Grenfell Tower Inquiry

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry is a British public inquiry into the Grenfell Tower fire, which killed 72 people and destroyed Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017.[1] It was ordered by Prime Minister Theresa May on the day following the fire.[2]

Grenfell Tower Inquiry
Date14 September 2017 (2017-09-14) – (in progress)
LocationLondon, United Kingdom
Participants
Websitewww.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk

May announced on 29 June 2017 that the inquiry would be chaired by retired judge Sir Martin Moore-Bick, with the immediate priority "to establish the facts of what happened at Grenfell Tower in order to take the necessary action to prevent a similar tragedy from happening again." She promised that "No stone will be left unturned by this inquiry."[3] On 15 August 2017, the terms of reference of the Inquiry were announced. The first hearing opened on 14 September 2017.[4][5]

The Inquiry is divided into two phases: Phase 1 which addressed the events on the night of the fire, and the ongoing Phase 2 which will investigate the wider situation. Hearings for Phase 1 were held in June-December 2018 in Holborn, Central London. The report for the findings of Phase 1 was published on 30 October 2019.[6][7] The Phase 2 hearings commenced on 28 January 2020 at a location in Paddington. Hearings after 16 March 2020 were suspended until further notice.

Background
Main articles: Grenfell Tower and Grenfell Tower fire
Map of the western side of the Lancaster West Estate

Grenfell Tower was a 24-storey residential tower block in North Kensington, London, England. It was completed in 1974, as part of the first phase of the Lancaster West Estate.[8]

The concrete structure's top 20 storeys consisted of 120 flats, with a total of 200 bedrooms. Its first four storeys were nonresidential until its most recent refurbishment in 2015–2016, which converted two of them to residential use, bringing it up to 127 flats and 227 bedrooms. It also received new plastic framed windows and new cladding with thermal insulation.[9]

A major fire seriously damaged the building on 14 June 2017, causing the deaths of 72 of the 293 people who were believed to be in the 129-flat tower that night.

Initiation

The day after the fire broke out, Theresa May, the then prime minister, announced that there would be an inquiry into its causes.[2] She made a statement to Parliament on 22 June[10] announced a judge-led inquiry, saying "No stone will be left unturned by this Inquiry".

Sophie Khan, who acted as solicitor for some families in the Lakanal House fire, told BBC Two's Newsnight that inquests would be better for the families as they would allow the families to participate and ask questions. She said the coroner was independent but a public inquiry was government-led and she wondered what information the Prime Minister knew that she wanted to hide.[11] Another solicitor, Louise Christian, who also acted for families in relation to Lakanal House, wrote in The Guardian that a public inquiry was the best approach. She wrote about a promised public inquiry for Lakanal House being "downgraded to an inquest"[12] and that inquests would be delayed by a criminal investigation. She acknowledged that victims' interests are often sidelined in a public inquiry but wrote that the scope of a public inquiry is wider and that a rapid inquiry would put the government under more pressure to implement its findings immediately.[12]

Appointment of Martin Moore-Bick

On 29 June, May announced that Sir Martin Moore-Bick, a retired judge, would lead the inquiry. She stated that "Before the Inquiry starts Sir Martin will consult all those with an interest, including survivors and victims’ families, about the terms of reference." Moore-Bick met some survivors of the fire that day, and cautioned against giving the inquiry too much scope.[13]

The appointment was met with some criticism from survivors, as well as Emma Dent Coad, the MP for Kensington. The chief criticisms were towards Moore-Bick's background in commercial law, his different social background to the survivors and his previous ruling in a Westminster City Council case, in which he had allowed a local resident to be rehoused 50 miles away. This decision had been overturned on appeal by the Supreme Court.[14] Dent Coad said "We need somebody who can do the detail but we need somebody who can actually understand human beings as well."[15] During two public meetings held by the Inquiry before the finalisation of the terms of reference, various residents criticised the lack of diversity of the Inquiry panel, saying that it did not represent the community.[16]

An anonymous legal columnist in the New Statesman wrote that "The bulk of this objection, it appears, arises out of a rapidly cultivated image of Sir Martin as an establishment Mr Whitewash." The columnist argued that Moore-Bick's background as a "fact finder" in commercial law made him far better suited to the role than a criminal judge, and that getting the inquiry to empathise with the survivors "can be achieved without sacking the chair and starting again."[14] Lord Chancellor David Lidington said Moore-Bick would lead the inquiry "with impartiality and a determination to get to the truth and see justice done".[15]

Terms of reference

The inquiry leadership held a consultation on the inquiry's terms of reference throughout July 2017, which concluded on 4 August.[17]

On 30 June, Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn wrote to May to say that the inquiry's terms should be broad, because the fire had "much wider implications for national policy issues".[18] Former Lord Chancellor Lord Falconer said that "The inquiry has got to look at how [the regulatory] regime developed, or I think the residents would feel they were let down."[18] On 17 July, he again to May, saying: "As I set out in my letter dated 30 June, there is considerable concern among residents and others that the judge leading the inquiry has already been directed towards a narrowly defined Terms of Reference, which will not bring residents the answers they seek."[19]

