Oded Stark

Oded Stark is an economist and Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Development Research, University of Bonn, Distinguished Professor at the University of Warsaw, and Adjunct Professor at the University of Tuebingen. He is Doctor honoris causa (University of Warsaw), a Humboldt Awardee, a Ministry of Science and Higher Education (Poland) Lifetime Achievement Awardee, and a Presidential Professor of Economics (Poland). In RePEc/IDEAS listings of leading economists, Oded Stark has been ranked highly.[1][2]

Oded Stark
InstitutionUniversity of Warsaw
University of Tübingen
University of Bonn
FieldApplied Microeconomic Theory, Development Economics, Population Economics, Economics of Migration, Labor Economics, Welfare Economics, Risk-Taking Behavior, Theory of the Firm, The Relationship between Social-Psychological Preferences and Economic Outcomes
Information at IDEAS / RePEc

Biography

Over the course of his career, Oded Stark served as Distinguished Research Scholar at Georgetown University, as University Professor (Chair in Economic and Regional Policy) at the University of Klagenfurt, and as Honorary University Professor of Economics at the University of Vienna, and prior to that as Professor of Economics (Chair in Development Economics) at the University of Oslo, and as Professor of Population and Economics and Director of the Migration and Development Program at Harvard University.

Research

Oded Stark is the author of the critically acclaimed books The Migration of Labor, and Altruism and Beyond, An Economic Analysis of Transfers and Exchanges Within Families and Groups, and co-editor (with Mark R. Rosenzweig) of the Handbook of Population and Family Economics (in Handbooks in Economics).[3][4] Stark’s research interests include Applied Microeconomic Theory, Development Economics, Population Economics, Economics of Migration, Labor Economics, Welfare Economics, Risk-Taking Behavior, Theory of the Firm, and the relationship between Social-Psychological Preferences and Economic Outcomes.

The New Economics of Labor Migration

Stark’s research on migration is set against the background of what he and David Bloom refer to as the “New Economics of Labor Migration” (subsequently coined as NELM), namely a theory of labor migration accounting for interpersonal income comparisons as a driver of migration; the role of asymmetric information between migrant jobseekers and native employers; migration decision making by households; intra-household contractual arrangements for education, migration, and remittances; risk attitudes; migrant networks; migration selectivity; and the role of game theoretic strategic behavior.[5] For instance, early work by Stark and Levhari highlights the role of risk aversion as a driver of rural-to-urban migration in less developed countries, where rural households diversify their incomes by placing their best-suited member in the urban sector.[6] This implies that, unlike what is suggested, for example, by Michael Todaro, rural-to-urban migration can be rational even if rural incomes are higher than expected urban incomes, and when households - instead of individuals - make decisions, and are risk averse. In work with Eliakim Katz,[7] Stark shows that information asymmetries between migrants and native employers tend to reduce the skill level of migrants, and that providing information to employers can raise the skill level of migrants. A similar argument to Katz and Stark’s “Labor Migration and Risk Aversion in Less Developed Countries”[8] is presented in Stark’s work with Mark Rosenzweig on rural India, wherein they hypothesize and test the idea that the marriage of daughters into geographically distant but kinship-related households reflects inter-household arrangements aimed at mitigating income risks and facilitating consumption smoothing in an environment where information is costly and risks are spatially correlated.[9] The role of the family in migration decisions is further underlined in Stark’s research with Jennifer Lauby on the Philippines, where migrants - typically young women (daughters) rather than young men (sons) - are selected partly for their amenability to family income needs and manipulation, which often favor certain though low short-run returns through high remittances.[10]

