Battle of Ticinus

The Battle of Ticinus was a battle of the Second Punic War fought between the Carthaginian forces of Hannibal and the Romans under Publius Cornelius Scipio in late November 218 BC. The battle took place in the flat country of Pavia county on the right bank of the Ticino River, not far north from its confluence (from the north) with the Po River. The battle is named from the river, not the nearby contemporaneous settlement of Ticinum (today's Pavia). Although the precise location is not known, it is generally accepted that a settlement known today as Vigevano is mentioned in Livy's text and that Scipio's camp was to the south at Gambolo, whose coordinates are given on the map. The conflict would have been west of there. It was the first battle of the war against the Romans that was fought on Italian soil and the first battle of the war to employ legion-sized forces. Its loss by the Romans, and the temporary disablement of Scipio's command, set the stage for the Roman disaster at the Battle of the Trebia in December.

Battle of Ticinus
Part of the Second Punic War

Cisalpine Gaul in 218 BC, depicting the Gallic revolt and the Carthaginian invasion
DateLate November 218 BC
Location
West bank of the lower Ticino River, in present-day Italy
45°15′0″N 8°52′0″E
Result Carthaginian victory
Belligerents
Carthage Rome
Commanders and leaders
Hannibal Publius Scipio (WIA)
Strength
6,000 cavalry 3,100 cavalry
7,200 velites
Casualties and losses
Few 2,300

This battle was mainly a cavalry engagement. It was so fast-moving that the javelin-throwers deployed by the Romans had no chance of throwing even a single volley and milled around on the field, a major cause of the Roman defeat. Scipio was wounded and barely escaped with his life. He was in fact rescued on the field by his 18-year-old son, the later Scipio Africanus.

Primary sources
Polybius

The main source for almost every aspect of the Punic Wars[note 1] is the historian Polybius (c. 200 – c. 118 BC), a Greek sent to Rome in 167 BC as a hostage.[2] His works include a now-lost manual on military tactics,[3] but he is now known for The Histories, written sometime after 146 BC.[4][5] Polybius's work is considered broadly objective and largely neutral as between Carthaginian and Roman points of view.[6][7] Polybius was an analytical historian and wherever possible personally interviewed participants, from both sides, in the events he wrote about.[8][9][10]

The accuracy of Polybius's account has been much debated over the past 150 years, but the modern consensus is to accept it largely at face value, and the details of the war in modern sources are largely based on interpretations of Polybius's account.[2][11][12] The modern historian Andrew Curry sees Polybius as being "fairly reliable";[13] while Craige Champion describes him as "a remarkably well-informed, industrious, and insightful historian".[14]

Other, later, ancient histories of the war exist, although often in fragmentary or summary form.[15] Modern historians usually take into account the writings of various Roman annalists, some contemporary; the Sicilian Greek Diodorus Siculus; the later Roman historians Livy (who relied heavily on Polybius[16]) – but who is a valuable source for the war in Italy and for the Battle of Ticinus – Plutarch, Appian and Dio Cassius.[17] The classicist Adrian Goldsworthy states "Polybius' account is usually to be preferred when it differs with any of our other accounts".[note 2][9] Other sources include coins, inscriptions, archaeological evidence and empirical evidence from reconstructions such as the trireme Olympias.[18]

Background

Pre-war
Main articles: First Punic War, Barcid conquest of Hispania, and Siege of Saguntum
The approximate extent of territory controlled by Rome and Carthage immediately before the start of the Second Punic War.

The First Punic War was fought between Carthage and Rome, the two main powers of the western Mediterranean in the 3rd century BC struggled for supremacy primarily on the Mediterranean island of Sicily and its surrounding waters, and also in North Africa.[19] The war lasted for lasted for 23 years, from 264 to 241 BC, until the Carthaginians were defeated.[20][21] The Treaty of Lutatius was signed by which Carthage evacuated Sicily and paid an indemnity of 3,200 talents[note 3] over ten years.[23] Four years later Rome seized Sardinia and Corsica on a cynical pretence and imposed a further 1,200 talent indemnity.[note 4][24][25] The seizure of Sardinia and Corsica by Rome and the additional indemnity fuelled resentment in Carthage.[26][27] Polybius considered this act of bad faith by the Romans to be the single greatest cause of war with Carthage breaking out again nineteen years later.[28]