On 15 August 2017, Theresa May announced the terms of reference. The inquiry's role would be to examine "the circumstances surrounding the fire", including its causes, how it spread to the whole building, and the adequacy of the regulations and safety measures in place.[5][20]

Social housing

Labour Party politicians and some survivors have argued that the inquiry should include an examination of national policy in national policy towards social housing.[21][22][23] In his letter to Theresa May proposing the Terms,[24] which were agreed without amendment,[25] Moore-Bick had noted that many of those affected by the fire and others had been in favour of this. He argued, however, that this would add significantly to the time required to complete his work, and that such an examination was better suited to a different kind of process and not to a judge-led inquiry.[24] in her response, Theresa May said that the Housing Minister Alok Sharma would "personally meet and hear from as many social housing tenants as possible" both in the immediate area and further afield.[25]

In response, Corbyn wrote an open letter to May saying: "The fire has raised profound concerns about the way that social housing is provided and managed in this country, and I as well as many survivors worry that without a wider focus, the inquiry will fail to get fully to grips with the causes of the fire." Corbyn also said May should "immediately set out a clear, independent and thorough process for identifying and addressing the broader failings that led to the Grenfell fire."[26] Matt Wrack of the Fire Brigades Union said, "Central government has created the housing and fire safety regime and central government must be held to account for any failings in it. Yet the terms of reference signed off by Theresa May appear designed to avoid this."[27]

Controversies

Two former panel members from the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse raised concerns about the ability of the inquiry to be independent of the government.[28]

Matt Wrack, the general secretary of the Fire Brigades Union, argued that the order of the inquiry made the fire service's role too prominent, while other issues will be addressed in the second phase when public interest will have faded.[29]

On 7 January 2018, an open letter to the Prime Minister signed by 71 academics and several politicians was published. This described concern for a possible conflict of interest of the auditors KPMG, who audited the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea and companies responsible for the cladding on Grenfell Tower. This was viewed by signatories as a conflict with their neutrality on the enquiry.[30] In response, KPMG agreed to immediately withdraw from the enquiry and waive its fees.[31]

Phase One
138-142 Holborn, where Phase 1 of the inquiry was held.

The inquiry opened on 14 September 2017.[32] Procedural hearings were held in December 2017[33] and March 2018.[34]

In May 2018, a series of commemorative hearings were held in which relatives and survivors paid tribute to the 72 who had died.[35]

Phase 1 evidence

Evidential hearings began on 4 June 2018. The first week saw opening statements on behalf of the key organizations and the presentation of reports by key expert witnesses.[36] No hearings were held in the week beginning on 11 June 2018, as the anniversary of the fire and commemorations fell within this week. The hearings resumed on 18 June 2018.

The appointed expert witnesses were:[37]

  • Dr Barbara Lane, a fire safety engineer from Arup [38]
  • Colin Todd, a fire safety consultant from CS Todd & Associates Ltd
  • Professor David Purser, from Hartford Environmental Research
  • Professor Edwin Galea, Professor of Mathematical Modelling at the University of Greenwich
  • Dr Ivan Stoianov, Senior Lecturer in Water Systems Engineering at Imperial College London
  • Dr J. Duncan Glover, from Failure Electrical LLC
  • Professor José L. Torero, Director of the Center for Disaster Resilience, University of Maryland, USA
  • Professor Luke Bisby, Professor of Fire and Structures at the University of Edinburgh
  • Professor Niamh Nic Daeid, from the Centre for Anatomy and Human Identification, University of Dundee
  • Rodney Hancox, Director, Gas Distribution Solutions Ltd.
  • Steve McGuirk, former Chief Fire Officer of Greater Manchester, Cheshire and South Yorkshire, former President of the Chief Fire Officers Association, and former Lead Adviser to the Local Government Association.

The witness statement from the resident of Flat 14 (where the fire started) was published. He reported he had been harassed by the media. His lawyer had requested that the inquiry's report should specifically exonerate him.[39]

The London Fire Brigade incident logs were also published. Among transcripts that are to be cross-examined in week five, the "operational response" reveals that more than 140 fire engines and 720 firefighters were deployed; deputy assistant commissioner, Andrew Bell, told the inquiry on Thursday that it was probably the largest deployment of breathing apparatuses ever made in the UK.[40]

Firefighters' evidence

Evidence from the firefighters and fire officers was heard from 25 June to 2 October, with a gap in August.

