Air supremacy

Air supremacy is a degree of air superiority where a side holds complete control of air warfare and air power over opposing forces. They are levels of control of the air in warfare. Control of the air is the aerial equivalent of command of the sea.

Air power has increasingly become a powerful element of military campaigns; military planners view having an environment of at least air superiority as a necessity. Air supremacy allows increased bombing efforts, tactical air support for ground forces, paratroop assaults, airdrops and simple cargo plane transfers, which can move ground forces and supplies. Air power is a function of the degree of air superiority and numbers or types of aircraft, but it represents a situation that defies black-and-white characterization. NATO forces in air superiority over Kosovo have lost a stealth strike aircraft to an "obsolete"[1] Serbian air defense system, and primitive An-2 biplanes (less visible to radar than metal planes) were considered for some time a serious capability of the Korean People's Air Force in North Korea.

The degree of a force's air control is a zero-sum game with its opponent's; increasing control by one corresponds to decreasing control by the other. Air forces unable to contest for air superiority or air parity can strive for air denial, where they maintain an operations level conceding air superiority to the other side, but preventing it from achieving air supremacy.

Friendly Forces Opposing Forces
Air supremacy Air incapability
Air superiority Air denial
Air parity Air parity
Air denial Air superiority
Air incapability Air supremacy

Levels
  • Air supremacy is the highest level, where a side holds complete control of the skies. It is defined by NATO and the United States Department of Defense as the "degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference."[2][3][4]
  • Air superiority is the second level, where a side is in a more favorable position than the opponent. It is defined in the NATO glossary as the "degree of dominance in [an] air battle ... that permits the conduct of operations by [one side] and its related land, sea and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by opposing air forces."[3]
  • Air parity is the lowest level of control, where a side only holds control of skies above friendly troop positions.

Methods
Main article: Offensive counter air

Although the destruction of enemy aircraft in air-to-air combat is the most glamorous aspect of air superiority, it is not the only method of obtaining air superiority. Historically, the most effective method of gaining air superiority is the destruction of enemy aircraft on the ground and the destruction of the means and infrastructure by which an opponent may mount air operations (such as destroying fuel supplies, cratering runways with anti-runway penetration bombs and the sowing of air-fields with area denial weapons). A historical example of this is Operation Focus in which the outnumbered Israeli Air Force dealt a crippling blow to the Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian Air Forces and airfields at the start of the Six-Day War, achieving Israeli air supremacy.

Disruption can be carried out through ground and air attack. On 6 December 1944, the Imperial Japanese Raiding Group Teishin Shudan destroyed B-29 aircraft on Leyte. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union claimed it could achieve air superiority despite the inferiority of its fighters, by over-running NATO airfields and parking their tanks on the runways, similar to what they have done during Tatsinskaya Raid during the Battle of Stalingrad (note the Germans used parts of their autobahn motorways as airfields during the last war). The Soviet Union planned to use its Spetsnaz special forces in attacks on NATO airfields in the event of conflict.

Attack by special forces is seen by some commanders as a way to level the playing field when faced by superior numbers or technology; attacking German aircraft and airfields was the main role which the British Special Air Service was formed for. Given the disparity in effectiveness between their own and South Korean and US fighters, North Korea maintains a large force of infiltration troops. In the event of a war, they would be tasked, among other missions, with attacking coalition airfields with mortar, machine gun and sniper fire, possibly after insertion by some 300 An-2 low radar-observable biplanes. Even in today's era of asymmetrical warfare, 15 fedayeen destroyed or severely damaged 8 Marine Harrier jump jets in the September 2012 Camp Bastion raid, with pilots fighting as infantry for the first time in 70 years.[5]

World War I

During the First World War, air superiority on the Western Front changed hands between the Germans and the Allies several times. Periods of German air superiority included the Fokker Scourge of late 1915 to early 1916, and Bloody April (April 1917).

