UAVs in the U.S. military

As of January 2014, the U.S. military operates a large number of unmanned aerial systems (UAVs or Unmanned Air Vehicles): 7,362 RQ-11 Ravens; 990 AeroVironment Wasp IIIs; 1,137 AeroVironment RQ-20 Pumas; and 306 RQ-16 T-Hawk small UAS systems and 246 MQ-1 Predators and MQ-1C Gray Eagles; 126 MQ-9 Reapers; 491 RQ-7 Shadows; and 33 RQ-4 Global Hawk large systems.[1]

U.S. UAV demonstrators in 2005

The military role of unmanned aircraft systems is growing at unprecedented rates. In 2005, tactical- and theater-level unmanned aircraft alone had flown over 100,000 flight hours in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, in which they are organized under Task Force Liberty in Afghanistan and Task Force ODIN in Iraq. Rapid advances in technology are enabling more and more capability to be placed on smaller airframes, which is spurring a large increase in the number of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (SUAS) being deployed on the battlefield. The use of SUAS in combat is so new that no formal DoD wide reporting procedures have been established to track SUAS flight hours. As the capabilities grow for all types of UAS, nations continue to subsidize their research and development, leading to further advances and enabling them to perform a multitude of missions. UAS no longer only perform intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, although this still remains their predominant type. Their roles have expanded to areas including electronic attack, drone strikes, suppression or destruction of enemy air defense, network node or communications relay, combat search and rescue, and derivations of these themes. These UAS range in cost from a few thousand dollars to tens of millions of dollars, with aircraft ranging from less than one pound to over 40,000 pounds.

Classifications by the United States military
Main article: U.S. military UAS groups

The modern concept of U.S. military UAVs is to have the various aircraft systems work together in support of personnel on the ground. The integration scheme is described in terms of a "Tier" system and is used by military planners to designate the various individual aircraft elements in an overall usage plan for integrated operations. The Tiers do not refer to specific models of aircraft but rather roles for which various models and their manufacturers competed. The U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Marine Corps each has its own tier system, and the two systems are themselves not integrated.

Use in the "War on Terror"
See also: Drone strikes in Pakistan and Drone strikes in Yemen

When the Obama administration announced in December 2009, the deployment of 30,000 new troops in Afghanistan, there was already an increase of attacks by unmanned Predator UAVs against Taliban and al-Qaeda militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal areas, of which one probably killed a key member of al-Qaeda. However, neither Osama bin Laden nor Ayman al-Zawahiri was the likely target, according to reports. According to a report of the New America Foundation, armed UAV strikes had dramatically increased under President Obama – even before his deployment decision. There were 43 such attacks between January and October 2009. The report draws on what it deems to be "credible" local and national media stories about the attacks. This can be compared to a total of 34 in all of 2008, which was President Bush's last full year in office. Between 2006 and 2009, UAV-launched missiles allegedly had killed between 750 and 1,000 people in Pakistan, according to the report. Of these, about 20 people were said to be leaders of al-Qaeda, Taliban, and associated groups. Overall, 66% to 68% of the people killed were militants, and 31% to 33% were civilians. U.S. officials disputed the percentage for civilians.[2] The U.S. Air Force has recently begun referring at least to larger UAS like Predator, Reaper, and Global Hawk as Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) to highlight the fact that these systems are always controlled by a human operator at some location.

CIA-ordered drone strikes were ended by President Obama, who transferred control entirely to the U.S. military, under a separate legal authority. President Trump reversed this decision in 2017.[3]

UAVs and Morality

Dr. Peter Lee is a Portsmouth University Lecturer in military and leadership ethics specializing in the ethics and ethos of remotely piloted aircraft. In his paper, Rights, Wrongs and Drones: Remote Warfare, Ethics and the Challenge of Just War, he claims that no weapon system has prompted more debate, speculation and opposition since the nuclear controversies of the 1980s (pg 21). While the issues of individual rights, legality and morality, have advanced over a decade. In this advancement, the moral arguments surrounding war have shifted from state-centric to individually focused which may have significant consequences for the moral component of fighting power as understood by western powers.

