Operation All Clear

Operation All Clear was a military operation conducted by Royal Bhutan Army forces against Assam separatist insurgent groups in the southern regions of Bhutan between 15 December 2003 and 3 January 2004. It was the first operation ever conducted by the Royal Bhutan Army.

For others things named All Clear, see All Clear (disambiguation).

Operation All Clear
Part of Insurgency in Northeast India
A part of the 108 chörten built on the Dochu-La pass, to commemorate the operation
Date 15 December 2003 – 3 January 2004 Location Southern Bhutan Samtse District Samdrup Jongkhar District Sarpang District Zhemgang District Result Bhutanese victory Destruction of rebel encampments. Expulsion of the remaining rebels.
Belligerents
Bhutan Royal Bhutan Army Royal Bhutan Police Bhutanese Militia[1] Supported by: India	ULFA NDFB KLO NSCN ATTF BLTF[2][3] MULTA
Commanders and leaders
Jigme Singye Wangchuck Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck Jigme Thinley Lam Dorji Batoo Tshering Nirmal Chander Vij [4][5]	Arabinda Rajkhowa Bhimkanta Buragohain  (POW) Mithinga Daimary  (POW) Ranjan Daimary Milton Burman  (POW) Tom Adhikary  (POW) Harshabardhan Barman  (POW)[4][6][7]
Strength
6,000 RBA 634 Bhutanese Militia[1][6]	1,500–3,500 [6]
Casualties and losses
108 killed 35–60 wounded[8]	160 killed 490 captured[6]

Background

In 1990 India launched Operations Rhino and Bajrang against Assam separatist groups. Facing continuous pressure, Assamese militants relocated their camps to Bhutan.[6]

In the 1990s, United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) allegedly assisted the government of Bhutan in the expulsion of the ethnic Lhotshampa population, occupying the land left behind by the refugees.[5][9]

In 1996 the Bhutan government became aware of a large number of camps on its southern border with India. The camps were set up by four Assamese separatist movements: the ULFA, NDFB, Bodo Liberation Tigers Force (BLTF) and Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO). The camps also harbored separatists belonging to the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) and All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF).[4]

The camps had been established with the goal of training cadres and storing equipment, while the thick jungles of the region also enabled the militants to easily launch attacks into Indian territory.[10]

India then exerted diplomatic pressure on Bhutan, offering support in removing the rebel organisations from its soil. The government of Bhutan initially pursued a peaceful solution, opening dialogue with the militant groups on 1998. Five rounds of talks were held with ULFA, three rounds with NDFB, with KLO ignoring all invitations sent by the government. In June 2001 ULFA agreed to close down four of its camps; however, the Bhutanese government soon realized that the camps had simply been relocated.[6]

KLO had also been allegedly involved in establishing links between Nepalese Maoists and Bhutan Tiger Force, a Bhutanese militant organization. This strengthened the Bhutanese government's resolve to launch the operation.[9]

On 19 July 2003, a group of Bhutanese parliamentarians proposed to raise the number of Bhutanese militia, by introducing a Swiss-style militia training for all citizens aged between 18 and 50. The motion was dismissed by foreign minister Jigme Thinley and Brigadier General Batoo Tshering, who asserted that 5,000 Royal Bhutan Army soldiers have been deployed to the country's border with India.[11]

On 3 August 2003, more than 15 gunmen attacked a ULFA base in Kinzo, leaving two ULFA members dead. The attackers fled after the rebels returned fire.[12] The following day, a group of between 10 and 12 gunmen attacked ULFA members residing in an abandoned house in Babang. Four gunmen and one ULFA fighter perished in the encounter.[12] In response, a ULFA spokeswoman blamed the attacks on mercenaries and SULFA fighters hired by the Indian government. Indian officials attributed the attacks to rebel infighting.[12]

During the course of 2003, Bhutan reestablished its militia force.[1] By 15 September 2003, the Bhutanese militia consisted of 634 volunteers. The militia volunteers were deployed in the southern regions of the country, after undergoing a two-month training period. Bhutan's militia played a supporting role during the conflict.[1]

By 2003 the talks had failed to produce any significant result. On 14 July 2003, military intervention was approved by the National Assembly.[6] On 13 December 2003, the Bhutanese government issued a two-day ultimatum to the rebels. On 15 December 2003, after the ultimatum had expired, Operation All Clear – the first operation ever conducted by the Royal Bhutan Army – was launched.[13]

Operation

A map of Bhutan.

