Law enforcement in Syria

Law enforcement in Syria is carried out by police forces for general policing duties; internal security duties are carried out by several intelligence agencies. The Political Security Directorate is one of these agencies and is under the guidance of the Ministry of Interior. The Directorate operates independently and generally outside the control of the legal system to repress internal dissent and monitor individual citizens.[1] Syria has been an INTERPOL member since 1953.[2][3] Since the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, much of Syria has been outside the control of the Syrian government. Currently, the Asayish are responsible for policing in Rojava, the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Police in areas under the Turkish occupation of northern Syria, and various Syrian opposition groups around Idlib[4][5]

Syrian riot police in central Damascus.
Police emblem of the Damascus Governorate
A traffic policeman in Damascus

The Ministry of Interior controls the Internal Security Forces. There are also other specialized organizations, such as the special metropolitan police in Damascus (overseen by the Director General of the Public Security and Police), the Gendarmerie for control in rural areas and the Desert Guard for border control (especially the Syria-Iraq border).[6] General Nasser Deeb is the head of the Criminal Security Directorate.[7]

The Internal Security Forces Day is on 29 May, the anniversary of French forces shelling the Parliament building in Damascus in 1945.[8]

History
General Hrant Maloyan. He was essential in the establishment of the Syrian law enforcement system.

Police history in Syria dates back to the French Mandate, when General Pierre Rondot[9] established a Gendarmerie in order to maintain law and order in rural areas; led by General Wahid Bey, it was poorly armed, organized, disciplined and equipped and did not prove very effective against rebel forces, despite several attempts to ameliorate at least discipline and morale.[10]

From 1940s to 1950s: Independence and development

During the second half of 1944, France transferred most of the directorates of the Common Interests to the national governments, except the Levantine Special Forces and the police. To both the Lebanese and the Syrians, and to the Syrians in particular, the transfer of the army and police was of utmost importance;[11] after several months of tense confrontation with the Syrian and Lebanese establishment, by July 1945 France had agreed to transfer control of the Levantine Special Forces.[11] As with the Levantine Special Forces, French officers held the top posts in the security establishment, but as Syrian independence approached, the ranks below major were gradually filled by Syrian officers. By the end of 1945, the gendarmerie numbered some 3,500.[12]

At the dawn of the independent era of the Syrian Republic, of around 15,000 troops under French control, some 5,000 would be converted into the Syrian Army of one brigade with auxiliary services; equal number would be taken into the Gendarmerie; half of remaining third would be needed for police and frontier customs control; remainder would be pensioned off. Several British officers were detailed as “training team” to assist the Syrian Gendarmerie.[13]

Since independence, Syria's police and internal security apparatus have undergone repeated reorganization and personnel changes, reflecting the security demands of each succeeding regime.[1] In 1945, Armenian general Hrant Maloyan was appointed by president Shukri al-Quwatli as the General Command of the Internal Security Forces in Syria and served this position until 1949. Maloyan would eventually be known to modernize the Syrian police ranks and improve discipline; members of the Gendarmerie doubled to 9,751 members by the time his post finished in 1949.[14] On the wake of 1946, the Syrian Gendarmerie was considered the only reliable and effective support of the Government; it was purged and, once equipped by the United Kingdom with modern weaponry, it was successfully deployed to quell a revolt[14] of Alawi religious leader Salman al-Murshid.[10] In late 1940s, the national police force, grown out of the Gendarmerie, was deemed understaffed and poorly disciplined, with several cases of corruption among its ranks.[15] Syrian President Shukri al-Quwatli favoured the Gendarmerie over the French-inherited Army, fearing the military might against his own patronage network.[10]

While continuing discipline-improving efforts, in 1949 President Husni al-Za'im seized power and reformed the security apparatus, transferring the Gendarmerie from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Defence;[10] the director-general of police was Adib Shishakli, who in turn took the power in 1953.[16] The reformed security apparatus cooperated with United States officials against drug trafficking in mid-1950s.[17] As Syrian ruler, Shishakli retrained, reequipped, and expanded Syrian armed forces, police, and security services; the Director General of Police and Public Security was at the time Ibrahim al-Husseini.[18]

Until early 1960s, the Syrian government sought the support also from former German officers for both the Army and the police forces: President of Syria Husni al-Za'im recruited military officers and police specialists.[19] According to CIA records, two Nazi officials, Alois Brunner and Franz Rademacher, as soon as 1957 were granted asylum in Syria and advised Syrian police until the early next decade.[19]

As of late 1950s, Syrian non-military internal security forces totalled about 5,000 personnel, including a National Gendarmérie of 2,800, a Desert Patrol of 400 and 1,800 uniformed police,[20] under the authority of the Ministry of Interior.[21] Both the gendarmérie and police were deployed in strategically important posts throughout the country.[20] One desert patrol company was located in Central Syria and the other in Eastern Syria. The standard of training was deemed as being very low. In addition to the uniformed police, the police services included the Sûreté, a plain-clothes service of about 300 men.[20] At the time, the United States Department of State deemed the non-military security forces to be unable to restrict the Communist action;[20] nevertheless, due to the strength of political forces deemed as leftist (Communist and Ba'ath parties), the U.S. Department of State adopted a policy of avoiding to take actions aimed strengthen Syrian internal security forces.[22]

1960s: United Arab Republic and Ba'ath coups

Under the United Arab Republic, Syrian Minister of Interior Colonel Abdel Hamid al-Sarraj regained control over Syrian gendarmerie and the desert patrol; the Gendarmerie, the Desert Patrol and the Department of General Security (under military control) and the police (under the Ministry of Interior) were merged in the overall organization, called Police and Security, on 13 March 1958;[23] the organization was placed under al-Sarraj's Ministry of Interior.[23] Syrian police higher post were taken over by Egyptians[24] even if three of the four intelligence networks operating in Syria were under Syrian direction; the other was attached to the President’s Office in Cairo.[25] In each Governorate, a Major General of Police was appointed to the influential position of Director of Security.[26]

Back to the regained independence in 1961, Adnan Quwatli, a professor of Law linked to business community,[27] was appointed Interior Minister;[28] on 15 December 1961 Colonel Muhammad Hisham al-Samman was appointed Commander of Internal Security Forces, assisted by a Committee under his presidency and including the Directors-General of Police and Public Security and six provincial superintendents.[29] The Kuzbari government pledeged to establish political liberties and to disestablish emergency laws;[27] despite this, the civil police forces are believed to have been used extensively to combat internal security threats to the government, including pro-Nasserites[30] Baathists and other secular socialists (opposed to the business-Islamist alliance),[27] especially in the universities, which were subjected to several forms of control;[27] also trade unions were harshly confronted by the police in 1962.[27]

With the 1963 Syrian coup d'état, Amin al-Hafiz was appointed Ministry of Interior under Salah al-Bitar and Naji Jamil became the head of Military Police (until 1966),[14] and in 1964 large-scale riots erupted in Hama, and in the late 1960s and early 1970s disturbances erupted over the secular constitution.[31] With the Legislative Decree No. 67, issued on 24 March 1965, the police received the title of Internal Security Forces; according to the law the ISF were part of the armed forces, linked to the Minister of Interior, and specialized business and the tasks entrusted to them according to the regulations in force. The law granted the same status of the Syrian Arab Army and his men to the Internal Security Forces.[32]