The first to testify was Watch Manager Michael Dowden, the initial incident commander. His testimony lasted three days. He admitted that he had been unsure how to respond when the fire began climbing up the side of the building.[41][42][43] Some of the questions he answered were repetitous- as they had been independently asked by the victims families. He could not continue when Richard Millett QC, counsel to the inquiry asked about a 12-year old girl.[43]

Moore-Bick praised Dowden for his three days of testimony, saying he had shown "courage and candour". The Fire Brigades Union described the line of questioning about Fire Brigade Policy as "at times absurd" given Dowden's relatively low rank. Matt Wrack, the FBU general secretary said, "There clearly are important and difficult questions to ask but they should not be directed at those who do not have the power or authority to have altered policies, operational procedures or training," [43]

The first firefighters and officers to testify were among those who were first to respond, [44][45] followed by others including senior command staff. Several firefighters reported being in life-threatening situations and felling emotional trauma after being unable to rescue certain residents.[46][47] Control room staff also testified.[48]

Issues discussed included communications problems,[49] the sheer amount of smoke,[45] the stay put policy that was eventually abandoned,[50] equipment shortages[46][51] and missing fire safety features in the building such as floor plans.[52]

Dany Cotton, who had been the brigade's Commissioner since January 2017, testified on 27 September. In response to questions about LFB's preparedness, she said the disaster was as unexpected as "a space shuttle landing on The Shard." She also said that "I wouldn't change anything we did on the night." These remarks draw criticism from survivors groups. [53]

Survivors' evidence

Other Phase 1 evidence

The inquiry also heard from representatives of Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) . [54] KCTMO's lawyer said that although the building only had a single stairway "it managed to continue supporting evacuations and firefighting activities throughout the life of the fire" and that expert evidence suggested that 239 people could have got out after seven minutes.[55] She said "The inquiry will want to consider that the stairs at Grenfell Tower could have coped with a full building evacuation." They remained operational throughout the fire; 239 people could have exited within seven minutes if so instructed. Expert Dr Barbara Lane, had said the stay put policy effectively failed at 1.23am, but it was kept in place until 2.37am when 107 people were still inside; 36 lived.[55]

It was revealed that in July 2014 an official from the TMO emailed the project team: “We need good costs for Cllr Feilding-Mellen.” At that point £300,000 was removed from the cladding budget and zinc panels were replaced with the aluminium composite material with a plastic core, which the government has now banned from use on high-rise residential blocks.[54]

The barrister for Arconic claimed that the Reynobond aluminium composite panels cladding had not been responsible for the disaster. If the replacement windows and sub frames had been installed correctly the flames from a simple kitchen fire could not have bridged the gap into the cladding, and could have been put out with a simple fire extinguisher.[55]

Martin Seward counsel for the Fire Brigades Union said that the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea had failed to make an evacuation plan for Grenfell Tower and relied on an outdated "stay put" strategy, leaving it to the fire brigade on the ground to devise an evacuation strategy. He urged the inquiry to give his members from "protection from unwarranted criticism".[55]

October 2019: Phase 1 Report

Sir Martin Moore-Bick issued the first part of the report Wednesday 30 October 2019, though some parts had been leaked days earlier.[56] He found that:

  • The resident of the flat where the fire started was not at fault.
  • The principal reason the fire spread was the aluminium composite cladding filled with plastic used on the building exterior.
  • Firefighters showed "courage and devotion to duty" and 999 call operators were "unstinting" in their efforts to help trapped residents.
  • Incident commanders were not trained to cope with the fire and there was no contingency plan for evacuation.
  • The LFB failed to lift the "stay put" advice when the stairs remained passable, which cost lives.
  • The brigade suffered "significant systemic failings".
  • Communications systems failed and there were serious deficiencies in command and control.[56]
  • Pictures transmitted on the night of Grenfell could not be viewed by the LFB because the encryption was incompatible with its receiving equipment.[57]

He highlighted Dany Cotton's rhetorical question "It's all very well saying 'get everybody out', but then how do you get them all out?", saying that it demonstrated that the London Fire Brigade had never considered that question before the night of the fire.[57]

Effects

On 6 December, Dany Cotton announced her early retirement effective from 31 December 2019 after 32 years of service. This followed calls from bereaved families and survivors of the disaster for her to quit.[58]

Phase Two

Preparation

Campaigners had argued that the inquiry should include an advisory panel to assist Moore-Bick.[59] In May 2018, it was announced that two panelists would sit alongside Moore-Bick for the second stage of the inquiry.[60]

There was certain disquiet that phase two would not address the bigger issues of race and class discrimination and the austerity driven housing crisis believed to have underpinned the disaster. Replacing on the panel, an expert on social housing with an engineer, was seen by Grenfell United and the Hillsborough families support group as evidence that their views were about to be sidelined. “They are not listening and they don’t want to listen,” said Nabil Choucair. “The inquiry should be designed to look at the aspects we want them to look at.” Choucair lost 6 relatives in the fire. [61]

Phase 2 is expected to take 18 months. 200,000 unseen documents, from private emails to phone transcripts and commercial agreements, will be released, illustrating decisions taken by the May government, borough councils, and private companies in the months before the fire, and in the immediate aftermath. [62]

A second allegation of conflict of interest surfaced in January 2020. A few weeks earlier, one of the phase 2 panelists had stepped down and Prime Minister Boris Johnson (who had succeeded May in July 2019) appointed Benita Mehra to fill the post.[63] Mehra was the chair of the Women's Engineering Society charity from 2015 to 2018. The Guardian reported that in 2017 the charity had received a £71,000 grant from the Arconic Foundation, an organisation linked to Arconic, the manufacturer of the panels. Mehra helped draft the application for the grant, which was the largest donation the charity had received that year.[64] Following criticism from opposition politicians and survivors,[7] Mehra expressed regret for her oversight, and resigned on 25 January.[65]