The Italian Corpo Aeronautico Militare established air superiority over the Austro-Hungarian Imperial and Royal Aviation Troops at the Battle of Vittorio Veneto (late October 1918). The defeat suffered by Austria-Hungary in the battle caused the dissolution of the empire.[6]

Interwar period

In 1921, Italian aerial warfare theorist Giulio Douhet published The Command of the Air, a book positing that future wars would be decided in the skies. At the time, mainstream military theory did not see air power as a war-winning tactic. Douhet's idea that air power could be a decisive force and be used to avoid the long and costly War of Attrition was influential although later events proved him wrong in many details. In The War of 19, Douhet theorized that a future war between Germany and France would be settled in a matter of days, as the winner would be the one to gain air supremacy and destroy a few enemy cities with aerial bombs. (The targets would be announced ahead of time and all the population evacuated.) That would terrorize citizens into pressuring their government into immediate surrender. At the beginning of World War II, Douhet's ideas were dismissed by some, but it became apparent that his theories on the importance of aircraft were supported by events as the war continued.

In 1925, the Royal Air Force (RAF) tested the ability of air supremacy in isolation from other warfare forms during their first independent action in Waziristan. The operation, that later came to be known as Pink's War after Wing Commander Richard Pink in charge, used only air warfare in a combination of air attack and air blockade over 54 days to force militant tribes to surrender. The campaign was successful in defeating the tribes with two deaths for the RAF, but contemporary critics were not entirely convinced of its use in isolation; Commander-in-Chief, India General Sir Claud Jacob stated that "satisfactory ... the results of these operations have been, I am of [the] opinion that a combination of land and air action would have brought about the desired result in a shorter space of time, and next time action has to be taken, I trust that it will be possible to employ the two forces in combination."[7]

A 2,000 lb. bomb "near-miss" severely damages Ostfriesland at the stern hull plates in the Project B demonstration of naval air power

American general Billy Mitchell was another influential air power theorist of the inter-war period. After World War I, then-Assistant Chief of Air Service in the United States Army Air Service under Chief Mason Patrick, Mitchell arranged live fire exercises that proved that aircraft could sink battleships (the largest and most heavily armed class of warships). The first of these was Project B in 1921, in which the captured German World War I battleship, SMS Ostfriesland, was sunk by a flight of bombers in 22 minutes.

Mitchell's ideas were not popular, with his outspoken opposition to Army and Navy resistance resulting in a court-martial that precipitated his resignation,[8] but he would prove prescient; his 1924 inspection tour of Hawaii and Asia culminated in a report (published in 1925 as the book Winged Defense) that predicted future war with Japan, including the attack on Pearl Harbor.[9] He would also go on to influence air power advocates such as Russian-American Alexander P. de Seversky, whose 1942 New York Times bestselling book, Victory Through Air Power, was made into a 1943 Walt Disney animated film that opened with a quote from Mitchell; the film is reported to have been influentially shown by Winston Churchill to Franklin D. Roosevelt in support of long-range bombing.[10]

World War II
Royal Air Force Supermarine Spitfires before the Battle of Britain

At the beginning of World War II, the main sides took different views on the importance of air power. Germany saw it as a helpful tool to support the German Army, in an approach dubbed "flying artillery". The Allies saw it, specifically long-range strategic bombing, as being a more important part of warfare which they believed capable of crippling Germany's industrial centers.

After the Battle of France, the German air force (Luftwaffe) achieved air supremacy over Western Europe. The Battle of Britain represented a concerted attempt by Germany to establish air superiority over Britain, which it never achieved. Through home-territory advantage and Germany's failure to push home its strategy of targeting Britain's air defenses, Britain was able to establish air superiority over the territory – a superiority that it never lost. It denied the German military air superiority over the English Channel, making a seaborne invasion (planned as Operation Sea Lion) impossible in the face of Britain's naval power. Strategically, the overall situation at home and abroad at the end of the battle might be considered air parity between Britain and Germany. After the air battle, known as the Battle of Britain, the Germans switched to a strategy of night bombing raids, which Britain echoed with raids over Germany.