Migration, remittances, and inequality

Together with J. Edward Taylor and Shlomo Yitzhaki, Stark explored the nexus between migration, remittances, and inequality. In this, one key argument of Stark is that (rural-to-urban) migration decisions may be driven not merely by migrants’ desire to improve their absolute incomes, but also by their interest in reducing their or their families’ deprivation relative to a local reference group.[11] Stark and Yitzhaki further show that individuals who are rich by local standards are unlikely to migrate, whereas the poorest may have both very weak or very strong incentives to migrate.[12] In further work with Taylor on migration from Mexico to the United States, the relevance of relative deprivation is confirmed; and independent of relative deprivation, they also observe that households tend to send members to those domestic or foreign labor markets where the returns from human capital are highest.[13][14] Together with Robert E. B. Lucas, Stark sought to explain remittance behavior, theorizing and subsequently testing the notion that remittances can be seen as part of a long-term understanding between migrants and their families; in that implicit contract, families (for example from Botswana) sacrifice resources to educate their children, who - once abroad - are expected to earn higher wages and remit to their families, enabling the families to undertake more risky activities and save less. Also, competition over inheritance is mediated through remittances.[15][16] In joint work with Taylor and Yitzhaki on the relationship between remittances and income inequalities in rural Mexico, Stark finds that migration histories of villages (for example internal migration in comparison with international migration) and the degree of diffusion of migration opportunities across households are key determinants of the impact of remittances on rural income inequality,[17] which itself is sensitive to the weight attached to local income distributions.[18] In “Inequality and migration: A behavioral link,”[19] Stark provides an analytical-behavioral explanation for the observed positive relationship between income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, and the incentive to migrate. He shows that a higher total relative deprivation of a population leads to a stronger incentive to engage in migration for a given level of a population’s income; that total relative deprivation is positively related to the Gini coefficient; and that, consequently, the Gini coefficient and migration are positively correlated, holding the population’s income constant.

Return migration

In work with Oded Galor, Stark explores return migration, demonstrating how a positive probability of this increases migrants’ work savings and effort. The rationale underlying these results is that an exogenously imposed probability of return to the home country is tantamount to a probable wage cut, given that wages in the home country are lower than wages in the host country. A higher perceived probability of return induces migrants to beef up their savings. A similar reasoning explains them working harder and increasing their labor supply. If return migration does not take place, then the said response to the probability of return helps account for positive migrant-native earning differentials.[20][21] A similar logic underlies work with Łukasz Byra on the effectiveness of a policy of deportations.[22] Drawing on a model in which utility is derived from consumption and effort (labor supply), Stark asks how the deportation of a number of undocumented migrants influences decisions regarding labor supply and savings of the remaining undocumented migrants. Stark assumes that the intensity of deportation serves as an indicator to the remaining undocumented migrants when they assess the probability of being deported. Stark finds that a higher rate of deportation induces undocumented migrants to work harder and save more. Assuming that the purpose of a deportation policy is to reduce the aggregate labor supply of undocumented migrants in order to raise the wages of low-skilled native workers, Stark concludes that the policy can backfire: an increase in the labor supply of the remaining undocumented migrants can more than offset the reduction in the labor supply arising from the deportation of some undocumented migrants. In related work, Stark studies the case in which some of the returns to migration accrue from return migration. Consequently, the optimal duration of migration may be shorter than its feasible duration.[23] Stark develops a model that provides and highlights conditions under which voluntary return migration takes place even though a reversal of the inter-country wage differential does not occur. In particular, he considers the higher purchasing power of savings (generated from work abroad) at home than abroad as a motive for return migration. Inter alia, the model produces a negative relationship between the optimal duration of migration and the purchasing power differential, and in some (but not all) cases, a negative relationship between the optimal duration of migration and the wage abroad. In addition, and contrary to our prior expectation, the utility maximization analysis suggests that East-West migration will tend to be temporary while inter-European Community (or intra-West European) migration will likely be permanent. In “Behavior in reverse: Reasons for return migration,”[24] Stark presents and discusses twelve reasons for return migration. The reasons he lists are derived from his research on migration. Stark notes that just as research on motives for migration can help to establish the reasons for return migration, research on the latter can help to deepen understanding of the former. Moreover, in a great many circumstances and for a variety of reasons, countries that host migrants may want them to leave. In such circumstances, enacting policies that align with motives for return migration will be more efficient than devising measures that are independent of these motives. The Migration of Labor[25][26] These migration-related ideas and approaches were subsequently expanded and developed further in Stark’s book The Migration of Labor (1991,1993). In the book, Stark models afresh labor migration and various phenomena and processes associated with it. The book builds on three premises: first, although the entities that engage in migration are often individual agents, there is more to labor migration than individualistic behavior. Migration by one person can be undertaken in pursuit of rational optimizing behavior by a group of persons such as the family. Second, there is more to labor migration than a response to wage differentials. Third, a great many migration phenomena would not have occurred if the set of markets and financial institutions were perfect and complete. The book attempts to explain labor migration in the light of these three premises and their interactions. It offers new insights into why and when entities such as families may find it optimal to behave strategically, to act simultaneously in, and distribute their human capital across several markets, and to sequence their actions in a particular fashion. The book demonstrates how migration is ingeniously and efficiently harnessed to assume a variety of tasks. It also takes a novel look at how migration outcomes are fed back into and modify the very market environments that stimulated migration.