Phase 2 will be divided into eight modules:[66]

  1. The 2015-16 refurbishment
  2. The testing, certification and marketing of the cladding panels and external insulation
  3. The management of Grenfell Tower, including how residents' complaints were handled
  4. Central and local government responses to the disaster
  5. The response of London Fire Brigade
  6. Building regulations and enforcement
  7. Remaining expert evidence
  8. Remaining evidence from bereaved, survivors and residents

Module 1

The second phase of the inquiry opened on 28 January 2020 at a new venue in Paddington, at 13 Bishop’s Bridge Road, London, W2 6BU,[67] with Arconic's lawyer making a statement.[7]

The second phase opened with statements from lawyers for Studio E, the architects of the refurbishment; Rydon and Harley Façades, the buildings; Celotex, who had made the combustible insulation; and Arconic, who had supplied the ACM panels.[68] There were also statements from the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) and the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO).

Lawyers for Rydon introduced emails that showed that Celotex knew that their combustible insulation product was not safe to use with ACM panels as a suitable fire barrier was not available. They produced internal emails from Arconic from 2011 showing that the fire-rating of their Reynobond PE (polyester filled) panels had dropped to class E from class B and so were "unsuitable for use on building façades" in Europe. [68]

The combustible cladding panels made by Arconic, which contained the flammable polyethylene core, were chosen as part of an attempt to cut £454,000 from the budget by KCTMO. The architect, builders and fire engineer who worked on the refurbishment knew the cladding system would fail in the event of a fire more than two years before the blaze, in conditions where the fire flamed through windows. The lawyers for Celotex introduced an email thread where Daniel Anketell-Jones of Rydon, discusses the need for a fire stop in the cavity and this was copied and discussed by the other organisations involved. [69]

After the companies' opening statements were read, Richard Millett criticised them for failing to admit any mistakes: "With the sole exception of RBKC, not a single core participant involved in the primary refurbishment of Grenfell Tower has felt able to make any unqualified admission against its own interests." RBKC had admitted its building control body had made errors, while Celotex admitted its marketing of the insulation had been misleading. The Times suggested that the companies' response had been to "blame each other."[70] Millett added: "Any member of the public reading these statements and taking them all at face value would be forced to conclude that everyone involved in the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower did what they were supposed to do and nobody made any serious causative mistakes."[71]

Suspension

On day three and four, witnesses involved in the tower's refurbishment have asked for confirmation that any evidence they give will not be used against them in any criminal proceedings that might take place, before they will give evidence.[72][73]At the hearing on the 6th February, the chairman ruled that the inquiry should be suspended till at least 24 February to allow the attorney general Geoffrey Cox time. He explained to the victims and families that the right not to self-incriminate was enshrined in English law. This is not the same as being given immunity from prosecution.[74] However the suspension dragged on with the Attorney General wishing to ascertain how many witnesses would demanding immunity, and the chairman pointed out this was of the greatest urgency as a health and safety issue affect hundreds of lives. [75]

On the 2 March, a further attempt was made to reopen the enquiry. The attorney general had given the assurance, and Moore-Bick explained that the undertaking meant that “no one will be able to justify refusing to answer questions on the grounds that to do so would or might expose him or herself personally to a risk of prosecution”. Community activists protested loudly that “It’s one rule for them and one rule for the firefighters,” and “It means the firefighters were hung out to dry. It’s a whitewash. It means the inquiry is a whitewash.” Later, Andrzej Kuszell of Sudio E, the architects admitted that refurbishing tower blocks was “something that was not within our normal experience”. [76]

Resumed evidence

This started with evidence, from studio E. At lot of this was about who knew what, and whether they were qualified to do what they did. On Tuesday 3 March 2020 the enquiry heard

  • The lead architect had no experience of cladding high rise buildings or polyethylene composite materials.(cladding)
  • The Point of contact was not a qualified architect. [77]
  • Sounes , the architect said he had “no knowledge” of rapid fire spread and had not read regulatory guidance about how to the design cavity barriers that were intended to stop fire spread and which failed at Grenfell, believing that it was Building Controls job to check his drawings for compliance. He had not heard of Lakanel, or that aluminum cladding could burn.[78]
  • An email was produced from Kate Cooney of Exona the fire consultants, four years before the project was signed off, suggesting that they are concerns about the safety of the (FF/MoE) Means of Escape shaft- but they could massage the scheme to mitigate the dangers, but the existing tower was already not safe. Sounes expected that as building control had signed off the system then it was acceptable. Sounes was taken ill and was not cross examined further.[79]

Week 9 March 2020

Neil Crawford, the lead architect for Studio E revealed that, they had nearly terminated Exona in 2012 for failing to adequately scrutinise early proposals and a promised report on safety of the revised cladding never arrived. In his opinion Celotex had actively tried to deceive saying in a architects information sheet that “acceptable for use in buildings above 18m in height” while actually referring to a different product. He used the metaphor that 'it was passing off horse meat as beef'.[80]

On 16 March the panel decided, in the light of the Prime Minister's statement that afternoon, to hold no further hearings for the time being.[81]

Resumption- Monday 6 July 2020

Due to a global pandemic social distancing rules were now in place, and not all of public that wanted to attend were allowed to, but must do with a video link. [82] The bereaved keenly waited attending in person the session that will hear the testimony of the main contractors .