During Operation Barbarossa, the Luftwaffe initially achieved air supremacy over the Soviet Union. As the war dragged on, the United States joined the fight and the combined Allied air forces gained air superiority and eventually supremacy in the West. (For example, the Luftwaffe mustered 391 aircraft to oppose over 9,000 allied aircraft on D-day.) Russia did the same on the Eastern Front, meaning the Luftwaffe could not effectively interfere with Allied land operations. Achieving total air superiority allowed the Allies to carry out ever-greater strategic bombing raids on Germany's industrial and civilian centers (including the Ruhr and Dresden), and to prosecute the land war successfully on both the Eastern and Western fronts. Following the Big Week attacks in late February 1944, the new 8th Air Force commander Jimmy Doolittle permitted P-51 Mustangs to fly far ahead of the bomber formations instead of closely escorting them starting in March 1944. This commenced in March 1944 and was part of a massive "fighter sweep" tactic to clear German skies of Luftwaffe fighters. Allied planes went after the German fighters wherever they could be found and substantially lowered bomber losses for their side for the rest of the war over Western Europe.

361st Fighter Group P-51D Mustangs of the Eighth Air Force heading out on an air supremacy mission over Nazi Germany

The element of air superiority has been the driving force behind the development of aircraft carriers, which allow aircraft to operate in the absence of designated air bases. For example, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was carried out by aircraft operating from carriers thousands of miles away from the nearest Japanese air base.

Some fighter aircraft specialized in combating other fighters, while interceptors were originally designed to counter bombers. Germany's most important air superiority fighters were the Messerschmitt Bf 109 and Focke-Wulf Fw 190, while the Supermarine Spitfire and Hawker Hurricane were the primary ones on the British side. Performance and range made the P-51 Mustang the outstanding escort fighter which permitted American bombers to operate over Germany during daylight hours. They shot down 5,954 aircraft, more than any other American fighter in Europe. In the Pacific Theater, the A6M Zero gave Japan air superiority for much of the early part of the war, but suffered against newer naval fighters such as the F6F Hellcat and F4U Corsair which exceeded the Zero in performance and durability. The Hellcat shot down 5,168 enemy aircraft (the second highest number), while the land-based Lockheed P-38 was third, shooting down 3,785 in all theaters.[11]

After World War II

Cold War

During the Cold War between 1946 and 1991 the US, UK, and NATO allies faced the USSR and its allies and were engaged in an arms race of improving radar and fighter intercept capability versus the threat of intercontinental strategic bombers carrying nuclear weapons. Initially, high altitude, later combined with high supersonic speeds, was hoped to keep nuclear bombers out of range of fighters and later surface to air missiles, both of which were sometimes equipped with nuclear warheads. In the 1960 U-2 incident an American very high altitude spy plane was shot down over the USSR with a S-75 Dvina(SA-2) long range high altitude surface to air missile largely refuting the concept of high altitude as a refuge for high-performance bomber aircraft. US training changed to low altitude flight of bombers and unpiloted cruise missiles in the hopes of avoiding ground-based air defense radar networks by hiding in with ground clutter and terrain, thwarting attempts at air supremacy over the enemy landmass. Nuclear missiles were also introduced and were very difficult and expensive to intercept even with nuclear-armed defensive missiles. Airborne early warning and control flying radar aircraft as well as look down shoot down radar in fighter and interceptor aircraft allowed engaging low flying invaders again tipping the balance though this was partly ameliorated by succeeding generations of electronic countermeasures. Ultimately the US lead the way in first applying stealth technology to small strike aircraft like the F-117 and stealthy nuclear cruise missiles carried in conventional bombers for standoff release before the air defenses got too thick. The Soviet Union invested heavily in expensive to defeat intermediate and intercontinental range nuclear missiles and less on expensive to maintain patrol bombers, though they had to spend heavily on interceptors and surface to air missiles as well as radar sites to cover the huge landmass of the Soviet Union. The US joined with Canada to organize defense of the area of Alaska, Canada, and the continental US with North American Aerospace Defense Command or NORAD using both interceptors, some armed with the nuclear AIR-2 Genie, and a surface to air missile component, which was at one point partly nuclearized. Development for the B-2 stealth bomber was intended for, and in anticipation of, a nuclear war and it was the first fully mature stealth aircraft to enter service. The F-22 Advanced Tactical Fighter was a stealth fighter and interceptor aircraft designed during the Cold War as a medium altitude air superiority fighter which was intended to destroy Warsaw Pact aircraft without ever being detected or engaged; both were introduced after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

Air superiority in the feared Cold War era WW-III European theater would include fighters intercepting or diverting nuclear and conventionally armed strike aircraft and ground-based air defences some of which were developed into mobile systems which could accompany and protect armored and mechanized formations.

