Yeo Jun Wei

Yeo Jun Wei (Chinese: 杨俊伟; pinyin: Yáng Jùnwěi;[7] born 22 February 1981), also known as Dickson Yeo, is a Singaporean and a spy accused for assisting People's Republic of China (China) to spy on United States. On 24 July 2020, he pleaded guilty at the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for assisting China in collecting information at the United States without prior notification made to United States Attorney General.

This is a Chinese name; the family name is Yeo.
Yeo Jun Wei
Born (1981-02-22) 22 February 1981[1]
Singapore
NationalitySingaporean
Other namesDickson Yeo
Education
Alma materNational University of Singapore (2009-2011), Master's degree in South East Asian Studies
AgentMinistry of State Security (China)
Known forSpying on US for People's Republic of China
Criminal charge(s)Acting in the United States as an Illegal Agent of a Foreign Government, in violation of 18 U.S. Code § 951 - Agents of foreign governments[2][3]
Criminal penaltyPending sentencing on 9 October 2020.[4]
Criminal statusPleaded guilty as charged on 24 July 2020.[4]
Yang Junwei
Traditional Chinese楊俊偉
Simplified Chinese杨俊伟
Hanyu PinyinYáng Jùnwěi
Yang Zhongwei [lower-alpha 1]
Traditional Chinese楊忠偉
Simplified Chinese杨忠伟
Hanyu PinyinYáng Zhōngwěi

Early life and education

Yeo was born and raised in Singapore. He studied at National Junior College between 1998 and 1999. Thereafter, he studied mass communications at Oklahoma City University between 2004 and 2006. He went on to National University of Singapore (NUS) to study the master's degree between 2009 and 2011.[8] He later started studying for a Doctor of Philosophy in Public Policy in 2015 at NUS Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (LKYSPP).[9][1] In 2019, he was granted a leave of absence from the programme.[1]

As a People's Republic of China agent

Being recruited

While still receiving education at LKYSPP, Yeo made a presentation on Southeast Asia's political situation at Beijing in 2015 and was approached by individuals who claimed to be China-based think tanks.[10] They offered him money in exchange for political reports.[10] Yeo later learnt that at least four of these individuals were Chinese intelligence officers. One of the intelligence officers later offered Yeo a contract to work with the People’s Liberation Army. Yeo refused to sign the contract but he continued to assist and work for the intelligence service.[11][10]

Between 2015 and 2019, Yeo had made frequent trips to China, meeting different operatives for at least 40 times.[lower-alpha 2] In each trip, he would be processed in a separate office, away from the custom lines upon arrival to conceal his identity.[10] Yeo would also maintained communications with the officers via WeChat, through by changing different WeChat accounts and phones each time they communicate.[10] However when Yeo was in United States, he was instructed not to communicate with the intelligence officers over concerns that their communications would be intercepted.[10] If need be, he would email them from a local coffee shop.[10] Yeo was also issued with a bank card to facilitate payments to his targets.[10]

Information gathering efforts

Yeo was tasked by the intelligence officers to provide them with information about international political, economic and diplomatic relations, and these information were to be of "non-public" in origin, and were referred to as "scuttlebutt".[10] In one of his meetings with the intelligence officers in China, he was specified to obtain non public information about the U.S. Department of Commerce, artificial intelligence, and the “trade war” between China and the United States.[12]

Yeo's focus was initially Southeast Asian centric, but subsequently was switched to United States. By combing through LinkedIn,[13][14] Yeo found Americans, including U.S. military and government employees with high-level security clearances, with resumes and job descriptions suggesting that they would have access to valuable non-public information which the Chinese intelligence officers seek. After he identified individuals worth targeting, Yeo followed guidance he received from Chinese intelligence operatives regarding how to recruit potential targets, including identifying their vulnerabilities, such as dissatisfaction with work or financial difficulties. Yeo then solicited them for non-public information and paid them to write reports. Yeo told these American targets that the reports were for clients in Asia, without revealing that they were in fact destined for the Chinese government.[11][10][4]

In 2018, Yeo created a fake consulting company that used the same name as a prominent U.S. consulting firm that conducts public and government relations, and Yeo posted job advertisements under that company name.[4][10] He would receive more than 400 resumes,[10] with 90 percent of them coming from U.S. military and government personnel with security clearances, and he passed resumes of interest to one of the Chinese intelligence operatives.[12][10]

Between January 2019 to July 2019, Yeo stayed in Washington, D.C., he attended several events and speaking engagements at D.C. area think tanks. Yeo also contacted several individuals from lobbying firms and defence contracting companies.[11][10]

Successful recruitment of individuals

Yeo managed to successfully recruit multiple United States citizens to provide him with information.[10]

In 2015, through LinkedIn, Yeo spotted an contacted a civilian who was working with United States Air Force on the F-35B military aircraft programme. The civilian held high-level security clearance, and was having financial trouble. Yeo had him to write a report. The civilian also had provided additional information about the geopolitical implications of the Japanese purchasing F-35 aircraft from the US from which Yeo drafted a report and sent it to his contacts in Chinese intelligence.[4]