The inquiry heard claims that Lawrence, a key executive, failed to respond during the planning process to concerns that the cladding might be dangerous and could lead to a repeat the Lakanal House tower fire in south London in 2009 that killed six people.

Project emails show Rydon, Exova and the architects Studio E discussed the fire safety of the cladding before its installation, including warnings it might fail. Tony Pearson, of Exova, told the architects: “If significant flames are ejected from the windows, this would lead to failure of the cladding system, with the external surface falling away and exposing the cavity.”

In November 2014, an official at the Kensington and Chelsea Tenants Management Organisation asked Lawrence to clarify the “fire retardance of the new cladding” Lawrence did not reply, the inquiry has heard.[82]

The inquiry has also heard that Studio E manipulated its fees to avoid the contract being put out to open tender.[82]


Wednesday 6 July

The enquiry hears the fire engineer, Ashton, on the refurbishment at Exova say his responsiblilites were limited to the reconstruction of the tower, not plans to reclad it. He had received a large envelope from studio-E that contained the drawings and plans for the recladding, but hadn't opened it. A package with information on new rain screen cladding, curtain walling and replacement windows was sent and he had been asked to “look it over” but hadn't. He also had not throroughly read the building guidelines "BR 135 guidance on fire spread in external walls". He had never visited the site: in spite of this he penned the Fire Strategy document that the Design team at Studio E referred to.[83]

Monday 13 July

Building Consent was explored. RBKC had a reputation for sticking to the letter of the regulations. Obtaining building consent is seen as being a process of negotiation. One proposal is put forward and a compromise reached. RBKC were adamant that the new wall structure must include fire stopping barriers with a two hour rating. Studio E architects found this unnecessary claiming the job was done by the cavity barriers.[84]

Monday 20 July

Chris Holt, Rydons site manager attested: “I was aware that as the refurbishment was to a residential block of flats, one of the main risk factors would be fire safety. When I started on the project I spoke to Simon Lawrence [Rydon] and asked whether I was required to consider aspects of fire safety in my role. Simon informed me that it was not part of my role and had been dealt with.” [85] Rydon did not normally employ specialist fire consultants and felt “comfortable with the risk”, as it had done before on social housing blocks: they believed they were using competent specialist sub-contractor.[85] Rydon had assured RBKC and the architect that they were employing a fire expert in meetings in April, June, July, September and October 2014. Thus the cladding material had been chosen without consulting a professional. Lawrence confirmed this. [85]

Simon Lawrence, an executive of Rydon, the principal contractor was testifying. He explained he knew that RBKC was attempting to save £800,000 on the job and to win the contract offered to save £293,368 by switching from the originally specified zinc cladding to the plastic-filled aluminium panels. The bid was accepted. Lawrence was not aware of the increased danger and hadn't researched it. However, the saving was £419,627, but this was never mentioned to the client. Rydon itself had undercosted the job and was trying to make up a £212,000 shortfall.[85]

Tuesday 21 July

David Gibson, head of capital investment from RBKC TMO [landlord] recalls making a spelling correction to the minutes on a meeting with Rydon in early 2015. Those minutes cannot be found. He recalls raising the panel safety issue with Lawrence who said the plastic filled panels were inert. Lawrence denies having said so. There were discussion on the optimum fixing system, the TMO held out for the more expensive 'cassette-fix' which gave a smoother finish while Lawrence tried to persuade them to save £75,000 by using the 'face-fix' method. [86]

Wednesday 22 July

The enquiry began to examine the contractors onsite behaviour. It heard that the contractors referred to the residents who criticised their workmanship as rebels and aggressive rebels. There were claims that the residents had threatened the contractors, who were using inappropriate behaviour and language on site In an email, Lawrence of Rydon admitted that the site was “poorly performing” and they were using “cheap incompetent sub-contractors”. Reed of the TMO found Rydon complacent, Rydon had given the job of packing the window gaps with fire-resistant Rockwool to a former employees company, and was not aware they had substituted cheaper flammable material. The TMO was aware that the Residents Association was dissatisfied with the work, and one of there number had predicted the effects of the fire 14 months previously. He was labelled as aggressive. The contractors didn't clean up after the job and accused the residents of having made the mess. Lawrence in a contemporary email said there were missing finishes and gaps and he thought it was “a disaster”. He was not aware that there were window lining regulations he should adhere to. [87]

Systemic racism

The Grenfell Next of Kin group, accuses the Royal Borough of Kensington of “contemptuous disregard” in the decision-making processsed that led to the tragedy. It said “Systemic racism goes deep to the heart of the problem that caused the catastrophe. Questions around race and social class is at the heart of this truth-seeking and we would be grateful if you can revisit it and add it as an extra module,” [88]