• 14 December 2003: According to two separate testimonies made by ULFA commanders, a Royal Bhutan Army major visited an ULFA encampment claiming that Bhutan's king was planning to make a friendly visit on the next day. Having received the king on numerous other occasions, the operation that followed came as a complete surprise to the militants.[7][10]
• 15 December 2003: The Royal Bhutan Army inflicted heavy casualties on the rebels; among the dead was ULFA commander Rahul Datta. A total of 90 rebels surrendered.[4][6] The army seized ULFA’s central command headquarters located at Phukatong in Samdrup Jongkhar.[14]
• 16 December 2003: The Indian Army deployed 12 battalions along the border with Bhutan to prevent rebel infiltration. India also provided helicopters in order to assist the Royal Bhutan Army troops with evacuating the injured. Clashes occurred in Kalikhola, Tintala and Bukka. Ten rebel camps were destroyed by the end of the day.[8][14]
• 18 December 2003: A group of ULFA rebels surrendered themselves at Buddha Vihar, after hiding in the jungle for three days.[7]
• 20 December 2003: Five days after the launch of operations, militants were dislodged from all 30 camps, with the camps burned and razed to the ground. Meanwhile, the army troops continued their efforts to combat resistance pockets in the dense forests of the southern districts.[6]
• 25 December 2003: Five top ranking militants, including KLO vice-chairman Harshabardhan Barman, were transferred to Tezpur, India by an Indian Army helicopter.[7]
• By 25 December 2003, the Royal Bhutan Army had killed about 120 militants. They managed to capture several senior ULFA commanders. Large numbers of rebels fled to Bangladesh and India.[4]
• By 27 December 2003, RBA confiscated 500 AK 47/56 assault rifles and a huge quantity of other weapons types including rocket launchers, mortars and communication equipment, along with more than 100,000 rounds of ammunition. An anti-aircraft gun was also found inside the ULFA headquarters. The captured rebels and civilians along with seized weapons and ammunition were handed over to the government of India.[15]
• 30 December 2003: An ULFA camp in Goburkonda is captured, after previously being subjected to mortar fire. A generator, 20 tonnes of rice and television sets were among the confiscated items.[16]
• By 3 January 2004, RBA destroyed 35 additional rebel observation posts.[17]
• According to the rebel leader Bhimkanta Buragohain alias 'Mama' Bhutan attack was betrayal, says Ulfa leader .The women cadres were making pithas for the King of Bhutan while the men were sprucing up the camp to welcome him when the first shots rang out, breaking the morning calm. The gunshots signalled the launch of Operation All Clear, which, by the time it ended after three days, not only left Ulfa in utter disarray, but, more importantly, dealt a crippling blow to its confidence and the fight for a sovereign Assam. That was on December 15, 2003. It was a morning — cold, with the sun struggling to break through the clouds. There was a cheer in the camp as we were expecting the King of Bhutan. The previous day (December 14), I was sitting in front of my camp at our central headquarters along with my bodyguards and some of our cadres after having my morning meal when a major from the Royal Bhutan Army (RBA), whom I knew very well, came and informed us that the King would be visiting our camp the next morning. The King had visited our camp on a couple of occasions earlier, too. The army official exchanged pleasantries and handed over some gifts, including a huge box of fresh oranges and a silver bottle of US-made vitamin pills. On December 15, all of us — there were around a hundred of us including women and children — got up early and started preparing for the King’s visit. The women were preparing Assamese pithas, while I instructed my men to tidy up the camp and line up along the three approach roads to accord a ceremonial welcome to the King. Everything was ready. Around 8.30am, I heard the first gunshots. Initially, I thought our boys were firing to welcome the King. Quickly, though, I realised that the firing was directed towards the camp and us. Among the melee of thoughts that crowded my mind in those moments, one realisation dawned with shocking numbness: We had been betrayed and attacked. My bodyguards put a protective shield around me as I shouted out to all to run to the jungles. I went inside my camp to pick up my bag and some other items but one of my bodyguards immediately dragged me out by my hand. That saved me. Within seconds, the first mortar shell landed right on my camp. Two of my boys died in the attack but we did not fire a single round till then. We remained in the jungles for three nights, starving and thirsty. The attack, mainly shelling and indiscriminate firing, continued for three days. The attackers, however, were unable to locate us and just kept shelling and firing. Then they started sending out radio messages, knowing we would be intercepting those just as they were intercepting ours, to come out of the jungle and give ourselves up. This was the time “major” Robin Hondique, who is no more now, decided to take a calculated risk. Converting the gamocha into a white flag, we walked down from the hill for an hour to reach Buddha Vihar where the RBA officials were camping in civil dress. All of us were taken captive, but they behaved very well with us. We stayed there for two days. Next day, the RBA took us to Writers Army Camp at Koipani. They sent two beautifully decorated horses to take me to the camp, which was a journey of three hours. After a stay at the camp, on December 25, five of us, including Robin and KLO (Kamtapur Liberation Organisation) vice-chairman Harshabardhan Barman, were taken to Deothang, another RBA base, where we saw several Indian armymen. After some time, an Indian Army chopper arrived and the five of us were taken to it. While black cloth hoods were put over the heads of the other four and their hands were tied, they let me be. Not long after, we landed at a large base of the army. It took me a while to make out I was in Tezpur. We never really recovered from the reverses we suffered in Bhutan. Operation All Clear left us in total disarray with there being no trace of several leaders while some of us were arrested. The last I saw of Ashanta Baghphukan and Robin Neog was at the Writers Army Camp. Before I was sent away, I was told they would be sent later. The central headquarters, which was under my command, the general headquarters and two other camps — headquarters of 27 battalion and the Madhya Mandal camp — were all demolished by the Royal Bhutan Army with assistance from the Indian Army. Till Bhutan happened, there was a proper communication between the higher-ups and the battalions. But the offensive broke this chain. More important than the blow to the organisational set-up perhaps was the pounding that our confidence took. Suddenly, our war became more difficult. Operation All Clear may have been a huge success for Delhi but for us it was a great betrayal. The Indian Army also tried to create further chaos among our rank and file by spreading the word that I had died. I heard later that hearing the news of my death, the RBA official who had visited us the day before the operations were launched shot himself with his pistol.