In response to the job posting that Yeo had posted for his fake consulting company, an United States Army officer had sent in his resume. The officer was assigned to the Pentagon, US Army's headquarters, at that time. Yeo contacted the officer via a social networking app, and had met him on multiple occasions. The officer confided in Yeo that he was traumatised by his military tours in Afghanistan. Yeo asked him to write reports for clients in Korea and other Asian countries, and withheld the fact that it would be read by a foreign government. The officer wrote an report on how the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Afghanistan would impact China, which Yeo paid $2,000. The money was made to the officer's wife's account.[10][4]

Between 2018 and 2019, Yeo spotted another individual on LinkedIn who was employed at the US Department of State at the time.[10] This individual felt dissatisfied at work and was having financial trouble, worrying about his upcoming retirement. Despite his misgivings about jeopardising his retirement pension if it was made known that he had provided Yeo a report, he wrote a report about a then-serving member of the Cabinet of the United States, and was paid $1,000 or $2,000.[10][4]

Arrest

Sometime after the Army officer had provided his report, one of the Chinese intelligence officers instructed Yeo to recruit him to provide classified information. Yeo was also promised more money if the Army officer could become a permanent conduit of information. Yeo returned to United States in November 2019 with plans to ask the Army officer to provide classified information, and reveal who he was actually working for. However upon arrival at the airport, Yeo was stopped by law enforcement, questioned, and eventually arrested. No further contact with the Army officer could be made by Yeo.[10][12]

Conviction

Yeo's indictment was unsealed on 18 June 2020,[15] with a guilty plea from Yeo entered on 24 July 2020 in United States District Court for the District of Columbia.[16] In his plea, he admitted to the charge of "one count of acting within the United States as an illegal agent of a foreign power without first notifying the Attorney General",[3] in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 951.[2] Yeo faces up to 10 years in jail and will be sentenced on 9 October 2020.[16]

International reactions

United States

In the press release of Yeo's guilty plea, Alan E. Kohler, Jr., the Assistant Director of the FBI's Counterintelligence Division was quoted: "Mr. Yeo admits he set up a fake consulting company to further his scheme, looked for susceptible individuals who were vulnerable to recruitment, and tried to avoid detection by U.S. authorities. But this isn't just about this particular defendant. This case is yet another reminder that China is relentless in its pursuit of U.S. technology and policy information in order to advance its own interests.The FBI and our partners will be just as aggressive in uncovering these hidden efforts and charging individuals who break our laws."[4]

China

The Foreign Ministry spokesman, Wang Wenbin, told the media on 27 July 2020 that he was unaware of Yeo's espionage cases. Wang criticise United States and also berated United States to stop the "smear" campaign against People's Republic of China. Wang said: "I’m not aware of what you just mentioned, but I would like to point out that lately, US law enforcement has been busy hyping up the so-called China infiltration and espionage issues to the point of paranoia."[17][18]

Singapore

Singaporean officials

Responding to media queries, Singapore's Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) issued a statement on 26 July 2020 that it was informed by US authorities of Yeo's arrest in November 2019. Its investigations did not reveal any direct threat to Singapore's security. MHA reminded Singaporeans of the expectations to abide by the laws of the country which they visit or reside in. Appropriate consular assistance was rendered to Yeo as required,[19] a fact which the foreign affairs minister of Singapore, Vivian Balakrishnan confirmed.[20]

Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

The institution announced the termination of Yeo's PhD candidature on 26 July 2020, after the information of Yeo's criminal act were released by the United States Department of Justice.[1][21]

Reactions by notable persons

The retired Singapore diplomat, Bilahari Kausikan, criticised Yeo on his Facebook on 25 July 2020. Kausikan characterised Yeo for being fool and said his action could causes all Singaporeans to be suspected, and stated that it is not unreasonable to assume Yeo was recruited to work as spy when he was a student at the LKYSPP. Kausikan added that he later learnt that Huang Jing, the political scientist and alleged spy, was Yeo's supervisor in LKYSPP.[22]

When interviewed by the Singapore news media, Mothership, Kausikan referred to Yeo as a "traitor", and said: "the probability is that Yeo was 'at least talented spotted' by Huang or Huang 'played some sort of a role'", and that he did not believe that it was simply a pure coincidence.[23][24]

Huang stated that he was "shocked" when he learnt the news of Yeo's incident from another former student, he also felt glad that Yeo was caught.[25] Huang told the media that he seldom interacted with Yeo and only knew him as "Dickson Yeo". Huang also said that Yeo's academic performance was the worst among the six PhD students under Huang's supervision.[26] In response to Kausikan's allegations, Huang denied he recruited Yeo to conduct the espionage and told the media that Kausikan's claims were “nonsense” and “unreasonable”, as well as demanded Kausikan either prove the comments or retract them.[27]

Notes
  1. In some Chinese news reports, this name was used instead[5][6]
  2. As noted in Yeo's statement, he had met with an operative between 19 to 25 times, and another approximately 25 times.