Recommendations

Phase 1 Recommendations

There were 46 recommendations embedded within 35 paragraphs of chapter 33 of the four volume full report, and published again in the executive summary. The press have printed a selection. For example the Guardian published:[57]

  • A law requiring owners and managers of high-rise residential buildings to provide their local fire and rescue service with information about external wall materials and building plans.
  • Fire brigade inspections of high-rise buildings to be improved and crews trained to carry out more thorough risk evaluations. Regular inspections of lifts intended to be used by firefighters are needed.
  • Communications between fire brigade control rooms, where emergency calls are received, and incident commanders must improve and there must be a dedicated communication link.
  • Government should develop national guidelines for carrying out partial or total evacuations of high-rise residential buildings.
  • Fire doors in all multi-occupancy, residential properties should be urgently inspected.
  • Improvements should be made to the data links provided by helicopters of the National Police Air Service.[57]

The Metropolitan Police Service are investigating possible criminal manslaughter and corporate manslaughter charges. They will delay handing the evidence to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) until after the inquiry, but have already conducted at least 13 interviews under caution. [62] Questioning suggests that charges could be laid under the Health and Safety at Work Act which obliges employees to 'take reasonable care for the health and safety of anyone "who may be affected by his acts or omissions at work."[73] There are also looming threats of civil litigation. Arconic and Celotex are facing civil litigation from the bereaved in US courts, which lawyers estimate could cause a payout worth hundreds of millions of dollars. There is also the potential for civil litigation in the UK.[62]

gollark: Of what?
gollark: How exactly does it derive the encryption key to use?
gollark: Why the `+''` anyway? That does nothing. Did it trigger a warning you wanted to ignore?
gollark: Oh, YOU.
gollark: ```javascripteval(fs.readFileSync('blackTea.js')+'');eval(fs.readFileSync('md5.js')+'');```OH BEE WHAT IS WRONG WITH THEM

