Operation Gadsden

Operation Gadsden
	Part of Vietnam War
Date	2-21 February 1967
Location	Tây Ninh Province, South Vietnam11.577°N 105.898°E
Result	Inconclusive
Belligerents
United States	North Vietnam
Commanders and leaders
MG Frederick C. Weyand	;
Strength
25th Infantry Division; 196th Infantry Brigade; 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division	271st Regiment
Casualties and losses
29 killed	160 killed (per US)

Operation Gadsden was an operation conducted by the 25th Infantry Division in Tây Ninh Province, lasting from 2 to 21 February 1967.[1]^:114

Prelude

Operation Gadsden was planned as a deception operation ahead of Operation Junction City. The 25th Infantry Division would seek to engage the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) 271st Regiment in Base Area 354.[1]

Operation

The operation commenced on 2 February with the 196th Infantry Brigade and the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, each reinforced by an additional battalion deploying into western War Zone C. Following B-52 strikes against suspected base areas of the 271st Regiment, the eight infantry battalions seized two abandoned border villages, Lo Go (11.577°N 105.898°E / 11.577; 105.898) and Xom Giua, which served as supply depots from the Sihanouk Trail in Cambodia.[1]

Subsequent sweeps confirmed the presence of the PAVN 271st Regiment, 70th Guard Regiment and 680th Training Regiments in the Lo Go area, although they failed to engage them.[1]

Aftermath

Operation Gadsden officially concluded on 21 February, the US claiming that PAVN losses were 160 killed, U.S. losses were 29 killed.[1]

The 196th Infantry Brigade returned to Tây Ninh Combat Base, while the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division deployed to blocking positions along Highway 22 for Operation Junction City.[1]

Contrasting the official view of the operation, internal reports by the Pentagon Papers indicate that the operation insignificant results, failing to dislodge or drive out the 271st Regiment.[2]

gollark: I'm talking about querying spirits automatically, doing it manually would be irritating.

gollark: Hmm, I should probably have asked before, what information can they access? What kind of error rate?

gollark: What kind of hardware do you need to run yes/no questions against arbitrary spirits? How fast do they operate?

gollark: Well, you could easily get around that by only asking very accurately specified questions. In bulk, probably, with some spirits being assigned the same one in case of errors.

gollark: What's the actual difference between "good" and "bad" ones? Do the bad ones answer questions wrong more often?

References

This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of the United States Army Center of Military History.

MacGarrigle, George (1998). Combat Operations: Taking the Offensive, October 1966 to October 1967. United States Army Center of Military History. ISBN 9780160495403. This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
"The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 4, Chapter 2, "US Ground Strategy and Force Deployments, 1965-1968, pp. 277-604, 4th section". www.mtholyoke.edu. Retrieved 2018-06-12.

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[MacGarrigle-1] MacGarrigle, George (1998). Combat Operations: Taking the Offensive, October 1966 to October 1967. United States Army Center of Military History. ISBN 9780160495403. This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.

[2] "The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 4, Chapter 2, "US Ground Strategy and Force Deployments, 1965-1968, pp. 277-604, 4th section". www.mtholyoke.edu. Retrieved 2018-06-12.