Clientitis

Clientitis (also called clientism[1][2] or localitis[3][4][5]) is the alleged tendency of resident in-country staff of an organization to regard the officials and people of the host country as "clients". This condition can be found in business, military, or government. The term clientitis is somewhat similar to the phrases "gone native" or "going native", and may have its origins in the 19th Century when small diplomatic missions were staffed by long-term expatriates with distant connections to their home country. 20th and 21st Century rapid communication with home ministries, and frequent rotations of staff, make the term anachronistic and less relevant in modern diplomatic context.

"Clientism" redirects here. It is not to be confused with Clientelism.

A hypothetical example of clientitis would be a Foreign Service Officer (FSO) or foreign diplomat, serving overseas at an Embassy, who drifts into a mode of rationalizing and defending the actions of the host country government. In such an example, the officer has come to view the officials and government workers of the host country government as the persons he is serving. Former USUN Ambassador John Bolton has used this term disparagingly to describe the culture of the U.S. State Department[6], but the available public record shows little genuine evidence of modern diplomatic clientitis.

An example from business would be a representative for a company living in another nation, representing that company to the host nation and other institutions in that country. A business representative suffering clientitis would defend the host country government and operating environment as if those were his employers.[7] A military example would be a defense attaché who identifies reflexively with the host country's military establishment.

Within the U.S. State Department

The State Department's training for newly appointed ambassadors warns of the danger of clientitis,[8] and the Department rotates FSOs every 2–3 years to avoid it.[9] During the Nixon administration the State Department's Global Outlook Program (GLOP) attempted to combat clientitis by transferring FSOs to regions outside their area of specialization.[4][10]

Robert D. Kaplan alleges that the problem "became particularly prevalent" among American diplomats in the Middle East because the investment of time needed to learn Arabic and the large number of diplomatic postings where it was spoken meant diplomats could spend their entire career in a single region.[3]

Anthony Lake argues that while clientitis is a danger, reflexive accusations of it can deter Foreign Service Officers from providing accurate analysis to policymakers.[11] In modern practice, with tight control from Washington or any other home office, and narrow advancement paths requiring deference to career interests, clientitis (as much as appeasement) is an obsolete label for diplomacy, and use of the stereotype may reflect an anti-elitist or unilateralist agenda. In contrast, caustic and realism-based diplomats' analyses, including recently those of former UK Ambassador Kim Darroch and former U.S. Ambassador Michael McFaul, demonstrate diplomats' main purpose in providing unvarnished opinion, at risk of angering the host government.

In the 1990s the phenomenon was seen within the State Department as being particularly acute in El Salvador, reflecting "both the polarization of the country and the highly ideological position of the United States within that polarization."[12]

Revelations about U.S. diplomatic cables however show how "U.S. ambassadors really felt about their host governments and gave an unvarnished view of the inner workings of American diplomacy. [And] sparked diplomatic firestorms across the world that left the State Department reeling."[13] Rather than identifying with host countries, modern diplomats compete with a range of open media and news sources to gain the attention and favor of their home offices, resulting in sharp, opinionated reporting identifying the national interests at stake, potential advantages to be gained, and sometimes writing attention-getting travelogues of local cultural conditions.

In "To The Secretary,"[14] former diplomat Mary Thompson-Jones "describes several types of cables: official updates, scene setters, biographical profiles, spot reports, daily media reaction and situation reports. “Knowing by instinct when and what to communicate back home is what makes a good diplomat,” she writes. “Their reporting must walk a line between loyally carrying out assignments from Washington, while making essential, sometimes contradictory, points to a foreign policy establishment that does not always want to hear them.”[15]

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See also

References
  1. "The Carter Years". Behind the disappearances: Argentina's dirty war against human rights and the United Nations. University of Pennsylvania Press. 1990. p. 156. ISBN 0812213130. Retrieved 2013-05-08.
  2. Timothy J. Lynch (2004). Turf War: The Clinton Administration And Northern Ireland. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. p. 87. ISBN 0754642941. Retrieved 2013-05-08.
  3. Robert D. Kaplan (1995). "The Arabists". Arabists: The Romance of an American Elite. Simon and Schuster. p. 122. ISBN 1439108706. Retrieved 2013-05-08.
  4. Meyer, Armin (2003). Quiet diplomacy: from Cairo to Tokyo in the twilight of imperialism. iUniverse. p. 158. ISBN 9780595301324.
  5. Freeman, Charles W. (1994). Diplomat's Dictionary. Diane Publishing. p. 58. ISBN 9780788125669.
  6. The American Spectator online, from November 6, 2007, review by Phillip Klein of John Bolton's book: Surrender Is Not An Option, http://www.spectator.org/dsp_article.asp?art_id=12270
  7. Baker, George, The Tortilla Curtain, or Why Home Office Communications Fail example given of an American business representative resident in Mexico suffering clientitis
  8. Vera Blinken; Donald Blinken (2009). Vera and the ambassador: Escape and Return. SUNY Press. p. 58. ISBN 978-1438426884. Retrieved 2013-05-08.
  9. Eizenstat, Stuart E. "Debating U.S. Diplomacy." Foreign Policy, No. 138 (Sep. - Oct., 2003), p. 84
  10. Kennedy, Charles Stuart (18 July 2003). "Interview with Ambassador Charles E. Marthinsen". Foreign Affairs Oral History Project. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. Check date values in: |year= / |date= mismatch (help)
  11. Anthony Lake (2009). Somoza falling. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. p. 109. ISBN 978-0395419830. Retrieved 2013-05-08.
  12. Teresa Whitfield (1994). Paying the Price: Ignacio Ellacuría and the Murdered Jesuits of El Salvador. Temple University Press. p. 227. ISBN 1566392535. Retrieved 2013-05-08.
  13. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/09/diplomats-fear-chilling-effect-british-ambassador-snub-kim-darroch-uk/
  14. Thompson-Jones, Mary A. (2016). To the Secretary: Leaked Embassy Cables and America's Foreign Policy Disconnect. ISBN 9780393246582.
  15. https://washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=14790:to-the-secretary-illustrates-importance-of-diplomats-and-american-disconnect&catid=1554:february-2017&Itemid=578
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