The New Economics of the Brain Drain

In the late 1990s, Stark began to weigh in on the brain drain debate. Together with Christian Helmenstein and Alexia Prskawetz, he showed that, given asymmetric information, the possibility of migration can generate a brain gain along with a brain drain by increasing the expected returns from education, resulting in a situation where the increase in incentives for human capital investments more than compensates for the migration of educated persons.[27][28] In his 2003 Tjalling Koopmans Distinguished Lecture and then in a World Development paper, Stark showed that this effect is further augmented by positive educational externalities, strengthening the theoretical argument that the lure of migration for the highly educated can actually improve a source country’s human capital,[29] and can be a substitute for subsidies to the formation of human capital in the source country (with Yong Wang).[30] Specifically, Stark showed that the probability of migration from a developing country can be used as a policy tool for enhancing human capital formation and raising welfare within the country. This line of work was extended in several directions, both analytically and empirically. For example, in work with Łukasz Byra, Stark shows that the long-term effect of migration solely by unskilled workers is that skilled workers in the home country acquire additional human capital yet their share in the country’s workforce falls. Consequently, the country’s average level of human capital is lowered.[31] And together with Steve Boucher and Taylor, Stark seeks to test the hypothesis that, other things being equal, the average level of human capital of non-migrants is higher in villages from which a larger share of individuals have migrated to destinations in which the economic returns to schooling are higher than at origin. That empirical investigation has two components. First, to develop and estimate a dynamic model using village-level data on education and on international and internal migration. This approach is similar in spirit to a country-level study of the brain gain, but with a longitudinal dimension that is lacking in existing studies. The approach yields cautious but illuminating support for the brain gain hypothesis. Stark finds that in rural Mexico, even though internal migrants are more educated than those who stay behind, average village schooling increases with internal migration. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the dynamic investment effect counteracts and even reverses the static, depletion effect of migration on schooling.[32]

Social stigma and migration

Together with C. Simon Fan, Stark developed new theories of migration that is motivated by the experiences of humiliation and social stigma. In “Migration for degrading work as an escape from humiliation,”[33] Stark presents a model of voluntary migration into degrading work. The essence of the model is a tension between two “bads:” that which arises from being relatively deprived at home, and that which arises from engaging in humiliating work away from home. Balancing between these two “bads” can give rise to an explicit, voluntary choice to engage in humiliating work. In “A theory of migration as a response to occupational stigma,”[34] Stark constructs a model of labor migration that is prompted by a desire to avoid “social humiliation.” In a general equilibrium framework, it is shown that as long as migration can sufficiently reduce humiliation, migration will occur even between two identical economies. Migration increases the number of individuals who choose to perform degrading jobs and, consequently, migration lowers the price of the good produced in the sector that is associated with low social status. Moreover, the greater an individual’s aversion to performing degrading jobs, the more likely it is that he will experience a welfare gain when the economy opens up to migration.