Shortly after Rome's breach of the treaty the leading Carthaginian general Hamilcar Barca led many of his veterans on an expedition to expand Carthaginian holdings in south-east Iberia (modern Spain and Portugal); this was to become a quasi-monarchial, autonomous Barcid fiefdom.[29] Carthage gained silver mines, agricultural wealth, manpower, military facilities such as shipyards and territorial depth which encouraged it to stand up to future Roman demands.[30] Hamilcar ruled as a viceroy and was succeeded by his son-in-law, Hasdrubal, in the early 220s BC and then his son, Hannibal, in 221 BC.[31] In 226 BC the Ebro Treaty was agreed, specifying the Ebro River as the northern boundary of the Carthaginian sphere of influence.[32] A little later Rome made a separate treaty with the city of Saguntum, well south of the Ebro.[33] In 218 BC a Carthaginian army under Hannibal besieged, captured and sacked Saguntum.[34][35] In spring 219 BC Rome declared war on Carthage.[36]

War in Cisalpine Gaul

In 218 BC the Romans raised an army to campaign in Iberia under the consul Publius Scipio, who was accompanied by his brother Gnaeus. The major Gallic tribes in Cisalpine Gaul (modern northern Italy), antagonised by the founding of several Roman towns on traditionally Gallic territory, attacked the Romans, capturing several towns. They repeatedly ambushed a Roman relief force and blockaded it in Tannetum.[37] The Roman Senate detached one Roman and one allied legion from the force intended for Iberia to send to the region. The Scipios had to raise fresh troops to replace these and thus could not set out for Iberia until September.[38]

Carthage invades Italy
Main article: Hannibal's crossing of the Alps
Hannibal's route from Iberia to Italy

Meanwhile, Hannibal assembled a Carthaginian army in New Carthage (modern Cartagena) over the winter, marching north in May 218 BC He entered Gaul to the east of the Pyrenees, then taking an inland route to avoid the Roman allies along the coast.[39][40] Hannibal left his brother Hasdrubal Barca in charge of Carthaginian interests in Iberia. The Roman fleet carrying the Scipio brothers' army landed at Rome's ally Massalia (modern Marseille) at the mouth of the Rhone in September, at about the same time as Hannibal was fighting his way across the river against a force of local Allobroges at the Battle of Rhone Crossing.[41][42][40] A Roman cavalry patrol scattered a force of Carthaginian cavalry, but Hannibal's main army evaded the Romans and Gnaeus Scipio continued to Iberia with the Roman force;[43][44] Publius returned to Italy.[44] The Carthaginians crossed the Alps with 38,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry[39] early in 217 BC, surmounting the difficulties of climate, terrain[39] and the guerrilla tactics of the native tribes.[45]

Hannibal arrived with 20,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry and 37 elephants[46][47] in what is now Piedmont, northern Italy. The Romans had already withdrawn to their winter quarters and were astonished by Hannibal's appearance. His surprise entry into the Italian peninsula led to the cancellation of Rome's planned campaign for the following year: an invasion of Africa by an army under the consul Tiberius Longus.[48] The Carthaginians needed to obtain supplies of food, as they had exhausted their reserve, and obtain allies among the north-Italian Callic tribes form which they could recruit, in order to build up their army to size with which it could effectively take on the Romans. The local tribe, the Taurini, were unwelcoming, so Hannibal promptly besieged their capital, (near the site of modern Turin) stormed it, massacred the population and seized the supplies there.[49][50] The modern historian Richard Miles believes that with these brutal actions Hannibal was sending out a clear message to the other Gallic tribes as to the likely consequences of non-cooperation.[51]

Hearing that Publius Scipio was operating in the region, he assumed that the Roman army in Massala which he had believed en route to Iberia had returned to Italy and reinforced the army already based in the north.[note 5] Believing that he would therefore be facing a much larger Roman force than he had anticipated Hannibal felt an even more pressing need to recruit strongly among the Cisalpine Gauls. He determined that a display of confidence was called for and advanced boldly down the valley of the Po. However, Scipio led his army equally boldly against the Carthaginians, causing the Gauls to remain neutral.[53][52] Both commanders attempted to inspire the ardour of their men for the coming battle by making fiery speeches to their assembled armies. Hannibal is reported to have stressed to his troops that they had to win, whatever the cost, as there was no place they could retreat to.[54]

After camping at Piacenza, a Roman colony founded earlier that year,[note 6] the Romans created a pontoon bridge across the lower River Ticinus and continued west. With his scouts reporting the nearby presence of Carthaginians, Scipio ordered his army to encamp. The Carthaginians did the same.[55] Next day each commander led out a strong force in order to personally reconnoitre the size and make up of the opposing army, things of which they would have been almost completely ignorant.[56][57]

