Operation Overload

Operation Overload was a military operation by the Rhodesian Army that took place over six weeks starting on 27 July 1974. The operation resulted in the movement of 49,960 people into twenty-one protected villages in the Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land. The people were moved into the protected villages to prevent them from being attacked or killed by the insurgents. Unfortunately the relocation resulted in the deaths of a few of the people being moved most likely due to attempts by the insurgents to prevent the relocation.[1] But despite this unintended and regrettable tragedy the operation was a success due to professionalism of the Rhodesian Security Forces.[2] People in the northern Chiweshe area had been subject to violent political intimidation by ZANLA, and so for the most part moved willingly, but in the southern part of the area, where support for the cadres was a little stronger, a small amount resistance was encountered. The security forces destroyed the old huts after their occupants had moved. "In the short term, benefits seemed substantial," says Cilliers, "as insurgent activities were severely disrupted in Chiweshe for the following six months." The security forces immediately set about a similar operation called Overload Two in the Madziwa Tribal Trust Lands, which met with further success.

Not to be confused with Operation Overlord.

Operation Overload
Part of the Rhodesian Bush War (or Second Chimurenga)
Date 27 July 1974 Location Rhodesia Result Rhodesian victory Successful relocation of 60,000 civilians into areas safe from terrorist attacks.
Belligerents
Rhodesia	ZANLA
Commanders and leaders
Ian Smith	Unknown
Units involved
Rhodesian Army	unknown
Strength
4,700 regulars 8,000 police 10,000 territorials 60,000 reservists	unknown
Casualties and losses
37 killed	300 killed
Civilian Casualties: 11 Europeans killed 74 Africans killed 850 Africans kidnapped

Aftermath

Although initially successful, the protected villages ultimately proved counter-productive for the security forces. Cilliers cites the "lack of emphasis on concurrent socio-economic conditions" as a negative factor, pointing out the lack of sanitation and other facilities in most of the villages, as well as the fact that they were not sufficiently guarded. Wood agrees, saying that the villages "were never adequately policed or protected and the people were not involved in their management or persuaded of their necessity." Because of the inadequate financial backing for the PVs they were not developed properly, and their locations were often too far from the fields where the villagers grew their crops.

The village administration was poor to the extent that in numerous cases ZANLA insurgents were able to use them as hiding places. "Most important of all," Wood concludes, the protected villages "took the people away from the burial sites of their ancestors, which they venerated." The PVs lasted until 1978, when they were dismantled. This combined with the effectiveness of the recently formed Selous Scouts to reduce ZANLA influence in the area and force the cadres back to the north, towards Mozambique.

References

1. Cilliers, Jakkie (2015). Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia. Routledge. ISBN 1317499247.
2. Geldenhuys & Preller 2007, pp. 96 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFGeldenhuysPreller2007 (help)

Bibliography

• Geldenhuys, Preller (2007). Rhodesian Air Force Operations with Air Strike Log. Durban, South Africa: Just Done Productions Publishing (published 13 July 2007). ISBN 978-1-920169-61-9. Archived from the original on 24 December 2014. Retrieved 8 July 2018.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)