Intergenerational transfers

In a cluster of works, Stark sought to understand what governs intergenerational transfers, and the consequences of these transfers. In one work on this topic, co-authored with Donald Cox, Stark modeled the demand for grandchildren where it is argued that parents provide help with housing down-payments in order to encourage the production of grandchildren, and that such a subsidy emanates from the “demonstration effect:” a child’s propensity to furnish parents with attention and care can be conditioned by parental example. Parents who desire such transfers in the future have an incentive to make transfers to their own parents in order to instill appropriate preferences in their children. This generates a derived demand for grandchildren because potential grandparents will be treated better by their adult children if the latter have their own children to whom to demonstrate the appropriate behavior. Empirical work indicates behavior consistent with subsidization of the production of grandchildren and the demonstration effect.[35] In work on the topic of intergenerational transfers with Anna Nicinska, Stark inquired how inheriting affects bequest plans. Stark presents and tests the idea that bequest planning is linked with the experience of inheriting. He considers “a family tradition of bequeathing” as a channel through which the intention to bequeath is molded by and positively correlated with the experience of inheriting. Using data from the Survey on Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), he finds that the experience of inheriting enhances the intention to bequeath, independently of the positive impact of wealth. He also finds that the expectation of inheriting has a positive impact on the intention to bequeath, controlling for the expected increase in wealth on account of future inheritance.[36] In work with Ewa Cukrowska-Torzewska on gender differentiation in intergenerational care-giving and migration choices, Stark weaves together care-giving, gender, and migration. He hypothesizes that daughters who are mothers have a stronger incentive than sons who are fathers to demonstrate to their children the appropriate way of caring for one’s parents. The reason underlying this hypothesis is that women on average live longer than men, they tend to marry men who are older than they are and, thus, they are more likely than men to spend their last years without a spouse. Because it is more effective and less costly to care for parents if they live nearby, daughters with children do not move as far away from the parental home as do sons with children or childless offspring. Data on the distance between the children’s location and the parents’ location extracted from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), in conjunction with data on selected demographic characteristics and institutional indicators taken from Eurostat, the OECD, and the World Bank, lend support to the hypothesis: compared to childless daughters, childless sons, and sons who are fathers, daughters who are mothers choose to live closer to their parents’ home.[37]

Altruism and Beyond

Another strand of Stark’s research concerns altruism. Along with Douglas Bernheim, Stark challenged the view that altruism necessarily increases the benefits of group interactions or improves the allocation of resources within families, instead emphasizing how altruism can make individuals exploitable and inefficient, especially the more so as altruists are reluctant to punish betrayal.[38] By contrast, in work with Theodore Bergstrom, Stark highlighted the potential for cooperation to persist in evolutionary, competitive environments through genetic and cultural inheritance.[39] In his book Altruism and Beyond, An Economic Analysis of Transfers and Exchanges Within Families and Groups (1995,1999; Oskar Morgenstern Memorial Lectures)[40][41] Stark employs economic methodology to study the motives for and repercussions of transfers and exchanges within families, between generations, and within groups. Stark’s book studies both altruistic and nonaltruistic motives for transfer behavior, and traces some of the market effects of intrafamilial and intragroup transfers and exchanges. Stark shows that allocation behavior and wellbeing of one family member depend on his altruistic link with another family member, how the timing of the intergenerational transfer of the family productive asset affects the incentive to engage in human capital formation, and how transfers from an adult to his parents impinge on future transfers to him from his own children. In addition, Stark shows how altruism, which in the beginning of his book is assumed, is explained: the transmission to or probable acquisition by children of parental traits and the exchange between siblings result in a stable equilibrium wherein no agent behaves nonaltruistically. In related work, Stark demonstrates how altruism can surge in a population of non-altruists.[42] Stark constructs a model in which it is assumed that each individual plays a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game with his or her sibling, or with a stranger, and that the probability that an individual survives to reproduce is proportional to his or her payoff in this game. Stark models the formation of couples and the rule of imitation of parents and non-parents. He then asks what happens to the proportion of altruists in the population. Stark specifies a case where a unique and stable equilibrium is one in which the entire population will consist of altruists. The possibility that behavior that is seemingly altruistic is actually not, is taken up in “Transfers, Empathy Formation, and Reverse Transfers.”[43] In that work Stark considers a donor and a recipient. The recipient has an empathy function where empathy is induced by gratitude. The donor’s decision-making is formalized as an optimization problem that incorporates anticipation of the recipient’s gratitude. This gratitude is a function of the size of the donation, the recipient’s pre-transfer income, and the donor’s pre-transfer income. Stark assumes that gratification is expressed through a probable future transfer that is valued by the donor. Consequently, a recipient’s lower income may be positively correlated with a seemingly altruistic transfer because such an income is associated with a stronger sense of gratitude. Because under well-specified conditions the donor’s utility arising from a gratitude-eliciting transfer and the donor’s utility arising from a transfer in the standard pure-altruism model correlate negatively with the recipient’s pre-transfer income, the ability to infer motive from conduct is jeopardized; the two motives give rise to types of behavior that can be observationally equivalent.

