Why Die for Danzig?

Why Die for Danzig? (French: Pourquoi mourir pour Dan(t)zig?, Polish: Dlaczego musimy umierać za Gdańsk?) is an anti-war French political slogan created on the eve of World War II.[1]

Article

The phrase originated in the title of an article ("Mourir pour Dantzig?") by the French Neo-Socialist writer Marcel Déat, published on May 4, 1939 in the Parisian newspaper L'Œuvre (L'Œuvre in French Wikipedia)[2][3] The article concerned one of the Nazi German ultimatums to the Second Polish Republic, regarding the demand to transfer control of the Free City of Danzig (Gdańsk) to Germany.[4] In the article, Déat argued in favor of appeasement.[5] He asserted that France had no interest in defending Poland, and that German Chancellor Adolf Hitler would be satisfied after receiving the territory he (rightfully, according to Déat[6]) demanded. He accused the Poles of warmongering and dragging Europe into a war.[6] Déat argued that Frenchmen should not be called to die paying for irresponsible Polish politicking,[6] and expressed doubts about whether Poland would be able to fight for any significant amount of time.[3] "To fight alongside our Polish friends for the common defense of our territories, of our property, of our liberties," wrote Déat, "this is a perspective that one can courageously envisage, if it should contribute to maintaining the peace. But to die for Danzig, no!" ("Mais mourir pour Dantzig, non !") [7]

Impact

Opinions on the significance and the impact of the slogan differ. The article and several similar pieces were noticed by diplomats and government officials, French and foreign, and elicited press releases from Prime Minister Édouard Daladier and Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet, who noted that this sentiment did not represent the majority views of either the French public and the French government, and reaffirmed their support for the Polish-French alliance.[8]

The slogan has been credited by Henry Kissinger with demoralizing the French in 1940,[1] but historian David Gordon argues that it was mostly marginalized by that time.[9] Historian Julian T. Jackson agrees, noting that while the slogan was taken up by some extremist groups, such as the British People's Party, for the most part at the time of being written it "fell largely on deaf ears".[10] According to historian Karol Górski, Déat's article, and the resulting slogan, gained some popularity in France and abroad,[6] and others list the groups among it resonated, such as the French intelligentsia,[4] far right[11] and isolationists.[12] It was however less popular among the general public; Thomas Sowell cites a French poll around that time showed that 76 per cent of the public was supportive of going to war over Danzig.[4]

This slogan was particularly negatively received in Poland,[13] and entered the Polish language as the phrase "umierać za Gdańsk", used as a type of an informal fallacy, describing an argument nobody should agree with.[14] It still appears in Polish political discourse and appears as a reference recognized by general public as of 2012.[15] A number of modern Polish sources cite this slogan arguing it was the dominant view shared by a majority of Frenchmen and even the British, claiming that the general mood of those countries was such that their citizens did not want to fight for their Polish ally.[16][17][18][19][20] The phrase has also been occasionally used in modern French and English language political discourse.[21][22][23] Back in 1939, the phrase was readily adopted by Nazi German propaganda, and used in French language broadcasts around the time of the Phoney War.[24]

Following French defeat by Germany and the creation of the Vichy regime, Déat became an advocate of fascism and a Nazi collaborator, going so far as to look for support in Nazi Germany for his fascist party, which was more radical than the Vichy regime.[25][26][27]