Opposing forces
Carthaginian cavalry of Hannibal's army, as depicted in 1891

Anticipating an engagement as he closed with the Romans, Hannibal had recalled all of his scouts and raiding parties[58] and took with him an exclusively cavalry force which including almost all of his 6,000 strong mounted contingent. Carthage usually recruited foreigners to make up its army. Many would be from North Africa which provided two main types of cavalry: close-order shock cavalry (also known as "heavy cavalry") carrying spears; and light cavalry skirmishers from Numidia who threw javelins from a distance and avoided close combat.[59][60] Iberia provided also experienced cavalry: unarmoured close order troops[61] referred to by Livy as "steady", meaning that they were accustomed to sustained hand-to-hand combat rather than hit and run tactics. Hannibal's cavalry contingent would have consisted almost entirely of these three types, but the numbers of each are not known.[62]

Most male Roman citizens were eligible for military service and would serve as infantry, a better-off minority providing a cavalry component. Traditionally, when at war the Romans would raise two legions, each of 4,200 infantry[note 7] and 300 cavalry. Approximately 1,200 of the infantry, poorer or younger men unable to afford the armour and equipment of a standard legionary, served as javelin-armed skirmishers, known as velites. They carried several javelins, which would be thrown from a distance, a short sword, and a 90 centimetres (3.0 ft) shield.[65] It was the long-standing Roman procedure to elect two men each year, known as consuls, to each lead an army. An army was usually formed by combining one or several Roman legions with the same number of similarly sized and equipped legions provided by their Latin allies; allied legions usually had a larger attached complement of cavalry than Roman ones.[66][67] Scipio's army consisted of four legions, with approximately 16,000 infantry and 1,600 cavalry.[68] A further 2,000 Gallic infantry and 200 cavalry were also serving with the Romans.[69] Scipio led out all of his 1,800 cavalry and, anticipating that they would be outnumbered, supplemented them with a large but unknown number of 4,500 or so available light infantry javelin men.[56]

Battle

Neither the precise date nor the precise location of the battle are known: it took place in Late November 218 BC a little to the west of the west bank of the Ticinus.[70][71] Livy and Polybius both give accounts of the battle, which agree on the main events, but differ in some of the details.[72] Formal battles were usually preceded by the two armies camping one to seven miles apart (2–12 km) for days or weeks; sometimes forming up in battle order each day. In such circumstances either commander could prevent a battle from occurring, and unless both commanders were willing to at least some degree to give battle, both sides might march off without engaging.[73][74] Many battles were decided when one side's infantry force was attacked in the flank or rear and they were partially or wholly enveloped. It was unusual, prior to Ticinus, for one side's more mobile cavalry to be similarly enveloped.[60][75] During these periods when armies were encamped in close proximity it was common for their light forces to skirmish with each other, attempting to gather information on each others forces and achieve minor, morale-raising victories. These were typically fluid affairs and viewed as preliminaries to any subsequent battle.[56][76]

Hannibal placed his cavalry in a line with the close-order formations in the centre and the Numidian cavalry on the flanks, possibly held back slightly.[77] Scipio, who had gained a low opinion of the Carthaginian cavalry from the clash near the Rhine, expected an extended exchange of javelins and hoped that his velites, being smaller targets and better able to shelter behind their shields than the Carthaginian horses, would come off best.[56][76][78] On sighting the enemy, the velites sallied forward from behind their cavalry in order to advance within Javelin-hurling range. On seeing this, the whole of the Carthaginian close order cavalry promptly charged them. The Roman light infantry, realising that they would be cut down if the Carthaginians came into contact with them, turned and fled. The Roman cavalry, who were all close order – which is to say that they had their horses arrayed relatively closely together, and that their main role was to engage in hand to hand combat – attempted to counter charge the Carthaginians.[note 8] They were obstructed by the large number of their infantry attempting to pass through their ranks to the rear, and in the case of the Gallic cavalry, possibly by still having a javelin man riding into battle behind each of the cavalrymen, as was their tradition.[77] The modern historian Philip Sabin comments that the Roman cavalry and infantry got into a "dreadful tangle".[78]

The cavalry did not move into contact at speed, but at a fast walk or slow trot; any faster would have "ended in a growing pile of injured men and horses".[80] Once in contact with the enemy, many of the cavalrymen dismounted to fight; this was a frequent occurrence in Punic War cavalry combat.[81][78][56] There is debate among modern scholars as to the reasons for this common tactic.[note 9] Some of the Roman javelinmen reinforced their outnumbered cavalry comrades, but the extent to which this occurred is unclear.[84] The ensuing melee is recorded as continuing for some time, with no clear advantage being gained by either side.[85]

