Two-level game theory

Two-level game theory is a political model of international conflict resolution between states derived from game theory and originally introduced in 1988 by Robert Putnam.[1]

Putnam had been involved in research around the G7 summits between 1976 and 1979. However at the fourth summit, held in Bonn in 1978, he observed a qualitative shift in how the negotiations worked.

The model views international negotiations between states as consisting of simultaneous negotiations at both the intranational level (i.e. domestic) and the international level (i.e. between governments).[2] Over domestic negotiations, the chief negotiator absorbs the concern of societal actors and builds coalitions with them; at the international level, the chief negotiator seeks an agreement that is amongst the possible "wins" in his state's "win-set". Win-sets are the possible outcomes that are likely to be accepted by the domestic interest groups who either must ratify the agreement or provide some other form of government backing. International agreements occur when there is an overlap between the win-sets of the states involved in the international negotiations.[3]

References

Footnotes

Putnam 1988; Williams & Covarrubias 2009, p. 275.
Méndez 2017, p. 8.
Méndez 2017, pp. 8–9.

Bibliography

Méndez, Álvaro (2017). Colombian Agency and the Making of US Foreign Policy: Intervention by Invitation. Abingdon, England: Routledge. ISBN 978-1-317-21573-8.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)

Putnam, Robert D. (1988). "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games". International Organization. 42 (3): 427–460. doi:10.1017/S0020818300027697. ISSN 1531-5088. JSTOR 2706785.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)

Williams, Matthew A.; Covarrubias, Jack (2009). "Rebalancing America's War on Terror: President Obama". In Lansford, Tom; Watson, Robert P.; Covarrubias, Jack (eds.). America's War on Terror (2nd ed.). Farnham, England: Ashgate. pp. 261–282. ISBN 978-0-7546-7787-1.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)

Topics in game theory
Definitions	Cooperative game Determinacy Escalation of commitment Extensive-form game First-player and second-player win Game complexity Graphical game Hierarchy of beliefs Information set Normal-form game Preference Sequential game Simultaneous game Simultaneous action selection Solved game Succinct game
Equilibrium concepts	Nash equilibrium Subgame perfection Mertens-stable equilibrium Bayesian Nash equilibrium Perfect Bayesian equilibrium Trembling hand Proper equilibrium Epsilon-equilibrium Correlated equilibrium Sequential equilibrium Quasi-perfect equilibrium Evolutionarily stable strategy Risk dominance Core Shapley value Pareto efficiency Gibbs equilibrium Quantal response equilibrium Self-confirming equilibrium Strong Nash equilibrium Markov perfect equilibrium
Strategies	Dominant strategies Pure strategy Mixed strategy Strategy-stealing argument Tit for tat Grim trigger Collusion Backward induction Forward induction Markov strategy
Classes of games	Symmetric game Perfect information Repeated game Signaling game Screening game Cheap talk Zero-sum game Mechanism design Bargaining problem Stochastic game Mean field game n-player game Large Poisson game Nontransitive game Global game Strictly determined game Potential game
Games	Go Chess Infinite chess Checkers Tic-tac-toe Prisoner's dilemma Gift-exchange game Optional prisoner's dilemma Traveler's dilemma Coordination game Chicken Centipede game Volunteer's dilemma Dollar auction Battle of the sexes Stag hunt Matching pennies Ultimatum game Rock paper scissors Pirate game Dictator game Public goods game Blotto game War of attrition El Farol Bar problem Fair division Fair cake-cutting Cournot game Deadlock Diner's dilemma Guess 2/3 of the average Kuhn poker Nash bargaining game Induction puzzles Trust game Princess and Monster game Rendezvous problem
Theorems	Arrow's impossibility theorem Aumann's agreement theorem Folk theorem Minimax theorem Nash's theorem Purification theorem Revelation principle Zermelo's theorem
Key figures	Albert W. Tucker Amos Tversky Antoine Augustin Cournot Ariel Rubinstein Claude Shannon Daniel Kahneman David K. Levine David M. Kreps Donald B. Gillies Drew Fudenberg Eric Maskin Harold W. Kuhn Herbert Simon Hervé Moulin Jean Tirole Jean-François Mertens Jennifer Tour Chayes John Harsanyi John Maynard Smith John Nash John von Neumann Kenneth Arrow Kenneth Binmore Leonid Hurwicz Lloyd Shapley Melvin Dresher Merrill M. Flood Olga Bondareva Oskar Morgenstern Paul Milgrom Peyton Young Reinhard Selten Robert Axelrod Robert Aumann Robert B. Wilson Roger Myerson Samuel Bowles Suzanne Scotchmer Thomas Schelling William Vickrey
See also	All-pay auction Alpha–beta pruning Bertrand paradox Bounded rationality Combinatorial game theory Confrontation analysis Coopetition Evolutionary game theory First-move advantage in chess Game mechanics Glossary of game theory List of game theorists List of games in game theory No-win situation Solving chess Topological game Tragedy of the commons Tyranny of small decisions

Two-level game theory

References

Footnotes

Bibliography

Further reading