Nancy L. Schwartz Memorial Lecture

The Nancy L. Schwartz Memorial Lecture is a series of public lectures held every year by the Kellogg Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences.[1][2][3]

Nancy Schwartz was the Morrison Professor of Decision Sciences. She was also the Kellogg School's first female faculty member appointed to an endowed chair. Schwartz became a part of Kellogg in 1970, chaired MEDS as well as served as director of the school's doctoral program until her death in 1981.[1] To date, sixteen out of the thirty-four speakers held or have gone on to win a Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences.

Lectures

1983 - 1989

  • Reinhard Selten (Nobel Laureate 1994). Evolution, Learning, and Economic Behavior.
  • Truman F. Bewley. Knightian Uncertainty.
  • Robert E. Lucas, Jr.,(Nobel Laureate 1995). On the Mechanics of Economic Development.
  • Robert J. Aumann (Nobel Laureate 2005). Cooperation, Rationality, and Bounded Reality.
  • Menachem E. Yaari. On the Role of 'Dutch Books' in the Theory of Choice Under Risk.
  • Andreu Mas-Colell. On the Theory of Perfect Competition.
  • Hugo Sonnenschein. The Economics of Incentives: An Introductory Account.

1990 - 1999

2000 - 2009

  • Drew Fudenberg. Learning in Games.
  • Roger B. Myerson (Nobel Laureate 2007). On the Foundations of Social Institutions.
  • Matthew Jackson. Social Structure, Segregation, and Economic Behavior.
  • Robert C. Merton. (Nobel Laureate 1997). How to Pursue Both Comparative Advantage and Efficient Diversification of Risk: An Application of Derivative Securities.
  • John O. Ledyard. Information Markets.
  • Daniel Kahneman (Nobel Laureate 2002). Psychology and Behavioral Economics.
  • Bengt R. Holmstrom (Nobel Laureate 2016). Corporate Governance.
  • Eric R. Maskin (Nobel Laureate 2007). How to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions: An Application of Auction Theory.
  • David Baron. Private Politics.
  • Oliver Hart (Nobel Laureate 2016). Financial Contracting.

2010 - present

  • Vincent P. Crawford. Puffery, Trickery, Rendezvous, and Reassurance: Nonequilibrium Models of Strategic Communication.
  • Paul Milgrom. Prices and Auctions in Markets with Complex Constraints.
  • Ehud Kalai. Chaos, Learning and Stability in Big Games.
  • Colin Camerer. When Game Theory Predicts Surprisingly Well, and Why.
  • Hal Varian. Predicting the Present with Search Engine Data.
  • Jean Tirole (Nobel Laureate 2014). Laws and Norms.
  • K. Daron Acemoglu. Why Nations Fail.
  • Al Roth (Nobel Laureate 2012). Market Design.
  • Susan Athey. Marketplaces, Intermediaries, and Product Quality.[4]
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References

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