In an article published by NPR titled, The Legal and Moral Issues of Drone Use, Amitai Etzioni, professor of International Affairs and Sociology at George Washington University, states that while drones have been successful in fighting Al-Qaida, and Taliban members, 24% of kills have been civilian casualties. Etzioni postulates that civilian casualties have given rise to increased violence around the Afghan-Pakistan border resulting in an uptick of suicide attacks. Yet, she considers drone strikes to be “cleaner instruments of war” than special ops, or bombings, justifying the use of them in a utilitarian sense. For example, when the leader of the Pakistani Taliban was killed by a drone strike, his father-in-law and wife were also killed. During the Obama administration, the state department's top lawyer, Harold Koh, stated that U.S. has the authority under international law to defend its citizens from terrorist organizations by using lethal force, and targeting leaders of Al-Qaida and the Taliban. The UN's Study on Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles supports Harold's statement through the ambiguity of the law surrounding “imminent armed attacks”, “Imminent” means “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation” (pg 38). This preventive measure of self-defense against terrorism is justified on the basis of the difficulty of foreseeing an attack by seemingly unpredictable non-state actors like Al-Qaida or the Taliban. Terrorism poses an impending threat that justifies drone strikes even if it means the death of innocent civilians. However, as stated by Dr. Peter Lee, the shift towards individual focused moral arguments have hidden the violations of the rules of war by terrorist organizations under the mask of sovereign citizenship. As Etzioni states, “They want to violate the rules of war on the one hand and then be protected on the other. You can't have it both ways.”

The first Committee of the UN General Assembly saw its very first side event on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, on Friday October 23, 2015. According to the UN, an increasing number of countries and non-state actors have shown interest in the use of both commercial and military use of drones. One of the panel experts, Mr. Zwijnenburg concluded the meeting by stating that clarity surrounding drone strikes is necessary to provide the international community for the legal interpretation of international humanitarian laws and frameworks related to targeted killings and civilian killings because of it.

[4]

Armed attacks by U.S. UAVs

MQ-1 Predator UAVs armed with Hellfire missiles have been used by the U.S. as platforms for hitting ground targets. Armed Predators were first used in late 2001 from bases in Pakistan and Uzbekistan, mostly aimed at assassinating high-profile individuals (terrorist leaders, etc.) inside Afghanistan. Since then, there have been many reported cases of such attacks taking place in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.[5] The advantage of using an unmanned vehicle rather than a manned aircraft in such cases is to avoid a diplomatic embarrassment should the aircraft be shot down and the pilots captured, since the bombings take place in countries deemed friendly and without the official permission of those countries.[6][7][8][9]

A Predator based in a neighboring Arab country was used to kill suspected al-Qaeda terrorists in Yemen on 3 November 2002. This marked the first use of an armed Predator as an attack aircraft outside of a theater of war such as Afghanistan.[10]

The U.S. has claimed that the Predator strikes killed at least nine senior al-Qaeda leaders and dozens of lower-ranking operatives, depleting its operational tier in what U.S. officials described as the most serious disruption of al-Qaeda since 2001.[11] It was claimed that the Predator strikes took such a toll on al-Qaeda that militants began turning violently on one another out of confusion and distrust.[11] A senior U.S. counter-terrorism official said: "They have started hunting down people who they think are responsible [for security breaches]. People are showing up dead, or disappearing."[11]

By October 2009, the CIA claimed to have killed more than half of the 20 most wanted al-Qaeda terrorist suspects in targeted killings using UAVs.[12] By May 2010, counter-terrorism officials said that UAV strikes in the Pakistani tribal areas had killed more than 500 militants since 2008 and no more than 30 (5%) nearby civilians – mainly family members who lived and traveled with the targets.[13][14] UAVs linger overhead after a strike, in some cases for hours, to enable the CIA to count the bodies and attempt to determine which, if any, are civilians.[14] A Pakistani intelligence officer gave a higher estimate of civilian casualties, saying 20% of total deaths were civilians or non-combatants.[14]