In 1966, as a result of the Syrian Regional Ba’ath Party’s coup, Abd al-Karim al-Jundi assumed the leadership of the security apparatuses as head of the National Security Bureau of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party – Syria Region.[33]

During the subsequent decades, however, police forces assumed a more conventional civil police role; this change in role coincided with increased professionalization and the parallel development of an effective and pervasive internal security apparatus. Nevertheless, the police continued to receive training in such functions as crowd and riot control.[1]

From 1970s to 1980s: Islamist insurgency

During the relative political stability of the 1970s and 1980s, police and security services were credited with having grown and become professional; however, they remained highly secretive, and in 1987 only the bare outlines of their institutional makeup were known.[1][34]

With the success of Hafez al-Assad'a Corrective Movement in November 1970, a partial reform of the law enforcement was carried out, with some crimes dealt with by the police instead of the Army;[35] with the 1970s state building process, the local security chiefs gained more prominence, with the whole security apparatus being seen as the Regime «bedrock».[35]

According to Alasdair Drysdale, the Hafiz al-Asad's rule was characterized by a marked increase of the Alawite presence in key posts in the officer corps, in the internal security forces and in the Ba'ath Party,[31] possibly also due to the Islamist unrest. During the 1980s, the internal security apparatus was under the command of Rifaat al-Assad, brother of President Hafez al-Assad.[36] During the unrest caused by the Muslim Brotherhood in 1976, the Internal Security Forces were heavily employed in the northern-central region, in Aleppo, Hama and Homs.[37] During 1970s, Ali Haydar's Special Forces formed a key part of the Syrian government's security apparatus; they participated to the quelling of the Islamist uprising in Jisr al-Shughur in March 1980[38][35] and in Hama in February 1982.[39]

According to John Andrade, in the mid-1980s the Public Security Police, a national police force, was responsible for routine police duties, although it was confronted by the insurgents in the 1982 Islamist uprising in Syria and held isolated skirmishes in Aleppo and in Latakia. Damascus had a metropolitan police force, which, like theprovincialforces, was subordinated to the national command. The Police was subdivided into four main services: Administration, Criminal Investigations, Public Order and Traffic departments which also dealt with internal security matters.[1][39][40]:198[41] The police system incorporated the 8,000-man Gendarmerie, which had originally been organized by the French Mandate authorities to police rural areas, and the 1800-man Desert Guard in charge for desert borders.[40]:198

As of late 1980s, the internal security forces were given a high status: typically, provincial police chiefs were member of the relevant Ba'ath Party provincial command.[42]

From 1990s to 2000s: Confrontation with Kurds and Islamists and reform of the security sector

Starting from the 1990s, the Syrian security sector underwent a series of reform, which were part, from mid-2000s, of a broader-range reform process. As of 2016, some 1993 estimates put the Gendarmerie as still being in force within the Internal Security Forces and being 8,000-men strong.[43] In 1996 the Government of Syria reformed police and established the Anti-Narcotics Division.[44] In 2002, Syria elevated the Anti-Narcotics unit from a branch to a separate Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior.[45] The Economic Security Courts, established under the 1970 emergency laws and tasked with dealing with economic crimes, were disestablished in February 2004.[46] In late 2000s, training programmes focusing on human rights were launched.[47]

According to American professor Joshua Landis, the Internal Security Forces in mid-2000s altered their own ethnic/religious composition, under the guidance of then-Minister of Interior Ghazi Kanaan. This alteration was reportedly carried out in order to make the national police (subject to the law) reliable to step in dealing with national security issues, thus diminishing the extra-law Syrian intelligence community's role, as part of broader reforms of the same years.[48] The decision reportedly caused criticism by Sunni Arab officials.[48] Nevertheless, the police devoted to general duties was poorly equipped: according to the United Kingdom Home Office, as of 2009 there were few police checkpoints on main roads or in populated areas.[49]

In mid-2000s Syrian police was involved in operations against Islamist militants,[50][51] across the decade. Also the Military Police was involved in confrontations against Islamist militants detained in Syrian prisons.[41] During the same period the Syrian police confronted also against Kurds and dealt with Kurdish demonstrations;[52] clashes and shoot-outs were a not so uncommon occurrence throughout the decade.[53][54]

In mid-2000s, the main agency was still known to the 2006 edition of the World Encyclopedia of Police Forces and Correctional Systems as the Public Security Police, operating under the Ministry of the Interior.[55]:874 Alongside the Public Security Police, whose headquarters maintained the subdivision into the four main branches, two paramilitary forces operated: the Gendarmerie and the Desert Guard.[55]:875 With regard to the ancillary law enforcement and security organizations, in 2003 Anthony Cordesman put the Gendarmes number at 8,000.[56] On the other hand, according to Jane‘s Assessment, cited by 2012 U.K. Country of Origin Information report, as of 2006 the number of border guards deployed was increased to about 10,000.[57]

On the international front, late 2000s were marked by an intensive cooperation with INTERPOL on terrorism issues.[58]

2011 onwards: Syrian Civil War

At the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, the Syrian security apparatus appeared, to Middle East scholar Professor Joshua Landis, a cohesive group, without significant dissertion problems;[59] Syrian police was in charge of quelling demonstrations and they exercised violence against demonstrators; some sources claim that often the police violence was a reaction against violent opponents.[60] According to government lists presented to and published by the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria, in 2011 the death toll for Syrian police forces was 478.[60] According to U.S. government-funded Radio Farda, the Iranian police forces, along with Qods Force units, supported the suppression of early protests in 2011.[61] During the following phases of the Civil War, also regular police units were deployed on the front lines.[62]

According to Fars News Agency, in 2016 Iranian police commander, Brigadier General Hossein Ashtari, said that Iran was ready to offer support in police training.[63]

Following the conquest of Aleppo by the Syrian Government, the Russian news agency Interfax reported that a Russian Military Police battalion arrived in Aleppo in order to support the law enforcement and to secure the peace commission,[64] as well as, according to the pro-Russian Sputnik news agency, to train local personnel.[65]

As consequence of the establishment of the De-escalation zones, some Russian sources reported that the Russian Federation deployed four Military Police battalions[66] in order to garrison such areas.[67] The MP units form the core of specific units with specific non-combat control tasks, such as, according to Gulf News, the manning of checkpoints and observation posts.[68]

In 2018, with the recovery of several areas by the Government, the Internal Security Forces were gradually redeployed in re-gained regions: Hama and Homs countryside, Damascus region. In particular, after the Syrian Government assumed complete control of the Damascus region with the capture of the Yarmouk Camp in May 2018, the Internal Security Forces deployed in al-Hajar al-Aswad district and Yarmouk Camp and held a parade there alongside the Army.[69][70]

Following the deepening of the civil war, police forces have been established also by insurgent factions, as well as by Rojava Kurdish-held region[4] and, on 24 January 2017, a Syrian security force was established by Turkey in Turkey-controlled Syrian border town Jarablus; a video reportedly showing ranks and files of armed men chanting Islamist and pro-Turkey slogans was released on YouTube.[5]

Police system
A Syrian police car bonnet, showing the official emblem.

