Alfred Blaisdell
Alfred Blaisdell (October 25, 1875 – March 8, 1946) was a North Dakota Republican Party politician who served as the Secretary of State of North Dakota from 1907 to 1910.[1] He was first elected to the position in 1906, was re-elected in 1908, but did not seek re-election in 1910. His nephew, Josiah Blaisdell, Jr., served in the North Dakota Legislative Assembly during the 1930s.[2]
Alfred Blaisdell | |
|---|---|
| 5th North Dakota Secretary of State | |
| In office 1907–1910 | |
| Preceded by | Edward F. Porter |
| Succeeded by | Patrick D. Norton |
| Personal details | |
| Born | October 25, 1875 |
| Died | March 8, 1946 (aged 70) |
| Political party | Republican |
Notes
- North Dakota Secretary of State | About the Secretary of State
- North Dakota Blue Book, 2005
| Preceded by Edward F. Porter |
Secretary of State of North Dakota 1907–1910 |
Succeeded by Patrick D. Norton |
Secretaries of State of North Dakota | ||
|---|---|---|
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gollark: So this is a mess. PotatOS is actually shipping a mildly different ECC library with a different curve because steamport provided the ECC code ages ago.
gollark: I mean, what do you expect to happen if you do something unsupported and which creates increasingly large problems each time you do it?
gollark: <@151391317740486657> Do you know what "unsupported" means? PotatOS is not designed to be used this way.
gollark: Specifically, 22 bytes for the private key and 21 for the public key on ccecc.py and 25 and 32 on the actual ingame one.
gollark: <@!206233133228490752> Sorry to bother you, but keypairs generated by `ccecc.py` and the ECC library in use in potatOS appear to have different-length private and public keys, which is a problem.EDIT: okay, apparently it's because I've been accidentally using a *different* ECC thing from SMT or something, and it has these parameters instead:```---- Elliptic Curve Arithmetic---- About the Curve Itself-- Field Size: 192 bits-- Field Modulus (p): 65533 * 2^176 + 3-- Equation: x^2 + y^2 = 1 + 108 * x^2 * y^2-- Parameters: Edwards Curve with c = 1, and d = 108-- Curve Order (n): 4 * 1569203598118192102418711808268118358122924911136798015831-- Cofactor (h): 4-- Generator Order (q): 1569203598118192102418711808268118358122924911136798015831---- About the Curve's Security-- Current best attack security: 94.822 bits (Pollard's Rho)-- Rho Security: log2(0.884 * sqrt(q)) = 94.822-- Transfer Security? Yes: p ~= q; k > 20-- Field Discriminant Security? Yes: t = 67602300638727286331433024168; s = 2^2; |D| = 5134296629560551493299993292204775496868940529592107064435 > 2^100-- Rigidity? A little, the parameters are somewhat small.-- XZ/YZ Ladder Security? No: Single coordinate ladders are insecure, so they can't be used.-- Small Subgroup Security? Yes: Secret keys are calculated modulo 4q.-- Invalid Curve Security? Yes: Any point to be multiplied is checked beforehand.-- Invalid Curve Twist Security? No: The curve is not protected against single coordinate ladder attacks, so don't use them.-- Completeness? Yes: The curve is an Edwards Curve with non-square d and square a, so the curve is complete.-- Indistinguishability? No: The curve does not support indistinguishability maps.```so I might just have to ship *two* versions to keep compatibility with old signatures.
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