Roland Kirstein

Roland Kirstein (born (1965-08-10)10 August 1965) is a German economist and professor of Business Administration at the Otto-von-Guericke-University in Magdeburg, Germany.

Biography

Roland Kirstein was born Schröder in Bremen, Germany. He studied economics and law at the Saarland University in Germany in 1988-1994. He finished his Ph.D. thesis in 1998 (supervisor Prof. Dieter Schmidtchen) on the topic "Imperfect Decision-Making Judges". As an assistant professor of economics, he specialized in law and economics, namely banking regulation, insurance economics, and constitutional economics.

In 2002, Roland Kirstein visited the University of California, Berkeley (Law School, invited by Prof. Robert Cooter) and in Santa Barbara (Economics Department, invited by Prof. Ted Bergstrom) to do research into asymmetric information in consumer markets. Since 2003, he has been a visiting professor at the University of California, Santa Barbara, giving courses in Law and Economics.

Since October 2006, he holds the professorship "Economics of Business and Law" at the Otto-von-Guericke-University Magdeburg. In August 2007, he became a tenured professor. Since 2012 he is president of the German Law and Economics Association (Gesellschaft fuer Recht und Oekonomik e.V.).

Personal

Roland Kirstein is married to Annette Kirstein, with two children. He is a strong supporter and member of the German soccer club SV Werder Bremen.

Research areas

Law and Economics
Game theory, Bargaining theory
Collective Decision-Making in Organisations
Intellectual Property Rights
Regulation of Banking and Insurance, Islamic Finance

Achievements and awards

President of the German Law and Economics Association since 2012, vice president 2006-2012.
Member of the steering committee (2001-2005) and the advisory board of the European Association of Law and Economics.
Member of the following committees of the Verein für Socialpolitik: economic policy, competition, institutions.
Editorial Board of the journal Banks and Bank Systems.
Editorial board of The Reviews of Law and Economics.
Member of the Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Saarland University.
Eduard-Martin-Award of the Saarland University for his PhD thesis.

Memberships

American Economic Association (AEA), Royal Economic Society (RES), Verein für Socialpolitik (VfS).
American Law and Economics Association (ALEA), Canadian Law and Economic Association (CLEA), Greek Association of Law and Economics (GALE), European Association of Law and Economics (EALE).
Verband der Hochschullehrer der Betriebswirtschaft e. V. (VHB), Schmalenbachgesellschaft für Betriebswirtschaft, German Economic Association for Business Administration (GEABA).

Selected publications

Haucap, J./Kirstein, R. (2003): Government Incentives when Pollution Permits are Durable Goods; in: Public Choice 115, 163-183.
Kirstein, R. (2000): Risk-Neutrality and Strategic Insurance. In: The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance. Issues and Practice 25 (2), 262-272.
Kirstein, R. (2002); The New Basle Accord, Internal Ratings, and the Incentives of Banks. In: International Review of Law and Economics 21 (4), 393-412.
Kirstein, A./Kirstein, R. (2009): Collective Wage Agreements on Fixed Wages and Piece Rates may Cartelize Product Markets. In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 165(2), 250-259.
Kirstein, R./Cooter, R. (2007): Sharing and Anti-Sharing in Teams. In: Economics Letters 96(3), 351-356.
Kirstein, R./Rickman, N. (2004): „Third Party Contingency“ Contracts in Settlement and Litigation. In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 160 (4), 555-575.
Kirstein, R./Schmidtchen, D. (1997): Judicial Detection Skill and Contractual Compliance. In: International Review of Law and Economics 17 (4), 509-520.
Kirstein, R./Schmidtchen, D. (2001): Do Artists Benefit from Resale Royalties? An Economic Analysis of a New EU Directive. In: Deffains, B./Kirat, T. (eds.): Law and Economics in Civil Law Countries; The Economics of Legal Relationships Vol. 6, Elsevier Science, Amsterdam et al., 231-248.
Kirstein, R./Voigt, S. (2006): The Violent and the Weak. When Dictators Care about Social Contracts. In: American Journal of Economics and Sociology 65(4), 863-889.
Kirstein, R. / Will, B. (2006): Efficient Compensation for Employees' Inventions. In: European Journal of Law and Economics 21 (1), 129-148.

Referee reports

American Economic Review
B.E. Journals in Theoretical Economics
European Economic Review
European Journal of Law and Economics
German Economic Review
Homo Oeconomicus
Industrielle Beziehungen
International Journal of Industrial Organization
International Review of Law and Economics
Journal of Cultural Economics
Journal of Economic Studies
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
Metroeconomica
Political Studies
Schmalenbach Business Review
Theory and Decision
Cusanuswerk
Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD)
Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes
Verein für Socialpolitik

gollark: That might very well kill the prions, but unfortunately it will also kill whoever they happen to be in.

gollark: The answer is 3, of course.

gollark: Other body parts have protein in them too though.

gollark: They seem to mostly affect the brain for whatever reason.

gollark: This was a big issue in the UK some time back, apparently, as some very smart farmers wanted to save money by feeding cows dead cows.

External links

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