While the Cold War never went hot directly between NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances, the US was engaged in two major limited air wars aiding allies who faced Soviet supported enemies with both sides using weaponry designed to fight WW-III; the Korean and Vietnam wars.

Korean War
A United States Air Force F-15C Eagle air superiority fighter

In the Korean War, the swept-wing jet-powered MiG-15 quickly outclassed initial superiority of United Nations forces. The United States introduced its own swept-wing F-86 Sabre, which claimed kill ratios as high as 10 to 1 against the MiGs. The Grumman F9F Panther, the mainstay for the USN during the war, was a straight wing carrier-based jet; it had a good showing, even having a 7:2 kill ratio against the more powerful Mig-15.

Vietnam War

During the Vietnam war the US side, especially over the north, had restrictive rules of engagement often requiring visual identification nullifying the advantage they would have had using beyond visual range missiles though possibly avoiding friendly fire due to IFF systems not being ubiquitous on US strike aircraft. In the 1950s, the United States Navy tasked the F-8 Crusader, known affectionately as the "Last Gun Fighter" as their close-in air superiority fighter. This role would be taken over by the F-4 Phantom, which was designed as a missile armed interceptor. The USAF had developed the F-100 and F-104 as air superiority fighters, though by the Vietnam war had already phased out the F-100 from all but air support missions and the fast but slow turning F-104 allegedly deterred attacks and despite losses scored no victories in air combat but in the USAF was also replaced by the F-4 by 1967. Especially under the rules of engagement imposed on them the 'Century Series" aircraft initially specifically designed for intercepting heavy nuclear bombers or delivering tactical nuclear weapons were found to be wanting when they were engaged by the very agile fighters Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-17 and Shenyang J-6 provided to the VPAF by the USSR and PRC; the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21 while less agile was formidable against the F-4 and traded range for very high performance. This imbalance lead to the USAF ordering variants of the F-4 with an internal 20mm gun, and both the USAF and USN sometimes flying with centerline gun pods on aircraft not equipped with an internal gun.

In the 1960s, the limited agility of American fighters in dogfights over Vietnam led to a revival of dedicated air superiority fighters, which led the development of the "Teen Series" F-14, F-15, F-16 and F/A-18. All of them made close-combat manoeuvrability a top priority, and were equipped with guns absent from early Phantoms.[12] The heavy F-14 and F-15 were assigned the primary air superiority mission, because of their longer range radars and capability to carry more missiles of longer range than lightweight fighters.

Arab–Israeli wars

From 1948, when Israel reestablished independence from a protective League of Nations mandatory regime managed by the UK, the neighbouring countries have, to varying degrees, disputed the legitimacy of a Jewish state in a majority Arab region. Some neighbouring states have in the last few decades recognized and signed peace treaties; all have ceased large scale conventional warfare to overrun Israel in large part due to an increasing ability to impose Israeli air supremacy over the region's airspace when required.

1948 war

The Israeli Air Force formed in 1948 with the formation of the modern State of Israel. Israel was involved in the 1948 Arab–Israeli War immediately after the end of the British administration and occupation. The air force initially consisted of mainly donated civil aircraft, a variety of obsolete and surplus ex-World War II combat-aircraft were quickly sourced by various means to supplement this fleet. Creativity and resourcefulness were the early foundations of Israeli military success in the air, rather than technology which, at the inception of the IAF, was generally inferior to that used by Israel's adversaries. In light of the complete Arab theater air supremacy, and the bombing and shelling of existing airbases, the first Israeli military-grade fighters operated from a hastily constructed makeshift airbase around the current Herzliya Airport, with fighters dispersed between the trees of an orange orchard.[13][14] As the war progressed, more and more Czech, US, and British surplus WW-II aircraft were procured, leading to a shift in the balance of power.