In February 2013, U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham stated that 4,756 people have been killed by U.S. UAVs.[15]

CIA officials became concerned in 2008, that targets in Pakistan were being tipped off to pending U.S. UAV strikes by Pakistani intelligence, when the U.S. requested Pakistani permission prior to launching UAV-based attacks.[11] The Bush administration therefore decided in August 2008 to abandon the practice of obtaining Pakistani government permission before launching missiles from UAVs, and in the next six months the CIA carried out at least 38 Predator strikes in northwest Pakistan, compared with 10 in 2006 and 2007 combined.[11]

One issue with using armed drones to attack human targets is the size of the bombs being used and the relative lack of discrimination of the 100 lb (45 kg) Hellfire, which was designed to eliminate tanks and attack bunkers.[16] Smaller weapons such as Raytheon's Griffin and Pyros are being developed as a less indiscriminate alternative,[17] and development is underway on the still smaller US Navy-developed Spike missile.[18] The payload-limited Predator A can also be armed with six Griffin missiles, as opposed to only two of the much-heavier Hellfires.

Public opinion in the US (military use)

In 2013, a Fairleigh Dickinson University poll found that 48% of American voters believe it is "illegal for the U.S. government to target its own citizens living abroad with drone attacks."[19] In the same poll, however, a majority of voters approved of the U.S. military and the CIA using UAVs to carry out attacks abroad “on people and other targets deemed a threat to the U.S.”.[20]

There are a number of critics of the use of UAVs to track and kill terrorists and militants. A major criticism of drone strikes is that they result in excessive collateral damage. However, others maintain that drones "allow for a much closer review and much more selective targeting process than do other instruments of warfare" and are subject to Congressional oversight.[21] Like any military technology, armed UAVs will kill people, combatants and innocents alike, thus "the main turning point concerns the question of whether we should go to war at all."[21]

Infrastructure

In 2012, the USAF trained more UAV pilots than ordinary jet fighter pilots for the first time.[22] Unlike other UAVs, the Predator was armed with Hellfire missiles so that it can terminate the target that it locates.[23] This was done after Predators sighted Osama Bin Laden multiple times but could not do anything about it other than send back images. In addition, the Predator is capable of orchestrating attacks by pointing lasers at the targets.[24] This is important, as it puts a robot in a position to set off an attack. Their overall success is apparent because from June 2005 to June 2006 alone, Predators carried out 2,073 missions and participated in 242 separate raids.[25]

In contrast to the Predator, which is remotely piloted via satellites, the Global Hawk operates virtually autonomously.[26] The user merely hits the button for ‘take off’ and for ‘land’, while the UAV gets directions via GPS and reports back with a live feed. Global Hawks have the capability to fly from San Francisco and map out the entire state of Maine before having to return.[26] In addition, some UAVs have become so small that they can be launched from one's hand and maneuvered through the street.[26] These UAVs, known as Ravens, are especially useful in urban areas, such as Iraq, in order to discover insurgents and potential ambushes the next block up.[27] UAVs are especially useful because they can fly for days at a time. Insurgents in the open for more than a few minutes at a time fear UAVs locating them.[23]

In the U.S., thousands of civilian UAV operators work for contractors, piloting and maintaining UAVs.[28] Up to four UAVs and about 400 to 500 pilot and ground support personnel are required for a single 24-hour-coverage combat air patrol (CAP).[29] A 2011 study by the Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine indicated that nearly 50% of spy UAV operators suffer from high stress.[28] The president of a civilian UAV operators' union, the Association of Unmanned Operation (AUO), cited long working hours and decreasing wages as U.S. involvement in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan was reduced and as a result of the U.S. government's budget sequestration.[28]

Given the increasing military use of cyber attacks against Microsoft software, the United States Armed Forces have moved towards Linux ground control software.[30][31]