According to the official website of the Ministry of Interior, its task are limited to the protection and enforcement of security.[71] Alongside with other Directorates, the Ministry of Interior controls the Internal Security Forces, through the Criminal Security Directorate, which are organised into at four separate divisions of police forces under a Director General: Administrative Police, Traffic Police (whose official Day is on 4 May), Criminal Investigations, and Riot police, as well as a fanfare and the Khan al-Asal Police Academy.[72] The Internal Security Forces are part of the Ministry of Interior but makes uses of military ranks.[73] Also specialist organizations exist.

Personnel

As for total manpower of the Syrian police, in 2011 reportedly were about 100,000 police plus reserves,[74] while 2016 estimates put the total force of 28,000 personnel,[75] and 8,000 to 9,000 injured soldiers.[76] Syrian women are allowed to serve (although not in frontline units)[77] and to reach senior positions.[76]

Operating methods

The police reportedly undergo military-type[78] and counter-terrorism[77] training. Community policing is also a large element within the country of Syria. Citizens in Syria began using cyber community policing tactics via social media as a way to address the conflict happening around them. Doing so has given them some power to influence change in their environment. Their efforts demonstrate that global cyber community policing programs have the ability to connect communities and create social media networks that can effectively and proactively address, and hopefully prevent, threats to its citizens.[79]

Training

The police reportedly undergo military-type[78] and counter-terrorism[77] training, having a school in al-Hasakah.[80]

Education for all police personnel is provided at three institutes: two central Police Training Schools in Damascus and Aleppo and the Officers College in Homs, where junior officers are sent for six-month courses in specialized areas of expertise.[55]:875

Criminal Security Directorate

Within the Criminal Security Directorate there are five Divisions and branches:

  • The Administrative Police is also known as Neighbourhood Police: they are responsible for general security and deal with non-emergency situations.[81]
  • The Emergency Division deals with emergency situations, operating roving patrols. The emergency number is 112.[81]
  • Criminal Security Department;
  • Riot Division;[82]
  • Electronic Criminal Branch, in charge of combating computer- and web-based crime. According to pro-government newspaper Al-Watan, the Electronic Criminal Branch has a dedicated criminal laboratory.[83]

At the central level, the Directorate also has an its own Commission for combating money laundering in cooperation with the Commission of the same name at the Central Bank of Syria.[84][85]

Since 8 July 2019, the head of the Criminal Security Directorate is General Nasser Deeb, considered closely linked with Russia.[7]

Criminal Security Department

The Criminal Security Department is the subdivision of the Criminal Security Directorate which is in charge for general investigative police duties.[86] Police records in Syria are maintained by the Ministry of Interior, Criminal Security Department and separate records are maintained by each jurisdiction: some jurisdictions are computerized, but there is no central computerized database.[87]

As of 2016, the director of the criminal security branch is General Natham al-Housh.[88]

Within the Criminal Security there is a subdivision known as the “Department of Protection of Public Moralities", tasked with investigating suspect homosexuals and their activities.[86]

Riot police

The Riot police is part of the Criminal Security Directorate.[82] The riot police core missions are to provide security, crowd control and riot control for demonstrations. In Damascus, the riot police is also used in order to protect diplomatic missions against protestors.[89][90][91][92]

During the Syrian civil war, the riot police has been used in order to break early protests; according to pro-opposition opinionists, it even opened fire on demonstrators.[93]

Syrian riot police is issued typical riot equipment, such as riot helmets,[94] shields[95] and rubber batons.[96][97] Other heavier equipment includes armoured personnel carriers, water cannons[98] and tear gas.[99] According to pro-U.S. sources, anti-riot equipment was also issued by the Iranian police.[61] The riot police is also reportedly equipped with armoured vehicles.[100]

Policemen assigned to security and riot control duty wear the military olive green with garrison caps,[95][78] but also camouflage.[101]

Territorial organization

At territorial level, the Syrian police is organized into Police Provincial Commands, each led by a Major General, who is assisted by a Brigadier General acting as a deputy.[102][103] Districts are headed by Directors ranking Brigadier General.[104]

As of May 2018, the Commander of Damascus region is Major General Issam Shehadeh al-Hallaj.[70]

Anti-Narcotics Directorate

The Anti-Narcotics Directorate, independent from the Criminal Security Directorate since 1996,[44] has responsibility for anti-drug law enforcement and intelligence gathering.[105] The anti-narcotics establishment was separated from the police in 2002 and made an independent Directorate within the Ministry of Interior.[45] Before the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, the Government also operated regional counternarcotics offices in Aleppo province and in Homs province, with plans to open offices in the remaining provinces.[106]

The work of the Anti-Narcotics Directorate is specialised in guiding and coordinating efforts aimed at fighting the illicit traffic, plantation and use of drugs, plans the fight against drugs in coordination with other authorities, executes international anti-drugs operations, and collects information on drug crimes.[84]

As of 2006, the Anti-Narcotics Directorate was subdivided into:[84]

  • Internal anti-drug division;
  • International anti-drug division;
  • Information division;
  • Rehabilitation and training division.

Specialist organizations

Aside of the general police, there are also other specialized organizations, such as the special metropolitan police in Damascus and the country's other major cities[57] (overseen by the Director General of the Public Security and Police), the Gendarmerie for control in rural areas and the Desert Guard for border control (especially the Syrian-Iraqi border), up to 10,000-men strong.[107] These latter two organizations have a military character.

For ceremonial duties, the Internal Security Forces also have a cavalry battalion based in Damascus.[108]

Other elements of the internal security, albeit separated by the Internal Security Forces and by the Ministry of the Interior, are the Military Police, the Shabbiha and the People‘s Army.[57] Loyalist and reconciled[109] militias also provide police and security services in areas controlled by the Government of Syria.[110]

Syrian Special Mission Forces
Main article: Syrian Special Mission Forces

During the Syrian Civil War, the Ministry of Interior established a quick reaction unit, the Syrian Special Mission Forces.[111] According to Al-Masdar News, the Special Mission Forces have been set up by Russian advisers[112] and are mainly, although not exclusively, intended for urban security actions,[112][113] as well as carrying out force protection and security operations against terrorist activities.[114]

Police equipment

Syrian police equipment is an issue. According to The Telegraph, which cites WikiLeaks, the Syrian police was supplied with advanced radio communications equipment, including 500 hand-held VS3000 radios, by Finmeccanica as late as 2011.[115]

According to pro-opposition website Zaman al-Wasl, in 2014 the Ministry of Interior received two Russian MI-171SH helicopters.[116] Regular police units appear to be equipped with the AKM assault rifle and the Makarov PM and Browning Hi-Power pistols.