1956 war

In 1956, Israel, France, and the UK invaded the Sinai after Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships in the Suez Crisis. Israel's new French-made Dassault Mystere IV jet fighters provided air cover for the paratroop transport aircraft. The Egyptian tactic was to use their new Soviet-made MiG-15 jets as fighter escorts, while their older jets conducted strikes against Israeli troops and vehicles.[15] In air combat, Israeli aircraft shot down between seven and nine Egyptian jets[15] with the loss of one plane,[16] but Egyptian strikes against the ground forces continued through to 1 November.[17] With the attack by the British and French air forces, President Nasser ordered his pilots to disengage to bases in Southern Egypt. The Israeli Air Force was then free to strike Egyptian ground forces at will.

1967 war
Israeli Air Force officers next to a destroyed Egyptian MiG-21 at Bir Gifgafa

In 1967, the Straits of Tiran were again closed and international peacekeepers were ejected by Egypt. Israel then initiated Operation Focus. Israel sent nearly every capable combat aircraft out against the vastly larger Egyptian Air Force, holding only four for protection. Egyptian airfields were destroyed with anti-runway penetration bombs and the aircraft were mostly destroyed on the ground; Syria and Jordan also had their air forces destroyed when they entered the conflict. This is one of the preeminent examples of a smaller force seizing air supremacy where Israel had complete control of the skies above the entire conflict area.

War of Attrition

Following the Six-Day War, from 1967 to 1970, there were small scale incursions into the Israeli-held Sinai desert as Egypt rearmed. This evolved into large-scale artillery and air incursions in 1969, with Soviet pilots and SAM crews arriving to assist in January 1970. The strategy was to engage Israeli aircraft in surprise fighter encounters near the Suez Canal where Egyptian SAMs could be used to assist fighters. Syrian, North Korean, and Cuban pilots assisting also suffered losses in this period. In August 1970, a cease-fire was agreed on.

1973 war

The first few days of the 1973 Yom Kippur War saw major Arab ground breakthroughs, surprising Israel who, after its lopsided 1967 victory, considered its air supremacy sufficient to blunt or dissuade any conventional attack. Despite Egypt and Syria having rebuilt their air forces since 1967, Israel continued to deny them the airspace over the battle area; however, these Arab forces were able to control losses and shoot down Israeli air support aircraft by employing mobile surface to air weaponry which travelled along with invading units. Most of Israel's air power in the first few days was directed to reinforce the badly mismatched garrison overlooking the besieged Golan Heights which was under attack by Syria. After weakening the Arab SAM cover with airstrikes, commando raids, and armored cavalry, the Arab armored units outran their mobile SAM cover and Israeli aircraft began to take greater control of Egyptian skies, permitting Israeli landings and establishing a beachhead on the west bank of the Suez canal. When Egyptian fighter aircraft were sent into the area of the Israeli bridgehead, SAM sites were offlined which allowed Israeli air power to more safely engage and destroy many Egyptian fighters though taking some losses.

1978 Lebanon conflict

The 1978 South Lebanon conflict was an invasion of Lebanon up to the Litani River, carried out by the Israel Defense Forces in 1978 in response to the Coastal Road massacre. Israel had complete air supremacy.

1982 Lebanon invasion

In the 1982 Lebanon War where Israel invaded up to Beirut, Syria intervened on the side of Lebanon and the PLO forces residing there. Israeli jets shot down between 82[18] and 86 Syrian aircraft in aerial combat, without losses.[19][20] A single Israeli A-4 Skyhawk and two helicopters were shot down by anti-aircraft fire and SAM missiles.[18][19][20] This was the largest aerial combat battle of the jet age with over 150 fighters from both sides engaged. Syrian claims of aerial victories were met with skepticism even from their Soviet allies.[21] The Soviets were so shaken by the staggering losses sustained by their allies that they dispatched the deputy head of their air defense force to Syria to examine how the Israelis had been so dominant.[22]

The Israelis have upheld substantial air superiority for most of this time with Israel able to operate almost unopposed; Israel held near air supremacy against targets anywhere within range in the Middle East and North Africa until today. Regarding aircraft procurement, Israel started with British and French designs, then transitioning to indigenous production and then also design before moving again to purchasing to American designs. The Arabs directly participating in these battles against Israel except for Jordan and, to some extent, Iraq have commonly used Soviet designs.

