I read about an attack on the TESLA protocol which will be used in Galileo's navigation message authentication (Full article can be found here: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49806-5_1)
Basically, an attacker delays all messages to make the receiver change their time. The receiver believes that he is synchronizing its time with the sender while in reality he is changing his time to lag behind the sender.
When the time lag of the receiver is big enough, the attacker can receive the keys used to authenticate messages of an earlier Interval i and use that key to authenticate a fake message while the receiver still believes to be in Interval i (so the receiver still considers the already disclosed key as undisclosed)
While that article does not mention Galileo, I was wondering whether such an attack would still be possible with Galileo's OSNMA. Does Galileo have any countermeasures or features that make such an attack impossible or infeasible?