Elite police units are equipped with AK-103 and AK-104 assault rifles.[117]

Police uniforms

Police uniforms vary according to the police branch which it is considered. Generally speaking, policemen assigned to security tasks wear the military olive green with garrison caps,[95][78] but also camouflage.[101]

Since 2009, the Government has decided to change traffic policemen’s uniforms from military olive green to grey pants, a white shirt with yellow shoulder patches and black belt and shoes.[118] As of 2011, Anti-terrorism police wore dark blue uniforms.[119]

Ceremonial uniforms consist in jackboots, white peaked cap and white tunic, with dark trousers with a red trim for infantry and motorcycle units, and white cavalry pants for mounted troopers.[108]

Issues

According to several sources, police impunity and corruption are serious problems.[55]:875[1] In 2008, President Bashar al-Assad issued a law that mandates that only the General Command of the Army and Armed Forces may issue an arrest warrant in the case of a crime committed by a military officer, member of the internal security forces, or customs police officer in the pursuit of his normal duties, and that such cases must be tried in military courts.[1] Arbitrary and false arrests are also problems, and detainees had no legal redress. According to the accusations, the authorities use the Emergency Law to detain persons critical of the government and charge them with a wide range of political crimes, including treason. Incommunicado detention was a severe problem. Many persons who disappeared were believed to be either in long-term detention without charge or possibly to have died while detained. Many detainees brought to trial were held incommunicado for years, and their trials were often marked by irregularities and lack of due process. A shortage of available courts and lack of legal provisions for a speedy trial or plea bargaining led to lengthy pretrial detentions.[1]

According to a 2005 Freedom House report, women are discouraged from presenting their claims in police stations, which are largely staffed by male police officers, for fear of experiencing discomfort or sexual harassment. According to the report, Syrian police officials are not sympathetic to women victims of violence.[120]

A human rights police training program funded by the Swiss and Norwegian governments continued throughout 2008. The Geneva Institute for Human Rights, with support from the Ministand the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, began a third training course in October.[47]

Torture accusations

The law prohibits such practices as torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, and the penal code provides punishment of a maximum imprisonment of three years for abusers. Under article 28 of the constitution, "no one may be tortured physically or mentally or treated in a humiliating manner." Nevertheless, security forces reportedly continued to use torture frequently. Local human rights organizations continued to cite numerous credible cases of security forces allegedly abusing and torturing prisoners and detainees and claimed that many instances of abuse went unreported. Individuals who suffered torture or beatings while detained refused to allow their names or details of their cases to be reported for fear of government reprisal.[1]

Former prisoners, detainees, and reputable local human rights groups report that methods of torture and abuse included electrical shocks; pulling out fingernails; burning genitalia; forcing objects into the rectum; beatings while the victim is suspended from the ceiling and on the soles of the feet; alternately dousing victims with freezing water and beating them in extremely cold rooms; hyper-extending the spine; bending the body into the frame of a wheel and whipping exposed body parts; using a backward-bending chair to asphyxiate the victim or fracture the spine; and stripping prisoners naked for public view.[1]

In previous years Amnesty International documented 38 types of torture and mistreatment used against detainees in the country. AI reported that torture was most likely to occur while detainees were held at one of the many detention centres operated by the various security services in the country, particularly while authorities attempted to extract a confession or information. Courts systematically used "confessions" extracted under duress as evidence, and defendants' claims of torture were almost never investigated.[1]

Criminal procedure

Upon arrest, the individual is brought to a police station for processing and detained until a trial date is set. At the initial court hearing, which can be months or years after the arrest, the accused may retain an attorney at personal expense or be assigned a court-appointed attorney, although lawyers are not ensured access to their clients before trial. The individual is then tried in court, where a judge renders a verdict. Although the prison code provides for prompt access to family members, human rights organizations and families reported inconsistent application of the code, with some families waiting as long as a year to see relatives. Civil and criminal defendants had the right to bail hearings and possible release from detention on their own recognizance.[1]

Military courts

Military courts have authority over cases involving soldiers or members of other military or police branches. If the charge against a soldier or member of the military or police branch is a misdemeanour, the sentence against the defendant is final. If the charge is a felony, the defendant has the right to appeal to the Military Chamber at the Court of Cassation. Military courts also have authority to try civilians in cases based on military law. Civilians have the right to appeal all sentences in military court. A military prosecutor decides the venue for a civilian defendant.[47]

ISIL police

Between the end of 2012 and 2017, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) maintained a local police force in parts of the Raqqa and Aleppo governorates that it controlled.[121] According to Carl Anthony Wege, ISIL seemed to keep separate local police from religious police; the religious police has a mission of promoting virtue and preventing vice,[122] called Hisbah[123] which included a female unit.{ The Hisbah forces were organized at battalion-level under their own Emir.[123]

Aside of Hisbah, al-Khansaa and Umm Rayhan brigades were internal security units maintaining their own morality police forces.[123]

Ordinary police

The main official function of the ordinary police forces was to serve as the executive body for the court, but there were also road police services. Additionally, the police forces were tasked with maintaining internal security through the deployment of regular patrols inside towns. According to a well-known ISIL account, ISIL provided local police patrols with dedicated vehicles as well as branded khaki uniforms.[124][125]

Despite ISIL claims that its officers “do not rule on any case, but rather transfer cases to the court,” the reality is that extrajudicial detainment and torture are commonplace in ISIL-held territory. According to a report released by Amnesty International in December 2013, ISIL maintained at least seven large detention facilities throughout Raqqa and Aleppo provinces.[124]

Inside its detention centers ISIL held common criminals who have been sentenced by its judicial branch, but it also detains political opponents, activists, and even children as young as eight years old. On 28 April 2014, an activist movement in Raqqa city publicized a protest by women demanding to know the fate of their male family members, who had been detained by ISIL for some time.[124]

SDF
Members of the Raqqa internal security forces in Ayn Issa.

The Asayîş or Asayish (Arabic: الأسايش‎, Kurdish for security[126]) is the official security organisation of the autonomous administration in Rojava (Syrian Kurdistan). It was formed during the Syrian Civil War to police areas controlled by the Kurdish Supreme Committee.

On 17 May 2017, the Raqqa Internal Security Forces was established, with the support of the Self Defence Forces.[127] The training has been provided by the international coalition against ISIS, with the first training course of 50 recruits based in Ayn Issa. The United States reportedly provided training to Raqqa security forces.[128] The Manbij Internal Security Forces also operate as a police force.

The long-term goal for the group is to train 3,000 recruits;[129] the initial batch is intended to develop in a training cadre in order to continue training Raqqa internal security forces recruits.[130] According to Kurdistan 24, members of the Raqqa Internal Security Forces are mainly Arabs.[127]

Northern Syria Internal Security Forces is an umbrella terms for internal security forces (minus Sutoro and the police branch of Bethnahrain Women's Protection Forces)

Free Syrian Police

The Syrian National Coalition established in 2013[131] a Free Syrian Police in Aleppo.[132] The FSP was said to be underequipped and underarmed; according to British foreign secretary Philip Hammond, the United Kingdom from 2014[133] to 2017[134] worked with international donors to provide the Free Syrian Police training, technical assistance, maintenance funds, and basic equipment.[133][135] Most assistance was provided through the private contractor Adam Smith International.[136] The UK-backed Free Syrian Police force reportedly operate unarmed.[133][134][137]

According to pro-opposition sources, the label of "Free Syrian Police" does not imply an unified security organization;[138] moreover, there is not a united judicial entity.[138]

The rebel council directing police affairs which pro-opposition sources report is planned to be formed[138] includes the chief for Aleppo police, a director of officers affairs, a director of inspections, regulation and administrative affairs, a director of immigration and crossings, a director of public relations and media and a representative for Idlib Governorate.[138]