Aftermath

In a follow-up action to the operation, 22 Bhutanese civilians were found guilty of aiding the separatists with charges ranging from supplying the militants with food to providing services in exchange for money. Another 123 Bhutanese citizens were facing trial on similar charges as of July 2004.[18]

Between 2008 and 2011, Royal Bhutan Police and Royal Bhutan Army personnel undertook numerous actions against unidentified militants. Several firefights occurred while Bhutan military personnel were required to dispose of several explosive devices and destroyed a number of guerrilla camps.[19] The incidents that took place during the period include:

• In 2010, a Royal Bhutan Army soldier was killed in the area of Gabrukanda. NDFB rebels allegedly were involved in the killing.[20]
• 1 August 2010: Security forces uncovered five new NDFB camps within Bhutan.[21]
• 12 October 2010: Two RBA soldiers were injured by bombs planted by NDFB.[19]
• 20 February 2011: At least four Royal Bhutan Police personnel were injured after being ambushed by a group of 15 to 20 militants wearing camouflage in the Sarpang region of Bhutan. NDFB rebels are suspected of being behind the attack. A NDFB spokesman appealed for the release of information regarding the disappearance of several NDFB leaders during the operation All Clear, while denying any involvement in the attack.[22][23]

Footnotes

1. "Bhutan's Militia". Kuensel. 15 September 2003. Retrieved 4 October 2014.
2. "Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) - Former Terrorist Group of Assam". SATP. Retrieved 24 October 2014.
3. "Bhutan Backgrounder". SATP. Retrieved 24 October 2014.
4. Anand Kumar (25 December 2003). "Operation All Clear: Bhutan's step for regional security". Kathmandu Post. Retrieved 5 September 2014.
5. Anand Swaroop Verma (April 2004). "The military Offensive against ULFA". Revolutionary Democracy. Retrieved 11 September 2014.
6. Dipankar Banerjee (January 2004). "Implications for insurgency and security cooperation" (PDF). IPCS. Retrieved 5 September 2014.
7. "Bhutan attack was betrayal, says Ulfa leader". Telegraph India. 22 July 2004. Retrieved 15 December 2010.
8. "A Nation Pays Tribute". Kuensel. 15 August 2004. Archived from the original on June 10, 2011. Retrieved 5 September 2014.
9. Praveen Kumar (July 2004). "Assessing Bhutan's Operation All Clear". IDSA. Retrieved 11 September 2014.
10. Teresa Rehman (27 January 2007). "Seek Revenge!". Tehelka. Retrieved 11 September 2014.
11. Tashi Dema (16 June 2007). "Militia Should Start in 2008". Kuensel. Archived from the original on June 10, 2011. Retrieved 17 October 2014.
12. Subir Bhaumik (4 August 2003). "Gunmen kill India rebels in Bhutan". BBC. Retrieved 28 September 2014.
13. Arun Bhattacharjee (19 December 2003). "Bhutan army sees action at last". Asia Times. Retrieved 17 October 2014.
14. "124 killed in Bhutan operation". Tribune India. 17 December 2003. Retrieved 5 September 2014.
15. "Protecting mutual concerns and interests". Kuensel. 27 December 2003. Archived from the original on June 10, 2011. Retrieved 17 October 2014.
16. "The Bodo & Ulfa Problem". Kuensel. 3 January 2004. Retrieved 28 September 2014.
17. "RBA Makes Good Progress in Flushing Out Operations". Kuensel. 3 January 2004. Retrieved 26 October 2014.
18. G. Vinayak (22 July 2004). "Bhutan books 22 abettors of Indian militants". Rediff News. Retrieved 11 September 2014.
19. Tshering Tobgay (16 December 2011). "Thanking our armed forces". Retrieved 4 October 2014.
20. "NDFB attacks". Times of India. 20 February 2011. Retrieved 12 September 2014.
21. "BTN/BHUTAN/SOUTH ASIA". Wikileaks. 13 August 2010. Retrieved 24 October 2014.
22. "Four police injured in NDFB ambush in Sarpang". Bhutan News Service. 21 February 2011. Retrieved 12 September 2014.
23. "NDFB appeals Bhutan to disclose whereabouts of outfit's missing leaders". Assam Sentinel. 21 February 2011. Retrieved 12 September 2014.