Syrian Civil War

Israel has upheld air superiority through the Syrian Civil War.[23] However, the deployment of a Russian S-400 missile battery into Syria has brought Israeli dominance into question.[24] During the February 2018 Israel–Syria incident, despite the loss of an aircraft, Israel has demonstrated their capability to operate without effective interference within the Syrian theater.[25]

1980s to present
See also: Argentine air forces in the Falklands War
A United States Air Force F-35A Lightning II fifth-generation stealth-fighter aircraft

In the 1980s, the United States opted for a newer fighter capable of gaining air superiority without being detected by an opposing force. The US government approved the Advanced Tactical Fighter program, resulting in the United States Air Force receiving new aircraft to replace their aging F-15 fleet. The YF-23 and the YF-22 were chosen as the finalists in the competition. The F-22, the subsequent result of the program, became operational in 2005, and has been dubbed the "fifth generation" of fighter aircraft.

In the Falklands War (2 April–20 June 1982),[26][27] the British deployed Harrier jets as air superiority fighters against Argentina's Mach-capable Dassault Mirage IIIEA fighters and subsonic Douglas A-4 Skyhawk jets.[28] Despite the Sea Harrier's numerical and performance disadvantages the British Harrier force suffered no air-to-air losses for over twenty Argentine aircraft shot down in aerial combat.

The Iraqi Air Force suffered almost complete obliteration in the opening stages of the Persian Gulf War (2 August 1990 – 28 February 1991). It lost most of its aircraft, as well as command-and-control capability, to precise Coalition strikes or when Iraqi personnel flew their aircraft to Iran. The Iraqis shot down relatively small numbers of opposing Coalition aircraft.

Anthony Cordesman wrote of NATO's theater air supremacy during its 1999 intervention in the Kosovo War of 1998–1999.[29] According to several reports, including reports by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that quote Russian sources, the Russian Federation has in recent decades formulated explicit strategies for using tactical nuclear weapons. These new strategies have in part resulted from the assumption of obtaining air supremacy and use by the U.S. Air Force of precision munitions with little collateral damage in the Kosovo conflict in what amounted to quick mass destruction of military assets once only possible with nuclear weapons or massive bombing against fellow Slavic Serbians; it also assumed that Russia and its allies do not have the strategic economic capacity of current NATO and allied nations to meet this threat with conventional weapons. In response Vladimir Putin, then secretary of the Security Council of Russian Federation, developed a concept of using both tactical and strategic nuclear threats and strikes to de-escalate or cause an enemy to disengage from a conventional conflict threatening what Russia considered a strategic interest. This concept was formalized when Putin took power in Russia in the following year.[30][31][32]

gollark: bad.
gollark: Praise the Consortium!
gollark: They are the UNICODE Box Drawing block æ.
gollark: ASCII contains NO (zero (0)) box drawing characters.
gollark: They are !!NOT ASCII!