As of 2016, the Opposition factions have reportedly diminished the role of the Free Syrian Police in areas under their control; the Police has reportedly been limited to pursuing crimes and offences, directing traffic and other matters, excluding the Police from the security management.[138]

According to Syrian Opposition website Zaman al-Wasl, Brigadier Adeeb al-Shalaf, chief of police in rebel-held areas of the Aleppo Governorate, announced in July 2017 the start of recruitment of women, in order to deal with the female inspection activities.[139]

An investigation by the BBC program Panorama in 2017 found the Free Syrian Police to be involved in recurring human rights abuses, including executions by stoning, and collaboration with extremists such as the Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement.[140] After a suspension, British and other government funding resumed in early 2018.[141]. The resumption of funding without an independent investigation was decried by Kate Osamor, shadow secretary for international development, and other aid experts.[142]

In June 2018 the British government decided, due to the changing military situation, to responsibly withdraw from funding some programmes in the area that the police operated in, such as education, livelihood support and policing. British government funding support for the Free Syrian Police ended in October 2018.[143]

On 10 January 2019, following the Idlib inter-rebel conflict, the Free Idlib Police dissolved itself and handed over assets to local councils.[144][145] With HTS taking over all of greater Idlib, the Free Syrian Police ceased to operate, with the only FSA area being with the SNA, which is policed by the Turkish created "Free Police". According to Abdullah Al-Jabassini for the European University Institute's Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, at least several members of the former Free Syrian Police joined the regular police.[146]

Turkey-backed "Free Police"

A Syrian security force was established by Turkey in Turkey-controlled Syrian border town Jarablus on 24 January 2017, in order to take control of the ordinary security of Euphrates Shield areas;[147] a video reportedly showing ranks and files of armed men chanting Islamist and pro-Turkey slogans was released on YouTube.[5] According to Reuters, the force is referred to as the "Free Police", in reference to the Free Syrian Army (FSA) alliance, and in January 2017 consisted of 450 recruits, many of whose are former Syrian rebel fighters, who received five weeks of training in Turkey;[148] reportedly, the force is intended to grow up to 8,000 men.[149][150][151]

As of 2017, the Turkey-backed "Free Police" is active in Azaz, Jarablus and al-Bab.[147] According to the Syrian Opposition website Zaman Zaman al-Wasl, as of May 2017 the Turkey-backed "Free Police" in the border town of Azaz consisted of 1,600 officers.[152] According to Zaman al-Wasl, the new police force replaced previous rebel police forces, with improvement in numbers and logistics.[152] The Turkey-backed police reportedly lack highly ranked officers, as well as ranking criteria.[152]

The Turkey-based security force consists of regular police and special forces; the commander is General Abd al-Razaq Aslan,[148] a defector from the Syrian army.[150]

Members of the Turkey-backed security force reportedly wear Turkish police uniforms decorated with the word "Polis" (Turkish for "Police")[5] and Special Forces wear distinctive light blue berets, also worn by Turkish Gendarmerie. Some wore a Turkish flag patch on their uniforms at the inauguration ceremony on 24 January 2017.[148] As of 25 October 2017, 5,600 Syrian police were trained by Turkey in Euphrates Shield area:[153] Azaz, al-Bab and Jarabulus districts;[154] in May 2018 they also assumed control of the Afrin area.[154]

According to Danielle Fife for the Center for Security Policy, the Turkey-backed "Free Police" is part of the Turkish efforts to counter the Kurdish expansionism, along with the Turkish Free Syrian Army.[149]

Following the Idlib inter-rebel conflict in January 2019, the Free Police became the only remaining FSA police force (as the Free Syrian Police ceased to operate).

gollark: To Suggestions/Requests! Again!
gollark: Hmm... good idea.
gollark: 🌵
gollark: I think they should limit it to one per person though.
gollark: Well, obviously crazy madness will occasionally happen with enough prize handouts.

