How to manage backups of encrypted partitions

1

I have the following material with my laptop :

  • 20GiB SSD
  • 500GiB HDD (Disk A)
  • External HDD (Disk B)

What I want :

  • My Linux (Debian 9) encrypted at the partition level (that I manage), with classic separation (root-var-home-tmp-boot) on the SSD.
  • A backup of it. I'm not so sure about how I want it, ideally with some versionning but with the encrypted partition that would mean synchronize at the file system level, and then encrypt the backup.

For now, the best solutions I saw was either implementing RAID 1 (mdadm --> LUKS --> LVM --> ext4) or using rsync or dd.

It feels like mdadm is the best way to achieve what I want because of the encryption, and that using dd on a live partition might cause issues. But that means that I have to use continuously Disk A with a 120GiB volume, and Disk B as an optional disk being my real backup.

So is there any better way to go? I feel like there should be, in the end what I'd really like is some dd-like of the full disk, that could be done in boot before decryption or at shutdown. That would even be better for restoration, because I want to protect most against system corruption.
Is using a solution like rsync or dd better for performance, even if that means re-encrypting? Would there be an easy way to restore from a clean backup if the whole system is corrupted?

Any suggestions are welcome.
Thanks!

Zumado

Posted 2018-04-03T17:12:35.303

Reputation: 13

Answers

0

Provided you use AES encryption and your laptop supports aes-ni (almost all modern x86 cpus do), encryption and decryption is not expensive. Your best bet would probably be to use rsnapshot to an encrypted disk. Rsnapshot uses rsync and symlinks to provide simple to use versioning while only duplicating files which have changedand can even be done remotely over ssh ( meaning it can be automated and bandwidth limited to minimize performance impact). If using local removable disk, you could keep a key file for the encrypted removable disk on the main system (ie so it's only accessible once the main disk is decrypted), and make it fairly seem less - just make sure you have a backup of he key and/or a second alternate passphrase.

davidgo

Posted 2018-04-03T17:12:35.303

Reputation: 49 152

Thanks, I'm setting up that solution right now. I'll see how much time it takes to make snapshots (once the first is done). About ssh, unless you mean I can control it remotely, or adding a layer of encryption, I wouldn't transfer the data over it - it doesn't provide the same security as the full encrypted disk. – Zumado – 2018-04-05T18:52:33.977

You are confusing 2 things here - ssh encrypts data in flight/on the wire - and prevents interception of it - and it's ubiquitous so easy to add. This is entirely different to encryption at rest - which is how data is stored on disk. As encryption always has some cost - which you have deamed worthwhile - if you are not backing up to a physically attached disk, you really want both - ssh overhead is trivial compared to the cost of disk IO. – davidgo – 2018-04-05T19:02:46.013

"prevents interception of it" : No, that's what I meant, it doesn't. Maybe I'm too paranoid, but from the moment when it is disclosed that someone can break it, I do not consider it secure. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Shell#US_government_hack_of_SSH_protocols_confirmed

– Zumado – 2018-04-05T20:57:32.510

Huh? AFAIK, SSH is not known to be insecure (except for a specific implementation which was corrected many years ago). Please advise how it can be broken? – davidgo – 2018-04-05T20:59:52.327

Well I gave you a link. It's not broken per se, clients implementations are, and for years (CIA Gyrfalcon tool for OpenSSH on Linux). Anyway, it's just a general guideline I follow, unless I have to, I try not to communicate sensitive data over Internet (even encrypted). – Zumado – 2018-04-06T12:51:27.780

You do realise that Gyrfalcon requires the system already be uterly compromised - ie the person installing it already needs to have root? ( https://www.ssh.com/ssh/cia-bothanspy-gyrfalcon ) At that point they could just as easily replace the opens binary with a malicious one. Of-course, you also will have access to the private keys and mounted +ie unencrypted) data.

– davidgo – 2018-04-06T18:40:52.590