Royal Marie-Claire Open
The Royal Marie-Claire Open was a women's professional golf tournament on the Ladies European Tour that took place in France.[1]
| Tournament information | |
|---|---|
| Location | Evian-les-Bains, France |
| Established | 1999 |
| Course(s) | Royal Golf Club Evian |
| Par | 72 |
| Tour(s) | Ladies European Tour |
| Format | 54-hole Stroke play |
| Month played | May |
| Final year | 1999 |
| Tournament record score | |
| Aggregate | 215 Silvia Cavalleri (1999) |
| To par | −1 Silvia Cavalleri (1999) |
| Final champion | |
 | |
Winners
| Year | Dates | Venue | Winner | Country | Score | To par | Margin of victory | Runners-up | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1999 | 7–9 May | Royal Golf Club Evian | Silvia Cavalleri | | 215 | −1 | 1 stroke |  | [2] |
gollark: If the probability of false positives is low relative to the number of possible keys, it's probably fine™.
gollark: I don't think you can *in general*, but you'll probably know in some cases what the content might be. Lots of network protocols and such include checksums and headers and defined formats, which can be validated, and English text could be detected.
gollark: But having access to several orders of magnitude of computing power than exists on Earth, and quantum computers (which can break the hard problems involved in all widely used asymmetric stuff) would.
gollark: Like how in theory on arbitrarily big numbers the fastest way to do multiplication is with some insane thing involving lots of Fourier transforms, but on averagely sized numbers it isn't very helpful.
gollark: It's entirely possible that the P = NP thing could be entirely irrelevant to breaking encryption, actually, as it might not provide a faster/more computationally efficient algorithm for key sizes which are in use.
References
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