Vernichtungsgedanke

Vernichtungsgedanke, literally meaning "concept of annihilation" in German and generally taken to mean "the concept of fast annihilation of enemy forces", is a tactical doctrine dating back to Frederick the Great. It emphasizes rapid, fluid movement to unbalance an enemy, allowing the attacker to impose its will upon the defender and to avoid stalemate. It relies on uncommonly-rigorous training and discipline and thoroughly-professional leadership. Much of Vernichtungsgedanke can be seen in Carl von Clausewitz's classic treatise German: Vom Kriege, lit. 'On War'.

The doctrine was used in the War of Austrian Succession, the Seven Years' War, the Napoleonic Wars, the Austro-Prussian War and the Franco-Prussian War. The military success of the Kingdom of Prussia and later the German Empire was the catalyst of the alliance systems of 19th-century Europe.

The arms races of the period produced the military equipment that eroded the attacker's advantage during Europe's "Long Peace". It gave an advantage to the defender and set the stage for the stalemate of the First World War. The long reign of Vernichtungsgedanke as the prime tactical doctrine of modern warfare ended on the Western Front because of its huge concentrations of armed forces and materiel, which made it impossible to reach the enemy's flank or rear. On the Eastern Front the idea was, however, redeemed and flourished in the Battle of Tannenberg and others, mainly because they had a much lower density of forces and machines, which left more space to manoeuvre.

During the 1930s, British Army officers such as Vivian Loyd, proposed the widespread use of light tracked vehicles to provide speed and agility in support of tank units. Loyd's theory, known as the "armoured idea" or "all-tank idea", was not widely accepted by his superiors.

When World War II began, many German officers (chiefly General Heinz Guderian) were all too aware of this doctrinal failure and had specific ideas for its replacement. They had, however, to fight to overcome bureaucratic inertia. They mostly won those battles, bringing forth a doctrinal evolution during the war, which included the methodology now known as Blitzkrieg.

See also

References
  • Cooper, M. (1978). The German Army 1933–1945, its Political and Military Failure. Briarcliff Manor, NY: Stein and Day. ISBN 0-8128-2468-7.


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