The handshake part of the TLS 1.3 protocol has three goals:
- exchange certificates;
- let the server confirms that the client really have the secret key associated with the provided public certificate, without exchanging the secret key;
- exchange ephemeral keys.
Part 1 - Trust of certificate
Client sends its certificate with Certificate
message.
Server determines if the certificate is from trusted source. It verifies the signature of the client's certificate, then the signature of each intermediate certificate, until it finds a trusted certificate, either from a server-side list of trusted certificates, or from a trusted certificate authority (CA).
Pseudo-code:
- Alice (client) sends her public certificate to Bob (server) as well as the certificate chain.
- Bob hashes the certificate.
- Bob decrypts the certificate using the upper-level certificate in the chain.
- Bob compares the two results; if they match, Bob has the proof that the certificate was really signed using the upper-lever certificate.
- Bob continues through the chain (steps 2, 3, 4) until it finds a trusted certificate.
Part 2 - Trust of client
The client sends the Certificate Verify
message:
struct {
SignatureScheme algorithm;
opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
} CertificateVerify;
The signature scheme
tells hash function used and signature algorithm.
The signature
is produced by the client and verified by the server. The data actually signed is known by client and server and thus not re-sent (it's spaces, a context string, a zero byte and the previous messages).
Pseudo-code:
- Alice (client) generates an asymetric key pair.
- A trusted authority signs her public key, producing a public certificate.
- Alice hashes the data.
- Alice encrypts the hash using her encryption key (her private key).
- Bob (server) knows, from a previous message: Alice's public certificate and the certificate chain.
- Alice sends to Bob: signature, hash function and signature algorithm.
- Bob hashes the data.
- Bob decrypts the signature using Alice's public certificate.
- Bob compares the two results; if they match, Bob has the proof that the signature is associated with the data and Alice's private key generated the signature.
Now, Alice must keep her key secret, and the data must vary between requests to avoid Eve from replaying the request with same data and same signature.
I hope it helps you to better understand.
References:
http://www.garykessler.net/library/crypto.html#why3
https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/draft-ietf-tls-tls13.html
https://nodejs.org/api/crypto.html#crypto_class_sign
https://www.tutorialspoint.com/cryptography/cryptography_digital_signatures.htm