Then the Carthaginian light cavalry swept round both ends of the line of battle, and attacked the still disorganised velites, the small Roman cavalry reserve, to which Scipio had attached himself, and the rear of the already engaged Roman cavalry, throwing them all into confusion and panic.[86][56] The Velites, still aware of their vulnerability to cavalry, immediately fled. The Roman reserve cavalry attempted to protect the rear of the fighting line, but were surrounded and Scipio was badly wounded. The main force of Roman cavalry, attacked from both sides, routed and suffered heavy losses.[87][77] In the confusion Scipio's 16-year-old son, of the same name, leading a small group, cut his way through to his father and escorted him away from the fight, saving his life.[note 10][86]

Aftermath
The Trebbia today at Rivergaro, at the foot of the hills in which Scipio sought refuge from Hannibal's army.

Hannibal scattered the Roman forces, but he did not press his victory that day, perhaps because his forces were far outnumbered by the Roman infantry still in the fort. He left the field and Scipio's men gradually returned to base. He knew Hannibal would be back the next day with his whole army, would interpose himself between the Roman fort and the bridge and Scipio and all his men would be trapped, a set-up for another massacre. He therefore broke camp in the night, hastened to get over the bridge before dawn and was in Piacenza before Hannibal knew he had left camp.[88] Finding the camp empty the next morning, Hannibal followed the Roman trail to the river, capturing the 600-man guard over a torn-up bridge. He decided not to force a subsequent crossing of the Po under hostile fire at Piacenza, but turned, went up its left bank, found a convenient crossing and descended the right bank to camp before Piacenza two days later.[89]

The 2,200 Gallic troops serving with the Roman army attacked the Romans closest to them in their tents, and deserted to the Carthaginians; taking the Romans' heads with them as a sign of good faith.[69][21] Meanwhile, Scipio, again anticipating the consequences, immediately broke camp before dawn on that same night (or the next, in Livy) and slipping up the right bank of the Po to the west in the same direction from which Hannibal had come crossed the Trebia River, a right-bank tributary of the Po. Then he headed south along its left bank to the hills from which it flows, keeping the river between him and Hannibal.[90] The Numidian cavalry sent in pursuit made the mistake of burning the camp first, giving all but Scipio's rearguard time to cross the river. A day's march to the south, Scipio reached the hills, fortified the slope of one of them and settled down to rest and wait for the arrival of the second consul, Tiberius Sempronius Longus. The most likely site[91] is a 4.5 km (2.8 mi) ridge on the left bank across from Rivergaro some 20 km (12 mi) south of the Po. The locality was called ripa alta, "high bank", by the Romans, becoming Rivalta Trebbia. It is noted for the Castello di Rivalta, built over a permanent Roman castra of unknown origin.[92] Hannibal camped at a distance in the plain below, enthusiastically supplied by the Gallic population.[93]

The result of Longus' arrival would be the Battle of the Trebia, another Roman disaster.

Notes, citations and sources

Notes
  1. The term Punic comes from the Latin word Punicus (or Poenicus), meaning "Carthaginian", and is a reference to the Carthaginians' Phoenician ancestry.[1]
  2. Sources other than Polybius are discussed by Bernard Mineo in "Principal Literary Sources for the Punic Wars (apart from Polybius)".[17]
  3. 3,200 talents was approximately 82,000 kg (81 long tons) of silver.[22]
  4. 1,200 talents was approximately 30,000 kg (30 long tons) of silver.[22]
  5. The Roman army in Massala had, in fact, continued to Iberia under Publius's brother, Gnaeus; only Publius had returned.[52]
  6. It was the settling of Roman colonists at Piancenza and Cremona that had been the cause of several of the Gallic tribes initiating their campaign against Rome earlier in the year.[37]
  7. This could be increased to 5,000 in some circumstances,[63] or, rarely, even more.[64]
  8. One of cavalry's main advantages in close combat was their impetous; they were at a considerable disadvantage if struck by opposing cavalry while stationary.[79]
  9. The stirrup had not been invented at the time, and Archer Jones believes that its absence meant that cavalrymen had a "feeble seat" and were liable to come of their horses if a sword swing missed its target.[82] Sabin states that cavalry dismounted to gain a more solid base to fight from than a horse without stirrups.[78] Goldsworthy argues that the cavalry saddles of the time "provide[d[ an admirably firm seat" and that dismounting was an appropriate response to an extended cavalry versus cavalry melee. He does not suggest why this habit ceased once stirrups were introduced.[83] Nigel Bagnall doubts that the cavalrymen dismounted at all, and that the accounts of them doing so reflect the additional men carried by the Spanish dismounting and that the velites joining the fight gave the impression of a largely dismounted combat.[77]
  10. An ancient historian writing a century after the event claimed that it was a household slave, not Scipio's son, who saved him.[87] The younger Scipio was to go on to be Rome's most successful general of the war.[85]