The integration of regions and nations

In a more recent series of works, Stark studied the downside to the integration of regions and nations, looking at that integration through the prism of the merger of populations (societies), and employing a particular index of social stress. Stark showed that under specified conditions, upon the integration of populations the social stress index will increase. Developing new formulas for calculating the social stress of an integrated population as a function of the levels of social stress of the constituent populations when apart reveals that the social stress of an integrated population is higher than the sum of the levels of social stress of the constituent populations when apart. This research raises the distinct possibility that the merging of populations may be a social liability: integration may fail to give the population a sense of improved wellbeing.[44][45][46] Taken directly into the field of trade, together with Ewa Zawojska, Wilhelm Kohler, and Krzysztof Szczygielski, Stark demonstrated that the approach just described, namely acknowledging individuals’ distaste for low relative income, can render trade less appealing when trade is viewed as a technology that integrates economies by merging separate social spheres into one. Defining a “trembling trade” as a situation in which gains from trade are overtaken by losses of relative income, Stark obtained the result that global social welfare is reduced. A constructive example reveals that a “trembling trade” can arise even when trade is doubly gainful in that it increases the income of every individual and narrows the income gap between the trading populations.[47]

Assimilation

In the 2010s, Stark engaged in an intensive research into the topic of assimilation of migrants. Building on earlier work with C. Simon Fan on a social proximity explanation of the reluctance to assimilate,[48] Stark sought to model the assimilation behavior of migrants, conditions under which migrants will constrain their assimilation and the native inhabitants will gain from migrants’ assimilation, and ways in which policies can be enacted so as to “exploit” migrants’ assimilation to raise the welfare of the native population.[49][50] For example, in work with Marcin Jakubek and Krzysztof Szczygielski,[51] Stark models the assimilation behavior of a group of migrants who live in a city populated by native inhabitants. Stark conceptualizes the group as a community, and the city as a social space. Assimilation increases the productivity of migrants and, consequently, their earnings. However, assimilation also brings the migrants closer in social space to the richer native inhabitants. This proximity subjects the migrants to relative deprivation. Stark considers a community of migrants whose members are at an equilibrium level of assimilation that was chosen as a result of the maximization of a utility function that has as its arguments income, the cost of assimilation effort, and a measure of relative deprivation. He asks how vulnerable this assimilation equilibrium is to the appearance of a “mutant” - a member of the community who is exogenously endowed with a superior capacity to assimilate. If the mutant were to act on his enhanced ability, his earnings would be higher than those of his fellow migrants, which will expose them to greater relative deprivation. Stark finds that the stability of the pre-mutation assimilation equilibrium depends on the cohesion of the migrants’ community, expressed as an ability to effectively sanction and discourage the mutant from deviating. The equilibrium level of assimilation of a tightly knit community is stable in the sense of not being vulnerable to the appearance of a member becoming better able to assimilate. However, if the community is loose-knit, the appearance of a mutant will destabilize the pre-mutation assimilation equilibrium, and will result in a higher equilibrium level of assimilation.

Social preferences and risk-taking behavior

In research in the late 2010s on social preferences and risk-taking behavior, Stark demonstrated new links between relative deprivation and relative risk aversion, in particular showing that, holding absolute income constant, the experience of relative deprivation (low relative income) results in a lower relative risk aversion.[52][53][54][55]

gollark: I like the textual UI concept of terminals, but not the horrible mess of in-band signalling.
gollark: It *basically works*, if suboptimally, and I don't want to have to configure it.
gollark: I mostly use VSCode (which *is* highly bloatful, yes) or nano if I have to SSH into a thing.
gollark: Minoteaur is designed to and pretty much does complete common operations in below 10ms.
gollark: What is your text editor *doing*?