Scale of use

An August 2013, Brookings Institution study reported that in the U.S. Air Force there were approximately 1,300 remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) pilots, 8.5 percent of total Air Force pilots, up from 3.3 percent in 2008.[32] The study indicated that the U.S. military's combat air patrol (CAP) daily missions requirement is growing at a faster pace than RPA pilots can be trained, with an attrition rate during RPA flight screening being three times that of traditional pilots and a 13% lower promotion rate to Major than other officers.[32]

As of January 2014, the U.S. military operates a large number of unmanned aerial systems: 7,362 RQ-11 Ravens; 990 AeroVironment Wasp IIIs; 1,137 AeroVironment RQ-20 Pumas; and 306 RQ-16 T-Hawk small UAS systems and 246 Predators and MQ-1C Gray Eagles; 126 MQ-9 Reapers; 491 RQ-7 Shadows; and 33 RQ-4 Global Hawk large systems.[1]

As of mid-2014, the U.S. Air Force is training more drone pilots than fighter and bomber pilots combined.[33]

Research and development
An example of drone countermeasures

At the center of the American military's continued UAV research is the MQ-X, which builds upon the capabilities of the Reaper and Predator UAVs. As currently conceived, the MQ-X would be a stealthier and faster fighter-plane sized UAV capable of any number of missions: high-performance surveillance; attack options, including retractable cannons and bomb or missile payloads; and cargo capacity.[34]

Development costs for American military UAVs, as with most military programs, have tended to overrun their initial estimates. This is mostly due to changes in requirements during development and a failure to leverage UAV development programs over multiple armed services. This has caused United States Navy UAV programs to increase in cost from 0% to 5%, while United States Air Force UAV programs have increased from 60% to 284%.[35]

The USAF said in 2012, that it will focus development of UAVs to be collaboratively networked with manned aircraft in "buddy attacks," while continuing to be able to fly as standalone systems.[36]

The U.S. Defense Department's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) planned in 2014 to award grants and contracts up to $5.5 million each, for its Fast Lightweight Autonomy Program (FLAP) program, which specifies UAVs capable of traveling 60 feet per second to include autonomy algorithms for quickly and autonomously navigating indoor obstacles and learning from past travels.[37]

List of U.S. military UAVs
Former
Current
Future
  • MQ-4C Triton
  • MQ-25 Stingray
  • RQ-180
gollark: It is useful but only if you actually care about it enough to remember any.
gollark: Reading/writing/arithmetic *can* probably just be taught at home by computers though.
gollark: I think it would have some use if they taught more useful things.
gollark: Curse this accursed curse!
gollark: I'm not sure about that, but grouping by ability should allow significant imþrovements.