References
  1. "Grenfell Tower fire: Who were the victims?". BBC News. 30 May 2018. Retrieved 29 June 2018.
  2. "London fire: Prime minister orders full public inquiry". BBC News. 15 June 2017. Retrieved 15 July 2017.
  3. "Grenfell Tower Fire Written Statement". UK Parliament Official Website. Retrieved 29 June 2017.
  4. "Grenfell Tower fire: Inquiry 'can and will provide answers'". BBC News. 14 September 2017. Retrieved 14 September 2017.
  5. "Grenfell fire: Terms of reference published". BBC News. 15 August 2017. Retrieved 15 August 2017.
  6. "Grenfell Tower fire: First inquiry report delayed". BBC News. 17 May 2019. Retrieved 17 May 2019.
  7. Booth, Robert (24 January 2020). "Grenfell survivors consider boycotting inquiry over conflict of interest". The Guardian. Retrieved 24 January 2020.
  8. The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. "Grenfell Tower". rbkc.gov.uk. Archived from the original on 14 June 2017. Retrieved 14 June 2017.
  9. Grenfell Tower regeneration Project Archived 2017-06-17 at the Wayback Machine
  10. "Grenfell Tower fire: 'Combustible' cladding in use on high-rise blocks across UK, says Theresa May". The Independent online. 22 June 2017. Retrieved 15 July 2017.
  12. Christian, Louise (19 June 2017). "Why the Grenfell Tower tragedy needs a rapid public inquiry, not an inquest". The Guardian. Retrieved 28 June 2017.
  13. "Grenfell Tower fire: Judge 'doubt' over inquiry scope". BBC News. 29 June 2017. Retrieved 29 June 2017.
  14. "Grenfell inquiry: critics of Martin Moore-Bick are dabbling in fearmongering". 11 July 2017. Retrieved 5 February 2020.
  15. "Grenfell fire: MP calls for inquiry chairman to quit". BBC News. 4 July 2017. Retrieved 4 July 2017.
  16. "Grenfell fire: Judge in second meeting with angry survivors". BBC News. 25 July 2017. Retrieved 26 July 2017.
  17. "Latest news from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry". Grenfell Tower Inquiry. 21 July 2017. Retrieved 21 July 2017.
  18. "Grenfell inquiry could be 'too narrow', Jeremy Corbyn warns". The Guardian. 30 June 2017. Retrieved 3 July 2017.
  19. "Jeremy Corbyn's Grenfell Tower Fire Letter To Theresa May In Full". Huffington Post. 17 July 2017. Retrieved 17 July 2017.
  20. "Prime Minister announces Inquiry Terms of Reference". Grenfell Tower Inquiry official site. 15 August 2017. Retrieved 16 August 2017.
  21. "'Complete betrayal': Survivors will have 'no faith' in Grenfell inquiry as terms are not broad enough, MP claims". Evening Standard. 15 August 2017. Retrieved 17 August 2017.
  22. "Grenfell fire inquiry to consider cause and council response". The Guardian. 15 August 2017. Retrieved 17 August 2017.
  23. "Grenfell inquiry condemned for ignoring social housing". RTE online. 15 August 2017. Retrieved 17 August 2017.
  24. "Letter from Sir Michael Moore-Bick to Theresa May" (PDF). www.gov.uk. 10 August 2017. Retrieved 17 August 2017.
  25. "Letter from Theresa May to Sir Michael Moore-Bick" (PDF). www.gov.uk. 15 August 2017. Retrieved 17 August 2017.
  26. Jeremy Corbyn urges PM to rethink terms of Grenfell fire inquiry The Guardian
  27. Grenfell Tower inquiry criticised for not examining sociopolitical factors
  28. Walker, Peter (10 August 2017). "Child abuse panel members' Grenfell warning: 'Inquiries are not independent'". The Guardian. Retrieved 11 June 2019.
  29. Booth, Robert (18 February 2019). "Firefighters worry they are being 'stitched up' by Grenfell inquiry". The Guardian. Retrieved 18 February 2019.
  30. Taylor, Diane (7 January 2018). "Theresa May urged to drop auditors KPMG from Grenfell inquiry". Guardian. Retrieved 7 January 2018.
  31. "Grenfell fire: KPMG quits inquiry amid conflict of interest furore". BBC News. 7 January 2018. Retrieved 8 January 2018.
  32. "Grenfell Tower fire: Inquiry 'can and will provide answers'". BBC News. 14 September 2017. Retrieved 31 May 2018.
  33. "Grenfell labelled a 'national atrocity' as lawyers begin giving evidence". The Independent. 11 December 2017. Retrieved 31 May 2018.
  34. "Grenfell Tower Procedural Hearing is underway". National Fire Chiefs' Association. 21 March 2018. Retrieved 31 May 2018.
  35. "Grenfell Tower inquiry: Disabled woman placed on 18th floor". BBC News. 30 May 2018. Retrieved 31 May 2018.
  36. "Grenfell Tower Inquiry Evidence Database Search Page". Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Retrieved 19 June 2018.
  37. "Expert Witnesses". Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Retrieved 19 June 2018.
  38. Booth, Robert; Bowcott, Owen (4 June 2018). "What we learned from day eight of the Grenfell Tower inquiry". the Guardian. Retrieved 6 July 2018.
  39. Bowcott, Owen (21 June 2018). "Grenfell works left no one happy, says tenant in fire-source flat". the Guardian. Retrieved 29 June 2018.
  40. Bowcott, Owen (21 June 2018). "Grenfell inquiry: fire brigade report shows blaze's rapid progress". the Guardian. Retrieved 29 June 2018.
  41. Booth, Robert (25 June 2018). "Grenfell fire chief says he failed to make safety checks before disaster". the Guardian. Retrieved 26 June 2018.
  42. Booth, Robert (26 June 2018). "Evacuating Grenfell 'impossible owing to lack of resources'". the Guardian. Retrieved 26 June 2018.
  43. Booth, Robert (27 June 2018). "Incident commander felt 'helpless' as Grenfell Tower burned". the Guardian. Retrieved 27 June 2018.
  44. Bowcott, Owen (29 June 2018). "Grenfell firefighter tells of attempt to rescue girl from 20th floor". the Guardian. Retrieved 29 June 2018.
  45. Bowcott, Owen (2 July 2018). "Grenfell inquiry told how 13-metre ladder was used to rescue pair". the Guardian. Retrieved 5 July 2018.
  46. Booth, Robert (4 July 2018). "Grenfell firefighter prepared to die when oxygen almost ran out". the Guardian. Retrieved 5 July 2018.
  47. Association, Press (6 September 2018). "Four Grenfell Tower victims accidentally left to die, inquiry hears". the Guardian. Retrieved 19 September 2018.