References
  1. RePEc/IDEAS: Top authors in Poland
  2. RePEc/IDEAS: Top authors
  3. Rosenzweig, Mark E. and Stark, Oded (1997). Handbook of Population and Family Economics. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
  4. Critical acclaim for Handbook of Population and Family Economics.
  5. Stark, Oded and Bloom, David E. (1985). “The new economics of labor migration.” American Economic Review 75(2): 173-178.
  6. Stark, Oded and Levhari, David (1982). “On migration and risk in LDCs.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 31(1): 191-196.
  7. Katz, Eliakim and Stark, Oded (1987). “International migration under asymmetric information.” Economic Journal 97(387): 718-726.
  8. Katz, Eliakim and Stark, Oded (1986). “Labor migration and risk aversion in Less Developed Countries.” Journal of Labor Economics 4(1): 134-149.
  9. Rosenzweig, Mark. R. and Stark, Oded (1989). “Consumption smoothing, migration, and marriage: Evidence from rural India.” Journal of Political Economy 97(4): 905-926.
  10. Lauby, Jennifer and Stark, Oded (1988). “Individual migration as a family strategy: Young women in the Philippines.” Population Studies 42(3): 473-486.
  11. Stark, Oded (1984). “Rural-to-urban migration in LDCs: A relative deprivation approach.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 32(3): 475-486.
  12. Stark, Oded and Yitzhaki, Shlomo (1988). “Labour migration as a response to relative deprivation.” Journal of Population Economics 1(1): 57-70.
  13. Stark, Oded and Taylor, J. Edward (1989). “Relative deprivation and international migration.” Demography 26(1): 1-14.
  14. Stark, Oded and Taylor, J. Edward (1991). “Migration incentives, migration types: The role of relative deprivation.” Economic Journal 101(408): 1163-1178.
  15. Lucas, Robert E. B. and Stark, Oded (1985). “Motivations to remit: Evidence from Botswana.” Journal of Political Economy 93(5): 901-918.
  16. Stark, Oded and Lucas, Robert E. B. (1988). “Migration, remittances, and the family.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 36(3): 465-481.
  17. Stark, Oded, Taylor, J. Edward, and Yitzhaki, Shlomo (1986). “Remittances and inequality.” Economic Journal 96(383): 722-740.
  18. Stark, Oded, Taylor, J. Edward, and Yitzhaki, Shlomo (1988). “Migration, remittances and inequality: A sensitivity analysis using the extended Gini index.” Journal of Development Economics 28(3): 309-322.
  19. Stark, Oded (2006). “Inequality and migration: A behavioral link.” Economics Letters 91(1): 146-152.
  20. Galor, Oded and Stark, Oded (1990). “Migrants’ savings, the probability of return migration and migrants’ performance.” International Economic Review 31(2): 463-467.
  21. Galor, Oded and Stark, Oded (1991). “The probability of return migration, migrants’ work effort, and migrants’ performance.” Journal of Development Economics 35(2): 399-405.
  22. Stark, Oded and Byra, Lukasz (2020). “Can a deportation policy backfire?” Public Choice 183: 29-41.
  23. Stark, Oded, Helmenstein, Christian, and Yegorov, Yury (1997). “Migrants’ savings, purchasing power parity, and the optimal duration of migration.” International Tax and Public Finance 4: 307-324.
  24. Stark, Oded (2019). “Behavior in reverse: Reasons for return migration.” Behavioural Public Policy 3(1): 104-126.
  25. Stark, Oded (1993,1995). The Migration of Labor. Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
  26. Critical acclaim for The Migration of Labor.
  27. Stark, Oded, Helmenstein, Christian, and Prskawetz, Alexia (1997). “A brain gain with a brain drain.” Economics Letters 55(2): 227-234.
  28. Stark, Oded, Helmenstein, Christian, and Prskawetz, Alexia (1998). “Human capital depletion, human capital formation, and migration: A blessing or a 'curse'?” Economics Letters 60(3): 363-367.
  29. Stark, Oded (2004). “Rethinking the brain drain.” World Development 32(1): 15-22.
  30. Stark, Oded and Wang, Yong (2002). “Inducing human capital formation: Migration as a substitute for subsidies.” Journal of Public Economics 86(1): 29-46.