References
  1. "Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy cancels Dickson Yeo's PhD candidature". CNA. Archived from the original on 2020-08-02. Retrieved 2020-08-08.
  2. "18 U.S. Code § 951 - Agents of foreign governments". Legal Information Institute. Archived from the original on 2020-05-19. Retrieved 2020-08-11.
  3. "Case 1:20-cr-00087-TSC Document 1 Filed 06/18/20". Archived from the original on 2020-07-28. Retrieved 2020-08-11.
  4. "Singaporean National Pleads Guilty to Acting in the United States as an Illegal Agent of Chinese Intelligence". www.justice.gov. July 24, 2020. Archived from the original on July 28, 2020. Retrieved August 1, 2020. This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
  5. "美中交恶新动态：新加坡公民承认在美国为中国搜集情报". July 26, 2020 – via www.bbc.com.
  6. Welle (www.dw.com), Deutsche. "新加坡公民在美承认为中国收集情报 | DW | 25.07.2020". DW.COM.
  7. 杨, 浚鑫 (2020-07-27). "本地男子在美涉间谍案 内政部：未威胁我国安全". 早报 (in Chinese). Retrieved 2020-08-13.
  8. "S'porean pleads guilty in US to gathering intelligence for China, faces 10 years' jail". mothership.sg. Archived from the original on 2020-07-28. Retrieved 2020-08-02.
  9. "PhD Student Profiles". lkyspp.nus.edu.sg. Archived from the original on 31 March 2019. Retrieved 2020-08-13.
  10. "How a Singaporean man went from NUS PhD student to working for Chinese intelligence in the US". CNA. Archived from the original on 2020-07-29. Retrieved 2020-08-02.
  11. Yang, George (2020-07-25). "Dickson Yeo Jun Wei: 11 Facts About the S'porean Who's a 'China Spy'". Goody Feed. Archived from the original on 2020-07-31. Retrieved 2020-08-01.
  12. "Statement of Offense". USAO-DC | Department of Justice. This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
  13. Ponniah, Kevin (2020-07-26). "The Chinese spy who hunted on LinkedIn". BBC News. Retrieved 2020-08-13.
  14. Quint, The (2020-07-27). "How a Chinese Agent Weaponised LinkedIn to Steal Sensitive Info". TheQuint. Retrieved 2020-08-13.
  15. "Case Unsealed as Specified | District of Columbia | United States District Court". www.dcd.uscourts.gov. Retrieved 2020-08-13.
  16. "Singaporean pleads guilty in US to working for Chinese intelligence". CNA. Retrieved 2020-08-13.
  17. "Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman "not aware" of Dickson Yeo spying case – The Independent News". Archived from the original on 2020-07-30. Retrieved 2020-08-03.
  18. "Dickson Yeo: China 'not aware' of case, says US should stop using 'espionage issue' to smear it". CNA. Archived from the original on 2020-07-30. Retrieved 2020-08-03.
  19. "Arrest of Dickson Yeo: Investigations have not revealed any direct threat to Singapore's security, says MHA". CNA. Archived from the original on 2020-08-02. Retrieved 2020-08-02.
  20. "S'porean who pleaded guilty in US to spying for China to receive consular assistance: Vivian". mothership.sg. Retrieved 2020-08-02.
  21. "Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy terminates Dickson Yeo's PhD candidature". mothership.sg. Archived from the original on 2020-07-31. Retrieved 2020-08-08.
  22. "'Chinese agent of influence' Huang Jing was PhD adviser of S'porean caught spying for China: Bilahari Kausikan". mothership.sg. Archived from the original on 2020-07-28. Retrieved 2020-08-02.
  23. "Ethnic-Chinese S'poreans may come under suspicion by Americans due to 'traitor' Dickson Yeo: Bilahari Kausikan". mothership.sg. Archived from the original on 2020-07-29. Retrieved 2020-08-02.
  24. "Professor demands Bilahari Kausikan prove or retract accusations of spy recruitment of Dickson Yeo – The Independent News". Archived from the original on 2020-07-31. Retrieved 2020-08-08.
  25. "Huang Jing 'glad' Singaporean ex-student was caught spying for China". South China Morning Post. 2020-07-27. Archived from the original on 2020-08-02. Retrieved 2020-08-03.
  26. "Deported academic Huang Jing demands ex-diplomat Bilahari Kausikan retract comment or prove it". mothership.sg. Archived from the original on 2020-08-03. Retrieved 2020-08-02.
  27. "Chinese-American academic denies recruiting Singaporean as a spy". South China Morning Post. 2020-07-27. Archived from the original on 2020-08-09. Retrieved 2020-08-03.
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