See also

References
  1. "Syria Intelligence & Security Agencies". Global Security.Org. Retrieved 10 September 2015.
  2. "Syria". Interpol. Retrieved 10 September 2015.
  3. http://inpublicsafety.com/2017/05/how-syrians-are-using-cyber-community-policing-to-fight-terrorism/
  4. Serwer, Daniel; Youhana, Rose; Preston, Katherine (30 September 2016). "Analysis: What Syrians Can Expect in a Post-War Landscape". News Deeply. Retrieved 15 January 2017.
  5. Zaman, Amberin (25 January 2017). "Syria's new national security force pledges loyalty to Turkey". Al Monitor. Retrieved 26 January 2017.
  6. Burgat, François (28 April 2014). "Testimony of General Ahmed Tlass on the Syrian Regime and the Repression". NORIA. Retrieved 20 September 2015.
  7. "Syria's security reshuffle highlights Russia's consolidation of power". amec.org.za. Afro-Middle East Centre. 14 August 2019. Retrieved 16 February 2020.
  8. "29th May, Syrian Internal Security Forces Day". Syrian Arab News Agecy. Syrian Arab News Agecy. 29 May 2015. Retrieved 25 December 2016.
  9. Follain, John (2011). Jackal : the complete story of the legendary terrorist, Carlos the Jackal. New York: Arcade Pub. ISBN 9781611450262. Retrieved 30 August 2017.
  10. Deep, Daniel (2012). Occupying Syria Under the French Mandate: Insurgency, Space and State Formation. Cambridge University Press. pp. 202–205. ISBN 978-1-107-00006-3.
  11. Chaitani, Youssef (2007). POST-COLONIAL SYRIA AND LEBANON THE DECLINE OF ARAB NATIONALISM AND THE TRIUMPH OF THE STATE. London: I.B.Tauris & Co. pp. 24, 32. ISBN 978-1-84511-294-3.
  12. "Syrian Military". syriagovernment.com. Retrieved 12 September 2015.
  13. "No. 638 The Minister in Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State ad interim". Office of the Historian. Retrieved 14 September 2015.
  14. Moubayed, Sami (2005). Steel & silk: men and women who shaped Syria 1900–2000. Seattle, Wash: Cune. pp. 60, 71–72, 232. ISBN 1-885942-40-0.
  15. Lawson, Fred Haley (1996). Why Syria Goes to War: Thirty Years of Confrontation. Ithaca, USA: Cornell University Press. p. 163. ISBN 9781501731860.
  16. Pipes, Daniel (1990). Greater Syria. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 104. ISBN 0195060210.
  17. Valentine, Douglas (2004). The Strength of the Wolf: The Secret History of America's War on Drugs. Verso. p. 122. ISBN 9781859845684. Retrieved 14 September 2017.
  18. Martin, Kevin W. (2017). "The Beginnings of Authoritarian Culture in the Arab World". Institute for Advanced Study. Retrieved 13 February 2020.
  19. Breitman, Richard; Goda, Norman; Naftali, Timothy; Wolfe, Robert (2005). U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 155, 456. ISBN 9780521617949. Retrieved 10 January 2017.
  20. "299. Paper Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board Working Group on National Security Council Action 1290–d". Office of the Historian. Department of State. 7 July 1955. pp. 532–534. Retrieved 25 December 2016.
  21. Moubayed, Sami M. (2000). Damascus Between Democracy and Dictatorship. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America. p. 149. ISBN 9780761817444. Retrieved 26 December 2016.
  22. "178. Operations Coordinating Board Report". Office of the Historian. U.S. Department of State. 22 December 1956. Retrieved 29 December 2016.
  23. Podeh, Elie (1999). The Decline of Arab Unity: The Rise and Fall of the United Arab Republic. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press. p. 54. ISBN 1902210204. Retrieved 27 January 2017.
  24. Etzioni, Amitai (2001). Political Unification Revisited: On Building Supranational Communities. London: Lexington Books. p. 110. ISBN 0-7391-0273-7.
  25. "THE SEPARATIST PERIOD IN SYRIA, 1961 – 1963". Asian and African Studies. 2 (18): 149. 2009.
  26. Oron, Yizthak (1961). Middle East Record Volume 1, 1960. Jerusalem: The Moshe Dayan Center. pp. 494–496. Retrieved 20 September 2015.
  27. Heydemann, Steven (1999). Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social Conflict, 1946–1970. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp. 140–143, 152–153, 158.
  28. "115. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant and Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy and Rostow)0". Office of the Historian. Department of State. 30 September 1961. Retrieved 20 February 2017.
  29. Oron, Yizthak (1961). Middle East Record Volume 2, 1961. Jerusalem: The Moshe Dayan Center. pp. 439. Retrieved 26 December 2016.
  30. "Syrian police quell mobs of pro-Nasserites". Chicago Tribune. Chicago. 9 May 1963. p. 2. Retrieved 3 December 2016.
  31. Drysdale, Alasdair (1982). "The Asad Regime and Its Troubles". Middle East Research and Information Project. 12 (110). Retrieved 22 February 2017.
  32. "قوى الأمن الداخلي (sy)/نظام الشرطة". موسوعة القانون المشارك الجامعية (in Arabic). Retrieved 5 December 2016.
  33. Syria Transition Roadmap (PDF). Syrian Center for Political and Strategic Studies. 2013. p. 158. Retrieved 25 December 2016.
  34. "Syria CIVIL POLICE AND INTERNAL SECURITY APPARATUS". Geographic.org. Retrieved 10 September 2015.
  35. Seale, Patrick (1990). Asad of Syria : the struggle for the Middle East. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 171, 177–179, 327. ISBN 0-520-06976-5.
  36. "Assad's uncle charged with corruption in Paris". The New Arab. 28 June 2016. Retrieved 25 December 2016.
  37. Lawson, Fred Haley (1996). Why Syria Goes to War: Thirty Years of Confrontation. Ithaca, USA: Cornell University Press. pp. 89–90. ISBN 9781501731860. Retrieved 4 December 2016.
  38. Lawson, Fred Haley (1996). Why Syria Goes to War: Thirty Years of Confrontation. Ithaca, USA: Cornell University Press. p. 107. ISBN 9781501731860.
  39. Lawson, Fred Haley (1996). Why Syria Goes to War: Thirty Years of Confrontation. Ithaca, USA: Cornell University Press. p. 118. ISBN 9781501731860. Retrieved 4 December 2016.
  40. Andrade, John (1985). World Police & Paramilitary Forces (PDF) (1985 ed.). London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 198. doi:10.1007/978-1-349-07782-3_160. ISBN 978-1-349-07782-3. Retrieved 14 February 2020.
  41. Saad, Houwauda (6 July 2008). "Police Kill 9 Inmates During Prison Riot in Syria". New York Times. Retrieved 25 December 2016.
  42. "The Baath Party Apparatus". Country Studies. Retrieved 18 January 2017.
  43. Cordesman, Anthony H. (2016). After The Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East. London, U.K.: Bloomsbury. pp. 277–278. ISBN 9781474292573.
  44. Gingrich, Newt (1997). Presidential Determination Regarding Certification of the 32 Major Illicit Narcotics Producing and Transit Countries. Washington, USA: U.S. Government printing office. p. 45. ISBN 9780788131868. Retrieved 4 December 2016.
  45. 2010 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. United States Department of State. 2010. p. 586.
  46. Landis, Joshua (24 November 2004). "SYRIA'S REFORMS – AN OVERVIEW by Sadhna Shanker". SyriaComment.com. Retrieved 5 January 2017.
  47. "Syria" (PDF). U.S. Department of State. Retrieved 11 September 2015.
  48. Landis, Joshua (8 August 2005). "What is Happening at the Ministry of Interior?". SyriaComment.com. Retrieved 6 January 2017.
  49. Operational Guidance Note: Syria. United Kingdom: Home Office. February 2009. p. 5. Retrieved 25 December 2016.
  50. "Syrian police kill militants near Iraq border". Syria News Wire. 9 September 2005. Retrieved 2 December 2016.
