Brilliant (1813 ship)

Brilliant was launched at Whitby in 1813. She spent the bulk of her career sailing between London and the Cape of Good Hope (CGH). Finally, she became waterlogged while sailing between New Brunswick and Dublin and on 7 February 1823 her crew and passengers had to abandon her.

For other ships with the same name, see Brilliant (ship).

History
United Kingdom
Name: Brilliant
Owner: John Barry & Co. (1814)
Builder: John Barry, Whitby
Launched: 2 December 1813
Fate: Foundered 7 February 1823
General characteristics
Tons burthen: 234​14⁄94[1] or 237[2] (bm)
Armament: 4 guns (1814)

Career

Brilliant's first captain was A. Smales. The Register of Shipping (RS) for 1815 showed her master as A.Smales, her owner as J.Barry, and her trade as Whitby–Shields.[3] She was sold to London owners in 1814.

She first appeared in Lloyd's Register (LR) in 1814.[4]

Year Master Owner Trade Source
1814 G.Brown
Young		 Berry London–Cadiz
London–CGH		 LR
1816 W.Young Berry London–CGH LR
1818 W.Young Berry London–CGH LR
1821 W.Young
J.Smith		 Berry
Hill & Co.		 London–CGH LR
1823 Scott Capt.& Co. Dublin–Quebec LR

Fate

Her passengers and crew abandoned Brilliant, Scott, master, on 7 February 1823 at 38°N 47°W as she was sailing from St. Andrews, New Brunswick to Dublin. Young Phoenix rescued the two passengers and the crew, who had taken to the tops of her masts as Brilliant became waterlogged.[5][Note 1]

Notes, citations, and references

Notes

  1. Young Phenix (or Young Phoenix), of 363 tons (bm), was launched in 1822 at Rochester-Mattapoisett, Massachusetts.[6] At the time of the rescue she was trading between Liverpool and New York.[7] In 1826 she became a whaling ship that continued whale hunting until gale-driven ice crushed her against the shore on 3 August 1888 at Point Barrow.[8]

Citations

  1. Hackman (2001), p. 256.
  2. Weatherill (1908), p. -125.
  3. RS (1815), "B" supple. pages.
  4. LR (1814), Supple.pages "B", Seq.№B24.
  5. "The Marine List". Lloyd's List (5780). 25 February 1823. Retrieved 11 April 2020.
  6. American Offshore Whaling Database – Voyages Young Phenix.
  7. LR (1824), Seq.№Y33.
  8. alaskashipwreck.com Alaska Shipwrecks (F)

References

  • Hackman, Rowan (2001). Ships of the East India Company. Gravesend, Kent: World Ship Society. ISBN 0-905617-96-7.
  • Weatherill, Richard (1908). The ancient port of Whitby and its shipping. Whitby: Horne and Son.
gollark: So this is a mess. PotatOS is actually shipping a mildly different ECC library with a different curve because steamport provided the ECC code ages ago.
gollark: I mean, what do you expect to happen if you do something unsupported and which creates increasingly large problems each time you do it?
gollark: <@151391317740486657> Do you know what "unsupported" means? PotatOS is not designed to be used this way.
gollark: Specifically, 22 bytes for the private key and 21 for the public key on ccecc.py and 25 and 32 on the actual ingame one.
gollark: <@!206233133228490752> Sorry to bother you, but keypairs generated by `ccecc.py` and the ECC library in use in potatOS appear to have different-length private and public keys, which is a problem.EDIT: okay, apparently it's because I've been accidentally using a *different* ECC thing from SMT or something, and it has these parameters instead:```---- Elliptic Curve Arithmetic---- About the Curve Itself-- Field Size: 192 bits-- Field Modulus (p): 65533 * 2^176 + 3-- Equation: x^2 + y^2 = 1 + 108 * x^2 * y^2-- Parameters: Edwards Curve with c = 1, and d = 108-- Curve Order (n): 4 * 1569203598118192102418711808268118358122924911136798015831-- Cofactor (h): 4-- Generator Order (q): 1569203598118192102418711808268118358122924911136798015831---- About the Curve's Security-- Current best attack security: 94.822 bits (Pollard's Rho)-- Rho Security: log2(0.884 * sqrt(q)) = 94.822-- Transfer Security? Yes: p ~= q; k > 20-- Field Discriminant Security? Yes: t = 67602300638727286331433024168; s = 2^2; |D| = 5134296629560551493299993292204775496868940529592107064435 > 2^100-- Rigidity? A little, the parameters are somewhat small.-- XZ/YZ Ladder Security? No: Single coordinate ladders are insecure, so they can't be used.-- Small Subgroup Security? Yes: Secret keys are calculated modulo 4q.-- Invalid Curve Security? Yes: Any point to be multiplied is checked beforehand.-- Invalid Curve Twist Security? No: The curve is not protected against single coordinate ladder attacks, so don't use them.-- Completeness? Yes: The curve is an Edwards Curve with non-square d and square a, so the curve is complete.-- Indistinguishability? No: The curve does not support indistinguishability maps.```so I might just have to ship *two* versions to keep compatibility with old signatures.
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