Battle of Byeokjegwan

The Battle of Byeokjegwan was a military engagement fought on 27 February 1593 between the armies of the Ming dynasty led by Li Rusong and Japanese forces under Kobayakawa Takakage. It resulted in Japanese victory and Ming retreat.[1]

Battle of Byeokjegwan
Part of the Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598)
Date February 27, 1593 (Gregorian Calendar); January 27, 1593 (Lunar calendar) Location Byeokjegwan, a postal station on the road to Hanseong Result Japanese victory
Belligerents
Japanese Sixth Division and reinforcements	Ming dynasty army and Korean allies.
Commanders and leaders
Kobayakawa Takakage Sayo Masakatsu Awaya Kagenao Inoue Kagesada Ukita Hideie Tachibana Muneshige Takahashi Munemasu Kikkawa Horoie	Li Rusong Zha Dashou Go Eonbaek Yang Yuan Zheng Wenbin Li Rumei Li Yousheng
Strength
<41,000[1][2] or 30,000 to 40,000 including infantry, cavalry and arquebus squads	3,000 cavalry with reinforcement of 6000-7000 infantry[3] Total: possibly 20,000
Casualties and losses
Varies	Varies

Background

After taking Pyeongyang, Li Rusong sent out Li Rubai, Zhang Shijue, and Yang Yuan with 8,000 troops. They retook Gaeseong on 19 February, and then the provinces of Hwanghae, Gyeonggi, and Gangweon.[4]

Next Li sent out scouting parties toward Hanseong, which Ryu Seong-ryong claimed had only some 10,000 Japanese troops.[3] Yang Yuan, Li Rubai, and Zhang Shijue were given 2,000 men and ordered to take positions north of Hanseong. When reports that the Japanese were pulling out of Hanseong came in, Li himself decided to head out with his vanguard, leaving the artillery behind. He sent Li Ning and Zu Chengxun even further ahead.[5]

Battle

The 3,000 strong advance force led by Zha Dashou, Zu Chengxun, and Go Eonbaek encountered a Japanese force of about 500 led by Jūji Den'emon. The Ming force retreated, luring Jūji into a bombardment and counterattack, killing 100.[6] Jūji's remaining troops retreated and Tachibana Muneshige attacked the Ming right flank with 2,000 troops. After suffering heavy losses due to a lack of cavalry, Tachibana retreated into the hills with 200 soldiers armed with firearms providing cover fire to prevent Ming forces from pursuing.[3]

Reinforcements led by Kobayakawa Takakage arrived at the battle, bringing Japanese forces to 15,000, forcing the Ming scouting party to retreat. At the same time, Li Rusong also arrived with 2,000 troops. Upon being informed of the Japanese presence by retreating soldiers, Li decided to take only half his men and charge ahead.[1] Li Rusong's 1,000 cavalry encountered 3,000 troops under Awaya Kagenao occupying the hills around Byeokjegwan and fired on them with rockets. Awaya responded with matchlock fire but was unable to stop the rapid cavalry advance and was forced to retreat. However this led Li into a bowl shaped area where Inoue Kagesada brought 3,000 troops to attack his left flank and Awaya his front.[3]

Meanwhile 5,000 Japanese troops attacked the retreating Ming forces led by Zha Dashou. Inoue and Awaya's men were relieved of their positions by Kobayakawa and Tachibana, while they marched north to encircle the Ming forces. Seeing that the situation was lost, Li gave the orders to retreat. Yang Yuan joined the battle with the 1,000 cavalry Li had left behind, catching the Japanese in a pincer attack, allowing Li to retreat.[1][3][6]

Li Rusong's horse was shot out from under him and was almost killed, however Li Yousheng used his body as a shield to cover him. Li Rusong's brother, Li Rumei, then shot out the assailant's horse from under him.[6]

The battle lasted from late morning until noon. Finally Li Rusong was forced to retreat in the face of superior numbers.[1]

Aftermath

The Japanese burned all the grass within the vicinity of Hanseong to deprive the Ming cavalry of fodder. According to Samuel Hawley, this led to the death of some 10,000 horses within a few days, but this number is disputed and possibly accounts for all horse casualties in the entire war.[1][7]

After the failure at Byeokjegwan, some Koreans called for the replacement of Li Rusong with Luo Shangzhi. Li also came under fire from his own subordinates. Wang Bidi accused him of denying his men adequate food and drink, directing battles from the rear, and refusing to give out the money or titles he had promised to those who first ascended the walls of Pyeongyang. Li deflected the blame towards Song Yingchang, a civil official.[8]

Casualties

As with many battles in the Imjin war, the casualty figure is wildly different depending on the source. Li Rusong first reported a casualty figure of 264 against a kill of 167 enemies to the chief overseer Song Yingchang,[9] though it was later blasted by other Ming officials back home of being faulty. An investigation concluded that the actual casualty figure was closer to the 2,000 range (as many of the retinue soldiers killed were off-the-record soldiers, the on-record soldiers casualty was indeed in the 200s). The first Korean report on the battle relayed a story from a different Ming general that was not directly involved in the battle that the Ming lost 1,500 men while only killing a little more than a hundred foe,[10] while the Japanese records seem to suggest that they lost 2,000-3,000 men while killing 6,000 men[11] of the Ming force. One source in particular suggests that the Ming lost 20,000 men,[12] (which would have been around 60% of the entire Ming army in Korea at that time).

Given the nature of the battle and the maneuvers of both sides in the days and months after the battle, it could be estimated both sides lost between 2,000 to 5,000 men, though the Ming casualties were almost entirely among their elite retinues, which made the number more significant than it would appear.

Other controversies

Although the official version of the story was that Li Rusong and the Ming forces were misled by faulty Korean intelligence, some of the other Ming generals (especially those that originated from the South) claimed that in fact it was Zha Dashou who misled Li and the other Ming forces. Zha thought that the Japanese forces were on the verge of collapse, and thus a fast and sudden advance on their position would cause them to pull out of Seoul, and as the vanguard of the group, he would gain the largest share of the glory. The generals cited that almost all of them were caught by surprise by Li's sudden departure the day before the battle, and scrambled to catch him.[13]

The battle and other disputes at Pyongyang and elsewhere led to an ever increasing friction between the Ming officers of different origins.

Citations

1. Hawley 2005, p. 314.
2. https://greatmingmilitary.blogspot.com/2019/08/critique-samuel-hawley-p1.html
3. http://greatmingmilitary.blogspot.com/2018/03/battle-of-byeokjegwan-part-1.html
4. Swope 2009, p. 159.
5. Swope 2009, p. 160.
6. Swope 2009, p. 161.
7. http://greatmingmilitary.blogspot.com/2019/08/critique-samuel-hawley-p1.html
8. Swope 2009, p. 164.
9. Letters by Song Yingchang on February 8th 1593 to the Minister of Military affairs Shi Shin in 經略復國要編
10. Annals of Seonjo entry on February 5, 1593 當日南兵千戶吳惟珊, 以調兵事過去言: ‘前月二十七日, 晌午, 天兵爲我國哨兵瞞報所誤, 謂「倭賊已退, 京畿已空」, 領兵前進, 倭賊曾已埋伏, 反被中截圍掩,斬倭僅一百二十餘, 天兵死傷一千五百
11. "日本戰史‧朝鮮役". Archived from the original on 2012-02-27. Retrieved 2010-06-17.
12. 日本外史
13. 錢世楨 所著之 "征東實錄"所記 (The accounts of the southern Ming general Qian Shizhen in his memoir Records of the Eastern expedition)

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