  51. "Syrian police fight Islamic militants near state offices". Columbia Daily Tribune. Associated Press. 3 June 2006. Archived from the original on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 14 September 2015.
  52. "Group Denial Repression of Kurdish Political and Cultural Rights in Syria". Human Rights Watch. 26 November 2009. Retrieved 9 December 2016.
  53. "Syria: Investigate Security Force Shooting of Kurds". Refworld. Human Rights Watch. 26 March 2010. Retrieved 25 December 2016.
  54. World Report 2009: Events of 2008 (PDF). Human Rights Watch. 2009. p. 515. Retrieved 25 December 2016.
  55. Kurian, George Thomas (2006). World Encyclopedia of Police Forces and Correctional Systems. Farmington Hills, MI: Thomson Gale. pp. 874–875. ISBN 1414405146.
  56. Kaplan, Fred (15 April 2003). "Assad's Situation". Slate. Retrieved 21 September 2017.
  57. SYRIA COUNTRY OF ORIGIN IN FORMATION (COI) REPORT (PDF). UK Border Agency. 15 August 2012. pp. 53–54. Retrieved 30 December 2016.
  58. "Interpol says Syria "very cooperative" in combating terrorism". TopNews. 19 June 2008. Retrieved 7 January 2017.
  59. Landis, Joshua (7 October 2011). "The Issue Of Foreign Intervention – US Calls on Assad to "Step Down Now". Robert Ford, making a difference (By Ehsani)". Syria Comment. Retrieved 16 February 2017.
  60. Narwani, Sharmine (7 May 2014). "Syria: The hidden massacre". RT. RT. Retrieved 3 December 2016.
  61. "Iran Helped Assad Suppress Protests Long Before Jihadists Emerged, IRGC's Agency Says". Radio Farda. Prague, Czech Republic. 28 January 2020. Retrieved 30 January 2020.
  62. Barnard, Anne; Saad, Hwaida (14 February 2016). "Syrian Officer Gave a View of War. ISIS Came, and Silence Followed". The New York Times. Retrieved 3 December 2016.
  63. "Iran Ready to Help Syria with Police Training". Fars News Agency. 8 June 2016. Retrieved 14 December 2016.
  64. "Russian military police battalion deployed in Aleppo – Russian Defense Ministry (Part 2)". Interfax. 23 December 2016. Retrieved 24 December 2016.
  65. "What We Know So Far About Russian Military Police Deployed to Aleppo". Sputnik International. 25 December 2016. Retrieved 27 December 2016.
  66. "Four Russian Military Police Battalions Carrying Out Tasks in Syria Safe Zones". sputniknews.com. 26 July 2017. Retrieved 10 September 2017.
  67. "Russian military police in Syria's safe zones to be equipped with small arms". TASS. Astana. 5 July 2017. Retrieved 10 September 2017.
  68. "Russia deploys forces to police Syria safe zones". GulfNews. 24 July 2017. Retrieved 10 September 2017.
  69. "Syrian army, police celebrate recapturing all of Damascus". Hürriyet Daily News. 22 May 2018. Retrieved 23 May 2018.
  70. "Syrian police deploy forces in south Damascus areas". PressTV. 22 May 2018. Retrieved 23 May 2018.
  71. "مهام الوزارة". Syrian Arab Republic Ministry of Interior (in Arabic). Retrieved 5 December 2016.
  72. "En pleine guerre, la police syrienne recrute des musiciens". LaPresse.Ca. Agence France-Presse. 5 November 2013. Retrieved 13 September 2015.
  73. Sullivan, Larry E; Simonetti Rosen, Marie; Schulz, Dorothy M; Haberfeld, M. R. (15 December 2004). Encyclopedia of Law Enforcement – Volume I. SAGE Publications. p. 1327. ISBN 0-7619-2649-6.
  74. Aid, Matthew (13 December 2015). "Despite Losing 80% of Syria, the Assad Regime In Damascus Still Survives". Matthew Aid. Retrieved 9 December 2016.
  75. Aid, Matthew M. (29 February 2016). "Russian High-Tech Weaponry Turning the Tide in Syria". Matthew Aid. Retrieved 2 December 2016.
  76. "Thousands of Syria's Injured Police Receiving First-class Treatment: Ministry of Interior". The Syrian Observer. Al-Watan. 13 October 2016. Retrieved 3 December 2016.
  77. Sof, Eric (5 July 2017). "Watch Syrian police undergo special CT training". Spec Ops Magazine. Retrieved 30 August 2017.
  78. "Photos: Syrian police officers' military education and training". AhluBayt News Agency. 24 August 2016. Retrieved 15 December 2016.
  79. http://inpublicsafety.com/2017/05/how-syrians-are-using-cyber-community-policing-to-fight-terrorism/
  80. "Graduation of 3nd batch of sergeants, members of Internal Security Forces and police personnel in Hasaka". Syrian Arab News Agency. 20 November 2017. Retrieved 23 May 2018.
  81. Cordesman, Anthony H.; Nerguizian, Aram; Popescu, Ionut C. (2008). Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and Prospects of War. Center for Strategic and International Studies. p. 196. ISBN 978-0-313-35520-2.
  82. COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC (PDF). UK Border Agency COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION SERVICE. 6 February 2009. p. 24. Retrieved 24 April 2019.
  83. "New Crime Lab to Track Syrians Electronically". Al-Watan. The Syrian Observer. 7 December 2018. Retrieved 26 April 2019.
  84. Mutual Evaluation Report Of The Syrian Arab Republic On Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Financing of Terrorism (PDF). Manama, Bahrain: Middle East & North Africa Financial Action Task Force. 15 November 2006. p. 55. Retrieved 26 April 2019.
  85. "CMLTF commission uncovers base of unlicensed currency exchange company in Damascus". الاعلام السورية(مجمعة أخبار). Retrieved 26 April 2019.
  86. "Homosexuality in Syria". syriapagebypaige. Retrieved 3 December 2016.
  87. "Syria criminal records search". CRS Checks. Retrieved 2 December 2016.
  88. "Online Reports of Damascus Crime Wave Are Exaggerated: Security Official". The Syrian Observer. 31 October 2016. Retrieved 3 December 2016.
  89. Political Violence against Americans: 2000. DIANE Publishing. 2000. p. 20. ISBN 978-1-4289-6561-4. Retrieved 17 February 2020.
  90. "5. 2. 2006. ANTI-EUROPEAN RIOTS HIT DAMASCUS, AS FOUR EMBASSIES ARE STORMED". Aftenposten (in Norwegian Bokmål). 12 October 2011. Retrieved 17 February 2020.
  91. "Syria calls for Arab summit on deepening unrest". TheJournal.ie. The Associated Press. 13 November 2011. Retrieved 17 February 2020.
  92. "Rally put on to be pro-Syria". Arkansas Online. 16 March 2012. Retrieved 17 February 2020.
  93. Al-Hazzani, Amal (22 April 2011). "The revolution takes universities by storm". Asharq Al-Awsat (in Ukrainian). Retrieved 17 February 2020.
  94. Corsun, Andrew (2001). Political Violence against Americans: 2000. DIANE Publishing. p. 20. ISBN 9781428965614. Retrieved 16 September 2015.
  95. "Two police killed near Syrian capital". Press TV. 5 April 2011. Archived from the original on 19 September 2015. Retrieved 16 September 2015.
  96. "Syrian Riot Police Form Ring Around US Embassy". Asharq Al-awsat. 30 October 2008. Retrieved 17 February 2020.
  97. "Syrian riot police use rubber clubs to quell protesters". Gulf News. Associated Press. 10 December 2004. Retrieved 16 September 2015.
  98. "Three to Five Killed in Deraa Demonstration; Unrest Spreads". Syria Comment. Retrieved 16 September 2015.
  99. "Syrian police fire tear gas to control prison riot in Hama city". trend news agency. 14 August 2015. Retrieved 2 December 2016.
  100. "EU steps up sanctions on Syria". www.timesofisrael.com. The Associated Press. 27 February 2012. Retrieved 17 February 2020.
  101. "Tear gas fired during clashes in Syrian cities". RTÉ. 22 July 2011. Retrieved 17 February 2020.
  102. "Deputy police chief in Syria's Latakia flees to Turkey". The Jerusalem Post. REUTERS. 30 July 2012. Retrieved 13 September 2015.
