Freycinet Plan
The Freycinet Plan (French: Plan Freycinet) was an ambitious public works programme, launched in 1878 by the Minister of Public Works Charles de Freycinet, principally for the construction of railways, but also for canals and maritime ports. In its initial codification – which very largely was superseded – the plan foresaw the hypothecation of 3 billion francs to the railway lines, 1 billion to the canals and 500 million to the ports.[1]
Characteristics
The project became part of the Finance Act in January 1878. Freycinet, being close to Léon Gambetta and Léon Say, the Minister of Finance, organised a meeting between them all to prepare the political terrain. A first law was voted in on 18 May 1878, creating the Compagnie des Chemins de Fer de l'État ("State Railway Company"), by acquisition of several other companies.
On 8 June, a report was published. The main objective of the Freycinet plan was to give every French person access the railway, so as to favour the economic development of the country and to open up remote areas. It was made law on 17 July 1879.
The plan foresaw the construction of 8,700 kilometres (5,400 mi) of railway. They were built both by large private companies, mostly underwritten by the State, and by the State itself: Freycinet had formed the State Railway Company with the law of 18 May 1878.
In 1879, Freycinet became President of the Council of Ministers. He chose Henri Varroy to succeed him as Minister for Public Works and implement his plan. He brought in the engineer Alfred Picard, who was named Director of Railways in 1882.
The implementation of the Freycinet Plan took until 1914, and it was completed fully. However, many chefs-lieux were only served by small meandering metre gauge railways, of somewhat mediocre quality.
Classification of lines
The 181 lines listed below are numbered and designated in conformance with the law of 17 July 1879,[2] and represent a total of 8,848 kilometres (5,498 mi) of route.
- The first list proposed by Freycinet starting in 1878 comprised 154 new lines and 53 lines already with concessions as voies ferrées d'intérêt local, and this list was discussed at length both in committee and by the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.
- 94 lines, totalling 4,152 kilometres (2,580 mi), were the object of amendments referred to the Minister of Public Works, and were not put into law.
| List of 181 lines written into the law of 17 July 1879 |
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Motivation
Beside the economic considerations, the plan had a political objective: to promote the Third Republic in the rural areas, who were often hostile to the new régime.[3]
Criticism
According to some analysts, the Freycinet Plan caused considerable upheaval and can be shown to have been a cause of difficulties in French industry at the end of the 19th century, in the competitive international economy.
Albert Broder, Professor of History at the University of Paris-XII, explains this forcefully:
La forte demande suscitée via le plan Freycinet, and que les industriels Français ont du mal – satisfaire, semble avoir été – l'origine d'un abandon, sans doute considéré temporaire, des marchés extérieurs jugés moins rémunérateurs via les industriels, ces derniers confiants en des carnets de commandes remplis – des niveaux plus que satisfaisants. Leur confiance dans l'avenir suscite des investissements tout au long de la filière, de la construction de hauts fourneaux – la production de tôles and de rails d'acier. Politique contre-cyclique au moment où le marché international est en plein marasme [...]. La crise que connaissent les industries métallurgiques, – la suite de l'abandon des grands travaux and devant la récession qui se généralise, ne se traduit pas via une plus grande pugnacité – l'extérieur. Fragilisées via des investissements qu'elles ne peuvent rapidement amortir, les entreprises manquent de la trésorerie nécessaire
— Albert Broder, La longue stagnation en France, l'autre grande dépression, 1873-1897 [4]
The strong demand aroused by the Freycinet plan, with which the 'French industrialists had such difficulty – seemingly satisfied – was the cause of their abandoning, no doubt temporarily, those external markets they judged less profitable, confident of full order books – and at a greater level than they could meet. Their confidence in the future sustained their investments throughout the supply chain, from the construction of blast furnaces – the production of sheet metal and steel rails. Whirlwind politics at the time where the international market was in the doldrums[...]. The crisis which hit the metallurgy industries – then the abandoning of the great works and the general recession, was not transferred to a greater pugnacity – the outside world. Encumbered by investments which they could not quickly liquidise, the enterprises lacked the necessary assets.
References
- Caron, François (1997). Histoire des chemins de fer en France (in French). 1. Fayard. pp. 476–480. ISBN 2-213-02153-8.
- Picard, Alfred (1884). Les chemins de fer français (in French). III. J. Rotschild. pp. 686–.CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link)
- Jacques, Schnetzler (1967). "Le chemin de fer and l'espace français". Revue de Géographie de Lyon (in French) (42): 82.
- various (1997). La longue stagnation en France, l'autre grande dépression, 1873–1897 (in French). Economica. pp. 178–179.
- Le Patrimoine de la SNCF and des chemins de fer français (in French). Flohic. 1999. pp. 103–110. ISBN 2-84234-069-8.
- Picard, Alfred (1884). Les chemins de fer français (in French). III. J. Rotschild. pp. 632–698.