Operation Musketeer (1956)

Operation Musketeer (French: Opération Mousquetaire) was the Anglo-French plan[1] for the invasion of the Suez canal zone to capture the Suez Canal during the Suez Crisis in 1956. The operation had initially been given the codename Operation Hamilcar, but this name was quickly dropped when it was found that the British were painting an air recognition letter H on their vehicles, while the French, who spelled Hamilcar differently were painting an A. Musketeer was chosen as a replacement because it started with M in both languages. Israel, which invaded the Sinai peninsula, had the additional objectives of opening the Straits of Tiran and halting fedayeen incursions into Israel. The Anglo-French military operation was originally planned for early September, but the necessity of coordination with Israel delayed it until early November.[2] However, on 10 September British and French politicians and Chiefs of the General Staff agreed to adopt General Charles Keightley's alterations to the military plans with the intention of reducing Egyptian civilian casualties. The new plan, renamed Musketeer Revise, provided the basis of the actual Suez operation.[3]

Israeli soldiers waving at a French Air Force aircraft

The operation
Troops of the Parachute Regiment escort a captured Egyptian soldier at Port Said

Headed by British Army General Charles Keightley, it was conducted in November 1956 in close coordination with the Israeli armoured thrust into the Sinai, which was called Operation Kadesh. Egypt's government, led by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, was seeking political control over the canal, an effort resisted by the Europeans. The army was originally to land at Alexandria, but the location was later switched to Port Said since a landing at Alexandria would have been opposed by most of the Egyptian army, necessitating the deployment of an armoured division. Furthermore, a preliminary bombardment of a densely populated area would have involved tens of thousands of civilian casualties. The naval bombardment of Port Said was rendered less effective by the decision to only use 4.5-inch guns instead of large caliber guns, in order to minimise the number of civilian casualties.[4]

The final land order of battle involved the Royal Marine Commando Brigade, the 16th Parachute Brigade, and the 3rd Infantry Division. To bring these formations to war establishment, the regular army reserve and selected national service reservists were mobilised. Most of the latter were sent to units in home stations (Britain and Germany) to replace regulars posted to the Musketeer force. Lieutenant General Sir Hugh Stockwell was appointed to command the landing force. A French parachute brigade joined 16th Parachute Brigade as it returned to Cyprus. The Commando Brigade completed refresher training in shore landings from helicopters, in association with the Mediterranean fleet, which was preparing to support the amphibious operation. Over the summer the Royal Air Force selected a range of targets whose loss would cripple Egyptian resistance.

Details of the secret plan for Israeli forces to invade the Sinai desert were revealed to the Chiefs of the Defence staff in October. On 29 October Israeli armour, preceded by parachute drops on two key passes, thrust south into the Sinai, routing local Egyptian forces within five days. Affecting to be alarmed by the threat of fighting along the Suez Canal, the UK and France issued a twelve-hour ultimatum on 30 October to the Israelis and the Egyptians to cease fighting. When, as expected, no response was given, Operation Musketeer was launched.

The air offensive began. The 3rd Division, minus the Guards Brigade, embarked on 1 November. The 45th Commando and 16th Parachute Brigade landed by sea and air on 5 November. Although landing forces quickly established control over major canal facilities, the Egyptians were able to sink obstacles in the canal, rendering it unusable. The Anglo-French air offensive suppressed Egyptian airfields not already attacked by the Israelis, but failed to destroy oil stocks or cripple the Egyptian army.[5] Cairo Radio continued to broadcast. The 3rd Battalion Parachute group captured El Cap airfield by airborne assault. The remaining units, held back initially for deep airborne targets, travelled by sea to Port Said. The Commando Brigade captured all its objectives. The French parachutists took Port Fuad, opposite Port Said. Elements of the 16th Parachute Brigade led by Brigadier M.A.H. Butler and a contingent of the Royal Tank Regiment set off south along the canal bank on 6 November to capture Ismailia.

Reaction

Worldwide reaction against Musketeer was massive and negative. The United States unexpectedly led condemnations of the action at the United Nations and in other forums, marking a sharp break in the "special relationship" between the United States and the United Kingdom. Of the countries in the Commonwealth, only Australia, South Africa and New Zealand supported the military operation, with Canada strongly opposing it. Just before midnight Brigadier Mervyn Butler was ordered to stop on the hour, when a ceasefire would come into effect. This raised a difficulty. There were Egyptian forces ahead; the British column was in open desert with no defensible feature to hand. Butler compromised, advancing until 0:15 a.m. to reach El Cap, where he sited the 2nd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment, with supporting detachments.[6]

While the military operation itself had been completely successful, political pressure from the United States obliged the British and French governments to accept the ceasefire terms drawn up by the United Nations. The 3rd Division landed to relieve the parachutists. While accepting a United Nations Emergency Force to replace the Anglo-French presence, Nasser nevertheless ensured the Canal could not be used by sinking or otherwise disabling 49 ships in the channel. Anglo-French forces were withdrawn by 22 December.

End of operation

When the United States threatened to devalue the British currency (the Pound Sterling),[7] the British cabinet was divided. Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden called a ceasefire, without Israeli or French officials being notified. This caused France to doubt the reliability of their allies. A few months later, French president René Coty ordered the creation of the brand new military experiments facility C.S.E.M. in the Sahara. It was used by his successor Charles de Gaulle to develop an autonomous nuclear deterrent against potential threats. The French atomic bomb Gerboise Bleue was tested in February 1960. In 1966, de Gaulle further loosened his ties with the Western Allies by leaving NATO's peacetime command structure.