See also

• Western betrayal
• Why England Slept

References

1. Henry Kissinger (4 April 1995). Diplomacy. Simon and Schuster. p. 573. ISBN 978-0-671-51099-2. Retrieved 31 October 2012.
2. "Marcel Déat". Encyclopédie Larousse (in French). Retrieved 2012-11-06.
3. William Safire (12 October 2011). In Love with Norma Loquendi. Random House Digital, Inc. p. 152. ISBN 978-0-307-79975-3. Retrieved 31 October 2012.
4. Thomas Sowell (6 March 2012). Intellectuals and Society. Basic Books. pp. 306–307. ISBN 978-0-465-03110-8. Retrieved 31 October 2012.
5. The Higher Criticism by Daniel Bell | The New York Review of Books
6. Karol Górski (1983). Pologne--France. Książka i Wiedza. p. 417. ISBN 978-83-05-11067-9. Retrieved 31 October 2012.
7. "Combattre aux côtés de nos amis polonais pour la défense commune de nos territoires, de nos biens, de nos libertés, c’est une perspective qu’on peut courageusement envisager, si elle doit contribuer au maintien de la paix. Mais mourir pour Dantzig, non !" — Marcel Déat, "Mourir pour Dantzig", L'Œuvre, 4 mai 1939, cited in French Wikipédia's article on Marcel Déat
8. John Herman (1998). The Paris Embassy of Sir Eric Phipps: Anglo-French Relations and the Foreign Office, 1937-1939. Sussex Academic Press. p. 167. ISBN 978-1-902210-04-9. Retrieved 31 October 2012.
9. A NYMAS Fulltext Resource: France:1940
10. Julian Jackson (22 April 2004). The Fall of France:The Nazi Invasion of 1940: The Nazi Invasion of 1940. Oxford University Press. p. 202. ISBN 978-0-19-280550-8. Retrieved 31 October 2012.
11. Leszek Moczulski. Wojna Polska 1939. Bellona. p. 696. ISBN 978-83-11-11584-2. Retrieved 31 October 2012.
12. James MacGregor Burns (8 May 2012). Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom: 1940–1945. Open Road Media. p. 298. ISBN 978-1-4532-4516-3. Retrieved 31 October 2012.
13. Jacek Chrobaczyński (2002). "Nie okrył się niesławą naród polski": społeczne aspekty września 1939 roku. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Akademii Pedagogicznej. p. 11. ISBN 978-83-7271-139-7. Retrieved 31 October 2012.
14. Język i społeczeństwo. Czytelnik. 1980. pp. 307–308. ISBN 978-83-07-00347-4. Retrieved 6 November 2012.
15. Miller: PO jest gotowa umierać za Gdańsk, TVN24, 1 September 2012
16. Marian Podkowiński (1984). Po obu stronach Atlantyku. Wydawn. Poznańskie. pp. 293–296. ISBN 978-83-210-0485-3. Retrieved 31 October 2012.
17. Więź. CKPiW "Ruch". 1993. p. 12. Retrieved 31 October 2012.
18. Eugeniusz Guz (2009). Zagadki i Tajemnice Kampanii Wrześniowej. Bellona. p. 130. GGKEY:FRYJ6GBE7RE. Retrieved 31 October 2012.
19. Piotr Derdej (2009). Westerplatte-Oksywie-Hel: 1939. Bellona. p. 78. ISBN 978-83-11-11585-9. Retrieved 31 October 2012.
20. Ryszard Frelek (2000). Najkrótsza historia dyplomacji. Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza. p. 318. ISBN 978-83-88072-28-4. Retrieved 31 October 2012.
21. Estonian Academy Publishers (2004). Trames. Estonian Academy Publishers. p. 291. Retrieved 6 November 2012.
22. Martin Reichard (2006). The Eu-Nato Relationship: A Legal And Political Perspective. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. p. 197. ISBN 978-0-7546-4759-1. Retrieved 6 November 2012.
23. Irving Louis Horowitz (1 June 1981). Policy Studies Review Annual. Transaction Publishers. p. 758. ISBN 978-0-8039-1315-8. Retrieved 6 November 2012.
24. James Holland (15 March 2011). The Battle of Britain: Five Months That Changed History; May-October 1940. Macmillan. p. 95. ISBN 978-0-312-67500-4. Retrieved 31 October 2012.
25. Rémi Fournier Lanzoni (31 March 2004). French Cinema: From Its Beginnings to the Present. Continuum International Publishing Group. p. 105. ISBN 978-0-8264-1600-1. Retrieved 31 October 2012.
26. Judith Tydor Baumel (29 March 2001). The Holocaust Encyclopedia. Yale University Press. p. 184. ISBN 978-0-300-08432-0. Retrieved 31 October 2012.
27. Debbie Lackerstein (1 March 2012). National Regeneration in Vichy France: Ideas and Policies, 1930-1944. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. pp. 17–21. ISBN 978-0-7546-6721-6. Retrieved 31 October 2012.

Further reading

• Daniel Hucker (1 February 2011). Public Opinion and the End of Appeasement in Britain and France. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. ISBN 978-1-4094-0625-9. Retrieved 31 October 2012.