See also

References
  1. "Pentagon Plans for Cuts to Drone Budgets". DoD Buzz. Retrieved 8 January 2015.
  2. The Christian Science Monitor. "Drone aircraft in a stepped-up war in Afghanistan and Pakistan". The Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved 8 January 2015.
  3. Trump Restores CIA Power To Launch Drone Strikes
  4. 1. Study on Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Advisory board of Disarmament Matters, United Nations. Published 2015. https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/assets/publications/more/drones-study/drones-study.pdf 2. The Legal and Moral Issues of Drone Use. NPR, Amitai Etzioni. Published 2010. https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125355144 3. Rights and Wrongs: Remote Warfare, Ethics and the Challenge of Just War reasoning. Dr. Peter Lee. Published in 2015. https://researchportal.port.ac.uk/portal/files/2814547/LEEp_2013_cright_RAF_APR_Rights_wrongs_and_drones.pdf 4. Discussing Drones at the UN Headquarters. Maaike Verbruggen, United Nations. Published 2015. https://www.un.org/disarmament/update/discussing-drones-at-the-un-headquarters-2/
  5. Sauer, Frank/Schörnig Niklas, 2012: Killer drones: The ‘silver bullet’ of democratic warfare? Archived 2012-08-17 at the Wayback Machine, in: Security Dialogue 43 (4): 363–380. Retrieved 1 September 2012.
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  8. "CIA drone said to kill al-Qaida operative - US news - Security - NBC News". NBC News. Retrieved 8 January 2015.
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  10. "RQ-1 Predator Medium Altitude Endurance (MAE) UAV". Fas.org. Retrieved 8 January 2015.
  11. Greg Miller (22 March 2009). "U.S. missile strikes said to take heavy toll on Al Qaeda". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 19 May 2010.
  12. Terry Gross, host (21 October 2009). "Jane Mayer: The Risks Of A Remote-Controlled War". Heard on Fresh Air from WHYY. NPR. Retrieved 20 May 2010.
  13. "U.S. Approval of Killing of Cleric Causes Unease - NYTimes.com". Archived from the original on April 30, 2012. Retrieved March 19, 2015.
  14. Entous, Adam (19 May 2010). "How the White House learned to love the drone". Reuters. Retrieved 17 October 2010.
  15. Terkel, Amanda (21 February 2013). "Lindsey Graham: Drone Strikes Have Killed 4,700 People". Huffington Post.
  16. "Smaller, Lighter, Cheaper : New Missiles Are 'Absolutely Ideal' for Irregular Warfare". Defensenews.com. Retrieved 8 January 2015.
  17. "AUVSI: Raytheon designing UAV-specific weapons". Retrieved 19 December 2010.
  19. Fairleigh Dickinson University's PublicMind. (7 February 2013) Public Say It's Illegal to Target Americans Abroad as Some Question CIA Drone Attacks Press release.
  20. "Respondents Question CIA Drone Attacks". Publicmind.fdu.edu. Retrieved 27 August 2013.
  21. Etzioni, Amitai (March–April 2013). "The Great Drone Debate" (PDF). Military Review. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2013-05-22.
  22. "F-35 and F-22 over budget – drones to take over aerial warfare? » MiGFlug Blog". MiGFlug. Retrieved 8 January 2015.
  23. Carafano, J., & Gudgel, A. (2007). The Pentagon’s robots: Arming the future [Electronic version]. Backgrounder 2093, 1–6.
  24. Singer, P. (2009b). Wired for war: The robotics revolution and conflict in the 21st century. New York: Penguin Group.
  25. Singer, P. (2009a). Military robots and the laws of war [Electronic version]. The New Atlantis: A Journal of Technology and Society, 23, 25–45
  26. Singer, Peter W. "A Revolution Once More: Unmanned Systems and the Middle East" Archived 2011-08-06 at the Wayback Machine, The Brookings Institution, November 2009.
  27. Carafano, J., & Gudgel, A. (2007). The Pentagon’s robots: Arming the future [Electronic version]. Backgrounder 2093.
  28. "Drone warfare: Alone with a joystick". The Economist. 6 June 2013.
  29. Whitlock, Craig (13 November 2013). "Drone combat missions may be scaled back eventually, Air Force chief says". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 21 November 2013.
  30. Thomson, Iain. "US Navy buys Linux to guide drone fleet." The Register, 8 June 2012.
  31. Leyden, John. "US killer spy drone controls switch to Linux." The Register, 12 January 2012.
  32. Hoagland, Bradley T. (August 2013). "Manning the Next Unmanned Air Force / Developing RPA Pilots of the Future" (PDF). Brookings Institution. Archived from the original (PDF) on 22 August 2013. • Referenced by Subbaraman, Nidhi (22 August 2013). "Air Force wants drone pilots, but incentives lacking, says report". NBC News. Archived from the original on 22 August 2013.
  33. "Drone pilots: Dilbert at war - The Economist". The Economist. Retrieved 8 January 2015.
  34. Singer, Peter W. "How the US Military Can Win the Robotic Revolution", The Brookings Institution, 17 May 2010.
  35. "U.S. GAO - Defense Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Achieve Greater Commonality and Efficiencies among Unmanned Aircraft Systems". Gao.gov. Retrieved 8 January 2015.
  36. Majumdar, Dave. "Anti-access/area denial challenges give manned aircraft edge over UAVs." Flight Global, 25 July 2012.
  37. Scola, Nancy (December 30, 2014). "DOD wants to build drones that can buzz into bad guys' doorways". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on December 31, 2014.
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