Myerson, Roger B. (April 1999). "Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral Systems". European Economic Review. 43 (4–6): 671–697. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.21.9735. doi:10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00089-0.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)

His recent work on democratization has raised critical questions about American policy in occupied Iraq:

Books
  • Game theory: analysis of conflict. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1991. ISBN 9780674728615.
  • Probability models for economic decisions. Belmont, CA: Thomson/Brooke/Cole. 2005. ISBN 9780534423810.

Concepts named after him

gollark: It's an infohazard, not a cognitohazard.
gollark: https://media.discordapp.net/attachments/348702212110680064/915353616360034304/IMG_0812.png
gollark: human_relative_status_intuitions_irl
gollark: Logically, your risk of imploding is 50% whenever I say that. Cool, right?
gollark: Anyway, did you know that you'll either implode or not implode in the next femtosecond?

See also

References

Awards
Preceded by
Edmund S. Phelps
Laureate of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics
2007
Served alongside: Leonid Hurwicz, Eric S. Maskin
Succeeded by
Paul Krugman
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