Abstract object theory

Abstract object theory (AOT) is a branch of metaphysics regarding abstract objects.[1] Originally devised by metaphysician Edward Zalta in 1981,[2] the theory was an expansion of mathematical Platonism.

Not to be confused with Object theory.
For the general concept of objecthood in philosophy, see Object (philosophy).

Overview

Abstract Objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic Metaphysics (1983) is the title of a publication by Edward Zalta that outlines abstract object theory.

AOT is a dual predication approach to abstract objects.[3][4] On Zalta's account, there are two modes of predication: some objects (the ordinary concrete ones around us, like tables and chairs) exemplify properties, while others (abstract objects like numbers, and what others would call "non-existent objects", like the round square, and the mountain made entirely of gold) merely encode them.[5] While the objects that exemplify properties are discovered through traditional empirical means, a simple set of axioms allows us to know about objects that encode properties.[6] For every set of properties, there is exactly one object that encodes exactly that set of properties and no others.[7] This allows for a formalized ontology.

A notable feature of AOT is that Romane Clark's paradox (a paradox in naive predication theory undermining the earliest version of Héctor-Neri Castañeda's guise theory)[8][9][10] and Alan McMichael's paradox (another paradox in naive predication theory)[11] do not arise within it (AOT employs restricted abstraction schemata to avoid these paradoxes).[12]

In 2007, Zalta and Branden Fitelson have introduced the term computational metaphysics to describe the implementation and investigation of formal, axiomatic metaphysics in an automated reasoning environment.[13]

gollark: No it's not, could be even more incomprehensible.
gollark: Right, you said most shouldn't.
gollark: Unless you have good reasons other than "I hate it", don't go around saying "nobody should use this".
gollark: Well, that sounds like preference, not something which necessarily applies to all users or prospective ones.
gollark: Or my other question.

See also

Precursors

Related concepts

Notes
  1. Zalta, Edward N. (2004). "The Theory of Abstract Objects". The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University. Retrieved July 18, 2020.
  2. "An Introduction to a Theory of Abstract Objects (1981)". ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. 2009. Retrieved July 21, 2020.
  3. Reicher, Maria (2014). "Nonexistent Objects". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  4. Dale Jacquette, Meinongian Logic: The Semantics of Existence and Nonexistence, Walter de Gruyter, 1996, p. 17.
  5. Zalta (1983:33).
  6. Zalta (1983:36).
  7. Zalta (1983:35).
  8. Romane Clark, "Not Every Object of Thought has Being: A Paradox in Naive Predication Theory", Noûs, 12(2) (1978), pp. 181–188.
  9. William J. Rapaport, "Meinongian Theories and a Russellian Paradox", Noûs, 12(2) (1978), pp. 153–80.
  10. Adriano Palma, ed. (2014). Castañeda and his Guises: Essays on the Work of Hector-Neri Castañeda. Boston/Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 67–82, esp. 72.
  11. Alan McMichael and Edward N. Zalta, "An Alternative Theory of Nonexistent Objects", Journal of Philosophical Logic, 9 (1980): 297–313, esp. 313 n. 15.
  12. Zalta (1983:158).
  13. Edward N. Zalta and Branden Fitelson, "Steps Toward a Computational Metaphysics",Journal of Philosophical Logic 36(2) (April 2007): 227–247.
  14. Zalta (1983:xi).

References

Further reading
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