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An organization that develops software that may be subject to security evaluations such as Common Criteria is looking to externalize part of its IT infrastructure, including critical components such as source control management (i.e. internal services, we aren't talking about a merchant website here). Or not, depending on whether an external provider can provide the desired security (for a reasonable price).

How can we evaluate whether a hosting provider would meet our security requirements? What questions should we ask, both regarding the security of their offer and what documentation they can provide that our use of their services would meet CC requirements? Are there any official or reputable guidelines for requirements on IT infrastructure at various EALs?

Gilles 'SO- stop being evil'
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2 Answers2

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The "real" answer depends on where you intend to get your CC evaluations performed. There has been a recent upheaval in the CC evaluations world with US and Canada (and Australia) in one camp, and most of Europe in another camp. (I see from your uid that you may be in France.) Specific schemes may have specific requirements. You will need to contract with an evaluation facility anyway, so you might as well get that ball rolling.

The reason why the location is important is that the US/CAN market is moving to assurances at EAL2 and lower (and then they are going to get rid of assurance levels altogether). At EAL2, the only two things in scope for "infrastructure" purposes are the configuration management system and secure delivery/supply chain.

The requirements for EAL2 are pretty modest and basically say that you NEED to have a CM system and the product and documentation has to be controlled within the CM system. However, no demands are made on specific functionality other than to show that it is controlled (it doesn't even need to be automated for EAL2).

Now, in France, if I've correctly translated, the CC scheme (ANSSI: Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information) appears to be continuing down the path of medium-to-high assurance certifications (eg. EAL4 and up). At EAL4, there are significant security requirements levied on the development environment, tools, and the CM system.

The key, however, is that the CC is not prescriptive: it doesn't tell you what security functions you must have, only what the end result is (eg. it must protect the confidentiality and integrity of the product). One of the key things to remember is that where the developer's measures are deemed less than adequate by the evaluator, a clear justification must be provided based on the potential for an exploitable vulnerability.

I suggest you first look at what level of assurance you are looking to achieve (usually a marketing decision more than anything else). Use this decision to determine which assurance components are going to be included (dependent on the scheme, of course): this grid is found on page 231 (table 24) in Appendix E of CC Part 3. (For your situation, you are only interested in the ALC (Lifecycle) assurance class.) Then, look up these assurance components in the body of the same document. You are looking for the "Developer action elements" and "Content and presentation elements" such as ALC_CMC.2.1D and ALC_CMC.2.1C. It helps to know what an evaluator will be looking for, so I urge you to read the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) for the same assurance components. Based on what you find, you'll be in a better position to formulate the right set of questions. Many of these questions will be directed to your internal integration team, some will be questions about product features. As an example, at EAL4, you need to have automated access control and build integration (eg. ALC_CMC.4.4C and ALC_CMC.4.5C) in your CM system. However, you will also need an extensive "CM plan" describing how your development environment uses the CM system (ALC_CMC.4.6C). This will be developed internally.

I would find it highly unlikely that you'll find a list of products that are "CC Ready(tm)!". The reason is because CC is more concerned about the end result rather than how you get there. Therefore, a spreadsheet might be an acceptable form of configuration management system for EAL2 as long as there are policies and procedures in place to ensure it is enforced. This would not fly at EAL4. Conversely, just because you use the Bells and Whistles Source Control Management System(tm) doesn't mean you will pass at EAL2, either because you might not track all of the necessary items.

logicalscope
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  • I can't communicate publicly on the EAL, which is why I left my question somewhat vague. We haven't set the ball rolling on the evaluation — it's something we're planning for the future, but we're overhauling out IT now and don't want to end up with something we'll have to redo a few months down the line. The CEM is still a bit opaque to me. How much help would we typically need from the hosting provider to justify the security requirements? At what level do we need to demonstrate that what we claim is what we do? – Gilles 'SO- stop being evil' Jun 29 '12 at 18:15
  • You will likely start with a provider's high-level security architecture and drill down as required. The goal is to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE while in dev to reasonable assurance. If you can't prove this to yourself when hunting for providers, then you can't prove it to the evaluator. When talking to your CC consulting group or eval lab, make sure you specify that a 3rd party hosting service is being used. Demonstration of claims is done at EAL3 and higher for ALC items (except ALC_DEL which is done at EAL2 and higher), though it does depend on the scheme. – logicalscope Jun 29 '12 at 18:46
  • Be aware that generally only mature companies can achieve higher levels of assurance because many processes need to be altered or added to account for the increasing requirements laid down by the higher assurance components. That's not to say smaller companies cannot, but it would require more work to adjust internal processes and policies to make it happen. – logicalscope Jun 29 '12 at 18:48
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In this case, first, you would need to understand what is Dedicated Server, VPS and Cloud Server. Another thing would be to get your requirements, e.g. plaintext password storage @VPS Support, shared virtualization risks, processing power, security schemes like SELinux, GRSecurity, multi-level security, audit, monitoring, encryption. TIER-1 providers, global server load balancing, elastic scaling, backups, drive encryption, database encryption and the provider reputation as well price.

Then, you would need to start implementing this, the way you purchase a single server or two, and deploy the thing with their support, so you install SELinux, create accounts, harden the software and so on.

In 3rd step, you perform validation, e.g. you simulate what would happen, if somebody would break into your server via VPS hosting panel, or if your physical machine would be stolen. Once you got this, you are ready to certify the system and assuming you followed the process this should be formal only.

Which simply means, to perform proper evaluation, you need to design it, make it, check it and then you have evaluation done.

Rory Alsop
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Andrew Smith
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    This doesn't answer my question. I'm asking how to choose, not what vendor to choose. I'm also asking specifically about CC certifications and not about general security considerations (not that you're offering much more than buzzwords and hype). – Gilles 'SO- stop being evil' Jun 29 '12 at 18:16
  • As your machine is the device on which you will run the product meeting also CC criteria, you need to apply engineering process to this properly, and certify this at the end, when it meets the criteria, and the same process is also described here: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.125.5530&rep=rep1&type=pdf – Andrew Smith Jun 29 '12 at 18:25
  • Ah, thanks, this article is more interesting, even if it isn't directly applicable to my question. Do you know how their approach compares with others? I think an overview of typical approaches like this one would make a very good answer. – Gilles 'SO- stop being evil' Jun 29 '12 at 19:08
  • Others are better structured, like Microsoft SDL is a really a good model for this kind of security work. – Andrew Smith Jun 29 '12 at 20:28