Citations
  1. Sidwell & Jones 1998, p. 16.
  2. Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 20–21.
  3. Shutt 1938, p. 53.
  4. Goldsworthy 2006, p. 20.
  5. Walbank 1990, pp. 11–12.
  6. Lazenby 1996, pp. x–xi.
  7. Hau 2016, pp. 23–24.
  8. Shutt 1938, p. 55.
  9. Goldsworthy 2006, p. 21.
  10. Champion 2015, pp. 98, 101.
  11. Lazenby 1996, pp. x–xi, 82–84.
  12. Tipps 1985, p. 432.
  13. Curry 2012, p. 34.
  14. Champion 2015, p. 102.
  15. Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 21–23.
  16. Champion 2015, p. 95.
  17. Mineo 2015, pp. 111–127.
  18. Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 23, 98.
  19. Goldsworthy 2006, p. 82.
  20. Lazenby 1996, p. 157.
  21. Bagnall 1999, p. 97.
  22. Lazenby 1996, p. 158.
  23. Miles 2011, p. 196.
  24. Scullard 2006, p. 569.
  25. Miles 2011, pp. 209, 212–213.
  26. Hoyos 2015, p. 211.
  27. Miles 2011, p. 213.
  28. Lazenby 1996, p. 175.
  29. Miles 2011, p. 220.
  30. Miles 2011, pp. 219–220, 225.
  31. Miles 2011, pp. 222, 225.
  32. Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 143–144.
  33. Goldsworthy 2006, p. 144.
  34. Collins 1998, p. 13.
  35. Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 144–145.
  36. Goldsworthy 2006, p. 145.
  37. Goldsworthy 2006, p. 151.
  38. Zimmermann 2015, p. 283.
  39. Mahaney 2008, p. 221.
  40. Briscoe 2006, p. 47.
  41. Lazenby 1998, p. 41.
  42. Fronda 2011, p. 252.
  43. Zimmermann 2015, p. 291.
  44. Edwell 2015, p. 321.
  45. Lazenby 1998, pp. 43–44.
  46. Erdkamp 2015, p. 71.
  47. Hoyos 2015b, p. 107.
  48. Zimmermann 2015, pp. 283–284.
  49. Goldsworthy 2006, p. 168.
  50. Hoyos 2005, p. 111.
  51. Miles 2011, p. 266.
  52. Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 168–169.
  53. Lazenby 1998, p. 52.
  54. Goldsworthy 2006, p. 169.
  55. Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 169–170.
  56. Goldsworthy 2006, p. 170.
  57. Lazenby 1998, p. 98.
  58. Miles 2011, p. 268.
  59. Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 32–34.
  60. Koon 2015, p. 80.
  61. Goldsworthy 2006, p. 32.
  62. Lazenby 1998, p. 48.
  63. Bagnall 1999, p. 23.
  64. Goldsworthy 2006, p. 287.
  65. Goldsworthy 2006, p. 48.
  66. Bagnall 1999, pp. 22–25.
  67. Goldsworthy 2006, p. 50.
  68. Lazenby 1998, pp. 50–51.
  69. Rawlings 1996, p. 88.
  70. Lazenby 1998, p. 99.
  71. Daly 2002, p. 13.
  72. Livy XXI.45-48, Polybius III.65-68.
  73. Goldsworthy 2006, p. 56.
  74. Sabin 1996, p. 64.
  75. Sabin 1996, p. 66.
  76. Koon 2015, p. 83.
  77. Bagnall 1999, p. 172.
  78. Sabin 1996, p. 69.
  79. Jones 1987, pp. 103–104, 144–145.
  80. Koon 2015, p. 85.
  81. Koon 2015, pp. 85–86.
  82. Jones 1987, pp. 9, 103.
  83. Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 170–171.
  84. Koon 2015, p. 87.
  85. Goldsworthy 2006, p. 171.
  86. Lazenby 1998, p. 53.
  87. Hoyos 2015b, p. 108.
  88. Livy XXI.47.
  89. Polybius III.66.
  90. Polybius III.67.
  91. Grundy (1896) page 187.
  92. "Rivalta Castle Museum - Gazzola". Piacenza Museum. Archived from the original on 15 July 2011. Retrieved 17 March 2009.
  93. Polybius III.68.

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