Britain had a treaty with Jordan, and had a plan (Cordage) to give assistance to Jordan in the event of an attack by Israel. This led to the First Lord of the Admiralty (Hailsham) sending a memo to Eden on 2 October 1956 proposing the use of the light cruiser HMS Royalist for Cordage as well as Musketeer. HMS Royalist had just been modernised as an anti-aircraft radar picket ship, and was regarded as the most suitable ship for protection against the Mystère fighter-bombers supplied by France to Israel. But HMS Royalist had just been transferred to the Royal New Zealand Navy, and New Zealand's Prime Minister Sidney Holland did not in the end allow the Royalist to be used with the British fleet in the Mediterranean for Cordage or Musketeer (where her presence would indicate support by New Zealand). The memo indicates that Hailsham did not know of the negotiations of Eden and Lloyd with France and Israel for concerted moves against Egypt.[8]

Aftermath

Operation Musketeer was a failure in strategic terms. By mischance it covered the Soviet Union's military intervention in Hungary on 4 November. On this issue and, more generally, on the principle of premature military action against Egypt, the operation divided public opinion in the UK. It demonstrated the limitations of the UK's military capacity, and exposed errors in several staff functions, notably intelligence and movement control. Tactically successful, both in the sea and airborne assaults and the subsequent brief occupation.

French order of battle

French Navy

Ground forces

Most French units involved came from the 10th Parachute Division (10e DP).

United Kingdom order of battle
A Hawker Sea Hawk of 899 Naval Air Squadron, armed with rockets, about to be launched from the aircraft carrier HMS Eagle for a strike on an Egyptian airfield

Royal Air Force

British Army

These were supported by units from:

Royal Marines

Royal Navy

Fleet Air Arm

Royal Fleet Auxiliary

Civilian auxiliary ships
  • Ascania (troopship)
  • Asturias (troopship)
  • Ausdauer (chartered heavy-lifting vessel)
  • M/V Dispenser (salvage lifting vessel)
  • Dilwara (troopship)
  • Empire Fowey (troopship)
  • Empire Gaelic (troopship)
  • Empire Ken (troopship)
  • Empire Parkeston (troopship)
  • Energie (chartered heavy-lifting vessel)
  • SS Kingsbury (troopship)
  • New Australia (troopship)
  • MV Salinas (cargo ship)

Royal New Zealand Navy
  • HMNZS Royalist (cruiser), with the carrier group as a radar picket until 2 November, "but was ordered not to take part in any operations".[34]
gollark: I have no idea how to debug t his.
gollark: Ugh, how apious.
gollark: I IKR, right?
gollark: https://media.discordapp.net/attachments/426116061415342080/804473763923623936/uhffl26nm4e61.jpg
gollark: What is its viscosity?

See also

References

Citations
  1. Suez Crisis: Operation Musketeer
  2. Dupuy, R. Ernest and Dupuy, Trevor N. The Collins Encyclopedia of Military History Fourth Edition (1993) p. 1341
  3. Kyle, Keith (2011). Suez. London: I. B. Taurus. pp. 236–237. ISBN 978-1-84885-533-5.
  4. "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2011-06-29. Retrieved 2011-07-02.CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  5. The Oxford Illustrated History of the British Army (1994) p. 349
  6. The Oxford Illustrated History of the British Army (1994) General Editor David Chandler p. 349
  7. "The Art of Strategic Counterintelligence". Central Intelligence Agency. Retrieved 4 December 2015.
  8. ADM 116/6097, see Ties of Blood and Empire: New Zealand’s Involvement in Middle East Defence and the Suez Crisis 1947-57 by Malcolm Templeton, pages 130-131 (1994, Auckland University Press, Auckland, NZ) ISBN 1-86940-097-6
  9. Falls, Cyril. "Operation Musketeer". Brassey's Annual, the armed forces year-book, 1957. p. 77.
  10. Randier, Jean. La Royale, la torpille et la bombe. p. 155.
  11. Carter, Geoffrey. Crises Do Happen, the Royal Navy and Operation Musketeer, Suez 1956. p. 37.
  12. Jefford 1988, p. 151.
  13. Jefford 1988, p. 23.
  14. Cull 1996, p. 164.
  15. Jefford 1988, p. 26.
  16. Jefford 1988, p. 27.
  17. Jefford 1988, p. 28.
  18. Jefford 1988, p. 29.
  19. Jefford 1988, p. 30.
  20. Jefford 1988, p. 34.
  21. Jefford 1988, p. 35.
  22. Jefford 1988, p. 37.
  23. Jefford 1988, p. 39.
  24. Jefford 1988, p. 44.
  25. Jefford 1988, p. 53.
  26. Jefford 1988, p. 54.
  27. Jefford 1988, p. 55.
  28. Jefford 1988, p. 60.
  29. Jefford 1988, p. 62.
  30. Jefford 1988, p. 69.
  31. Jefford 1988, p. 71.
  32. Jefford 1988, p. 95.
  33. http://history.farmersboys.com/Postings/Malta/malta2.htm
  34. Carter, Geoffrey. Crises Do Happen, the Royal Navy and Operation Musketeer, Suez 1956. pp. 20–21.

Bibliography
  • Jefford, C G (1988). RAF Squadrons. A comprehensive record of the movement and equipment of all RAF squadrons and their antecedents since 1912. Shrewsbury: Airlife. ISBN 1-85310-053-6.
  • Carter, Geoffrey [2006] - Crises Do Happen: The Royal Navy And Operation Musketeer, Suez 1956. Maritime Books, Cornwall. ISBN 978-1-904459-24-8
  • Cull, Brian (1996). WINGS OVER SUEZ: The Only Authoritative Account of Air Operations During the Sinai and Suez Wars of 1956. London: Grub Street. ISBN 978-1-904943-55-6.
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.