Keith Donnellan

Keith Sedgwick Donnellan (/ˈdɒnələn/; June 25, 1931[2] – February 20, 2015) was an American philosopher and Professor of Philosophy (later Professor Emeritus) at the University of California, Los Angeles.

Keith Donnellan
Born(1931-06-25)June 25, 1931
Washington, D.C.
Died(2015-02-20)February 20, 2015
Fairfax, California
NationalityAmerican
Alma materCornell University
Notable work
"Reference and Definite Descriptions", "Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions", "Speaking of Nothing"
EraContemporary philosophy
RegionWestern philosophy
SchoolAnalytic philosophy
InstitutionsUCLA
Main interests
Philosophy of language
Notable ideas
Causal-historical theory of reference[1]
The "referential" and "attributive use" distinction

Donnellan contributed to the philosophy of language, notably to the analysis of proper names and definite descriptions. He criticized Bertrand Russell's theory of definite descriptions for overlooking the distinction between referential and attributive use of definite descriptions.[3][4]

Donnellan spent most of his career at UCLA,[5] having also previously taught at the university where he had earned his PhD, Cornell University.

Philosophical work

Proper names

By 1970, analytic philosophers widely accepted a view regarding the reference-relation that holds of proper names and that which they name, known as descriptivism and attributed to Bertrand Russell. Descriptivism holds that ordinary proper names (e.g., 'Socrates', 'Richard Feynman', and 'Madagascar') may be paraphrased by definite descriptions (e.g., 'Plato's favorite philosopher', 'the man who devised the theory of quantum electrodynamics', and 'the largest island off the southeastern coast of Africa'). Saul Kripke gave a series of three lectures at Princeton University in 1970, later published as Naming and Necessity,[6] in which he argued against descriptivism and sketched the causal-historical theory of reference according to which each proper name necessarily designates a particular object and that the identity of the object so designated is determined by the history of the name's use. These lectures were highly influential and marked the decline of descriptivism's popularity.[7] Kripke's alternative view was, by his own account, not fully developed in his lectures.[6] Donnellan's work on proper names is among the earliest and most influential developments of the causal-historical theory of reference.[8]

Descriptions

"Reference and Definite Descriptions" has been one of Donnellan's most influential essays. Written in response to the work of Bertrand Russell and P. F. Strawson in the area of definite descriptions, the essay develops a distinction between the "referential use" and the "attributive use" of a definite description. The attributive use most nearly reflects Russell's understanding of descriptions. When a person uses a description such as "Smith's murderer" attributively, they mean to pick out the individual that fits that description, whoever or whatever it is. The referential use, on the other hand, functions to pick out who or what a speaker is talking about, so that something can be said about that person or thing.[9][10]

Publications
  • Donnellan, Keith S. (July 1966). "Reference and Definite Descriptions". The Philosophical Review. The Philosophical Review, Vol. 75, No. 3. 75 (3): 281–304. doi:10.2307/2183143. JSTOR 2183143.
  • Donnellan, Keith S. (1974). "Speaking of Nothing". Philosophical Review. 83 (1): 3–31. doi:10.2307/2183871. JSTOR 2183871.
  • Donnellan, Keith S. (1978). "Speaker Reference, Descriptions, and Anaphora". In Peter Cole (ed.). Syntax and Semantics 9: Pragmatics. New York: Academic Press. pp. 47–68.
  • Donnellan, Keith S. (2012). Joseph Almog, Paolo Leonardi (ed.). Essays on Reference, Language, and Mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
gollark: You might say that the *position* of a particle was distributed like this, not just "a particle".
gollark: ????
gollark: What is "X" here?
gollark: It's *an* average-y thing, but probably not what you mean intuitively.
gollark: It's not really "the average".

See also

References
  1. Names (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
  2. "Keith Sedgwick Donnellan". Oxford Reference. doi:10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095726655. Retrieved 2020-03-31.
  3. Lycan, William G., Philosophy of Language - a contemporary introduction (2000), pp. 26-30
  4. "Keith Donnellan (1931-2015)". 2015-02-20.
  5. Having in Mind: The Philosophy of Keith Donnellan. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199844845.001.0001/acprof-9780199844845. ISBN 978-0-19-993350-1.
  6. Kripke, Saul (1980). Naming and Necessity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
  7. Cumming, Sam. "The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy". Names.
  8. Ludlow, Peter (1997). Peter Ludlow (ed.). Readings in the Philosophy of Language. The MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-62114-2.
  9. Martinich, A.P. (1985). "Reference and Descriptions". In A.P. Martinich (ed.). The Philosophy of Language. New York, New York. pp. 209–216.
  10. Donnellan, Keith (1966). "Reference and Definite Descriptions". In A.P. Martinich (ed.). The Philosophy of Language. New York, New York. pp. 265–277.
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