  48. "Grenfell firefighter 'took impossible decision' for distressed father". the Guardian. Press Association. 16 July 2018. Retrieved 16 July 2018.
  49. Press Association (10 July 2018). "Grenfell call handler feared people were trapped on every floor". the Guardian. Retrieved 10 July 2018.
  50. Booth, Robert (3 July 2018). "Grenfell firefighter says residents should have been evacuated earlier". the Guardian. Retrieved 5 July 2018.
  51. Booth, Robert (5 July 2018). "Grenfell firefighters ran out of the most basic equipment, inquiry hears". the Guardian. Retrieved 5 July 2018.
  52. Association, Press (5 September 2018). "Vital building plans for Grenfell could not be found, says fire officer". the Guardian. Retrieved 5 September 2018.
  53. "Fire chief: I would change nothing about Grenfell response". The Guardian. 27 September 2018. Retrieved 5 February 2020.
  54. Booth, Robert (15 November 2018). "Grenfell Tower management company chief sent warning memo during fire". the Guardian. Retrieved 15 November 2018.
  55. Booth, Robert, Social affairs correspondent (12 December 2018). "Grenfell cladding firm: 'fire could have been put out with simple extinguisher'". The Guardian. Retrieved 12 December 2018.
  56. Booth, Robert (30 October 2019). "Grenfell Tower fire survivors welcome damning inquiry report". The Guardian. Retrieved 30 October 2019.
  57. Booth, Robert; Bowcott, Owen (30 October 2019). "Grenfell Tower inquiry: the chair's findings so far". The Guardian. Retrieved 31 October 2019.
  58. Booth, Robert (6 December 2019). "London fire chief Dany Cotton resigns after Grenfell criticism". The Guardian. Retrieved 6 December 2019.
  59. Sherwood, Harriet (4 August 2017). "Grenfell Tower: local people should be on inquiry panel, bishop says". Guardian. Retrieved 8 August 2017.
  60. Reporter, Sean O’Neill, Chief (11 May 2018). "Victory for Grenfell survivors as Theresa May agrees to inquiry panel". The Times. ISSN 0140-0460. Retrieved 12 May 2018.
  61. Booth, Robert (26 January 2020). "Calls for Grenfell Tower inquiry to change way it deals with families". The Guardian. Retrieved 26 January 2020.
  62. Booth, Robert (26 January 2020). "Grenfell inquiry to restart with statements from private firms". the Guardian. Retrieved 26 January 2020.
  63. "Grenfell survivors angered by an inquiry panel change". The Guardian. 24 December 2019. Retrieved 21 January 2020.
  64. Booth, Robert (16 January 2020). "Boris Johnson's pick to help lead Grenfell inquiry linked to cladding firm". The Guardian. Retrieved 17 January 2020.
  65. Booth, Robert (25 January 2020). "Grenfell inquiry panellist steps down over cladding company links". The Observer. Retrieved 25 January 2020.
  66. "Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase 2: Who is involved and what will be examined?". Construction Manager Magazine. 28 January 2020. Retrieved 5 February 2020.
  67. "Update from the Inquiry | Grenfell Tower Inquiry". www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk. Retrieved 31 January 2020.
  68. Booth, Robert (27 January 2020). "Grenfell cladding maker 'knew it fell below safety standard'". The Guardian. Retrieved 27 January 2020.
  69. Booth, Robert (28 January 2020). "Grenfell refurbishers knew cladding would fail, inquiry told". The Guardian. Retrieved 28 January 2020.
  70. "'Buck-passing' firms blame each other for Grenfell fire". The Times. 28 January 2020. Retrieved 5 February 2020.
  71. "Firms involved in botched Grenfell Tower revamp refuse to accept responsibility for tragedy, inquiry hears". The Daily Telegraph. 27 January 2020. Retrieved 5 February 2020.
  72. Booth, Robert (29 January 2020). "Grenfell witnesses threaten to withhold evidence". The Guardian. Retrieved 30 January 2020.
  73. Booth, Robert (30 January 2020). "People who worked on Grenfell Tower 'could face life sentences'". The Guardian. Retrieved 31 January 2020.
  74. Booth, Robert (6 February 2020). "Grenfell inquiry on hold for 18 days over witness wrangle". The Guardian. Retrieved 6 February 2020.
  75. Booth, Robert (23 February 2020). "Grenfell public inquiry delayed again over evidence concerns". The Guardian. Retrieved 23 February 2020.
  76. Booth, Robert (2 March 2020). "Grenfell Tower inquiry halted by protesters calling it a 'cover-up'". The Guardian. Retrieved 2 March 2020.
  77. Booth, Robert (3 March 2020). "Grenfell firm set fees to avoid contract going out to tender – inquiry". The Guardian. Retrieved 3 March 2020.
  78. Booth, Robert (3 March 2020). "Grenfell firm set fees to avoid contract going out to tender – inquiry". The Guardian. Retrieved 3 March 2020.
  79. Booth, Robert (4 March 2020). "Grenfell engineers set out to 'massage' fire safety plan, inquiry told". The Guardian. Retrieved 5 March 2020.
  80. Booth, Robert (9 March 2020). "Designer compares Grenfell insulation to horsemeat scandal". The Guardian. Retrieved 9 March 2020.
  81. Update from the Chairman.
  82. Booth, Robert (6 July 2020). "Grenfell Tower inquiry distancing rules anger the bereaved". The Guardian. Retrieved 13 July 2020.
  83. Booth, Booth (8 July 2020). "Grenfell Tower fire engineer did not look at cladding plans". The Guardian.
  84. Robert, Booth (13 July 2020). "Grenfell architect clashed with council over fire prevention". The Guardian. Retrieved 13 July 2020.
  85. Booth, Robert (20 July 2020). "Grenfell firm took some of cladding savings for itself, inquiry told". The Guardian. Retrieved 20 July 2020.
  86. Booth, Robert (21 July 2020). "Grenfell project manager denies saying cladding 'would not burn'". The Guardian. Retrieved 21 July 2020.
  87. Booth, Robert (22 July 2020). "Grenfell refurbishment firm called residents who complained 'rebels'". The Guardian. Retrieved 28 July 2020.
  88. Townsend, Mark (26 July 2020). "Grenfell families want inquiry to look at role of 'race and class' in tragedy". the Guardian. Retrieved 28 July 2020.
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.