  103. "Assad appoints new police commander to end tension in Hama". en.zamanalwsl.net (in Arabic). 5 December 2019. Retrieved 30 March 2020.
  104. "Syrian antiquity smugglers apprehended". en.royanews.tv. 1 October 2018. Retrieved 11 December 2018.
  105. "SYRIA". GINAD – GLOBAL INFORMATION NETWORK ABOUT DRUGS. Retrieved 27 October 2015.
  106. "Country Reports – Slovakia through Zambia". U.S. Department of State. 1 March 2010. Retrieved 30 April 2019.
  107. "Syrian Arab Republic Country of Origin Information (COI) Report" (PDF). Gov.Uk. UK Visas and Immigration. 11 September 2013. p. 42. Retrieved 14 September 2015.
  108. "Internal Security Forces Day celebrated with activities across the country". Syrian Arab News Agency. 29 May 2017. Retrieved 23 May 2018.
  109. Al-Tamimi, Aymenn (27 April 2017). "Reconciliations: The Case of al-Sanamayn in North Deraa". Syria Comment. Retrieved 18 September 2017.
  110. Aron Lund (22 July 2017). "Assad cracks down on loyalist militias in Aleppo". Syria Comment. Retrieved 18 September 2017.
  111. "Syrian Army Continue Successful Operations Against Terrorists Across the Country". SYRIA 360° | INTERNATIONALIST NEWS AGENCY. 10 June 2015. Retrieved 31 August 2017.
  112. "Interior Ministry's Special Forces Committed to Restore Security to Syrian Cities". en.farsnews.com. Retrieved 31 August 2017.
  113. Fadel, Leith (1 May 2017). "Newly formed Syrian Special Mission Forces prove effective against jihadist groups". Al Masdar News. Retrieved 31 August 2017.
  114. Neville, Leigh (2019). The Elite: The A–Z of Modern Special Operations Forces. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4728-2430-1. Retrieved 17 February 2020.
  115. Squires, Nick (5 July 2012). "WikiLeaks begins publishing tranche of Syria emails". Telegraph. Retrieved 14 September 2015.
  116. Hadad, George; Ahmed, Yusra (20 April 2014). "Russia to provide Regime's Interior ministry by fighting helicopters: leaked document". Zaman al-Wasl. Retrieved 13 January 2017.
  117. "Спецназ МВД Сирии опробовал на передовой новые АК-104". Retrieved 25 June 2017.
  118. "Syria Ditches Traffic Cops' Military Uniforms". IWPR. Retrieved 12 September 2015.
  119. "Syrian police shoot nine people dead in attack on area sheltering protesters". The Guardian. 23 March 2011. Retrieved 22 February 2016.
  120. Bellafronto, Catherine (14 October 2005). "Women's Rights in the Middle East and North Africa – Syria". Refworld. Freedom House. Retrieved 25 December 2016.
  121. Dayoub, Basel (19 December 2012). "Syria: Religious Police Patrol Aleppo's Countryside". Retrieved 17 September 2015.
  122. Wege, Carl Anthony (29 September 2015). "Urban And Rural Militia Organizations In Syria's Less Governed Spaces". Journal of Terrorism Research. 6 (3): 35–61. doi:10.15664/jtr.1123.
  123. Nance, Malcolm (2016). Defeating ISIS: Who They Are, How They Fight, What They Believe. New York, NY, USA: Skyhorse Publishing. pp. 221–223. ISBN 9781510711846.
  124. Caris, Charles C.; Reynolds, Samuel (July 2004). "ISIS Governance in Syria" (PDF). Institute for the Study of War: 19–20. Retrieved 11 September 2015.
  125. Ubbiali, Giuliana (27 November 2015). "Il siriano fermato in aeroporto a Orio "Reclutato dall'Isis, sono fuggito"". Corriere della Sera (in Italian). Retrieved 27 November 2015.
  126. Miller, Judith (1993-01-03). "Iraq Accused: A Case of Genocide". The New York Times. Retrieved 2010-04-25.
  127. Arafat, Hisham (27 May 2017). "Raqqa Internal Security established by Kurdish-led SDF". Kurdistan24. Retrieved 29 May 2017.
  128. Jaffe, Greg; DeYoung, Karen (21 June 2017). "U.S. on collision course with Syria and Iran once de facto Islamic State capital falls". The Washington Post. Washington. Retrieved 30 August 2017.
  129. "Anti-IS coalition trains policemen for Syria's Raqqa".
  130. "US-led coalition trains Raqqa Internal Forces to run post-ISIS city". Aranews. 17 May 2017. Archived from the original on 23 May 2017. Retrieved 29 May 2017.
  131. "Syria opposition creates Aleppo police force". Al Jazeera. 3 February 2013. Retrieved 27 October 2015.
  132. Abdulrahim, Raja (11 July 2014). "In Syria, rebels face challenges in policing areas they control". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 11 September 2015.
  133. Perry, Tom (4 October 2014). "Syria's 'Free Police' outgunned by all its foes". Reuters. Retrieved 11 September 2015.
  134. Vallance, Chris (3 April 2017). "Free Syrian Police go unarmed to help their community". BBC. Retrieved 30 August 2017.
  135. Hammond, Philip. "Gifting of equipment to the Free Syrian Police". Gov.uk. Retrieved 11 September 2015.
  136. "UK aid 'diverted to Syria extremists'". BBC News. 2017-12-04. Retrieved 2018-06-29.
  137. "The travails of Syria's unarmed police". The Economist. 2 March 2017. Retrieved 30 August 2017.
  138. "Syria's 'Free' Police: Men Without Sirens". Enab Baladi English. 24 December 2016. Retrieved 8 January 2017.
  139. "Syrian women join police in rebel-held Aleppo SYRIA NEWS | ZAMAN ALWSL". SYRIA NEWS | ZAMAN ALWSL. 27 July 2017. Retrieved 10 September 2017.
  140. "UK aid 'diverted to Syria extremists'". BBC News. 2017-12-04. Retrieved 2018-06-29.
  141. Janssen, Brigid (11 January 2018). "Funding resumes for Free Syrian Police | Adam Smith International". Adam Smith International. Retrieved 23 May 2018.
  142. Hodal, Kate (2018-02-20). "'Disappointing': UK revives aid scheme halted over alleged payments to Syrian jihadists". the Guardian. Retrieved 2018-06-29.
  143. "Programme Completion Review - Syria CSSF: Community Support in North Western Syria Programme" (OpenDocument). Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 2020. CSSF-06-000024. Retrieved 25 May 2020.
  144. al-Aswad, Harun (16 January 2019). "Syrian Free Police disband following HTS militant takeover in Idlib". Middle East Eye. Retrieved 19 February 2020.
  145. https://www.reddit.com/r/syriancivilwar/comments/aej0oy/free_idlib_police_dissolves_itself_and_hands_over/?st=JQQN7IPF&sh=75e65ef4
  146. Al-Jabassini, Abdullah (2019). From Rebel Rule to a Post-Capitulation Era in Daraa Southern Syria: The Impacts and Outcomes of Rebel Behaviour During Negotiations (PDF). Fiesole: European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. p. 23. Retrieved 30 March 2020.
  147. Stein, Aaron; Abouzahr, Hossam; Komar, Rao (20 July 2017). "How Turkey Is Governing in Northern Aleppo". Syria Deeply. Retrieved 14 September 2017.
  148. Ashawi, Khalil; Barrington, Lisa; King, Larry. "Hundreds of police trained by Turkey start work in northern Syria". Reuters. Retrieved 26 January 2017.
  149. Fife, Danielle (31 January 2017). "Turkish "Free Police" Another Tool to Stop Kurdish Expansion". Center for Security Policy. Retrieved 3 February 2017.
  150. Ibrahim, Arwa (23 January 2017). "Turkey trains and deploys hundreds of police to Syria". Middle East Eye. Retrieved 3 February 2017.
  151. "Security ensured in areas liberated by Turkey-backed FSA • r/syriancivilwar". reddit.
  152. "No criteria for ranks, salaries of Turkey-trained local police in Azaz town SYRIA NEWS | ZAMAN ALWSL". SYRIA NEWS | ZAMAN ALWSL. 3 May 2017. Retrieved 10 September 2017.
  154. "620 Syrian police candidates to assume security duties in Afrin after being trained by Turkey". Hürriyet Daily News. 9 May 2018. Retrieved 23 May 2018.
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.