I think it is fine to use SHA1 in SRP. SHA1 is fine for these purposes. Using SHA1 won't hurt the confidentiality of the key.
Some people say that "SHA1 has some weaknesses". However, those weaknesses are relatively minor, and in any case, they affect only SHA1's resistance to collision attacks. Those attacks don't affect or endanger SRP, since SHA1 isn't relying upon SHA1's collision-resistance. Changing to a different hash function isn't likely to improve the confidentiality of the key. For a more detailed discussion, see Section 3.4 of RFC 5054, which discusses the use of SHA1 in the SRP protocol.
I'm a bit leary about making changes to a cryptographic protocol, on general principles. Cryptographic protocols are tricky and little details can make a big difference to security, especially password-authenticated key agreement protocols (where the exact bit layout of some fields can be important to security). My suggestion would be to find an existing, well-vetted specification that gives a complete specification of the SRP protocol, and adopt that exactly. Making changes has the potential to introduce subtle security weaknesses.
However, if you wanted to change the hash function in the way you outlined, I think that would be a relatively reasonable, low-risk change. In fact, Section 3.2 of RFC 2945 (a specification of SRP version 3) does say it is OK to change SHA1 to another cryptographically strong hash function, so changing the hash used in the key confirmation step to SHA256 or SHA512 would probably be OK.