See also

Notes
  1. "The conduct of the air campaign", North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) official website (Retrieved 26 July 2013)
  2. "Chapter 13: Air Power Definitions and Terms" (PDF). AP 3000: British Air and Space Power Doctrine. Royal Air Force. Archived from the original (PDF) on 28 September 2013. Retrieved 19 May 2013.
  3. "AAP-06 Edition 2013: NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions" (PDF). NATO. Archived from the original (PDF) on 3 March 2012. Retrieved 19 May 2013.
  4. "air supremacy". Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 8 November 2010 (amended through 15 April 2013). Department of Defense. Archived from the original on 21 September 2012. Retrieved 19 May 2013.
  5. Timperlake, Ed (21 September 2012). "Tribute To Camp Bastion Fallen; Taliban Targeted Harriers, Their 'Biggest Threat'". AOL Defense. Archived from the original on 24 October 2012. Retrieved 24 September 2012.
  6. Franks et al. 1997, pp. 111–113.
  7. "No. 33104". The London Gazette (Supplement). 20 November 1925. p. 7595.
  8. Colonel Meilinger, Phillip S. (USAF). "Billy Mitchell". Maxwell AFB. American Airpower Biography. Archived from the original on 24 September 2008. Retrieved 7 November 2015.
  9. Clodfelter, Mark A. (1997). "Molding Air Power Convictions: Development and Legacy of William Mitchell's Strategic Thought". In Melinger, Phillip S. (ed.). The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Air Power Theory (PDF). Alabama: Air University Press. pp. 79–114.
  10. Lawrence, John S.; Jewett, Robert (2002). The Myth of the American Superhero. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing. pp. 190–191. ISBN 0-8028-4911-3.
  11. "WWII US Aircraft Victories". Warbirds and Airshows. 11 June 1944. Archived from the original on 14 November 2013. Retrieved 14 October 2012.
  12. Flight International Magazine described the F-14 in 1969 as an "air superiority fighter".
  13. "המרכז הבינתחומי – הבסיס שעשה היסטוריה – וואלה! חדשות". 15 March 2017. Archived from the original on 15 March 2017. Retrieved 17 April 2019.
  14. "How Nazi Fighter Planes Saved Israel War Is Boring, 2016-15-08". Archived from the original on 7 September 2016. Retrieved 15 March 2017.
  15. Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars, p. 138 Random House, (1982)
  16. Nordeen, Lon Fighters Over Israel London 1991, p. 198
  17. Bishop, Chris ed. The Aerospace Encyclopedia of Air Warfare Volume Two: 1945 to the present Aerospace Publishing London 1997, pp. 148–153, ISBN 1-874023-88-3
  18. Rabinovich, p. 510
  19. Herzog & Gazit, pp. 347–348
  20. Walker, pp. 162–63
  21. Hurley, Matthew M. "The Bekaa Valley Air Battle". Airpower Journal (Winter 1989). Archived from the original on 23 September 2008. Retrieved 10 September 2008.
  22. Rabinovich, p. 510–511
  23. "IDF may need to alter its Syrian air strategy, but not because of a downed F-16". Times of Israel. Retrieved 12 February 2018.
  24. "Israel's air superiority clouded by new Russian missiles in Syria". Times of Israel. Retrieved 12 February 2018.
  25. David M. Halbfinger (11 February 2018). "Israel's Clash With Iran and Syria: 5 Takeaways". The New York Times. Retrieved 12 February 2018.
  26. "UK | Falklands war timeline". BBC News. 27 March 2007. Retrieved 14 October 2012.
  27. "BBC ON THIS DAY | 14 | 1982: Ceasefire agreed in Falklands". BBC News. Retrieved 14 October 2012.
  28. "Shropshire – Shropshire TV – Shawbury's farewell to Sea Harriers". BBC. Retrieved 14 October 2012.
  29. Cordesman, Anthony H. (2001). The Lessons and Non-lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo. Praeger Security International. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 203. ISBN 9780275972301. NATO forces rapidly achieved air supremacy in the theater by destroying Serb interceptor aircraft in the air and on the ground and by destroying or damaging their airbases.
  30. "Why Russia calls a limited nuclear strike "de-escalation"". 13 March 2014. Retrieved 16 August 2016.
  31. Colby, Elbridge. "The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the U.S.-Russian Relationship". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved 16 August 2016.
  32. Russia's Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, by Dr. Jacob W. Kipp, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth; published in Military Review May–June 2001

References
  • Franks, Norman; Guest, Russell; Alegi, Gregory. Above the War Fronts: The British Two-seater Bomber Pilot and Observer Aces, the British Two-seater Fighter Observer Aces, and the Belgian, Italian, Austro-Hungarian and Russian Fighter Aces, 1914–1918: Volume 4 of Fighting Airmen of WWI Series: Volume 4 of Air Aces of WWI. Grub Street, 1997. ISBN 1-898697-56-6, ISBN 978-1-898697-56-5.
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.