  31. Stark, Oded and Byra, Lukasz (2012). “A back-door brain drain.” Economics Letters 116(3): 273-276.
  32. Boucher, Steve, Stark, Oded, and Taylor, J. Edward (2009). “A gain with a drain? Evidence from Rural Mexico on the New Economics of the Brain Drain.” In János Kornai, László Mátyás, and Gérard Roland (eds.) Corruption, Development, and Institutional Design. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Pp. 100-119.
  33. Stark, Oded and Fan, C. Simon (2011). “Migration for degrading work as an escape from humiliation.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 77(3): 241-247.
  34. Fan, C. Simon and Stark, Oded (2011). “A theory of migration as a response to occupational stigma.” International Economic Review 52(2): 549-571.
  35. Cox, Donald and Stark, Oded (2005). “On the demand for grandchildren: Tied transfers and the demonstration effect.” Journal of Public Economics 89(9-10): 1665-1697.
  36. Stark, Oded and Nicinska, Anna (2015). “How inheriting affects bequest plans.” Economica 82(1): 1126 -1152.
  37. Stark, Oded and Cukrowska-Torzewska, Ewa (2018). “Gender differentiation in intergenerational care-giving and migration choices.” Journal of the Economics of Ageing 12: 118-134.
  38. Bernheim, B. Douglas and Stark, Oded (1988). “Altruism within the family reconsidered: Do nice guys finish last?” American Economic Review 78(5): 1034-1045.
  39. Bergstrom, Theodore C. and Stark, Oded (1993). “How altruism can prevail in an evolutionary environment.” American Economic Review 83(2): 149-155.
  40. Stark, Oded (1995,1999). Altruism and Beyond, An Economic Analysis of Transfers and Exchanges Within Families and Groups. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  41. Critical acclaim for Altruism and Beyond, An Economic Analysis of Transfers and Exchanges Within Families and Groups.
  42. Stark, Oded (1999). “Siblings, strangers, and the surge of altruism.” Economics Letters 65(2): 135-142.
  43. Stark, Oded and Falk, Ita (1998). “Transfers, empathy formation, and reverse transfers.” American Economic Review 88(2): 271-276.
  44. Stark, Oded (2015). “Comparing the global and merged with the local and separate: On a downside to the integration of regions and nations.” East Asian Economic Review 19(4): 325-355.
  45. Stark, Oded (2013). “Stressful integration.” European Economic Review 63:1-9.
  46. Stark, Oded and Wlodarczyk, Julia (2015). “European monetary integration and aggregate relative deprivation: The dull side of the shiny Euro.” Economics and Politics 27(2): 185-203.
  47. Stark, Oded, Zawojska, Ewa, Kohler, Wilhelm, and Szczygielski, Krzysztof (2018). “An adverse social welfare effect of a doubly gainful trade.” Journal of Development Economics 135: 77-84.
  48. Fan, C. Simon and Stark, Oded (2007). “A social proximity explanation of the reluctance to assimilate.” Kyklos 60(1): 55-63.
  49. Stark, Oded, Bielawski, Jakub, and Jakubek, Marcin (2015). “The impact of the assimilation of migrants on the well-being of native inhabitants: A theory.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 111: 71-78.
  50. Stark, Oded, Jakubek, Marcin, and Szczygielski, Krzysztof (2020). “The social preferences of the native inhabitants, and the decision how many asylum seekers to admit.” Review of World Economics 156(1): 133-152.
  51. Stark, Oded, Jakubek, Marcin, and Szczygielski, Krzysztof (2018). “Community cohesion and assimilation equilibria.” Journal of Urban Economics 107: 79-88.
  52. Stark, Oded (2019). “On social preferences and the intensity of risk aversion.” Journal of Risk and Insurance 86(3): 807-826.
  53. Stark, Oded and Szczygielski, Krzysztof (2019). “The likelihood of divorce and the riskiness of financial decisions.” Journal of Demographic Economics 85(3): 209-229.
  54. Stark, Oded, Budzinski, Wiktor, and Jakubek, Marcin (2019). “Pure rank preferences and variation in risk-taking behavior.” Economics Letters 184: 108636.
  55. Stark, Oded (2020). “Relative deprivation as a cause of risky behaviors.” Journal of Mathematical Sociology (in press).
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